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Through a series of studies, the overarching aim of this book is to investigate if and how 
the digitalization/digital transformation process affects various welfare services provided 
by the public sector, and the ensuing implications thereof. Ultimately, this book seeks to 
understand if it is conceivable for digital advancement to result in the creation of private/
non-governmental alternatives to welfare services, possibly in a manner that transcends 
national boundaries. This study also investigates the possible ramifications of technological 
development for the public sector and the Western welfare society at large.
This book takes its point of departure from the 2016 Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) report that targets specific public service areas 
in which government needs to adopt new strategies not to fall behind. Specifically, this 
report emphasizes the focus on digitalization of health care/social care, education, and 
protection services, including the use of assistive technologies referred to as “digital 
welfare.” Hence, this book explores the factors potentially leading to whether state actors 
could be overrun by other non-governmental actors, disrupting the current status quo of 
welfare services.
The book seeks to provide an innovative, enriching, and controversial take on society at 
large and how various aspects of the public sector can be, and are, affected by the ongoing 
digitalization process in a way that is not covered by extant literature on the market. This 
book takes its point of departure in Sweden given the fact that Sweden is one of the most 
digitalized countries in Europe, according to the Digital Economy and Society Index 
(DESI), making it a pertinent research case. However, as digitalization transcends national 
borders, large parts of the subject matter take on an international angle. This includes cases 
from several other countries around Europe as well as the United States.
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Foreword
Digital transformation of public 
services – how and why?
Why read this book? Most of us are subjected to a flood of distressing national 
and international news. This creates a sense of being out of control with anxiety 
and concerns that our political leaders are not correcting the situation. The recent 
world refugee crisis reflects this phenomenon: millions of citizens are seeking 
safer, healthier environments for themselves and their families while citizens of 
the destination countries fear loss of life quality and opportunity. The absence 
of clear solutions to our national and international societal problems produces 
extreme political polarization and nationalistic governments. The only area of 
significant consensus is that major systemic social and governmental changes are 
needed. However, there is no agreement on what the changes should be, nor is 
there any agreement on how to achieve them. This book provides clear, logical 
answers to the question: What should societies be doing and how can they do it?
Digital Transformation of Public Services: Societal Impacts in Sweden and 
Beyond is a book based on extant experience and nascent progress in western 
digitalized societies, often drawing upon Sweden as a prime example of a country 
that has come far in its digital transformation across its society on multiple levels. 
By stressing equal access in implementation strategies, these countries’ programs 
demonstrate how governmental and private organizations provide safe, effective, 
scalable, and affordable support services. Impressive, successful implementation 
of digitalization can be found in FinTech, E-commerce, social media, and medi-
cal informatics. Worldwide, digitalization access, quality, and extent vary widely. 
Economic development explains only part of the intercountry differences.
Even in highly developed countries, unintended consequences of digitaliza-
tion are ubiquitous. These include identity theft affecting millions of individu-
als; unwanted disclosure of personal, financial, or medical information; direct or 
covert manipulation of democratic processes; and governments’ use of surrepti-
tious monitoring and controlling citizens. Cashless retail businesses and banks 
are common in northern Europe and emerging in certain parts of Asia. However, 
they are just entering the US market. Because of large disparities in income and 
access to banking, the Internet, and E-commerce in the United States, bans on 
cashless businesses have been proposed. Equitable implementation of integrated 
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digitalized services in health care and social care, education, and citizen protec-
tion (both physical and digital safety) would improve accessibility while provid-
ing safer and less expensive services.
In each of these areas, the authors of this volume provide definitions, devel-
opmental history, current status, and paths to new practices and innovations, and 
discuss the potential impact of digitalization, including achievements and risks. 
The last section, “Part IV: Future of the Welfare State,” builds on digital develop-
ments in these fundamental areas and discusses unexpected benefits and pitfalls. 
Extensive, equitable implementation of digitalization can be a powerful force for 
democratization.
The general approach discussed in this book includes creating and sustaining 
capacity for digitalization in implementing countries. Success in implementation 
of digital systems is, to a large extent, a matter of national “will and skill.” Costs 
of digitalization are relatively small compared with other infrastructure invest-
ments (e.g., railroads, dams, ports, etc.). The extent to which Scandinavian digital 
innovations have been successfully implemented worldwide suggests that cul-
ture and system of government are much less important determinants of success. 
Implementation of widespread digitalization, as outlined in this book, could be a 
key solution to our current crisis.
Francis Andrew Gaffney
Professor of Medicine (Emeritus)
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine
Astronaut, NASA (Retired)
Guest Professor, Karolinska Institutet
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Increased “availability” and “individualization” are two of the most common 
demands from consumers in this day and age. This is a development that has 
gained a substantial foothold on the contemporary consumer market, whether the 
services lie in finance, insurance, retail, and/or transportation. The Internet, smart-
phones, and other technologies sprung from the digital age have helped people 
gain better insight into and awareness of what they expect from a service provider 
(Hardey, Loader and Keeble, 2009). To this extent, the welfare sector, just like 
other industries, also benefits from new technologies and digital innovations, as it 
seeks to drastically improve our everyday lives and help us create more sustain-
able societies.
It should at this point be noted that the welfare state as, we know it, has existed 
for approximately 100–150 years. While one may contend that the first welfare 
state was presented by the Islamic Caliphate under Umar (584–644), it did not 
exist in its modern concept until the late 19th-century Imperial Germany (1871–
1918) under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), when he established the 
social-welfare legislation that extended the privileges of some of the noble social 
classes to common Germans (Crone, 2005; Von Kersbergen and Vis, 2014). Still, 
the welfare sector is nowadays commonplace in most Western societies (albeit 
to varying degrees). However, digital solutions are often arduous to scale for the 
welfare sector. This is because the manner in which the welfare state is organ-
ized leads to various incentive structures that may hinder digital development. 
Traditionally, the incentive structure has been such that “the lower the benefit 
levels are in the compulsory systems, the stronger the incentives for citizens to 
add voluntary (market) solutions, in the form of private saving and private (indi-
vidual or collective) insurance arrangements” (Lindbeck, 1996, p. 1). To this 
extent, the rapid development of digital technology poses a challenge to several 
of the extant structures, providing citizens with new options in areas where they 
see a need for something that is currently not provided for by the state. In return, 
new actors entering the welfare sector have prompted a counter-response from the 
state actors, in some cases coaxing these actors to expedite their digital evolve-
ment in order to safeguard their market share against the new actors. This book 
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will endeavor to explore the development in different welfare areas as outlined 
later in this introductory chapter.
Digital technology consists of many different concepts and components. As 
previously mentioned, the Internet has in many ways provided the backbone to 
much of this development, providing people with information access and flex-
ibility in ways that were not possible in the past (Kienhues and Bromme, 2011). 
The development of smartphones has done much to forward digital advancement, 
providing people with Internet access virtually anywhere at any time (Amstutz, 
2018). There are, of course, some other important developments that have done 
much to advance the digital age. Artificial intelligence (AI) (sometimes known as 
“machine intelligence”) is a popular concept that has been defined in many differ-
ent ways. In its broadest and simplest definition, it pertains to the description of a 
function wherein machines mimic human “cognitive” functions, such as “learn-
ing” and “problem-solving” (Russell and Norvig, 2009; Kaplan and Haenlein, 
2019). The term “AI” is popularly attributed to computer scientist John McCarthy 
(1927–2011) in 1955 (McCarthy et al., 2006). McCarthy defined AI as “the sci-
ence and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent com-
puter programs” (McCarthy, 2007, para.2).
A closely associated concept is predictive analytics, which pertains to various 
statistical techniques, including data mining, predictive modeling, and machine 
learning, that analyze current and historical facts in order to make predictions 
about future events (Siegel, 2013; Kelleher, Namee and D’Arcy, 2015). Robotics 
is another broad concept that concerns the design, construction, operation, and 
use of robots. This also includes the computer systems needed for their control, 
sensory feedback, and information processing (Newton, 2018). While robots can 
take on any form or appearance, some are designed to resemble certain aspects of 
humans in order to help humans accept the robot’s presence in carrying out certain 
replicative behaviors that are otherwise typically performed by people, such as 
attempting to replicate walking, lifting, speech, and cognition (Liu, Sheng and He, 
2019). There is currently much debate regarding to what degree designers should 
aspire to design physical human characteristics on robots. The “uncanny valley” 
is a phenomenon in which humans may experience a feeling of discomfort when 
interacting with a robot that looks nearly, but not entirely, identical to a human 
being, while being more accepting of a robot designed with less humanoid fea-
tures (Van Wynsberghe, 2015).
Terms like “digitization,” “digitalization,” and “digital transformation” are 
ever so often confused, as they are often used interchangeably in various settings. 
Nevertheless, there are distinct differences among the terms, which are impor-
tant to bear in mind before going forward. The first term, “digitization,” entails 
the conversion of analog material (such as images, video, and/or text etc.) into 
a digital format (Larsson and Viitaoja, 2017; Feldman, 1997; Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee, 2014). The second term, “digitalization,” refers to a process wherein 
the use of digital/computer technology (also mobile applications) is adopted, or, 
alternatively, increased by an actor (Wachal, 1971; Castells, 2010). More often 
than not, the digital technology is implemented with the intent of establishing a 
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communication infrastructure that connects various activities of the actor’s vari-
ous processes (Van Dijk, 2012; Larsson and Viitaoja, 2017). “Digital transfor-
mation” is a considerably broader term that signifies customer-driven strategic 
business transformation requiring far-reaching and cross-cutting organizational 
change in addition to the implementation of digital technologies (Bloomberg, 
2018; Cochoy et al., 2017). Due to its scope, digital transformation is in reality not 
a matter of implementing one project, but rather a whole series of different pro-
jects, effectively necessitating the organization to deal better with change overall. 
In this way, digital transformation in and by itself essentially makes organiza-
tional change a core competency inasmuch that the venture seeks to become cus-
tomer driven end to end (Bloomberg, 2018).
For this reason, digitalization and digital transformation are the two most use-
ful/significant terms when explaining the changes and impact that digital tech-
nology has had on society at large. That is to say, intelligent algorithms make 
our day-to-day tasks easier, and it is in many cases nearly impossible to imagine 
how we could manage without them. The use of AI and robotics continues to 
gain momentum at a rapid pace. To this end, the idea of digitalizing welfare and 
the public sector has been seen as a way of providing a more efficient and cost-
effective solution in order to cater to the ever-growing demands of the population. 
Societal challenges, such as a growing and ageing population, along with popula-
tion increase of chronic diseases and overall lingering financial constraints, have 
placed the public sector under pressure to find new ways of providing public ser-
vices while keeping the costs down. The contention is that by using technology in 
welfare services, it can help secure the continued economic stability of the welfare 
state. Moreover, another possibility enabled by digital welfare is for the public 
sector to become more interconnected. Sharing information across the public sec-
tor is essential in order to shorten lead times, secure transparency, and ensure that 
the correct care is given to the right citizen.
To this extent, a 2016 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) report targets specific public-sector areas where governments need 
to adopt new strategies in order to ensure that they keep an even pace with societal 
development (OECD, 2016). Specifically, this report emphasizes the focus on dig-
italization of health care and social care,1 education, and protection services. The 
“smarter” use of well-proven assistive technologies in this context was referred 
to as “digital welfare.” Hence, this book has sought to explore topics within these 
spaces, as these are areas in which the state actors potentially risk being overrun 
by other non-governmental actors, be they local or global. That is to say, the entry 
of new actors in these areas has the potential to cause a disruption of the current 
status quo of welfare services provided by national governments for their citizens, 
and it is likely this disruption that is escalated through the advancement of “digital 
welfare.”
Ultimately, the discussion of technological advancements raises questions 
regarding the future role of the nation state in a fully digitalized world (Das-
gupta, 2018; Schmidt and Cohen, 2013). Traditionally, the nation state has always 
been seen as the classic provider of security and basic well-being in exchange 
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for citizens’ loyalty. However, what will happen when new types of loyalties and 
associations begin to challenge the state’s traditional role, that is, loyalties of kin-
dred identities based on shared commercial, political, and/or other interests, rather 
than religious or ethnic identities? Such a development is not unproblematic for 
the current nation state. Many citizens, particularly in the West, work for or hold 
stock in commercial organizations that pay little to no regard to national tax and/
or regulatory agencies. To this end, nation states may more often than not adhere 
to models of welfare provision that increasingly disappoint their citizens and are, 
moreover, often unaffordable. Thus, the developed Western countries’ high-cost, 
high-tax, high-benefits governance model is coming under an increasingly loom-
ing threat of disruption caused by global digitalization. To that end, this book will 
seek to explore the ramifications of such a societal development.
Moreover, this book seeks to provide an innovative, enriching, and controver-
sial take on society at large and how various aspects of the public sector can be 
(and are) affected by the ongoing digitalization trend in a way that is not covered 
by extant literature on the market. While this book covers the welfare state in a 
broader, Western perspective, many cases covered in this book draw upon Swed-
ish conditions. This is due to the fact that according to the Digital Economy and 
Society Index (DESI), Sweden (along with Denmark, Finland, and the Nether-
lands) is one of the most digitalized countries in Europe (European Commission, 
2019). This means that the Swedish cases presented tend to reflect a development 
in a particular area that is, by international standards, often more advanced, as 
opposed to that seen in many other countries, making the Swedish cases pertinent 
to study, as they may bear relevance to the future development in other countries 
in this area. Still, much of the digitalization and digital transformation transcends 
national borders, and thus much of the subject matter takes on an international 
character and also includes cases from other countries around Europe and the 
United States, as it still houses some of the world’s most innovative research 
institutions (Ewalt, 2016).
Following the aforementioned discussion, this book seeks to explore the fol-
lowing areas of the public sectors (and the society in which they exist) and how 
they are affected by digital welfare:
Health care and social care
• Telemedicine and its impact
• Blockchain in health care
• Digital developments in health care
• Social care and digitally connected devices
Education
• EdTech
• Digital transformation of public education
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Citizen protection
• Physical protection, both individual and societal
• Digital protection, data collection, and digital identity
Future of the welfare state
• Potential implications
• The future of cash in a digital welfare state
• New technological institutions
• The future consumption of welfare
• The changing democracy
The studies throughout the included chapters are methodologically and the-
matically multidisciplinary in nature, with some presenting empirical mate-
rial and others more theoretical, while others are based on various forms of 
literature reviews or depart from the authors’ personal, “best practice” experi-
ences, and so forth. The book represents a collaborative effort between expert 
authors with representation from some of the most prominent research institu-
tions and organizations in Europe and the United States, all contributing to a 
better understanding of the topic at hand. The authors have been instructed to 
look at the situation of their topic as how it has been, how it is now, and how it 
might be in the future. To this end, the chapters will base their assumptions in 
referenced facts, but they may also transcend the conventional academic com-
fort zone by offering some foresight in how their subject area could transpire 
based on the current and expected developments due to digitalization and/or 
digital transformation.
2 Chapter overview
The following section provides a brief overview of the themes and premises dis-
cussed in each of the chapters included in this volume.
Part I Health and social care
2  Mårten Blix and Johanna Jeansson – Telemedicine and the welfare 
state: the Swedish experience
This chapter uses the Swedish example of a vibrant economy and a large public 
sector as a case to analyze the implications of how digitalization reshapes the wel-
fare services, with emphasis on how telemedicine is set to transform the primary 
health care services.
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3  Anthony Larsson, Olivia Elf, Corinna Gross, and Julia Elf – Welfare 
services in an era of digital disruption: how digitalization reshapes 
the health care market
This chapter takes a closer look at how public and private actors react to the 
emergent use of telemedicine, using the Swedish primary health care market 
as a case. The study utilizes original empirical data in order to investigate how 
the changes in the industry brought on by technological advancements affect 
the actors’ perception of their role in the market and their relationship to one 
another.
4  Anna Essén and Anders Ekholm – Centralization vs. decentralization 
on the blockchain in a health information exchange context
Drawing upon interviews with individuals involved in the health care sector, this 
chapter discusses the availability of health data for learning by juxtaposing the 
governance arrangement of today’s state-based health information exchanges 
(HIEs) with that of a potential decentralized (blockchain-based) HIE scenario.
5 John Øvretveit – Digitalization of health in Sweden to benefit patients
This chapter discusses the digital developments in Swedish health services for 
patients and citizens to date while also paying attention to the rapid changes 
expected to occur in the coming years. The chapter proposes that the disruptive 
potential of new digital services and technologies (DST) is partially dependent on 
patient advocacy movements and patient organizations and their dissatisfaction 
with traditional health care.
6  Daniel Wänn – Personalized predictive health care: how predictive 
AI platforms will transform the health care industry
This chapter looks at the prerequisites for creating a predictive, personalized, and 
preventative health care platform; how publicly financed health care would be 
affected; and the broader implications for society.
7  Anthony Larsson and Dominika Sabolová – Digital dentistry: a 
solution to the dentistry crisis?
The chapter looks at the anticipated impending dentistry crisis in the Western 
countries due to the shortage of new dentists in the workforce in addition to 
increasingly more unaffordable dental health care for low-income earners. This 
has effectively created a possible dental welfare deficit problem, which calls for 
new, radical solutions. The authors draw upon extant literature and “best-practice” 
experiences in order to investigate if and how digital dentistry could be used in the 
future to remedy this dental welfare deficit problem.
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8  Andres Laya and Jan Markendahl – Solutions based on digital 
connected devices for social care and well-being
This chapter considers two aspects of the development of solutions for social care 
and well-being in Sweden. Drawing upon a number of interviews with technol-
ogy providers and municipalities, the authors investigate the business challenges 
preventing the development and uptake of new digital solutions. In addition, 
the authors discuss the implication of those challenges in terms of the emerging 
development patterns.
Part II Education
9  Cormac McGrath and Anna Åkerfeldt – Educational Technology 
(EdTech): unbounded opportunities or just another brick in the wall?
This chapter considers to what extent educational technology has a disruptive or 
transformative influence on the educational environment today. For the purpose 
of this study, EdTech is used as an umbrella concept to define and identify a wide 
range of technologies that have been designed and developed with an outspoken 
purpose to be used for teaching and learning.
10  Stephen Mahaley – Education at the intersection: a practitioner’s 
view of the effect of digital transformation on public education
This chapter seeks to review the history of public education in the United States 
through a combination of a literature review, a current event and policy anal-
ysis, and practical examples. The study then proceeds by looking at what is 
happening now with the increasing impact of digital technologies and finally 
examining the potential futures in terms of what lies ahead for this public good 
in particular.
Part III Citizen protection
11  Mark A. Conley and Emily Nakkawita – Citizen protection: a 
capabilities and intentions framework
This chapter conducts a linguistic analysis of the websites of US public and pri-
vate security-focused organizations in order to analyze the safety and security 
concern across both groups. Top government contractors continue to apply digital 
innovations toward defense purposes, and according to polling, US citizens sup-
port an increasing private role along with a decreasing public role in delivering 
safety and security. As the authors argue, although public opinion indicates that 
taxpayers expect fewer defense capabilities from the government, these struc-
tures still broadcast their enduring intentions to provide citizen protection. To 
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that extent, public-private partnerships are a modern standard in defense, and this 
relationship in the United States shows no sign of tilting away from government 
leadership, thus prompting a further analysis into their concern for safety and 
security.
12  Arne Norlander – Societal security: how digitalization enables 
resilient, agile, and learning capabilities
This chapter illustrates the relevance and potential impact of digitalization as 
an enabler of resilient, agile, and learning capabilities for societal security. The 
author argues that digitalization is essential in building organizations that can 
not only survive in complex and turbulent situations, but also excel in collec-
tive resilience, robustness, redundancy, and adaptability to ensure welfare, health 
care, food, water, energy, shelter, and security. The chapter explores how digitali-
zation, in times of societal disruption, can add new and reinforce existing capa-
bilities, while also generating vulnerabilities, in the protection of both society 
and its citizens.
13  Claire Ingram Bogusz – Digital identity – beyond verification: to a 
transparent (decentralized) system for data and identity monitoring  
and control
This conceptual chapter explores the existing models of digital identity veri-
fication and digital data management before juxtaposing them against emerg-
ing alternative solutions, and offering food for thought for policy-makers on 
how the tensions between digital integrity and data-driven innovation might 
be resolved using a digital identity management infrastructure. It then outlines 
some suggestions around how identity verification and data management – as 
distinct, but important, digital phenomena – might converge to allow individu-
als better dynamic control over which data are collected, by whom, and for what 
purposes.
Part IV Future of the welfare state
14  Björn Eriksson and Ulrika Sandhill – Cashless: a dead end for 
Sweden?
This chapter serves as an investigative commentary on the development of the 
cashless society in Sweden, the driving forces behind it, the outcome, and its 
ramifications on welfare. By doing so, the authors seek to provide some “best 
practice” insights using Sweden as a case in light of similar nascent developments 
across other digitalizing nations.
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15  Charlotte Mattfolk and Lina Emfeldt – Future consumption of  
welfare services: how the change in consumer expectations will  
affect offerings and business models in welfare
This chapter takes a qualitative approach in which the authors investigate the 
future consumption of welfare services to understand what scenarios may emerge 
given the rapid technological development, changing consumer behaviors, aging 
population, urbanization, and scarce human resources to cater to future needs. The 
empirical data have been collected from qualitative interviews and a workshop 
with representatives from both public and private sectors.
16  Alejandro Moreno Puertas and Robin Teigland – The trust revolution: 
blockchain’s potential to resolve institutional inefficiencies
This chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the potential impact of blockchain 
on political institutions. The first section offers a brief explanation of blockchain 
technology, followed by how it relates to the emergence of trust in political insti-
tutions. The second section describes the problems that arise from centralizing 
power, while the third part focuses on blockchain’s potential to mitigate some of 
them. The final section ventures into a discussion of the potential benefits of a 
blockchain nation.
17  Mats Lewan – The future of the nation-state: how the nation-state  
can find a way through digitalization
Building on a framework called the “innovation loop” developed by the author, the 
chapter considers societal evolution largely to be a continuous adaptation to changed 
conditions brought by innovations. The analysis traces the development of the mod-
ern nation-state from the perspective of major human inventions and addresses glo-
balization and the changing role of the nation-state, with less autonomy on one hand 
but with a new position in an increasingly interconnected world on the other. Three 
fields where the nation-state needs to adapt are identified – efficiency of services, 
alternative providers of services, and the structure of the democratic process. The 
threat from supra-states, localism, and cosmopolitanism is also discussed.
18  Olle Wästberg – Digitalization has changed the foundation  
of the democracy
This chapter seeks to examine the role of digitalized communication in the US 
presidential election of 2016 and an exploration of how the digital revolution has 
changed Swedish politics. In the United States as well as in Sweden, the digital 
revolution is enabling individual voters to access masses of data and to act and 
react online, as all the while political parties are eroding. An apparent result of 
this process is a dramatic polarization of the political conversation. The author 
10 Anthony Larsson and Robin Teigland
contends that political opinion formation and public information have largely 
been taken over by digital media.  
Note
 1 Social care entails the areas that countenance and develop care as an activity and set 
of relations lying at the intersection of state, market, and family (and voluntary sector) 
relations (Daly and Lewis, 2000). While distinct from health care, it is for the purposes 
of this book categorized alongside health care given the fact that it represents a smaller 
overall scope of the welfare sector as compared to the others mentioned.
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Part I
Health and social care    

1 Introduction
Health care in Sweden finds itself at a crossroads as regards digitalization. In 
this chapter, we will focus on one issue in particular that is causing consternation 
among primary care physicians: the rapid increase in popularity of telemedicine. 
Via smartphone apps, patients can at the press of a button make video calls directly 
with doctors, rather than having to wait days, or weeks, for a nonemergency meet-
ing with a doctor at a physical care center. Apart from reducing waiting times, 
this development brings a host of other benefits for patients, such as removing 
the inconvenience of travel and lessening the risk of contagion at care centers 
(Mohr et al., 2018). Online consultations also use the physicians’ time more effi-
ciently. But the development is not without its predicaments, and one issue in 
particular stands out. The substantial government subsidy for primary care visits, 
in combination with vastly improved accessibility, could result in unsustainable 
cost increases for taxpayers. As we show in this chapter based on new, original 
data, the number of digital health consultations has already grown dramatically. 
Hence, it remains to be seen if this lessens the number of physical visits or simply 
adds volume and thus total health care costs.
Although the health care system is continuously undergoing change, the remu-
neration system in Swedish primary care is mostly through capitation (Anell, 
Glenngård and Merkur, 2012). But digitalization is now raising new issues. For 
one, the rules and governance of health care are increasingly at odds with what is 
possible and efficient through digitalization, where scale and network effects are 
important. Since Swedish health care lies under the responsibility of the 21 county 
councils, their legally mandated regional autonomy is increasingly in conflict with 
providing efficient digital health care available nationally. The county councils 
have the authority to tax citizens and shape health care, subject to some general 
government guidelines, but regional institutions lack the benefit of scale available 
at the national level. The county councils need to find a way to centralize – at least 
temporarily – some aspects of digital health care, such as price, remuneration, and 
best practices, while retaining autonomy in the choices that matter for its citizens. 
This will not be easy.
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To get a sense of how rapidly things are changing, consider that telemedicine 
in Sweden in its current form began in 2016 and that it had grown to represent 
almost 2 percent of all primary care visits by the end of 2017 (Blix and Jeans-
son, 2018). During this period, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions (commonly known as “SALAR,” or “SKL” in Swedish), the organiza-
tion that represents the autonomous regions, has been more or less forced to make 
some uncharacteristically quick changes to the recommended pricing of digital 
services.
Notably, in March 2018, the Board of Governors of SALAR endorsed a rec-
ommendation to the county councils to impose a minimum fee of SEK 100 
(≈ €10) for telemedicine (SALAR, 2018). The reason was a peculiar combination 
of regional pricing and the borderless reach of digital services. One single county 
council representing just under 3 percent of the population in 2017 offers primary 
care free of charge (i.e., wholly subsidized by the taxpayers). Through a digital 
entrepreneur, gratis primary care suddenly became available in the whole coun-
try from January 1, 2018, a state of affair that created political tensions (Alskog, 
2018). It only took 75 days before SALAR quickly introduced a recommended 
minimum fee for telemedicine, though the county council in question has delayed 
implementing the recommendation.
Going forward, the role of telemedicine hangs in the balance from the political 
choices made in the next few years. There is substantial need of reform in a system 
characterized by considerable inertia, but future decisions will likely prove more 
difficult. Addressing remuneration systems and how to triage patients between 
digital and physical care will be key issues. If digitalization is not well managed, it 
may lead to tensions that cause Swedish health care costs to hemorrhage. It could 
also lead to other challenges for health care, for example, in the skills needed in 
the profession, but these issues are beyond the scope of this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we briefly discuss the per-
sistent issue of poor accessibility to Swedish primary care. Next, we describe how 
digital doctors and telemedicine are transforming primary care, which age groups 
and regions are using the service, and the increased tensions telemedicine bring to 
the Swedish health care system. Finally, we conclude by discussing three reform 
areas that could improve the framework and pricing for telemedicine in Sweden.
2 Pervasively low scores for health care accessibility
Sweden’s health care system is often acknowledged to deliver high-quality care 
even as the costs are among the higher in the OECD (apart from the United 
States). Measured per capita, or as a share of GDP, Sweden is one of the countries 
that spend the highest amount on health care (OECD, 2017). Based on various 
measures of quality, Sweden’s rank is high in international comparisons:
• The mortality in cancer and the prescription of antibiotics are among the 
lower within the OECD (2017).
• There are more doctors and nurses per capita than in many other countries 
(OECD and European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017).
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• There is a low proportion of unmet health needs caused by cost 
constraints(OECD and European Observatory on Health Systems and Poli-
cies, 2017; OECD, 2017; The Commonwealth Fund, 2017).
At the same time, Sweden ranks as one of the worst countries when measur-
ing quality based on patients’ experience of care and waiting times (Vårdanalys, 
2014). For example, Swedish health care is in the lower third of the OECD coun-
tries based on the amount of time a doctor spends with a patient during a visit and 
the level of transparency the patients receive in treatment (OECD, 2017). Senior 
citizens in Sweden (together with Germany and Canada) may also wait longer for 
care than in other Western countries (The Commonwealth Fund, 2017; Vårdan-
alys, 2017).
3 Health care disruption
3.1  New health care providers: the emergence of  
telemedicine in Sweden
In 2016, the digital entrepreneurs Kry and Min Doktor launched their respective 
telemedicine app. Since then, their popularity has steadily increased, as measured 
by a rapid increase in the number of digital visits (see Figure 2.1), with more 
companies entering the field. Also, Kry has expanded to other countries, notably 
to Norway and Spain, and has plans to enter other markets, notably France and the 
United Kingdom (Ram, 2018).
The novel element of the Swedish telemedicine apps is that they are designed to 
work seamlessly as part of the public welfare system. In contrast to other telemed-
icine companies, for example in the United States, the remuneration of telemedi-
cine in Sweden is part of an existing mechanism put in place by the 21 county 
councils. The advantage is that patients (so far) pay the same fee as for a physical 
care visit and that the barriers for patients to access the service are minimal.
It works as follows: the patient accesses the app and their identity is confirmed 
via a mobile BankID. The mobile BankID is a stand-alone technology originally 
developed by the banks but has, in our judgment, become a de facto standard in 
Sweden for a host of other services outside the financial sector, including the tax 
authorities. Sweden has one mobile BankID that works for all applications, so 
users do not need to access multiple identification tools.
The design choice of integration with public welfare services means that the 
patient’s access works smoothly, while all complicated interactions in regard to 
the technology and the health care bureaucracy occur in the background, out of 
sight.
The most notable of these complicated interactions is how costs are reim-
bursed. Within primary health care in Sweden, the primary funding is through 
capitation (Anell, Glenngård and Merkur, 2012). Each primary health provider 
receives funding based on the number of listed patients, with some adjustment for 
other factors, such as socioeconomic attributes and age. Telemedicine companies 
are not yet allowed to list patients. Instead, their remuneration is based on a legal 
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construction known as out-of-county visits that is established in a legal bill (Sver-
iges Riksdag, 2017). All Swedish citizens have access to health care throughout 
the country, but the cost for each visit is borne by the home county council where 
the patient pays regional tax. For example, a person living in Stockholm utilizing 
care in the city of Malmö will pay the out-of-pocket fee established by the county 
council responsible for Malmö. Subsequently, that council will bill the Stockholm 
county council for a visit according to their own fee structure. Though such visits 
were not infrequent before telemedicine apps, the scope was too small to make it 
a contested political issue.
Telemedicine rests on this construction of out-of-county visits combined with 
the law of freedom-of-choice (“LOV”) enacted in 2009–10 (Swedish Govern-
ment, 2008).1 This freedom-of-choice law was a signature bill of the center-right 
coalition (2006–2014) to create private alternatives to publicly provided welfare 
services. It gave private health care actors the right to establish their services 
anywhere in Sweden as long as they fulfill the regulatory requirements. The same 
law forms the legal basis for telemedicine doctors. By the same token, just as 
for private health care providers, telemedicine doctors can also establish their 
services anywhere as long as they fulfill the same regulatory requirements. It is 
unclear – even unlikely – that this later development was foreseen by the legisla-
tors at the time.
In practical terms, the digital entrepreneurs Kry and Min Doktor connected their 
services to the county council of Jönköping, which represents slightly less than 
2 percent of the national population. Formally, they are subcontractors to two pri-
vate primary health care centers, Tranås and Wetterhälsan, supervised by the local 
authorities. Suddenly, starting in 2016, with this somewhat artificial construction, 
Sweden had a form of hybrid health care system; a national primary digital health 
care accessible for all, but with local regulators responsible for supervision and 
financing.
Essentially, the private providers were able to produce an innovative and popu-
lar service resting on top of existing regulation and rules. In itself, the emergence 
of telemedicine was only a matter of time. Video calls via the Internet have been 
available at least since Skype was launched in 2003, and in the United States, 
digital doctors have been using such technologies with paying insurance custom-
ers almost since smartphones were introduced. But the few Swedish county coun-
cils that have experimented with video calls have not had much impact, as the 
services have been awkward and not particularly user friendly. Instead, it took 
privately owned companies to take the decisive steps in developing a smooth and 
convenient service through smartphones.
3.2 Digital transformation in primary health care
Digitalization has already transformed many service sectors. Although health care 
is unique in many ways, there are fundamental similarities in two central aspects: 
network effects and scale. In one way or another, most of the strengths and ben-
efits from digitalization stem from these two features (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 
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2016). The network effect implies that as more people use the service, the more 
useful it becomes. The scale effect means that the cost of the digital service is low 
and that the marginal cost of adding additional users is almost zero. These ele-
ments also have some bearing on telemedicine. Doctors can meet more patients in 
the same time-frame, and patients from far away can communicate with special-
ists who are locally unavailable.
The US physician Eric Topol has provided a perspective on these develop-
ments and argues that digitalization upsets the power balance between doctor and 
patients (Topol, 2015). The main argument is that digital technologies are provid-
ing patients with tools and information that were previously not available to them. 
In this way, digitalization makes health care more democratic. Patients can com-
pare notes online with other patients displaying similar symptoms and diagnosis, 
even in instances when it occurs only rarely. Patients can also find information 
more easily and read up on treatments and side effects. This will likely increase 
the pressure on health care both in terms of volume and quality.
Telemedicine is part of this digital transformation. From a patient perspective, 
quality is improved as patients can await doctor’s video call at a place of their own 
convenience (their home), instead of traveling to the care center or an emergency 
room. By the time the video call comes through, some of the bureaucracy in the 
identification and explaining of the symptoms have already been processed and 
both doctors and patients can spend their time more efficiently on medical ques-
tions rather than on administrative formalities. If a doctor writes a prescription, 
an electronic recipe makes it possible to visit any pharmacy to buy the medicine. 
Recently, it has also become possible to order home delivery of medicine, some-
thing especially useful for the elderly or those with mobility restrictions. But, as 
we have already mentioned, increased accessibility may raise costs, and there are 
also issues of regulating this new form of health care.
3.3 Criticisms of telemedicine
The most scathing comments against telemedicine come from within the medi-
cal profession. Perhaps this is no surprise. Health care has long-developed tradi-
tions and set hierarchies. As an added economic irritant to physical health care 
providers, some county councils reduce their remuneration for the physical care 
centers when their listed patients use telemedicine.
The criticism against telemedicine in Sweden can be summarized in three 
points (Andersson, Sjögren and Åsberg, 2017; Ahlzén et al., 2018):
• That diagnosis cannot be done by video call alone, but requires a physical 
examination
• That online doctors tends to overprescribe medicine, notably antibiotics, 
while underusing diagnostic tests
• That overconsumption of health care is encouraged, resulting in large vol-
umes of trivial or unwarranted e-visits at the expense of patients with com-
prehensive needs
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Overprescription of antibiotics is a global problem, but much less of an issue in 
Sweden. Recommendations and some use of pay-for-performance incentives have 
also proved successful in Sweden (Ellegard, Dietrichson and Anell, 2018). With 
telemedicine doctors, the incentive may also yet again be stronger in Sweden 
to overprescribe antibiotics, since this what patients may demand, and they can 
shop around more easily for a doctor who may then be more prone to acquiesce. 
Indeed, there have been some alleged instances of oversubscription of antibiotics 
from medical doctors on behalf of the regulators (Lägermo and Bengnér, 2017a, 
2017b, 2017c, 2017d), but the methodology and results have been criticized by 
the chief medical officer at Min Doktor (Cederberg, 2017). After these investiga-
tions, regulation and oversight have been strengthened. All aspects of regulating 
physical health care are also present in telemedicine, and it is important to main-
tain oversight so that the same standard is applied regardless of the format.
It is also clear that many diagnoses still require physical interaction between 
doctor and patients, for example, regarding ear and throat exams or when a bone 
may be broken. In regard to diagnosis, telemedicine doctors argue that much infor-
mation about a patient can be learned from a video call (Schildt et al., 2017). Sup-
porting their case is the fact that as technology advances, the range of diagnoses 
that may be feasible through telemedicine increases. For example, blood-pressure 
monitors can easily be connected to smartphones, as well as an expanding range 
of measuring and monitoring tools. As in other areas, increased competition and 
globalization also imply that lower costs for new medical instruments will make 
them more feasible for homeownership, which is especially vital for patients who 
often require access to health care. There are also promising results for using tel-
emedicine to treat mental illness, and a literature review shows that there is no sig-
nificant difference in diagnosis compared with physical visits (Hilty et al., 2013).
3.4 Telemedicine and privatization of welfare services
In Sweden, there are historical antecedents to the criticism against telemedicine in 
the private production of welfare services. While we will not try to summarize all 
arguments of this debate, we note that one motivating factor is the presumption 
that private producers boost demand in order to increase profit or reduce quality 
in order cut costs. The Swedish discussion has been ongoing with varying strength 
since the mid-1980s, and when the socialist-green coalition came to power in 
2014, it resurfaced with renewed vigor.
The first, and by far the most vitriolic, conflict occurred not in health care, but 
in another area of welfare, namely that of preschool for children aged 1–6. In 
1984, the private preschool Pysslingen met a storm of protests and legislation and 
the then–Prime Minister Olof Palme asked rhetorically if Sweden should allow 
“Kentucky-fried children” (sic), alluding to the alleged horrors of for-profit tax-
financed welfare services (Svanborg-Sjövall, 2013). Another example is elderly 
care, where, toward the end of the 1980s, political strife erupted around outsourc-
ing in the municipality of Danderyd. Since then, private production has increased 
across most areas of welfare production from preschools and schools to health 
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care. Today, private production plays an extensive role in health care in general 
and in primary health care in particular, where private providers account for 
36 percent of all production as measured by the share of net cost in 2015 (Jordahl, 
2013).
It is within this broader debate about profits within tax-financed welfare ser-
vices that telemedicine may become even more controversial than today. Dur-
ing 2016–17, telemedicine providers were loss-making, as is often the case with 
start-ups. But at some point in the future, their private financiers will want to see a 
return on their investments. The stage is then set for more political conflict.
4 Telemedicine use in Sweden
Telemedicine is on the rise in many countries. It comes in many shapes and forms, 
from automated advice with avatars, as developed at the USC Center for Body 
Computing (Saxon, 2015), to video calls with online physicians. In Table 2.1, we 
illustrate some of the available apps.
Data on the total number, age, and region of residence of telemedicine users are 
available in Sweden. As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the number of visits has 
increased steadily since 2016, and in December 2017, they amounted to about 
27,000 persons. In 2017 (December-December), the increase was almost 230 per-
cent, albeit starting from a low level.
As expected, it is also apparent from Figure 2.1 that it is the most populous 
regions that account for most of the digital care visits during the period June 2016 
to December 2017. Perhaps more surprising is how much the large regions dom-
inate as a share of digital visits. Sweden’s capital Stockholm, which accounts 
for 43 percent of all visits, is almost twice overrepresented relative to its popula-
tion share of about 23 percent in 2017. On the other hand, residents from the other 
two big regions, Scania and Västra Götaland, consume digital care almost in par-
ity with their respective population shares.
A relevant question in regard to the future of telemedicine is whether the previ-
ous figures are evidence of socioeconomic segregation, with high-income earners 
from the capital being the main beneficiaries of telemedicine, while other regions 
benefit less. While no data on socioeconomic characteristics are available, digital 
Table 2.1 Examples of health care apps in Sweden, the UK, and the US
Sweden UK US
Kry, Min Doktor, Doktor.se, 
Doktor24, A & O i Vården, 
Min Vård, Medicheck, 
Närhälsan online, 
Videmöte SLL, First Derm, 
iDoc24, Medicoo
Babylon Health, Push 
Doctor, Dr Now, Vitality 
GP, Ada Personal Health 
Companion






Note: Some apps have limited functionality outside their respective country.
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care is available on an equal footing to all citizens – low and high income earn-
ers alike. Such broad accessibility is a choice of design and was by no means 
inevitable. The digital entrepreneurs Kry and Min Doktor could have created a 
service accepting only insurance customers or those paying directly, such as in the 
United States (for some sense of how this is organized in other countries, see Has-
san et al. (2018, p. 14). Instead, Kry and Min Doktor both target the whole 
population. Moreover, telemedicine also provides improved access compared 
with primary nonemergency care by upping the staff of doctors on evenings and 
weekends.
The increased use of telemedicine in Sweden, as well as international stud-
ies, suggests the service is appreciated by patients. All that is required for 
access is a smartphone or a reasonably modern computer with an Internet connec-
tion. And Sweden is one of the countries with the highest Internet penetration in 
the world. The ease of access should make telemedicine an attractive option for 
the elderly or for people with disabilities or chronic diseases, as well as those 
living in rural areas. Still, so far neither the elderly nor those in rural areas are 
especially frequent users of telemedicine.
Figure 2.1 shows that large cities dominate in numbers of digital visits. Table 2.2 
and Figure 2.2 show that the elderly are underrepresented in regard to the age 
distribution of telemedicine use. Instead, young children aged 0–4 years are 
overrepresented, as they account for almost 20 percent of the visits but repre-


















































































Figure 2.1 Number of telemedicine visits in Sweden, June 2016 to December 2017
Source: Unpublished data from Jönköping county council.
Note: The visits illustrate those recorded at Region Jönköping county council.
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above, kids are sick more often. Moreover, the large share could reflect height-
ened parental worry for the smallest, more vulnerable children. It is rather the 
other end of the age spectrum that stands out in its own right. People above the 
age of 65 have a low level of use of digital care in relation to their (large) popula-
tion share. This feature likely reflects the group’s lower digital maturity. But as 
today’s smartphone users age, it is reasonable to assume that the use of telemedi-
cine will increase for the elderly and that the age distribution gradually will go 
from less of an “L” toward more of a “U” shape.
5 Price, demand, and quality in telemedicine
Swedish health care has long been struggling to achieve high-quality medical 
care that is both accessible and cost effective at the same time. A theme has been 
that health care should be based on medical need rather than being demand driven.
Table 2.2 Share of telemedicine visits compared to population shares, 2016–2017
Age group 0–19 20–64 65+
Share telemedicine visits 37.86 59.47  2.67
Population share 22.9 57.3 19.8
Sources: Statistics Sweden’s database www.scb.se and unpublished data from Region Jönköping.
Note: The population shares are dated November 2017. The number of telemedicine visits covers the 
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Figure 2.2  Number of telemedicine visits according to age, June 2016 to December 2017, 
thousands
Source: Unpublished data from Jönköping county council.
Note: The visits illustrate those recorded at Region Jönköping county council.
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One way of dampening demand is by calibrating the fee for health care. At the 
same time, studies show that the price sensitivity to health care fees in Sweden is 
low in the sense that the number of visits to doctors does not change much when 
the price changes (Jakobsson and Svensson, 2016). Also, the cap on medicine 
and health care spending for patients, above which the government subsidy costs, 
drastically reduces the importance of a fee. Those with outlays above the ceiling 
(in 2018 set to SEK 1100 over a 12-month period, or about €107) pay no fee at 
all. The same is true for children 0–19 as well as those above the age of 85. While 
we know how many young and old are exempt from health care fees, statistics on 
the number of patients benefiting from the ceiling is not centralized and therefore 
inaccessible.
Today, rationing of care is mostly done through longer waiting times, which 
probably explains the dissatisfaction with primary care availability.
5.1 Increased tension in remuneration systems
With telemedicine, the combination of easy access at today’s low fees has led to 
rapidly increasing demand. As shown in Figure 2.2, small children represent a large 
share of digital primary care visits. This is not without benefits. Small children are 
often ill, and with digital visits, both they and their parents are spared the journey 
to the health center, where there may also be other infections. Moreover, the time 
gained from telemedicine eases the burden for children, parents, and employers 
and thus eventually also on public finances. The reason is the generous system 
of sick-pay available when children are sick and need parental supervision. To 
convey the magnitude of the sick-pay benefit in Swedish social security, consider 
that in 2016, a total of approximately 870,000 individuals, or about 20 percent of 
all employed, applied for compensation for temporary parental benefit from the 
Swedish Social Insurance Fund, and approximately SEK 7.2 billion (≈ €0.7 bil-
lion) was paid for the care of sick children. With such a large amount, it can give 
significant cost savings if children are just a little healthier and the parents can 
spend a little more time at work.
Still, with virtually free-of-charge health care for children and improved 
accessibility, all constraints on rationing are essentially removed. In emergency 
care, there are already some indications that the treatment of those with extensive 
medical needs is neglected when parents and children seek care for less serious 
ills that could have been treated in primary care or at home (Ludvigsson, 2017).
When primary care is closed, telemedicine offers an attractive alternative to 
visiting the emergency room. But if the costs of telemedicine increase without 
alleviating the demand for primary care, there is an overt risk that the prioriti-
zation of care will deteriorate. But this is not the fault of telemedicine doctors. 
Apparently, they offer a medical service that patients demand.
The goal should be that primary care, emergency care, and digital care in its 
various guises form a coherent whole where the patient is matched to the appro-
priate level of care. There is, of course, an insight into these tensions at the county 
council, but little has happened.
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5.2 Remuneration and future innovation
In 2017, the total remuneration for telemedicine visits was set to SEK 650 (≈ €63), 
including the out-of-pocket patient fee that patients pay. Initially, the remunera-
tion was more than three times higher, but SALAR in short order lowered the rate 
on two occasions. Without putting too much significance into these quick revi-
sions, it still gives some indication of a system under pressure.
Indeed, it is fair to say that the construction of out-of-county visits, which rests 
on regulations intended for something else, has created additional administration. 
In principle, it is possible to track the new flows of payments between telemedi-
cine providers and counties. The quantitative budgetary impacts, however, are 
more difficult to assess – even for the experts. The county councils themselves are 
responsible for their own budgetary systems, and we do not yet have a comprehen-
sive analysis of how cost and compensation are affected by the developments that 
began in 2016. The remuneration flows are not exactly rocket science, but compli-
cated enough to conclude that overall budget effects are not known and that lack 
of transparency is a concern.
As the use of telemedicine increases, the remuneration system will come under 
increased pressure. Digital care is being pushed onto an existing system oper-
ated through loose and mostly nonmandatory cooperation between the 21 autono-
mous county councils, and health care is a regional responsibility. This means 
there is a risk that reforms tend to be incremental and that mainly minimum resist-
ance steps are possible.
Fees and remuneration for telemedicine are likely to grow in both economic 
and political importance. Profit for telemedicine introduces new complications. 
In other welfare services, county councils and municipalities set the standard for 
the level of compensation based on relevant comparisons. For schools, this com-
parison would be the cost of a student in a school operated by the municipality. 
Within health care, the relevant comparison would be a health care provider run 
by the county council. But as the country councils do not yet provide pure tel-
emedicine, this standard is lacking. It is noteworthy, however, that the compensa-
tion for a digital visit is but one-third of the weighted average cost of a physical 
visit to a primary care center (which was SEK 1706 in 2016).
The challenge for reforming remuneration is that big profits in telemedicine 
would cause political anger and irritation among primary care physicians. But if 
profits are too small – or if there is an extended period of loss-making – private 
investors may lose patience and innovation could grind to a halt. Another risk 
is that the county council change the conditions to such an extent that the tel-
emedicine doctors change their business model in order to focus only on private 
customers through insurance or fees. Already there are signs that advertising is 
increasing. Future innovation in telemedicine and its place in health care is 
thus hanging on a thread. It is essential that the county councils take this into 
account when considering reforms.
Today, digital care visits have quickly grown to almost 2 percent of all phys-
ical primary care visits, and within only a few years the share could edge up 
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toward 10 percent. What happens to the remuneration system if telemedi-
cine would account for 20, 50, or even 90 percent of primary care visits?
5.3 Increased availability or overuse?
A key issue is if telemedicine can reduce the burden on total primary health care 
by increasing efficiency or if it results in extra demand and therefore increases 
strain on the same resources. Studies show that the effects are greatly influenced 
by the way telemedicine is designed. A US study of 300,000 patients between 
2011 and 2013 found a volume increase of 88 percent but only 12 percent relief 
on primary care (Ashwood et al., 2017). However, in a six-month pilot trial at 
Hurley Group, a group of health care centers in the United Kingdom, telemedi-
cine led to nearly one-fifth of patients no longer feeling the need for a physical 
visit (Madan, 2014). The total time for visits to doctors also fell.
In the UK study, patients had access to digital solutions such as self-help 
guides, telephone counseling 24 hours a day, and e-consultation with their GP 
as a complement to the contact they already had with their primary health care 
center. The result showed more satisfied doctors and patients, where about 80 per-
cent of the doctors wanted to implement the program and about 80 percent of 
patients would recommend online care to others. The results indicate that coordi-
nation and continuity are central aspects of improving the quality and cost effec-
tiveness of health care by telemedicine. In Sweden today, however, telemedicine 
risks interrupting the continuity of care. This is partly because patients so far can 
only be listed with physical care centers, not with telemedicine doctors.
5.4 Incentives and regulations determine the quality
To start a telemedicine company, regulatory approval from the Health and Social 
Care Inspectorate (IVO) is required, but it is the county council where the online 
physicians are registered that is responsible for regular supervision.
An area that is under particular scrutiny is the prescription of antibiotics. Here, 
a review of a series of reviews of county council (Lägermo and Bengnér, 2017a, 
2017b, 2017c, 2017d) showed that the telemedicine doctors had not followed the 
guidelines on diagnosis for pneumonia and throat infections. In a majority of cases, 
the region’s criteria for diagnosis were not met, yet several doctors wrote prescrip-
tions for antibiotics. Since then, Region Jönköping has implemented stricter rules. 
For example, restrictions are imposed on which diagnoses the telemedicine doc-
tors can make and that more information about patient visits needs to be disclosed.
If guidelines are not followed, it is worrisome. To our knowledge, there is no 
compelling evidence of telemedicine providers generally being more likely to 
prescribe drugs or make erroneous diagnoses. A smaller American study com-
paring digital and physical visits showed no symptomatic oversubscriptions, 
although there were vast differences between health care providers (Schoen-
feld et al., 2016). Research on Swedish data shows that some calibration in the 
Telemedicine and the welfare state 27
compensation systems reduces the prescription of antibiotics (Ellegard, Dietrich-
son and Anell, 2018).
It is understandable that issues arise in the first phase of telemedicine, and super-
visors and telemedicine doctors should draw lessons from this experience. Here 
it is important that the knowledge of best practice for digital care not stop at an 
individual county council and that the knowledge be conveyed to all. Better and 
aggregate statistics on telemedicine are therefore important. Although it is still 
early days for Swedish telemedicine, knowledge of how to conduct digital health 
care is improving fast and new digital tools are being developed. Perhaps in the 
future, visiting a physical health care center will be equally rare as a visit to the 
bank today.
Another pressing issue is that the lack of national coordination between county 
councils creates artificial barriers to digital care. For example, the requirements 
for laboratory tests vary, and there is no available national registry for patients. 
The combination of private telemedicine providers that have an incentive to as 
quickly as possible satisfy new patients, while there are bureaucratic obstacles in 
sending samples for analysis, can very well lead to under-utilization of diagnos-
tics and overuse of medical prescriptions.
In comparing telemedicine to physical health care, it is also central that all 
be held to the same standard, be it private production or county council cent-
ers. There are examples of private providers that are kept to a higher standard 
than equivalent public-sector providers. Also, extensive distortion of competi-
tion occurs when county councils allocate more resources to their own care cent-
ers compared to what private actors receive, this according to the governmental 
agency responsible for competition in Sweden (Swedish Competition Author-
ity, 2014). Despite this, more than half of the health care centers run by county 
councils are loss-making.
6 Conclusions
Telemedicine has the potential to alleviate the lack of accessibility of primary 
care. Video calls save time for patients, reduce the risk of infection during physi-
cal visits, and increase physicians’ working time flexibility. Queues and waiting 
times can be shortened if digital care providers reduce the burden on physi-
cal primary and hospital care regarding simple diagnoses, prescriptions, and 
referrals. A digital solution can also be used for preventive purposes, to speed 
up referrals, to coordinate patient information, or to help health care providers 
improve their diagnoses. Finally, digitalization makes it possible for more care to 
be provided at home or remotely, which reduces the costs of hospital care and has 
the potential to improve access to care across the country. Better access to care 
in many sparsely populated areas of Sweden would be a considerable improve-
ment. But so far, it is mostly children and metropolitan residents who have used 
telemedicine in Sweden. The elderly, those with chronic diseases, and rural resi-
dents should in the years ahead be able to benefit much more from telemedicine.
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At the same time, there is a significant risk that telemedicine will cause increased 
pressures in several dimensions. In part, public finances may suffer because the 
rationing of health care is weakened, and the bill is sent to the taxpayers. In 
part, there is a risk for health care as a whole since telemedicine practitioners 
may disrupt the continuity of care for those with multiple or complex needs. The 
latter is, in our view, an apparent risk as long as the digital care providers are not 
allowed to list their own patients and thus become fully responsible for them.
The dramatic increase in telemedicine visits since the beginning of 2016 clearly 
shows the dormant forces that have been released. Going forward, three key issues 
should be addressed for a better future with telemedicine:
1 There must be incentives for caregivers to provide coherent and preven-
tive care and not encourage overuse. In order to avoid overuse and promote 
cost efficiency, remuneration systems should be reformed to induce care 
providers with greater cohesive responsibility for the patient. A simple first 
step is for existing physical health care providers to take much better advan-
tage of existing digital innovations and integrate those tools into their own 
services. This can be done either through improved cooperation between 
existing physical and digital health care providers or as physical health care 
providers develop their own digital services. Coherence and cooperation 
between health care actors could increase if there were a model of sharing 
remuneration from listed patients and fees from telemedicine visits. The 
responsible political actors should launch an inquiry into how this could be 
done.
2 Primary care should no longer be free of charge for children when there is 
almost no barrier to access. Socioeconomically weak groups can instead be 
supported by better-designed cost ceilings. Increased digital accessibility 
already exacerbates the economic consequences of lack of overall coher-
ence in the county system. While public finances may not exactly hemor-
rhage in the near term, the specter of dubious choices and priorities increases. 
A low fee for children’s access to telemedicine at least restores a symbolic bar-
rier with only minor reduction in accessibility. Whether telemedicine and 
physical health care visits should have the same fee is a difficult question. 
A higher fee for telemedicine could be motivated to reduce overconsumption 
of care. However, we believe that for the time being, the fee should be the 
same so as not to stifle innovation and the opportunities for telemedicine to 
reduce the burden on physical health care centers and emergency care. The 
remuneration system between county councils and telemedicine provid-
ers should also be reformed without the risk of holding back innovation – be 
that from the private or public sector.
3 More effort should be devoted to developing best practices for digital care. 
There is a need for better and more systematic knowledge about which 
forms of care can be provided by the telemedicine companies. Coordina-
tion among the 21 county councils in regard to experiences and protocols for 
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telemedicine should be strengthened, preferably with a strong, but perhaps 
temporary, mandate for central control.
An example of a digital triage function has been developed by Min Doktor, which 
includes several questions to identify patients who have weak medical reasons to 
visit a doctor or who might better be supported in other parts of the health care 
system. This is a step in the right direction. Such functionality should be encour-
aged and developed further in order to improve matching of health care needs 
and resources. New technology has the potential to strengthen the chain of health 
care and help patients to the appropriate level of care. Done right, patients should 
be able to get more health care without significant cost increases. This is also the 
experience from other sectors, where the gains of digitalization are closely linked 
to scale and network effects.
It will also be necessary to strengthen regulation and supervision. Central-
izing and analyzing data from digital care and telemedicine are key steps in 
this direction. Data collection should not only aim to improve telemedicine 
but also support research on medication and other effects for better health and 
prevention.
Some critical voices pejoratively dismiss the increase in telemedicine as “lux-
ury consumption.” It would be unfortunate if such an epithet were to gain 
ground because it implicitly implies a view of the “correct” amount of health 
care, while also suggesting that the current level of health care consumption is the 
appropriate one.
However, the benefits should not be taken for granted. They depend crucially 
on continued reform. If status quo remains, costs will increase, and the prioriti-
zation in health care will have more detrimental consequences for patients with 
comprehensive medical needs. It is the remuneration systems and supervision that 
should be reformed, not the patients’ demand for more and better health care.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The digital transformation health care
As industry after industry experiences digital disruption, the growing demands for 
digital solutions have in recent years stressed the needs of availability and person-
alization of services (Ihlström Eriksson, Åkesson and Lund, 2016). The welfare 
sector is no exception, as many researchers argue that the only way to accommo-
date the increase of citizens’ demands in the coming years is through the utiliza-
tion, and optimization, of so-called “digital welfare” (Urban, 2017; Cozza et al., 
2018). In fact, a 2016 OECD report concluded that digital welfare will continue 
to expand and prompt new disruptive developments that may well undermine the 
public sector as we know it in order to make way for new solutions by different 
actors (OECD, 2016). At the heart of the matter lies the fact that the public sector, 
by and large, is an unwieldy beast that is slow to adapt and react to innovative 
solutions. This provides non-governmental actors with an opportunity to advance 
their positions and seek to claim new market shares in the welfare sector. Beyond 
the strictly technological challenges of undergoing digital transformation, the 
public sector also has to deal with various bureaucratic and political complexities, 
often including several different actors (Hartley, 2005).
Digital transformation is particularly present in the health care service industry, 
in no small part due to the opportunities provided by the use of mobile devices, 
which in turn has led to increased levels of disruption from other non-governmental 
actors (McLoughlin, Garrety and Wilson, 2017; Lapão, 2016). The use of such 
mobile devices in primary health care provision is commonly referred to as “tel-
emedicine” (WHO, 2011). While it is easy to imagine the commercial possibili-
ties for the new, non-governmental actors looking to promote themselves on the 
health care scene, it is more difficult to anticipate the long-term consequences that 
such a disruption would entail for the health care industry as we know it.
That is not to say that only non-governmental actors have an interest in digital 
transformation. OECD (2016) illustrates a counterpoint by anticipating that the dig-
italization of the health care sector may actually increase government productivity, 
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as the demographic changes continue to bring about increases in health care expen-
ditures. As such, digitalization of the public sector may in fact result in a trillion–
US dollar productivity increase worldwide (Dilmegani, Korkmaz and Lundqvist, 
2014). This implies high incentives for governments to further accelerate digital 
transformation in order to fully capitalize on these benefits.
Callon (1998) suggests that disruptive technological advancements can urge a 
re-evaluation of market frames. Assuming such a re-evaluation, how do the actors 
react to the market changes, and how do they view their roles within it? Examin-
ing the dynamics within this changing field comprising both public and private 
actors contributes to an improved understanding of how digitalization can affect 
industry actors’ individual roles as well as their interactions.
1.2 Health care digitalization in Sweden
The effects of the digital transformation of public health care services have been 
a particularly pressing topic in Sweden, where the standard of health care has 
been historically held in high regard by the international community (Svanborg-
Sjövall, 2014). Traditionally, the Swedish health care system has always rested on 
three tenets (Anell, Glenngård and Merkur, 2012, p. 9):
1 Human dignity – Everyone is entitled the same dignity, irrespective of their 
status in the community.
2 Need and solidarity – Those in greatest need must have priority for treatment.
3 Cost effectiveness – There must be equity between costs and benefit when-
ever making a decision.
Pressing upon the third tenet, a 2016 report contends that Swedish health care 
could save one-quarter of its health care costs, corresponding to some €18bn 
(SEK180bn), merely by digitalizing health care service in an efficient manner 
(Hardy, Boldt-Christmas and Tyreman, 2016). Thus, digital transformation leads 
to more economical health care. To exemplify, a recent scientific study shows 
that the total economic cost of a digital medical consultation is roughly €189 
(SEK1960), as opposed to €324 (SEK3348) for a traditional consultation at a 
health care clinic (Ekman, 2018).
Nevertheless, in a 2013 report, the OECD cautions that there are lingering gov-
ernance issues that could threaten the excellence in Sweden’s health and social 
care system if they are left unaddressed (OECD, 2013). Primarily, the report high-
lights potential difficulties in coordinating care between hospitals, primary care, 
and local authorities. While a statutory framework is decided nationally through 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, health care in Sweden is managed (and 
for the most part funded) locally through income taxation (Anell, Glenngård and 
Merkur, 2012). As of 2010, every patient has a right to choose between a private 
and public primary care provider (Svanborg-Sjövall, 2014). In fact, primary care 
is provided by both public and private health care providers, and people can visit 
any accredited provider of their choice and be entitled to reimbursement.
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However, to complicate matters, Sweden’s political system consists of 21 coun-
ties (Swe: län) and 290 municipalities (Swe: kommun). In charge of coordinat-
ing all county councils and municipalities is the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SALAR), which also works as a communication bridge 
between the different levels (Anell, Glenngård and Merkur, 2012). In spite of this, 
the county councils have large degrees of autonomy, it is not uncommon for many 
of them to belong to a different political majority than the ruling party/parties 
of the national government, and their interest in implementing different reforms 
proposed by the national government may reflect party political interplay between 
the different political levels.
Private providers (constituting over 40 percent of all providers in 2017) receive 
public funding for their services if accredited by the local county council (Holm-
ström, 2019; Ekonomifakta, 2017). Health care providers compete for registered 
patients, but since the county councils define fixed price levels for their entire 
region, they cannot compete on price. Moreover, county councils are responsible 
for ensuring that all health care providers deliver quality services.
According to WHO, 70 percent of the member states in the European region 
have worked on strategies that specifically refer to eHealth (Peterson et al., 2016). 
However, Sweden has been one of the forerunners in health care digitalization, 
with the official work on eHealth already starting in 2002, when the government 
published a report to increase the development of eHealth (Olsson and Jarlman, 
2004; Wass, 2017). Subsequently, the eHealth strategy has been continuously 
updated and recently developed into the Vision for eHealth 2025, which states 
that “in 2025, Sweden will be best in the world at using the opportunities offered 
by digitalization and eHealth to make it easier for people to achieve good and 
equal health and welfare” (Government Offices of Sweden and SALAR, 2016, 
p. 9). As Wass (2017) explains, the implementation and coordination of Sweden’s 
eHealth strategies have been managed by different governmental organizations 
throughout the years. This development is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 Governmental organizations responsible for Sweden’s eHealth strategies
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The accelerating rise of eHealth is enabling the entry of new players in the 
health care provider market, which is particularly noticeable in the telemedicine 
environment. To this end, mobile health, or “mHealth,” has become increasingly 
present. As such, mHealth is a term used for the practice of medicine and pub-
lic health supported by mobile devices (WHO, 2011). Globally, the number of 
health apps on iOS and Android has more than doubled in only 2.5 years, and the 
mHealth market worth USD 23 billion in 2017 is estimated to grow at a Com-
pound Annual Growth Rate of more than 35 percent through 2019 (Cision, 2016; 
Deloitte, 2015). In Sweden’s primary health care market, several telemedicine 
actors have in recent years made their entry onto the scene, including contempo-
rary market leaders such as Kry and Min Doktor (Business Sweden, 2018).
As such, Sweden is a compelling case to study, partly due to its government 
relinquishing its public services monopoly of health care (Ranerup, Henriksen 
and Hedman, 2016; Ålander and Scandurra, 2015), and partly because Sweden 
lies at the forefront of digital health care innovation (Frid, Alsen and Robert-
son, 2017).
1.3 Innovation in welfare services
Although innovation in public services has increased in recent years, innova-
tive capabilities in this space are typically incremental (Jalonen and Juntunen, 
2011). Subsequently, there has been a dearth of disruptive innovations in 
health care services, a sector that has traditionally been governed by public 
services (Schulman, Vidal and Ackerly, 2009). This can be explained by the 
complexity of the environment in which public service organizations operate 
(Osborne et al., 2014; Antonsen and Jorgensen, 1997). Unlike private actors, 
public organizations are heavily embedded in society and subsequently evince 
differing drivers of innovation (Hartley, 2005). While commercial innovations 
are predominantly driven by competitive advantage, the public sector primarily 
acts on the motivation to increase public value (Moore, 1995; Hartley, 2005). 
Therefore, the evaluation of public-sector innovation tends to involve param-
eters of its usefulness to society and some notion of justice and fairness, in addi-
tion to the traditional criteria of efficiency and effectiveness (Bloch and Bugge, 
2013; Bommert, 2010).
This embeddedness of welfare services affects the risk factors inherent in inno-
vation practices (Albury, 2005). Not only are public-sector innovations exposed 
to higher levels of public scrutiny before they can be fully developed, the general 
risks to individual and community quality are also more substantial than for the 
private sector. Hence, it is important to stress that digital transformation of health 
care (and welfare services in general) be accompanied by complex challenges for 
policy and decision-makers (OECD, 2016). While the literature on public-sector 
innovation has to date mainly focused on the challenges hindering actors in going 
beyond incremental innovations, current disruptive digital developments raise 
several topics that have yet to receive any wider empirical attention. Thus, there 
exists little knowledge about the public sector’s reaction to the entry of digital 
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private companies in welfare, while, simultaneously, the increasingly blurring 
market boundaries call for insight in this space.
The social embeddedness of the welfare sector constitutes significant chal-
lenges for governments that are difficult to tackle unilaterally (Van Ham and Kop-
penjan, 2001). Dealing with this complexity, collaborations between the public 
and private sector have gained esteem as being an effective, legitimate mode of 
governance in recent years (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011) and showed increasing 
popularity in the health care sector (Jalonen and Juntunen, 2011). Still, such col-
laborations may give rise to complex controversies due to sometimes-conflicting 
values and rationales.
1.4 Public-private collaboration in public-sector innovation
In parallel to the increasing implementation of public-private collaborations 
(PPCs), a growing body of literature examining the phenomenon has developed. 
Schaeffer and Loveridge (2002) outline four forms of PPC, which is generally 
defined as the coordination of decisions between public and private actors.
As Figure 3.2 illustrates, in situations in which this coordination does not 
involve joint decision-making, the parties are involved either in a follower–leader 
or buyer–seller relationship. While the former is characterized by unequal power 
and/or resource conditions and well-defined problems, the exchange relationship 
between seller and buyer is open ended. Provided that the parties engage in joint 


















































Figure 3.2 Forms of public-private collaboration
Source: Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002, p. 182.
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limited time span, their collaboration is defined as a joint venture. That is, partner-
ships differentiate themselves from joint ventures by constituting an open ended 
agreement to work together (Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002). This definition is 
congruent with Koppenjan (2005), who denotes public-private partnership as a 
durable PPC in which mutual products and/or services are developed and risk, 
costs, and benefits are shared.
By leveraging the resources, expertise, and ideas of both parties, PPCs represent 
a powerful tool for addressing the complex problems of the welfare environment 
and have the potential to result in increased innovation (Reich, 2002). However, 
it should be noted that PPCs generate intricate organizational interlacings, which 
may inhibit the realization of potential benefits (Jalonen and Juntunen, 2011). 
Since the parties do not share a common ownership structure, they tend to pur-
sue different operating and strategic goals (Torchia, Calabrò and Morner, 2015). 
There are, of course, various reasons cooperation does not exist or does not turn 
out successfully. These include a lack of understanding and/or patience for the 
decision-making process in the public sector by private sector members, incom-
patible interests, and the existence of laws that prohibit cooperation (Schaeffer 
and Loveridge, 2002). Besides, actors exhibit differences in planning horizons, 
which further complicates successful collaboration (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 
2001).
To understand the potential of PPC in the formation of the telemedicine market, 
it is therefore crucial to develop today’s deficient understanding of which values 
and objectives the market parties act upon and how they perceive their own as 
well as the other’s position.
1.5 Synthesis and literature gap
The rise of telemedicine is enabling new players to enter the primary health care 
market. While this is expected to be discernable in numerous national health care 
markets in the future, the phenomenon is already evident in Sweden, a leading 
market in health care digitalization and innovation. By selectively applying the 
research of various disciplines, the background and literature review examine pre-
vious contributions to provide a foundation for further empirical investigation.
Although there is extant fundamental research on public service innova-
tion, there is a lack of knowledge about the disruption of welfare markets and 
the related entry by commercial players. The increasingly confounding market 
boundaries caused by technological developments in health care and other wel-
fare services necessitate insights on how traditional providers perceive and react 
to the subversion of their historically stable, well-defined markets.
Moreover, public-private collaborations have been perceived as auspicious 
paths for welfare services. Yet, to entirely grasp the potential for collaborative 
actions in the shaping of the telemedicine market, it is crucial to understand both 
parties’ interests and how they perceive each other’s positions. Today’s literature 
lacks insights on these aspects and is thus missing essential knowledge about 
building an understanding of the development of the market dynamics. While 
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collaborative activities are considered powerful mechanisms in the shaping of 
the welfare sector, it is ambiguous whether the public and private actors perceive 
collaboration with one another in this way or if they indeed regard themselves as 
competitors or as merely “irrelevant” to one another.
In conclusion, existing research provides valuable starting points for under-
standing innovation in the welfare sector as well as incentives and challenges for 
collaborative efforts between public and private actors. However, extant research 
fails to fill the knowledge gap of how today’s disruptive digital advancements 
reshape the health care industry and its market dynamics.
1.6 Research questions
To fill the outlined research gap, this study has formulated following research 
questions:
1 How do public-sector actors react to the emerging use of digital technology 
in the health care sector? Specifically, how do they perceive their role in a 
changing market?
2 How do public and digital private actors view potential collaborative efforts 
in the health care industry?
While the second research question applies to public and private actors, the first 
research question focuses solely on the reaction of the public sector. The underly-
ing reasoning is that, together with traditional, long-established private players, 
the public sector is experiencing the market change, while digital private players 
embody the source of change rather than being subject to it.
2 Theoretical discussion
2.1  Exploring market (re-)shaping from a  
socio-technological stance
A notion heralded by Callon (1990) and Latour (1984) is that market actors are 
embedded in their social network, which in turn connects to the markets-as- 
practice theory on the formation of markets. As illustrated before, this is of par-
ticular significance for actors in the welfare sector, as this perspective describes 
markets as socio-technical arrangements made up of various human and non-
human actor-networks that are linked through continuous translation processes.
Latour (1987) contends that it is important to explore situations in which sci-
ence is still nascent rather than solely studying ready-made science. That is to 
say, it is not only relevant to look at how technologies enable new connections 
between people and organizations as passive intermediaries, but also at the ways 
in which they themselves might constitute new actors that actively alter the roles 
and identities within socio-technical arrangements. Thus, markets inevitably 
become sites of conflicting practices and interests that stimulate market actors 
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to engage in strategic actions to shape the market to their advantage (Kjellberg 
and Helgesson, 2006; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). As Latour (2005) points out, 
to understand the shaping of a market, three crucial steps are involved. The first 
concerns how to deploy controversies so as to gauge the number of new partici-
pants in any future assemblage. The second step concerns the ability to follow 
how the actors themselves stabilize uncertainties by building formats, standards, 
and metrologies. The third and final step concerns how the assemblages gathered 
so far can renew the sense of still being part of the same collective. Opportunities 
to actively shape the emerging market are especially present in controversial and 
ambiguous environments, and these are sometimes characterized as “hot situa-
tions” (Rip, 2010; Callon, 1998).
2.2 Ambiguity heating up the market environment
Callon (1998) claims that interactions between different actors in the economy 
require frames that specify the context in which a particular set of relationships is 
ordered and made to make sense. However, those frames are regularly and inevi-
tably disrupted by “overflows,” which are tantamount to the economic parlance 
of “externalities.” That is to say, an overflow or “externality” in this context refers 
to negative (or positive) outcomes that are not considered when agents calculate 
their courses of action and the associated outcomes (Tarim, 2013).
In today’s fast-paced environment, technological advancements frequently put 
existing frames into question and call for fundamental re-evaluations (Kastberg, 
2014; Overdevest, 2011). Callon (1998) distinguishes between “hot” and “cold” 
situations that emerge in scientific and technological development. That is, each 
constitutes the extreme end of a continuum on which any market situation can 
be placed (Donaldson et al., 2013). A “cold” situation is characterized by clearly 
identifiable actors, interests, preferences, and responsibilities and is easily framed 
and resolved. In contrast, “hot” situations exhibit a high degree of uncertainty, 
making the entire process controversial. Consequently, consensus and agreements 
become difficult, and framing becomes a chaotic process in which various actors 
compete to realize their respective descriptions of future world states by investing 
in metrological devices (Callon, 1998).
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, it can be argued that digitalization in the health 
care market triggers a movement toward the right on this cold–hot continuum. 
There are three reasons to exhibit such a movement. First, the topic is long 
and frequently debated in academia, as well as in various public outlets (Patel 
and Rushefsky, 2002). Second, the influx of new actors on the scene inevi-
tably prompts questions about who might be considered part of the market 
and who might not (Gaynor, Mostashari and Ginsburg, 2017). Third and last, 
there is much ambiguity regarding the perceived roles, values, and objectives 
of the different parties (Castro-Sánchez et al., 2014; Panari et al., 2016). By 
studying the perceptions and attitudes of market actors, this chapter endeavors 
to elucidate the blurred market frames. As Kjellberg and Helgesson (2006) 
suggest, understanding ideas about a developing market allows for creating 
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links to the conceptualization of market practice and is therefore congruent 
with understanding the world that is continuously being accomplished. This 
concept of performativity thus captures how the world of ideas and percep-
tions participates in shaping the market and becomes part of a circular causal 
relation over time.
3 Methodology
Attempting to investigate a nascent research field, this qualitative study employs 
an interpretative and inductive approach. Sweden was selected as a case for exam-
ining health care digitalization, as it is advanced in its use of digital technologies, 
thus providing an antecedent for other countries (Carter, 2015; Hardy, Boldt-
Christmas and Tyreman, 2016; OECD, 2018). The study used semi-structured 
interviews with actors involved in the digital transformation of health care, who 
were in turn selected by means of purposive sampling based on their compe-
tence and insight into the subject matter (Denscombe, 2017; Oliver, 2006). The 
included respondents were initially contacted by email or telephone, after which 
they were accepted to participate in the study.
Prior to the interview, the respondents were provided with information 
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Figure 3.3 Market movement on the cold–hot continuum
Source: Authors’ own depiction.
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other various practical details regarding the study. The respondents subse-
quently provided their informed consent to participating in this study. A semi-
structured interview guide was drawn up for the purposes of conducting the 
interviews.
The interviews were conducted between April 2018 and May 2018, with each 
interview ranging between approximately 30 and 60 minutes. The mode of inter-
view was selected upon the interviewee’s preference, resulting in some of the 
interviews being conducted face-to-face, while others were conducted via IP 
telephony (Skype) or regular telephone.
Table 3.1 illustrates the complete list of respondents used in this study.
Similar to the data collection method, the data interpretation also followed an 
iterative approach. This means that although the study’s premise departed from 
certain theoretical discussions, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the discerned 
themes yielded by the data analysis were successively uncovered rather than mak-
ing use of predetermined themes based on pre-existing theoretical concepts. This 
ensured that the study could take part in new conceptual understandings that were 
grounded in empirical data (Welch et al., 2011).
Table 3.1 Overview of interview respondents
Code Company Description Position Background Duration Type
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TEL2 Kry Private 
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4 Empirical discussion
4.1 Re-evaluation of the market frame
The first research question aimed to investigate how public-sector actors react 
to the emerging use of digital technology in health care and how they anticipate 
potential change to their respective roles. In this section, we analyze the respond-
ents’ view of the current situation with Callon’s (1998) notion of framing and 
overflows as a starting point. The responses yielded from the interviews suggest 
that the market is currently subject to a re-evaluation of its existing frames – what 
Callon describes as a “hot situation.” Describing the emergence of telemedicine, 
TEL1 stated:
It is moving at a super high pace. Doctors, politicians, and decision-makers 
are not in control of things which they are not too happy about. With poli-
ticians you see that, while they had an extremely negative stance towards 
digital care just a year ago, now they are already working on legislations for 
digital services, which is really interesting and fun to observe.
The uncertainty about the market frames was further described by ORG1:
The new business model is challenging and changing the system. It has to 
adapt to the new situation, but there are so many discussions and questions 
regarding the digital doctors. Should they be allowed? What should they 
cost? Should we keep them away instead of integrating them?
This re-evaluation also implies that new actors previously not included within the 
market frame enter and challenge the hitherto stabilized conditions and knowl-
edge base. PUB2 mentioned the importance of patients knowing which of the 
telemedicine apps will be part of the welfare system. This can be interpreted as 
an attempt to determine the number of new market participants – Latour’s (2005) 
first step of market shaping. Another example of the increasingly vague barrier 
between the market and the outside world was expressed by PUB4:
Different perspectives are a good thing because we currently have this ste-
reotype working within health care. We are stuck within our roles and all of a 
sudden, we can see that, for instance, a logistician is the one telling us the best 
way to transport staff to people in their homes. By adding digitalization, we 
also add knowledge of another workforce and are increasingly letting them 
take part of the control and the development to help us think in other ways.
The perceived roles of both traditional and private digital actors appear to be 
affected by the emergence of telemedicine. All respondents described telemedi-
cine companies as challenging the public sector to innovate or adapt to the change. 
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Expressions varied from “put pressure on” (TEL1) to “breaking through barriers 
and forcing county councils to follow” (ORG2). PUB2 viewed their role as two-
fold by being responsible for enabling efficient use of telemedicine and encourag-
ing standards on the one hand, but, on the other hand, being responsible so that the 
health care industry does not become “technology driven.” PUB2 added:
The question is whether the regulatory framework is supposed to follow in 
the same pace. Making a new law is a slow process. But that is for a purpose 
because the law is supposed to be long-term and stable and be able to regulate 
a market that needs to be regulated. The first question we ask ourselves is 
therefore: should we change the regulations? Is it helping or is it just making 
the health care technology driven? Is it supposed to be handled from the tech 
side or the health care side? We aim to focus on the health care side, so there 
is [sic] a lot of regulations and laws which are slow-paced for a reason but 
that is not easy to explain to the other actors.
PUB3 expressed a similar opinion, stating that: “[telemedicine] is going to trans-
form the entire health care system, but it will take a while. Sometimes, that is not 
too bad, though – we must make sure that we have good quality.”
However, the potential to adapt to changes is regarded differently by telemedi-
cine actors, as in the following statement by TEL1:
What is significant for tech and telemedicine companies is that we can move 
pretty fast. If someone tries to shut one door, we will find some other way to 
do what we want to. We are set on the goal to make health care better and we 
are going to execute on that one way or another.
This statement further can be interpreted as pronouncement of investments shap-
ing the market frame to their advantage.
4.2 The desire for suitable metrological devices
The data interpretation showed that the hot situation involves actors’ desire for 
clarity in quantifying and comparing outputs within the evolving market frame. 
Public-sector respondents pointed toward an absence of 1) a regulatory framework 
that is adapted to the new situation and 2) measuring instruments and standards to 
ensure the quality of telemedicine services. In effect, this is analogous to Latour’s 
(2005) second step of market shaping and to what Callon (1998) calls “metrologi-
cal devices.” Similarly, private respondents argued that without such institutional 
frameworks, they are unable to attain legitimacy in the market. ORG2 and TEL2 
both emphasized that telemedicine actors are subject to a more severe scrutiny 
process than traditional actors. To this end, TEL2 stated:
We are helping SALAR to look into developing some sort of quality indicator 
for digital care. This would create standards for evaluating digital health care, 
Welfare services and digital disruption 45
but then there need to be compatible evaluation standards for physical health 
care. Often, when there is criticism about a digital health care provider, it is 
not compared to anything else but obviously there are errors made in normal 
health care as well.
The respondents had different views on how telemedicine actors could gain legiti-
macy, but independent clinical reports (mentioned by TEL2, ORG1, ORG2) and 
communication with the different actors in forums such as conferences (men-
tioned by TEL2, ORG1) are two means discussed. Such efforts to increase the 
understanding between actors and build a common ground can be considered 
a way to stabilize uncertainties in market formation and thus further illustrate 
Latour’s (2005) second step.
ORG2 explained that there has been a recent evaluation by a regional health 
assessment center, which concluded that there is not enough evidence to prove the 
quality of telemedicine:
Usually when this happens, they tend to not use [the innovation] instead of 
making more studies. So it is really difficult when you are being evaluated 
too soon and not allowed the time to retrieve the data to prove the positive 
health care effects of your service. Thus, I think it is really important for these 
companies to work with researchers, academia, and the health care profession 
to actually make a solid research base for their products. The legitimacy has to 
come from the health care side and . . . clinical studies will thus be essential.
4.3 The blurring national borders of health care
When encouraged to describe their role in the market, the respondents considered not 
only the Swedish health care market, but also reasoned beyond national borders. For 
instance, telemedicine respondents repeatedly discussed the enablers and challenges 
to scaling up internationally. TEL2 expressed the potential to optimize internationally 
in many ways because digitalization is not something local or regional – it is some-
thing national or international. Similarly, TEL1 described how digitalization allows 
for scalability to an unprecedented extent, which will encourage telemedicine compa-
nies to seek international opportunities. In terms of the theoretical discussion of this 
chapter, this may lead to an increasingly complex re-evaluation of the market frames 
due to the additional international actors and interests that then must be considered.
The public-sector respondents also believed that digitalization would challenge 
the national borders of primary health care. However, rather than scalability, the 
arguments centered chiefly on the benefits from a patient perspective, as well as 
various quality concerns. This perception is illustrated by the following quotations:
As a patient, I want to be where the knowledge is. And if there is someone in 
the world who is much better at providing a certain service, I want to be there. 
With digitalization this is possible.
(PUB4)
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What I see as very interesting with digital solutions is that soon, there will 
not only be Swedish telemedicine companies on the Swedish market but also 
international companies that want to offer services to patients in Sweden. 
How will we then make sure that they give good quality?
(PUB3)
Last, all actors expressed concerns that there may exist a conflict of interest 
between driving innovation in health care on the one hand and maintaining a con-
ducive business environment on the other. This was exemplified by PUB1 stating:
We have the Vision for eHealth 2025, which aims to provide better and more 
equal health. Then we have the strategy for digitalization driven by the Min-
istry of Enterprise and Innovation, which aims for a driving market which 
enables you to sell your business in a Swedish context. So one part of the 
government wants to ensure that app developers within the EU are able to 
sell them here, but the health care strategy says that you should only be able 
to sell them if they provide better health. So, from a very high policy level, 
I think there are sometimes different goals.
4.4 Insights on collaborative activities between the parties
The aim of the second research question was to understand how public and private 
actors view potential collaborative efforts in the health care industry. To do so, 
data were collected on the perceptions of and expectations about the development 
of market dynamics (Section 4.4.1) and actors’ views about underlying values 
and objectives of the market players (4.4.2), as well as obstacles to collaborative 
activities (4.4.3).
4.4.1 The changing market dynamics
The collected empirical data indicate that there are discernibly different percep-
tions about the current and future state of market dynamics between public actors 
and telemedicine companies. While all respondents generally agreed that there are 
and will be collaborations in the digitalized health care provision market, percep-
tions about the extent, forms, and use of collaborative activities diverged.
Telemedicine companies conveyed a competitive stance and regarded them-
selves as direct competitors to traditional health care providers. TEL2 explained 
that entering close partnerships with the public was considered in the early stages 
of their existence. Yet, they quickly distanced themselves from it due to different 
value sets and objectives (elaborated upon further in Section 4.4.2) and opted for 
the competitive route instead. Challenging the traditional method of health care 
provision, telemedicine companies viewed themselves as helping the welfare state 
improve its services, an attitude also supported by the public-sector representatives:
We are pushing the public sector to step up and take things to the next level.
(TEL1)
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Because of the competition that the private sector gives the public sector, the 
public sector is getting better. The challenge that, for instance, Kry or Min 
Doktor are giving the public sector is a good challenge.
(PUB4)
Nevertheless, it was expressed recurrently that not everyone in the public sector 
shared this level of appreciation. As ORG1 pointed out, small public clinics in 
particular were dismayed at losing money to digital actors.
While competitive, the telemedicine companies recognized that there did exist 
dynamisms that provided incentives to proceed with collaborative endeavors with 
the public. TEL2 explained that they previously collaborated with city councils 
to test their products in pilot studies, as well as a means of influencing the struc-
ture of the reimbursement system. Furthermore, they saw collaboration as another 
potential way to gain legitimacy. Hence, it is possible to surmise that the collabo-
rative activities constitute strategic actions of telemedicine players to become part 
of the re-evaluated market frame.
The interviews with public-sector representatives indicated that all of them 
acknowledged the value of being challenged and driven by new entrants. Only 
PUB3 perceived the new players as an actively emerging threat to the traditional 
welfare system by recognizing that:
As public service providers, we should know that we are compared to the 
best service . . . and if we do not take that in and learn from it, we will lose 
all the patients.
The other interviewees drew upon the fact that many public actors do not see their 
traditional health care provision as threatened by digital actors.
I cannot recall that I have seen any competition between the new and the old.
(PUB2)
It feels like you are perceiving it as if there was competition, but I do not see 
that. I mean, of course this is a hard time for the county councils, but that has 
more to do with the fact that the reimbursement system and other systems are 
not adjusted to digital solutions.
(PUB3)
The presence of these differing attitudes, even within the same organization, fur-
ther demonstrates the ongoing re-evaluation of the market frame and the differing 
perceptions about future market states.
4.4.2 Values governing behavior in the (Swedish) health care sector
The importance and controversy surrounding whether the market actors act upon 
the same values and objectives was illustrated by PUB2, as they claimed that it 
was essentially their most pressing issue at the given time.
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Overall, the vast majority of respondents agreed that the overarching mission 
for all health care providers was the same, to provide safe and high-quality health 
care. However, some discernable differences remained. Specifically, three distinct 
values of private telemedicine companies were postulated:
1 Strong user focus
 Mentioned by five respondents as separating digital health care providers 
from traditional health care providers.
2 Accessibility
 In interactions with a county council, TEL2 found that they, contrary to digi-
tal providers, did not see accessibility as a real problem, but only as a per-
ceived problem by the consumer.
3 Flexibility
 As expressed by TEL2, this did not coincide with the rest of the health care 
system because less emphasis was put on prioritizing those patients with the 
greatest need.
An aspect emphasized by telemedicine actors and private industry organizations 
was that telemedicine companies felt widely misunderstood. This is typical in a 
“hot situation” where the actors can no longer take into account all actors’ view-
points within the existing frame. The following quotation by TEL1 provides an 
illustrative example.
I think that they [the public sector] do not feel like we share the same values. 
I get the feeling that they think we are capital hungry and greedy VC [venture 
capital]-funded parasites that want to earn as much money as we can in the 
shortest time possible. But they totally got this wrong. . . . Sometimes it feels 
like everyone is afraid that the technology companies want to replace doctors 
by computers but that is not really our intention. We want to build software 
that can make doctors much more efficient and health care safer.
However, the telemedicine respondents asserted that the public sector is slowly 
starting to show more understanding, as illustrated by PUB1:
The traditional answer would be “yes, the private sector is just there to make 
money.” But having met a lot of these startups from the tech side, I know that 
they are always driven by something else. Personally, I am quite impressed 
by them because, of course, they have seen a business model somewhere, but 
they also seem to be driven by other things than money.
Besides the differences in values and strategic objectives, the information from 
the respondents suggested there were numerous other uncertainties and obstacles 
impeding collaborative activities between traditional and telemedicine actors. 
This in turn further illustrates the ongoing re-evaluation of the market frame.
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4.4.3 Obstacles to collaborative activities
Generally, obstacles to public-private collaboration were more explicitly stated 
by the telemedicine actors. By the same token, the public side was also aware that 
certain challenges had to be overcome. Recurrent obstacles, as expressed by the 
respondents, can be categorized into six different themes. These are illustrated in 
Table 3.2.












“A very typical view is that the 
public sector would say, there 
is a tech push in that they are 
asked to use tools and services 
that are not adapted towards 
their needs, that the tech 
players need to know their 
needs before they develop. . . . 
Then the entrepreneurs say, 
why do you not just tell us 
your needs; can we please 
come and see them? But then 
some public parties will not 








The late involvement 
of the public side 




services of digital 
caregivers.
“One lesson that we have 
learned is that it would have 
been beneficial to start the 
interaction with the other 
stakeholders at the same 
time to make them part of 
the things that we are doing 
from the beginning and thus 
have a smoother start so they 
would be more confident 
and comfortable about the 
development.” (TEL1)









prevails about who 
is responsible for 
setting them up.
“There is a lack of dialogues 
and forums between the 
new entrepreneurs and the 
councils. SALAR has a 
major role in making this 
dialogue happen.” (ORG1)
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Different timelines TEL1, 
ORG2, 
PUB4
Digital caregivers are 
required to work 
on dual timelines 
when interacting 
with the public: (1) 
fast, innovative, and 
agile and (2) long-
term and strategic.
“The implementation process 
is so slow that you will 
have multiple versions of 










structure of the 




as well as the 
procurement and 
scaling of services.
“Sweden does not operate in a 
national health care system, 
which makes scaling up 
super difficult.” (PUB2)
“It is very hard for a national 
agency . . . we are quite a 
long step away from the 
actual vendors, because we 
are speaking to someone 
representing the vendors and 







Threatened by the 
new development, 
some actors on the 





their own solutions 
rather than 
collaborating.
“The public side is often 
reluctant to move forward in 
integrating external digital 
services. They are protective 
and start their own solutions 
instead.” (ORG1)
“I know a lot of public 
providers think the digital 
caregivers are a bad thing . . . 
because they are not used 





Going back to Section 1.6 of this chapter, the first research question aimed to 
investigate how public actors react to the emerging use of digital technology in 
the health care sector (i.e., telemedicine) and how they perceive their role in the 
market that is about to change. The Swedish eHealth Agency has set an ambi-
tious goal by formulating a vision for eHealth 2025. However, as Schulman, Vidal 
and Ackerly (2009) suggest, disruptive innovation is less likely to occur within 
Table 3.2 (Continued)
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health care, and the responses from the respondents used in this study suggest 
that the decentralized structure of the Swedish health care system further hinders 
a successful implementation of innovative digital solutions. The public-sector 
respondents acknowledged these obstacles by agreeing that private telemedicine 
companies challenge the entire sector to innovate and are thus essential for suc-
cessful health care digitalization. For that reason, it is surmised that the public 
sector holds an overall positive attitude toward telemedicine companies entering 
the market. Still, the public-sector respondents did express some apprehension 
toward health care becoming solely technology driven rather than being propelled 
by other virtues and values. Following Albury’s (2005) notion, the data analysis 
showed that this apprehension may affect the adoption of innovative efforts. As 
Albury (2005) illustrates, as innovations financed by public sector are exposed 
to more rigorous degrees of public scrutiny, there is added forethought to swiftly 
include innovations as part of the welfare system, a point raised by both public- 
and private-sector respondents. Moreover, the public sector acknowledges that 
market accommodations will have to be made in order to fit internationally dis-
persed primary health care providers.
Concerning the actors’ perceived role in the changing market, public-sector 
respondents seemingly considered themselves less able to drive digital change or 
to shape market conditions compared to telemedicine companies. In other words, 
the public-sector respondents assume a reactive rather than a proactive stance, 
which follows a public-sector tradition of incremental introduction of innovations 
(Jalonen and Juntunen, 2011). They do consider themselves in power in relation 
to maintaining the old market frame by, for instance, changing the reimbursement 
system and hence shutting out telemedicine providers, but lack the control to form 
the new, re-evaluated frame. To gain and maintain the control of this re-evaluation 
and shape the market to their advantage, the telemedicine company respondents 
seek to 1) find metrological devices that can legitimize their actions and 2) con-
vince the consumer of their worth.
5.1.2 RQ2
The second research question aimed to assess how traditional and telemedicine 
actors viewed potential collaborative efforts in the health care industry. Essen-
tially, the study indicates that all parties consider each other as acting within the 
same, and not distinct, market frames in the future. This would require the current 
frame to be re-evaluated accordingly (by, for instance, adjusting the regulatory 
frameworks). Consequently, the potential paths for the development of the market 
dynamics amount to competition and/or collaboration.
While the different actors had different attitudes toward the means of doing so, 
the interviewees generally agreed on the fact that developing and strengthening 
some form of collaborative activities will be necessary to achieve the shared mis-
sion to provide the best care to people. On the one hand, the telemedicine actors 
convey a competitive attitude. However, they regard collaborative activities with 
the public sector as essential strategic means of establishing themselves as accepted 
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and well-positioned players. On the other hand, traditional care providers credit 
the challengers with bringing advanced tools to the health care industry, thereby 
enabling and also pushing traditional care providers toward improving their own 
services. Yet, most respondents stated that they do not regard the challengers as 
competitive threats, but rather as collaborative opportunity. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, PPCs are thought to serve as powerful tools in navigating within 
the complex environments of the welfare sector. However, the results of this study 
show that the actors’ underlying value bases differ significantly in some areas. 
This effectively restricts the fruitful forms of future collaboration between the 
parties since it limits the activities requiring joint decision-making. Drawing upon 
Schaeffer and Loveridge’s (2002) four forms of PPC mentioned in Section 1.4 of 
this chapter, this indicates that at the current stage, joint ventures, as well as part-
nerships, may be difficult to attain – at least to any successful extent.
5.2 Practical implications
Other than serving as an academic contribution to a nascent and rapidly growing con-
cept of the health care market, the findings from this chapter also carry some practi-
cal implications. To the point, the development and implementation of metrological 
devices are essential in order to successfully adapt innovative practices in the health 
care sector. Without such measurements, telemedicine companies will have trouble 
gaining legitimacy. Furthermore, the public sector would not fully benefit from the 
innovations, and stabilized new market boundaries would be difficult to attain.
Moreover, it is important that such metrological devices, as well as pertinent 
changes in regulations, include international considerations, since the results of 
this study indicate that increased digitalization will lead to blurred national bor-
ders in primary health care. An example would be to ensure that international tel-
emedicine companies operating in the Swedish market (and as part of the welfare 
system) are evaluated along the same quality measures.
Moreover, increased collaborative initiatives on the market can be anticipated 
in the near future. In order to help improve the prospects for such initiatives, it 
is important to overcome any perceived obstacles toward PPCs. The outcome of 
this study suggests that the most crucial aspect will be to secure improved means 
of communication between traditional and telemedicine companies. While digital 
disruption is yet in its early stage, it is paramount now to already start building the 
foundations to ensure optimized communication channels and a common knowl-
edge base. Establishing effective forums for exchange will not only foster interac-
tion between the parties but will also encourage the public to involve itself at an 
early stage and lessen its propensity toward protectionist tendencies. To this end, 
clear responsibilities must be communicated, agreed upon, and assigned across 
all involved parties.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has contributed to an increased understanding of how disruptive digi-
tal advancements, in particular regarding telemedicine, affect the perceived role 
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of public and private actors within the Swedish health care sector. While the find-
ings in this study are ultimately a representation of the respondents’ own subjec-
tive perceptions of the subject matter, they still provide insight into the mindset of 
the rationale used to motivate their actions and/or inactions. To this end, the main 
findings can be summarized as follows:
1 Both public- and private-sector respondents expect telemedicine to have a 
large impact on the Swedish health care market.
2 Compared to the telemedicine company respondents, the public-sector 
respondents expressed a more reactive than proactive stance toward market 
shaping.
3 Public-sector respondents are generally positive to the emergence of telemed-
icine since it is regarded to enhance productivity and push the public sector to 
innovate at a higher speed.
4 There is some apprehension due to the concern that the development will 
ignore quality assurances, which results in an urge from both sides to intro-
duce metrological devices, such as standardized quality measurements.
5 Parties encourage developing and strengthening collaborative efforts. These 
may, however, be difficult to attain due to perceived contrasting value bases 
as well as other obstacles, of which some can be productively counteracted, as 
suggested in the discussion of the main findings in Section 5.1 of this chapter.
While this study has chiefly sought to investigate the human experience of the 
respondents involved in this particular condition, the design of this study can be 
used analogously on similar examinations in other research settings. In regard to 
future research on the impact of health care digitalization, observational studies 
in forums of private-public interactions (such as conferences or joint projects) 
may yield additional insights to reinforce the understanding of the parties’ values 
in action and hence further fill an additional research gap in areas where extant 
research is lacking. Moreover, similar studies may also be performed on welfare 
areas outside of the health care remit, for instance education and social care.
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1 Introduction
The potential of opening the global health data market has been discussed in the 
popular and academic literature for decades. If we could only enable a wider set of 
human and AI-based actors to learn from the growing amount of clinically, self-, 
and device-generated data about us, we could innovate new kinds of preventive, 
individualized, and fair health services, which may ultimately improve our health 
and well-being at a low cost, or so the argument goes (Inera, 2017; Government 
Offices of Sweden, 2016; Gilbert, Goldstein and Hemingway, 2015).
The above situation has raised questions about whether continuing the cur-
rent development, that is, successively integrating more systems and new actors 
into the health information exchange (HIE) solutions of today, is a feasible way 
forward. That is, the technological infrastructure and governance of current 
HIEs have proven capable of attracting the actors (e.g., care providers, patients, 
researchers) that currently exchange clinical data. However, will the prevailing 
arrangement still be appropriate given the expected global exchanges between a 
whole new set of unknown actors, who in addition will exchange a range of new 
kinds of non-clinical but health-related data? Are the state-based governance and 
verification mechanisms of today’s HIEs attractive and trustworthy in such con-
texts? Are they even legitimate?
Such doubts are increasingly indicated in discussions around blockchain tech-
nology (blockchain). In short, blockchain consists of a distributed ledger on 
which a network of computers store data and verify transactions, and on which 
distributed applications (e.g., smart contracts) that execute automatically can be 
built (Casey and Vigna, 2018). Many publications underline that such distributed 
solutions, which are allegedly maintained, hosted, and governed by the collective 
rather than any single actor, are more technically secure and cost efficient than 
today’s platforms (Kuo, Kim and Ohno-Machado, 2017; Nicol, 2017; Gropper, 
2016). Echoing the views of liberalists and anarchists (Hayek, 1948; Rothbard, 
1978), some blockchain advocates even argue that because blockchain eliminates 
the need for intermediaries and vertical forms of coordination, they make rep-
resentative democracy obsolete. Blockchain creates possibilities to form hori-
zontal, stateless global direct democracies, in which self-sovereign identities can 
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determine the rules of the game on a peer-to-peer contract basis (Casey and Vigna, 
2018; Atzori, 2017). Whether these extreme blockchain-based scenarios will be 
realized, of interest is that they do foreground the predicament of how to combine 
decentralized and centralized features to create infrastructures that are not only 
technically capable but also perceived as legitimate in relation to the expanded 
health data transactions of the future.
The aim of the present chapter is to juxtapose the current infrastructure and 
governance of HIEs, focusing on the Swedish setting as an empirical example, 
with the completely decentralized blockchain-based HIE scenario that can be 
inferred from the blockchain debate. We discuss on what grounds the latter sce-
nario may be questioned and outline several challenges that justify some form of 
centralized governance of the health data infrastructures of the future.
We approach this question humbly and acknowledge that it is a significant 
question that we will only be able to touch shallowly, especially considering 
our rudimentary technological and contextual knowledge. We do, however, find 
this endeavor relevant to stimulate the critical consideration of different avenues 
forward in relation to the move toward global health data exchanges. We also 
hope that the chapter will provide valuable input to the discussion of who should 
determine what aspects of the digitalization of welfare services and society in the 
future more generally.
2 Premises
2.1 Theoretical points of departure
Several different theoretical frameworks could be used to discuss views on block-
chain in health care. Should we speak of technology as a “separate material” 
structure on its own? Or is this a futile attempt since what a technology becomes 
depends on how it is enacted – and “socially” constructed? These are debated 
issues in the information systems (IS) literature. In this chapter, we find it useful 
to analytically separate the material properties of digital infrastructures on the one 
hand and their affordances – the possibilities for action that they create – on the 
other (Essén and Värlander, 2018; Gibson, 2015; Leonardi and Barley, 2010). The 
assumption is that the material properties of technology matter but that they do 
not determine the outcomes. Technological properties can afford different things 
for different actors, depending on their goals and the ways in which they combine 
the various features of the technological artifact (Leonardi and Barley, 2010). The 
nature of and extent to which an affordance is actualized hence depends on the 
presence of a variety of releasing conditions, as well as environmental structures 
and values (Strong et al., 2014).
2.2 Data sources
We used online reports and published academic research to provide a brief 
overview of the current state of HIEs in Sweden and beyond. Given the lack of 
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academic literature and “empirical evidence” on blockchain-based infrastructures 
in health care, we reviewed academic literature, books, and websites about the 
potential of blockchains and white papers describing specific proprietary/open 
source health care blockchain designs, noting that some are already implemented 
in pilot projects. Research on digital networks and artificial intelligence further 
provided input to the discussion. Finally, the first author engaged in conversations 
about the digital health infrastructure of the future with a few individuals working 
in the fields of HIEs, blockchain, e-health services, and digital services platforms 
in several countries from February to June 2018 (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 List of interviewees
Country Firm/organization Individual/position Blockchain involvement




J. Eltes, chief 
technology officer.
No projects but scans the 
area.












No activity but scans the 
area.





The digital services platform 
Predix offers a blockchain 
service.




Provides AI, blockchain, 





S. Farestam and J 
Sellström, founders.
CareChain is a joint effort 
to establish blockchain 
infrastructure and personal 
data management for 
health.
US BurstIQ, blockchain 
provider.
A. Heartley, business 
developer.
Provides blockchain-based 
platforms for health care.
UK General Electrics 
Health Care 
Partners.
M. Jones, senior 
consultant.
Provides AI consulting 
services and more.
India Ohum Health Care 
Solutions.





Provides EHR and 
blockchain-based 
solutions.
India IBM India. P. Dey, customer 
engagements, SME.






IT architect of the 
Estonian HIE.
The Estonian National 
HIE, often referred to as 
blockchain based, although 




We cover the operation of the current HIEs (focusing on the Swedish example) 
crudely, most likely omitting numerous development projects aiming to address 
many of the limitations that we mention. We further focus our discussion on the 
possibilities emphasized in the blockchain debate, though blockchain is only one 
among many potential future decentralized technologies that may disrupt health 
care. We discuss a few aspects of blockchain rather than covering all the design 
possibilities or their problems. For instance, the area of smart contracts is huge 
and impossible to capture within the scope of this chapter. Further, blockchain is 
still very much still in development. All claimed technological benefits have been 
questioned, and some aspects may be outdated in the near future. Our purpose is 
to discuss the possibilities and challenges raised by blockchain and the idea of 
decentralized infrastructures at a more general level. Finally, we provide a few 
(out of many possible) perspectives on how blockchains may afford decentraliza-
tion as well as call for centralization, based on a limited number of interviews and 
selected readings, of which most were pro-blockchain biased. Numerous legal, 
financial, and psychological aspects remain to be explored.
3  Results: data-driven health innovation –  
expanding the club
We begin by outlining the arrangement of the health information exchanges of 
today, focusing on the Swedish example.
3.1 The health information exchange of today
Twenty years ago, most people understood health data to be the documentation 
performed by health care providers and stored in the care providers’ various local 
electronic medical record (EMR) systems (Berg and Bowker, 1997; Berg, 1996). 
Transferring data between the different EMR systems was difficult if not impos-
sible, and while patients in most countries enjoyed the legal right to request and 
view this documentation, this occurred only on a case-by-case manner, often with 
significant delays between a patient’s order and receipt of the data. In early 2000, 
platforms, or health information exchanges, that enabled health care providers to 
share EMR data globally emerged (Greenhalgh et al., 2009). From around 2010 
and onward, patients were also invited to join these platforms (Sellberg and Eltes, 
2017). Today, patients in many countries can access all or parts of their EMR 
data through patient portals, which typically also provide other services such as 
EMR access logs, e-scheduling, e-prescriptions, and e-communication with their 
physician and/or nurse (Redelmeier and Kraus, 2018; Mold et al., 2015). The 
HIEs underlying these patient portals are often provided and maintained by state-
based agencies that also run their respective underlying national HIE platform 
(see Essén et al. [2018] for an overview of different private/public arrangements). 
For example, the Swedish national HIE platform is maintained by the organiza-
tion Inera, which is owned and governed by the 21 Swedish regional governments 
(county councils).
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3.1.1 The current governance approach
The rules of the HIEs in Sweden and beyond are designed at several levels. The 
national parliaments (as well as international organizations such as the EU) shape 
the prerequisites by providing regulations tied to medical record keeping and per-
sonal data. These regulations are typically abstract and allow care providers to 
share data in more as well as less “generous” ways – something we elaborate on 
more below (Essén et al., 2018). In Sweden, all 21 regional governments (county 
councils), however, mandate care providers in their region to make EMR data 
continuously available to the patient and other care providers through the national 
HIE. This means that data exchanges between care providers and patients are 
subject to the more specific rules of the national HIE.
Who, then, decides the rules of the national HIE? In Sweden, it is the national 
HIE board, which in turn consists of county council representatives. The national 
HIE board makes decisions about which technologies to use for authentication, 
exchange, and verification. For instance, the HIE board decided to allow BankID1 
as an authentication method to allow actors to access data held in the original 
disparate systems through application programming interfaces (APIs), rather 
than, for instance, by creating a new central repository, and also to enable secure 
data integrity through the Exchange-index (Swe: engagemangsindex), a log of all 
transactions stored in the cloud. The national HIE board has also decided who is 
allowed to access and release data on the platform. Care providers have to fulfill 
specific requirements in order to receive permission to connect to the National 
Patient Summary (Swe: Nationell Patientöversikt NPÖ). Only then may they 
access other care providers’ documentation about a patient and make data avail-
able to others (Inera, 2017). The national HIE board has further developed recom-
mendations regarding which EMR data to release to which patients, for example, 
age restrictions, and when, for example, what is an accepted delay (Inera, 2016).
In summary, while a great deal of prestudies, anchoring work, and multiparty 
discussions have preceded all the decisions above, the Swedish county councils 
(the national HIE board) have heretofore assumed ultimate responsibility for 
ensuring that the national HIE infrastructure is technologically capable, that trans-
actions are safe, and that data exchanges comply with national regulations. They 
have also decided who can “participate” in the HIE club, and what rules partici-
pants must follow or are recommended to follow. All of the Swedish interviewees 
emphasized that this governance model has been important to attract and make 
the current participants trust the national HIE. The interviewees, however, also 
pointed to the limitations tied to the current arrangement when looking ahead.
3.1.2 Limitations tied to the current approach
Several data legislation issues were raised as setting constraints around the Swed-
ish HIE. For instance, interviewees referred to the current regulation’s treatment 
of data as static records documented and stored by certain organizations, and the 
focus on protecting such data from, rather than ensuring its use by, external actors. 
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They also pointed to the related uncertainty regarding individuals’ and organiza-
tion’s opportunities and obligations to share digital data. For instance, according 
to Swedish legislation, care providers own the data they have entered into an 
EMR and they are allowed but not obliged to make that data continuously avail-
able to the patient or other care providers. There is further vagueness regarding 
individuals’ rights and the rules tied to public e-services enabling individuals to 
release data that have been created by public care providers with third parties.2 
Several interviewees stated that this ambiguity – or flexibility – regarding the 
“proper” interpretation of current legislation and the associated unpredictability 
regarding its enforcement have impeded the development of multisided health 
data exchanges in Sweden and beyond. According to several interviewees, it has 
created a “wait-and-see” culture in which the national HIE board as well as other 
actors/initiatives refrain from trying out new data-sharing structures in order to 
avoid being accused of doing something “illegal.” The interviewees pointed to 
the tendency among actors to interpret the legislation in a conservative rather than 
in an entrepreneurial or “boundary-pushing” way. As argued by J. Eltes, “[The 
legislation] makes it difficult to radically change the terms of data ownership 
and data sharing” (J. Eltes, personal communication, February 2018). For more 
general discussions about the legal challenges in relation to digitalization, see 
Digitaliseringskommissionen (2016); Gulliksen, Persson-Stenborg and Backlund 
(2016); and Ekholm et al. (2016).
The Swedish interviewees also pointed to issues that were tied to the govern-
ance of the Swedish HIE rather than the legislation, though acknowledging that 
these are intertwined. They talked about the national HIE board’s inclination to 
focus on “regional” rather than “global health data market” perspectives and 
on public care providers rather than private care and app providers. What also 
emerged from the interviews was the perceived lack of transparency and long 
lead-times characterizing the current governance model, which in turn slow down 
the incorporation of new technologies, data, and participants on the platform (cf. 
Vimarlund [2014]). Expensive waits and other entry barriers for new actors who 
want to join the platform are produced as a result, according to the interviewees. 
N. Hugosson noted this in the following way: “Not only paying the direct costs for 
joining but understanding what is actually required to join the national HIE, can 
be difficult if not impossible for a small actor.”
Some of the interviewees argued that these tendencies will become increasingly 
problematic in relation to the envisioned large number of and dynamic partici-
pants in the HIE of the future. Problems were also foreseen in relation to the more 
varied types of data that the future HIE is expected to handle. For instance, numer-
ous health-related data beyond EMR data (care consumption, income, socio-
demographic, employment data, etc.) are currently stored locally by private and 
public social and health care providers and national agencies in Sweden (Digitali-
seringskommissionen, 2016; Gulliksen, Persson-Stenborg and Backlund, 2016). 
There are also so called “open data” that are currently made available through 
various disconnected interfaces (OpenData, 2019). Add to this the data generated 
by every individual and their self-tracking devices, along with their global digital 
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traces left behind when consuming and exploring online. It is neither the explicit 
responsibility of the Swedish national HIE, nor any other actor, to innovate, host, 
and govern services enabling individuals, public organizations, or external actors 
to share, access, combine, and use anonymized and aggregate data from these 
disparate sources in real time. As noted by the interviewees, the question is whose 
responsibility it should be.
The Swedish HIE (along with that of many other countries) is taking steps to 
enable greater exchanges and uses of data by making efforts to allow third-party 
actors to access and innovate services based on the EMR data that are currently 
only available to patients and care providers. There are even technological solu-
tions for this end ready for implementation (J. Eltes, personal communication, 
February 2018). International efforts to enable global sharing of EMR and smart 
device data are also underway. For instance, EU projects (Pinto, 2018) attempt 
to develop gateways between national state-based HIEs. The interviewed actors 
applauded these efforts while recognizing that they address only a limited share 
of the various types of data that could in theory be exchanged. The tech-firm 
interviewees also worried about the more overarching limits that may be tied 
to the approach to simply expand the current setup in the future. As noted by 
C. Landgren, “Continuing on the current path would imply the endless addition 
of new specific integrations and service level and interoperability agreements 
between systems and actors.” J. Metsallik pointed at this problem also in relation 
to the opening of the Estonian national HIE, “These kinds of national and interna-
tional integration efforts add yet another layer of centralized governance, and it is 
already slow and expensive.”
3.1.3  Who should run the global health information  
exchange of the future?
The interviewees’ observations reflect the international debate, which has begun 
to discuss whether there may be limits to the types of data transactions under the 
current legislation and whether the different types of national HIEs are capable, 
appropriate, and legitimate platforms for them (Gropper, 2016; Peterson et al., 
2016; Vest and Gamm, 2010). Health-related data are endless, bordering any data 
about an individual, the frequency and quality of one’s social connections and 
environment, generated by the individual or by sensors embedded in one’s body 
or environment. Who should create the rules regarding how to determine the qual-
ity of this kind of data, which will include but not be limited to what we currently 
think of as “health” and “identity” data, and who should decide who may access 
and use it? Neither completely state-based HIEs nor private firms are evident pro-
viders in this context. The need for more open and flexible platforms in combina-
tion with more nuanced and secure authentication mechanisms is discussed in this 
context, given the range of unknown actors that we may exchange data with in the 
future (Birch, 2014). It is against this background the decentralized blockchain 
scenarios may be understood.
Blockchain centralization/decentralization 65
3.2 Blockchain: enabling decentralized transactions
Blockchain research is immature and mostly deals with cryptocurrencies and 
applications in the financial sector. Studies have identified several technical chal-
lenges with the Bitcoin blockchain (e.g., theft, scalability, structural problems), 
and solutions have been proposed (Nofer et al., 2017; Risus and Spohrer, 2017). 
Hence, the definition of “blockchain technology” is continuously changing. Most 
definitions, however, refer to the unlimited network of computers (nodes) that 
may participate in verifying and adding data transactions that occur on open 
blockchains. Each node stores a copy of the history of verified transactions tied to 
each data object, thus forming a decentralized and immutable memory (Casey and 
Vigna, 2018; Burniske and Tatar, 2017; Nakamoto, 2008). This distributed and 
decentralized characteristic, in combination with certain hashing and encryption 
mechanisms, purportedly makes the blockchain possess a higher degree of secu-
rity (data provenance, immutable ledger, robust access) compared to centralized 
designs (Burniske and Tatar, 2017). As noted by Casey and Vigna (2018, p. 20), 
“The result is something remarkable: a record-keeping method that brings us to a 
commonly accepted version of the truth that’s more reliable than any truth we’ve 
ever seen.”
Because blockchain replaces a single centralized source of trust with network 
consensus, it allegedly eliminates the need for any intermediate or central func-
tion for verifying and storing transaction logs. Several analysts further claim that 
it would be more difficult for a malicious/noneligible actor to access and change 
a piece of data and to remove the traces of this breach on the blockchain com-
pared to the current centralized/cloud-based infrastructures. Further, in contrast 
to centralized systems, the functionalities of the blockchain are said to persist 
even if particular nodes break down (Kuo, Kim and Ohno-Machado, 2017; Nofer 
et al., 2017).
3.2.1  Eliminating the need for intermediaries and  
centralized functions
Self-executing, distributed applications, also known as smart contracts, can be 
built on the blockchain. Smart contracts are thus replicated on the system and 
supervised by the network of computers that run the blockchain (Blockgeeks, 
2016). Some blockchain advocates claim that the disintermediation enabled by 
smart contracts calls into question not only the centralized functions of traditional 
databases but also the role of any central institution. They argue that while central-
ized political organizations like the nation state, bureaucracy, and representative 
democracy have been a necessary response to the scaling problem, that is, for 
reaching consensus and coordination between heterogeneous or distant groups of 
people, such organizations imply a concentration of power in the hands of a few, 
which in turn implies inadequate responsiveness and risks tied to corruption, reg-
ulatory capture, and misuse of power. Dominant corporate giants such as Amazon, 
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Facebook, Google, Twitter, PayPal, and eBay are subject to similar critiques in 
these discussions (Sparkes, 2014). The civil society could, however, organize 
itself and protect its own interests more effectively by replacing the traditional 
functions of the State and giant corporations with decentralized, open-source plat-
forms, the argument goes (Buterin, 2014; Winfield, 2017). Such a decentralized 
system would produce benefits such as reduced overheads, improved security, 
and “removal of the weakest link of all – greedy, corruptible, fallible humans” 
(Sparkes, 2014, para.10). For an example of a stateless, DIY governance services 
entirely based on the blockchain, see Bitnation (2019).
This line of thought, often referred to as techno-libertarian, anarcho-capitalist, 
or market anarchist, echoes the anarchist view that coercive authority should be 
replaced by voluntary associations based on continuing consent and the idea that 
society best facilitates individual will in a free-market economy (Hayek, 1948; 
Rothbard, 1978; cf. Atzori, 2017). As noted by Bogost (2017, para.9), many 
blockchain-based scenarios depict a world where “neither states nor corporations 
are acceptable intermediaries. That leaves a sparsely set table. At it, individuals, 
the property they own, the contracts into which they enter to exchange that prop-
erty, and a market to facilitate that exchange.”
All the interviewees suggest more modest routes forward, a point to which we 
will return. At this stage, however, we find the extreme ideas useful as points of 
departure and comparison. Below, we will discuss how they could be applied in 
the HIE context.
3.2.2  Applying blockchain ideas in the global health  
information exchange context
Empirical research about blockchain in health care is scarce, to say the least. There 
is, however, a growing amount of development work and mobilization of interest 
in the area (see, for instance, the papers submitted to the US Office of National 
Coordination Blockchain challenge [Office of National Coordination, 2016] or 
posts on blogs and websites with blockchain content [Cryptoslate, 2018; Hashed 
Health, 2018; Bukstel, 2018]). The view emerging from this activity is that block-
chain enables the creation of a protected lifelong record of one’s health data. The 
record would handle (store and point to)3 all of an individual’s health-related data 
and log everything done with it, at what time, and by what entity. This differs 
from the current situation, in which health-related data are stored and exchanged 
through multiple different devices and cloud hosted by a variety of public and pri-
vate actors, requiring different authentication methods. The integrity of the block-
chain record would surpass the robustness and integrity of current systems for 
storing and logging health transactions due to the large number of computers serv-
ing as nodes. Also, the record could be much more comprehensive, as it would 
be capable of including a wide set of health data transactions. The procedure of 
writing and reading data on and through the record would allegedly also be more 
lean, direct, and efficient than the procedures tied to current HIEs, as there would 
be no intermediary actors performing verifications or controls (BurstIQ, 2019; 
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Carechain, 2018; Patientory, 2018; Lippman, Ekblaw and Halamka, 2017; Swan, 
2015). A number of engineers and tech experts continue to emphasize the pos-
sibility to “bypass” the interoperability problem via blockchain. Different authors 
refer to technologies such as the representational state transfer (REST) application 
programming interface, which allows a variety of sources (including EMR data 
as well as embodied and environmental sensors) to write data to the blockchain 
(Bresnick, 2017). It is further argued that interoperability can be achieved by 
smart models with the ability to learn how to identify and interpret the meaning of 
patterns in data, even though it is expressed in different ways (post-structuration) 
(S. Farestam, personal communication, February 2018).
Through what mechanisms would actors “writing” and “reading” data iden-
tify themselves, then? Casey and Vigna (2018) argue that we need to reorient the 
discussion to how blockchains provide the mechanism to radically change the 
way digital identities are managed in this context. Similarly, Diakun-Thibault 
(2018) claims that the fact that blockchain makes it possible to construct new 
solutions for digital identity represents the most important affordance of block-
chains. She notes, “Without identity (whether for humans or things), block-
chain may remain on the periphery as a shiny object. Identity or identification 
is the quintessential piece that will make Blockchain perhaps the most impor-
tant compound technology to date” (Diakun-Thibault, 2018, p. 2). To exemplify 
this point, consider how an individual “identifies” herself when using online 
eHealth services or wellness apps today. Most likely she uses a range of dif-
ferent accounts and credentials, provided by a set of different actors, and she 
may have more or less insight into where and by whom all her “identity data” 
are stored. Add to this the various paper-based proofs of her existence that she 
may store, for example, passport, population registration certificate, driver’s 
license, ID card. This common state of affairs underlies the vivid debate about 
the “missing identity layer of the Internet” and the need to create an infrastruc-
ture enabling digital IDs that are secure, portable, and owned by the individual. 
Self-sovereign identities on blockchain infrastructures are presented as a means 
for achieving just that.
3.2.3 Self-sovereign identities
Self-sovereign identities (ssIDs) refer to solutions enabling you to be your own 
identity provider, thus making your digital existence independent of any single 
organization or state. No external party could claim to “provide” the identity for 
or take away the ID from you because it would be intrinsically yours. With an 
ssID, you would hence completely control and manage your digital identity. This 
includes being free to enter an identity-relationship with any other (Windley, 
2018; Tobin and Drummond, 2017; Allen, 2016).
How would this work, then? There are several answers to this question. The 
general idea is, however, that you as an individual successively build your own 
ssID on a blockchain. Somewhere in the chain, you must most likely provide a 
physical proof of your existence. However, once you have a claim about your 
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existence, you can then connect and disconnect various claims to it, which allows 
for pseudonymity (Birch, 2014).
In his blog, Lewis (2017, para.22) describes a scenario where you would have 
an identity wallet app: “Your identity wallet would start off empty with only a 
self-generated identification number derived from public key, and a correspond-
ing private key. . . . You then use this identification number, along with your iden-
tity claims, and get attestations from relevant authorities. You can then use these 
attested claims as your identity information.” An ssID can hence be understood 
as a digital record or “container” of claims – statements – about you. The claims 
may concern attributes associated to your person (e.g., age, height, birth date, 
biometrics), attributes accumulated over time (e.g., medical information, prefer-
ences, communication metadata), and designated attributes (e.g., telephone num-
ber, email, passport number). You can add claims to your ID by writing claims 
yourself, by asking others to provide claims about you, and by accepting claims 
from any number of organizations. The fact that you accept a claim about you 
may, however, not be enough to make the claim trustworthy for others. Hence, 
the claim would be linked to attestations. An attestation refers to a “trusted” third 
party validating that according to their records, the claim is true by digitally sign-
ing pieces of info that are valid within certain time frames. For example, a uni-
versity may attest to the fact that you studied there and earned a degree, a hospital 
may attest to the fact that you suffer from a specific diagnosis, and a governmental 
agency may attest that you were born in and a citizen of a specific country (Preu-
kschat, 2018).
In this scenario, all transactions tied to your ID are broadcast and stored on the 
blockchain, which would allegedly reduce the risk of anyone reversing transac-
tions regarding your identity, for example, eliminating or modifying a piece of 
your identity. Further, only you as the identity owner can tie the claims together – 
there is no external correlation between them unless you wish to reveal it, for 
example, by sharing claims from two different issuers with the same relying party. 
This reduces the risk of “oversharing” identity information. You will only release 
the claims relevant for a specific transaction, and the recipient will not need to 
be burdened by protecting sensitive identity data. Importantly, no single central 
agent makes all decisions regarding who can read and write claims or what is a 
piece of identity information. Anyone can write a claim, and it is up to the transac-
tion parties to decide whether a claim and the attestations tied to it suffice for the 
exchange in question. Hence, authentication procedures will be determined in a 
decentralized way, through individual contracts. For an example of what a mar-
ket of claims may look like, see the reputation economy suggested by Tobin and 
Drummond (2017). Furthermore, the Swiss town of Zug is, as of 2017, developing 
an offer to its citizens to use a blockchain-based digital identity (Vitaris, 2017). 
There are also EU Horizon 2020 initiatives such as “MyhealthData” (2018).
Analysts argue that the new kinds of granular and “need-to-know” transactions 
of claims mentioned above are enabled by smart contracts that will automati-
cally execute the individual agreements and thus handle the authentication of the 
exchanging parties (Birch, 2014). These smart contracts may have access to both 
Blockchain centralization/decentralization 69
on-chain and off-chain information. For instance, if a research project wants to 
know if you have blood type A, the research project may send a question/transac-
tion to your smart contract: “Are you blood type A?” Given that this is a question 
that your smart contract accepts since it is programmed only to respond to some 
questions, it will answer the question by looking up data on and off chain.4 Your 
smart contract would, however, not divulge private information about your name, 
date of birth, and so on, and the procedure would be direct, only involving the 
research project and you, as opposed to the current state where redundant identity 
information is often released per default, and where several intermediary func-
tions are involved.
3.2.4 Self-executing contracts operating on our behalf
Given the possibility for smart contracts to efficiently handle authentication pro-
cedures, new service affordances emerge. The assumption is that you will perceive 
increased security regarding your health data transactions with ssIDs, for instance, 
worrying less about your data being used by someone else than the intended recip-
ient or you being identified backward. The fact that blockchain enables “private” 
machine learning (i.e., allows models to train on sensitive data without revealing 
them) is also claimed to reduce the problem of derivation/secondary confidential-
ity in this context (Ehrsam, 2018). The point emphasized is that this will make you 
more willing to and will provide you with greater opportunities to make your data 
available to various parties and secondary uses (Birch, 2014).
The result would be possibilities that are often mentioned in scenarios of the 
future of health care more generally: integrating big health data streams (genom-
ics, lifestyle, medical history, etc.) and running machine learning algorithms on 
them, which will yield insights used for wellness maintenance and preventive 
medicine. The constantly growing data will provide entirely new possibilities for 
actors to continuously monitor and learn about you, your things, and your envi-
ronment’s “normal” state, as opposed to the current situation in which data is 
generated at the point of care (at the clinic, for instance), when health problems 
have arisen, or at the “break-down” of things and environments. The knowledge 
will be used by actors to detect and act on early deviations, thus shifting the focus 
from reaction to prevention (Swan, 2015).
The blockchain community here envisions new global HIEs or data markets, 
completely run on and by several different dedicated blockchains. A range of dif-
ferent personalized services will be available on the markets, only you will be 
able to trade data, ideas, behavior, and identities with unknown actors and on 
new terms, not only with money (as we currently think of it) but also with data or 
other digital currencies, commodities, or goods (tokens), that is, “resources” that 
allow actors to do something. For a more in-depth discussion about the differ-
ences among cryptocurrencies, digital commodities, tokens, and finished digital 
goods, see Burniske and Tatar (2017). For instance, your personal AI agent may, 
based on data about you (your digital twin), identify the service that can help you 
achieve your specific health – or life – goal at the lowest cost, or it may constantly 
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poll for research projects that fit your personal values and behavior and that need 
data about a body that has your characteristics. The agent may donate data to some 
prespecified types of projects (for instance, to data research commons with vary-
ing levels of openness/privacy) or sell your data to parties that pay well in order 
to earn tokens. Your AI agent may later invest the tokens in services or projects 
that you find worthwhile. Indeed, you may even allow your AI agent to make 
political propositions (suggesting, for instance, the modification of the rules or 
technological infrastructure of a health community) and invite certain human and 
non-human entities or communities to vote on them. A smart contract will then 
automatically execute the majority’s decision. For more information about how 
to build “decentralized democracies,” see Ethereum (2018). The idea is that this 
could stimulate the innovation of much more complex health services and health 
projects than today, which would ultimately lead to improved health outcomes 
benefitting both the individual and the society.
In the extreme scenario, the global HIE would be based on a permissionless 
technological infrastructure (as the Bitcoin blockchain is) and would be open for 
anyone to act as a node and to engage in transactions. The HIE would also be 
based on a decentralized and autonomous mode of governance, as smart contracts 
could coordinate and execute the peer-to-peer transactions without any central-
ized human curation at all.
Many blockchain voices, however, envision a future in which blockchain 
arrangements are coupled with centralized functions (Atzori, 2017). For instance, 
Swan (2015, p. 17) writes, “The end point is not lawlessness and anarchy, but 
that legal frameworks become more granular and personalized to the situation.” 
Furthermore, in an interview, the blockchain advocate Antonopoulos states, “This 
is not some kind of libertarian manifesto, or anarchist manifesto, saying that we 
don’t need mechanisms for achieving social cohesion. It’s simply recognizing 
that we can create better mechanisms as we solve problems of scale. It’s simply 
that we can make better governments when we don’t concentrate power as much 
in the hands of a few people” (A. Antonopoulos, interviewed in Sparkes [2014, 
para.178]).
Below, we will elaborate on a few challenges associated with the establishment 
of expanded health data trades, which call for some element of centralization and 
some form of human governance.
4  Discussion: challenges tied to the shift toward  
global health innovation clubs
The idea of decentralized and autonomous infrastructures can be understood as 
a response to the limitations tied to current HIE arrangements. However, several 
needs may motivate some degree of centralized functions in the governance of the 
HIEs of the future. The needs discussed below are overlapping and nonexhaus-




Completely open infrastructures such as permissionless blockchains may provide 
effective means for creating secure transaction logs and flexible data exchanges. 
But would they be capable of creating systems that people trust? Consider the 
scenario where a community of unknown actors announces the availability of 
an open, blockchain-based HIE and tries to make potential users (care providers, 
patients, app developers, etc.) begin to write and read data on it. It seems reason-
able to doubt that the technological design, including the “transparent ledger” 
and “smart contracts” of such a network, would suffice to attract users in the near 
future.
For one, the potential users may worry about the long-term survival of the infra-
structure and its services. A decentralized blockchain could be dismissed by the 
actors providing computer power and/or data if not seen as attractive or remunera-
tive anymore, as illustrated by the forking of the Bitcoin blockchain (Andersen 
and Ingram-Boguz, 2017; Gasser, Budish and West, 2015). This implies risks for 
lack of service continuity and preservation of data, with no delineation or liabil-
ity (Reijers, Brochain and Haynes, 2016; DuPont and Maurer, 2015). In order 
to attract any users, a known, “trustworthy actor” may hence need to formally 
support the infrastructure underlying the health data market, in terms of provid-
ing an “OK stamp” on the actors that participate as nodes on it by guaranteeing 
its long-term stability and by ensuring the protection and preservation of certain 
shared values.
Consequently, the interviewees and many white papers suggest variants of 
permissioned technological blockchain designs for health care (BurstIQ, 2019; 
Carechain, 2018; Hashed Health, 2018; Patientory, 2018; Lippman, Ekblaw and 
Halamka, 2017). Permissioned blockchains are distributed and synchronized, but 
their network is restricted to few trusted nodes and members, identifiable by con-
trolled access permissions (Buterin, 2015).5
Who, then, could constitute the central, trustworthy agent providing permis-
sion rather than a network of nodes and actors? One suggested answer is not one 
actor (which would imply little difference from today’s setup), but several institu-
tions, associations, and groups, joining in collaborative governance arrangements, 
such as private-public partnerships, eternal non-profit foundations, alliances, con-
sortia, or cooperatives (see, e.g., Carechain [2018] and additional ideas from the 
organizational literature about the new forms of multi-actor governance [West 
and O’Mahony, 2008; Abbott, 2000; Paquet, 2000]). The idea of some blockchain 
advocates is that the current state-based boards of national HIEs could act as one 
among several participants in such consortia, which would also include other pub-
lic, private, and non-profit actors, spanning sectors and national borders. As noted 
by one of the interviewees, “The crucial point will be to maximize participation 
and consensus while including actors diverse enough to prevent collusion of inter-
ests” (J. Sällström, personal communication, May 2018). That is, the support of 
state-based or private actors alone would not suffice to create trust in the platforms 
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of the future, as there will be a need to find consensus-based solutions to problems 
spanning both sectors and national borders, a point to which we will return below.
4.2 Realizing the societal value of data-based learning
Large amounts of data available at low cost are often assumed in the scenarios of 
the future. As indicated above, current HIE setups in combination with abstract 
and ambiguous regulatory approaches have not generated any significant change 
in the release and use of data by individuals or public and private organizations. 
Indeed, what seems to emerge from HIE research across countries is that care pro-
viders’ and patients’ enthusiasm in “participating” in HIEs is growing but could 
be greater (Redelmeier and Kraus, 2018; Mold et al., 2015). The question is if a 
completely decentralized blockchain would be a more effective means for real-
izing the potential of data at societal level.
For one, a pure decentralized market would not be able to handle positive and 
negative externalities stemming from data use (Spiekermann et al., 2015). For 
instance, when deciding which data transactions to accept on a market, you may 
choose to ignore that the use of your data may yield insights that benefit not only 
you and the actor using the data, but larger groups in society. Similarly, you may 
refuse to release data about yourself, although this may limit not only your pos-
sibilities to receive individualized services but also the development of precision 
medicine for the population overall. This also applies to corporations. Overall, 
a market would encourage the view of data as a unique competitive advantage, 
which would create incentives to lock in, protect, and sell rather than freely shar-
ing data, with resulting limitations on the degree to which actors could learn from 
the data (for a more elaborate discussion about the challenges related to the crea-
tion of data markets, see Spiekermann et al. [2015]).
The aim to maximize learning and innovation based on health data may hence 
motivate some form of centralized administration and regulatory changes. Insights 
from the AI community can be applied here, where analysts have proposed inter-
ventions such as time-restricted data monopolies as well as shared investment in 
and promotion of global data commons, donor banks, and gift-aid style schemes 
for data where there is value in secondary analysis. This is in order to create 
extended forms of what we currently think of as “open data,” which would enable 
firms, governments, and individuals to contribute and reuse anonymous, aggre-
gate datasets in new ways. Of course, creating such data philanthropy and making 
actors trust that they contribute to “the use of data for good” will be a challenge. 
Hence, efforts to enable and stimulate data generosity will need to be coupled 
with shared agreements regarding what kinds of uses are “for good” and what are 
not (UK Parliament, 2018; Naylor and Jones, 2017).
4.3  Developing shared agreements to facilitate  
innovation “for good”
The notion of decentralized health and identity data transactions can be seen as 
a response to the limited opportunities that individuals currently enjoy in terms 
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of determining with whom and how to share health data. Some (new) forms of 
shared (rather than individual) agreements helping individuals to make decisions 
regarding their data (or nudging individuals to make a decision that benefits the 
society) may, however, be needed in the future.
As an example, given that a new culture of data use emerges, the number 
of agents wanting an individual’s data for various purposes may become too 
numerous to count. Handling such data requests and providing consent on a 
case-by-case or individual contract level may not be tenable or desirable for a 
large share of the population. This may call for shared agreements regarding 
categories of agents and uses for the large scope of population that are not overly 
interested in these matters. Shared agreements may also be motivated in order to 
fully realize the value of data at a societal level. One could here imagine shared 
agreements regarding different dimensions of use and data ownership. As a basic 
example, the use of 1) non-identified data for research and model training could 
be differentiated from the use of 2) identified data for personalized interven-
tion purposes. For the use of non-identified data, opt-out possibilities may be an 
alternative. Spiekermann et al. (2015) even discuss the alternative to remove the 
choice from individuals and make certain levels of non-identified data provision 
involuntary, given the aim to maximize health outcomes of data at societal level. 
For AI agents using multidimensional sets of data tied to an individual’s identity 
in order to identify risks and deliver personalized interventions, opt-in possibili-
ties may be an alternative.6 Obviously, endless degrees of nuance are possible 
here, and the path forward will involve balancing the need for simplicity versus 
flexibility and the freedom and responsibility of the individual in relation to the 
collective.
On a related note, the interviewees foresee a need for standards regarding the 
exchange of ID claims should the ssID-scenario materialize. While ssIDs are sup-
posedly governed by the individual, it cannot be taken for granted that all indi-
viduals will be able and motivated to carefully delimit the claims they release. To 
prevent actors from connecting the dots and linking data to a specific individual 
(backward identification), a need for shared rules regarding, for instance, a maxi-
mum number of claim requests allowed is discussed (J. Sellström, personal com-
munication, May 2018).
What these issues point toward is a shift in the target of data regulations, from 
a focus on the organization in which the data were documented to the situations 
in which the data will be used, updated, and extended. This will imply a need to 
ensure transparency and accountability in contexts of use that involve human as 
well as non-human actors and that span national jurisdictions (P. Dhey, personal 
communication, March 2018).
Finally, while blockchain enables a post-structuration approach to interoper-
ability, the Swedish individuals interviewed here suggest a combination of pre- 
and post-structuring of data and metadata. Indeed, the variability of data formats 
and documentation patterns of today beg for pre-structuration, too, in order to 
facilitate the aggregations that are typically assumed. As pre-structuring stand-
ardization work cannot be solved on an individual-contract basis, this implies yet 
another motivation for some form of centralized governance unit.
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4.4 Preventing hidden forms of power centralization
The current HIE setups are criticized for not representing all participants in the 
future health ecosystem and for placing control in the hands of a few. However, 
the argument that blockchains will imply a decentralization of control may be 
deceptive. Research on networks based on distributed consensus show that they 
do exhibit centralized points of control, only in more subtle and hidden forms. For 
instance, centralization patterns have arisen in the Bitcoin blockchain due to the 
scalability problem and unequal knowledge distribution (Courtois, 2014; Gervais 
et al., 2014). Analysts have pointed to risks such as miner corporations and the 
likely dependency of private oligarchies, which may conduct mergers and gain 
considerable power on a global scale. This relates to research on infrastructures 
for distributed innovation, which points to the parallel existence of the “long tail” 
of specialized niche actors and the “giants” that achieve global dominance thanks 
to their ability to integrate diverse capabilities, combined with network effects 
(Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, 2010; Anderson, 2007). In short, digital networks of 
today often exhibit more or less subtle points of centralized control, resting with 
individuals (due to technical knowledge), firms (with resources), or foundations 
(with more insight into the network than others). Such actors may become de 
facto leaders but lack accountability and have not made any promise to serve pub-
lic interests (for a more general critique against the dominance of today’s corpo-
rate data giants, see, e.g., Bergstein [2017], Galloway [2017], and Taplin [2017]). 
There is no guarantee that principles such as diversity, inclusiveness, and equal 
access of care will be maintained by such groups (nor by smart contracts acting 
autonomously on a market). This presents additional charges for centralized func-
tions: to prevent asymmetries, lower barriers to entry, and potentially develop new 
antitrust legislation to address data-based monopolies (UK Parliament, 2018). It 
will be equally important to ensure democratic values such as diversity and equal 
opportunity, and to protect groups that may be gaining the least, for instance, those 
who are data illiterate or generate data that are potentially less useful (Dahl, 1989).
4.5 Securing a place for humans
The scenarios in which AI agents learn to execute things on our behalf will 
increasingly raise ethical questions, which will be difficult to resolve on an 
individual-contract basis. For one, AI agents may be biased and may discriminate 
against actors (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Tegmark, 2017; Ananny, 2016; Harari, 
2015; Newell and Marabelli, 2015). Note that this is a risk in relation to the inan-
ity of today’s narrow artificial intelligence, which may lead to AI being unable to 
recognize important dimensions of “the big picture” (Faraj, Pachidi and Sayegh, 
2018). The risk is also relevant in relation to the potential “general” artificial intel-
ligences, which may become “smarter” than we are and thus discriminate against 
us in undesirable ways, such as possibly not even including us in the “big picture” 
(Tegmark, 2017).
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Indeed, looking far ahead, Harari (2015) argues that technological develop-
ments in AI and biological and cyborg engineering may increase our ability to 
extend lifespans and even cheat death. Meanwhile, the redundancy of human 
labor, replaced by efficient machines, will generate an enormous “useless class,” 
without economic purpose. In combination, this will lead to a society character-
ized by a universal faith in the power of algorithms, and in which individuals will 
become just a collection of “biochemical subsystems” monitored by global net-
works, which will inform us second by second how we feel. His book closes with 
the following questions: “What’s more valuable – intelligence or consciousness?” 
and “What will happen to society, politics and daily life when non-conscious but 
highly intelligent algorithms know us better than we know ourselves?” (Harari, 
2015, p. 402). Smart contracts will not provide the answer.
Ensuring that the systems of the future work toward our collective well-being 
hence requires us to be exceptionally lucid in our representations of the values 
we hold and the ways we want those values to be optimized and/or preserved 
(Yudkowsky, 2016). As noted by the UK Parliament (2018, p. 47): “Our ability to 
engage with philosophy and converge on ethical principles is starting to take on a 
dimension of significance that has not existed before.” Needless to say, engaging 
in such philosophical and ethical questions will constitute a true challenge for the 
human governance layers of the HIEs of the future, blockchain based or not.
5 Conclusion
Health data available for learning at the global scale seem to be what most actors 
engaged in the digitalization of society hope for. Diverse views regarding how 
to achieve this state of affairs are, however, emerging. In an attempt to stimulate 
a discussion about alternative paths forward, we have juxtaposed the arrange-
ment of today’s HIEs with the decentralized (blockchain-based) HIE scenario. 
Based on our conversations with individuals involved in the field, we outline 
some question marks regarding the ability of current HIEs to enable the global 
data exchange and innovation envisioned. As one may expect, the decentralized 
(blockchain-based) scenario does not seem able to autonomously deal with these 
challenges. We conclude that a combination of decentralization and new forms 
of centralization will characterize the infrastructures of the future, be they block-
chain based or not. Much effort will be required to reach agreement regarding 
how these infrastructures and governance models can serve the interests of both 
individuals and society.
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Notes
 1 BankID is a virtual certificate or ID that allows an individual to authenticate herself 
online. In Sweden, BankID is owned, maintained, and provided by Finansiell ID-Teknik 
BID AB, which is owned by several Swedish banks. BankID certificates are issued only 
to individuals with a personal social security number.
 2 As an example, the Swedish eHealth Agency made an attempt to develop a personal 
health account (PHA) (Swe: Hälsa för mig) that would allow individuals to store health 
data from various sources (including EMR data) in a so-called “private space” (the 
Swedish legal term is “eget utrymme” [Bålman, 2017]). However, the Swedish Data 
Protection Agency found uncertainties regarding whether the setup regarding storage, 
processing, and exchange of the data actually complied with current data regulations in 
2017 (Data Protection Agency, 2017). The Swedish administrative court (Swe: Förvalt-
ningsdomstolen) subsequently ruled against the PHA on the basis that its design was not 
compliant with Swedish legislation, and the initiative was thus shut down in 2018 (Data 
Protection Agency, 2018).
 3 There are different views regarding whether the actual health data should also be stored 
on or off chain. In the on-chain scenario, additional technologies are used to protect 
sensitive data stored on the blockchain, while the transaction data is kept open. In the 
off-chain scenario, the blockchain includes pointers to sensitive data stored off chain, 
and smart contracts fetch such off-chain data when necessary. Combinations are also 
possible.
 4 While the transactions would be stored on chain, there are different views of where 
sensitive data and the private key should be stored, ranging from a personal off-chain 
device such as our smartphone, on a card and stored in a safe like we store passports, on 
a chip implanted in our bodies, in a space hosted by a trusted actor, and so on.
 5 The number of nodes that may participate in these health care blockchains is hence 
smaller than permissionless blockchains. However, the nodes would still be higher in 
number than the nodes of the HIEs of today and thus make it more difficult for any 
central administrator to reverse the history of transactions. Since nodes are few, with no 
need for mining and computationally intensive proof-of-work, validations and propaga-
tion of data are further faster than permissionless blockchains.
 6 While blockchain discussions often emphasize that data will be exchanged at a more 
fine-grained level and on a need-to-know basis, and even without revealing identified 
data, the possibility that some types of AI-based learning and innovation will require 
(“need-to-know”) a horizontal, full view of all of your data cannot be excluded.
References
Abbott, F.M., 2000. Distributed governance at the WTO-WIPO: an evolving model for 
open-architecture integrated governance. Journal of International Economic Law, 3(1), 
pp. 63–81.
Allen, C., 2016. The path to self-sovereign identity. [online] Life with alacrity blog. Avail-
able at: <www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html> 
[Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Ananny, M., 2016. Toward an ethics of algorithms. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 
41(1), pp. 93–117.
Andersen, J. and Ingram-Boguz, C., 2017. Patterns of self-organising in the Bitcoin online 
community: code forking as organising in digital infrastructure. In: Association for 
information systems AIS electronic library (AISeL) ICIS 2017 proceedings, pp. 1–20.
Anderson, C., 2007. The long tail: why the future of business is selling less of more. Jour-
nal of Product Innovation Management, 24(3), pp. 1–30.
Blockchain centralization/decentralization 77
Atzori, M., 2017. Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: is the state still 
necessary? Journal of Governance and Regulation, 6(1), pp. 45–62.
Bålman, J., 2017. Promemoria 2017–09–29. Eget utrymme är numera accepterat i lagmo-
tiv – frågor om legalitet och dataskydd återstår [Private space is accepted: questions 
about legality and data protection remains]. [online] Available at: <www.esamverka.
se/download/18.3687e38a15e84632115c9b02/1506941988144/PM Eget utrymme.pdf> 
[Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Berg, M., 1996. Practices of reading and writing: the constitutive role of the patient record 
in medical work. Sociology of Health & Illness, 18(4), pp. 499–524.
Berg, M. and Bowker, G., 1997. The multiple bodies of the medical record: toward a soci-
ology of an artifact. Sociological Quarterly, 38(3), pp. 513–37.
Bergstein, B., 2017. We need more alternatives to Facebook. [online] MIT Technology 
Review. Available at: <www.technologyreview.com/s/604082/we-need-more-alterna 
tives-to-facebook> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Birch, D., 2014. Identity is the new money. London, UK: London Publishing Partnership.
Bitnation, 2019. Enter Pangea. The internet of sovereignty. [online] Bitnation homepage. 
Available at: <https://tse.bitnation.co> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Blockgeeks, 2016. Smart contracts: the blockchain technology that will replace lawyers. 
[online] Blockgeeks blog. Available at: <https://blockgeeks.com/guides/smart-con 
tracts> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Bogost, I., 2017. Cryptocurrency might be a path to authoritarianism. The Atlantic. [online] 
Available at: <www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/blockchain-of-com 
mand/528543> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Bresnick, J., 2017. Exploring the use of Blockchain for EHRs, healthcare big data. [online] 
Health IT analytics. Available at: <https://healthitanalytics.com/features/exploring-the-
use-of-blockchain-for-ehrs-healthcare-big-data> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Brynjolfsson, E., Hu, Y.J. and Smith, M.D., 2010. Long tails vs. superstars: the effect of 
information technology on product variety and sales concentration patterns. Information 
Systems Research, 21(4), 736747, pp. 1–20.
Bukstel, E., 2018. Competition for the healthcare blockchain. [online] Medium blog. 
Available at: <https://medium.com/@Connected_Dots/competition-for-the-healthcare-
blockchain-26a6f2bc09a4> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Burniske, C. and Tatar, J., 2017. Cryptoassets: the innovative investor’s guide to bitcoin 
and beyond. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
BurstIQ, 2019. Connecting people: changing health. [online] BurstiQ homepage. Avail-
able at: <www.burstiq.com> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Buterin, V., 2014. An introduction to Futarchy. [online] Ethereum Blog. Available at: 
<https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/08/21/introduction-futarchy> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Buterin, V., 2015. On public and private blockchains. [online] Ethereum Blog. Available at: 
<https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains> [Accessed 
4 Sep. 2019].
CareChain, 2018. The CareChain infrastructure consortium. [online] Available at: <www.
carechain.io/files/CareChain_The_Infrastructure_Consortium.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 
2019].
Casey, M.J. and Vigna, P., 2018. The truth machine: the blockchain and the future of eve-
rything. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Courtois, N., 2014. On the longest chain rule and programmed self-destruction of crypto 
currencies. [online] Available at: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0534> [Accessed 4 Sep. 
2019].
78 Anna Essén and Anders Ekholm
Cryptoslate, 2018. Healthcare cryptocurrencies. [online] Cryptoslate website. Available at: 
<https://cryptoslate.com/category/cryptos/healthcare> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Dahl, R., 1989. Democracy and its critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Data Protection Agency, 2017. Stopp for spridning av hälsotjänster från e-tjänsten hälsa 
för mig. [MyHealth halted]. [online] Data Protection Agency homepage. Available at: 
<www.datainspektionen.se/nyheter/stopp-for-spridning-av-halsouppgifter-fran-e-tjan 
sten-halsa-for-mig> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Data Protection Agency, 2018. Domstol ger Datainspektionen rätt om Hälsa för mig. [The 
court supports the data protection agency concerning the personal health account]. 
[online] Data Protection Agency homepage. Available at: <www.datainspektionen.se/
nyheter/domstol-ger-datainspektionen-ratt-om-halsa-for-mig> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Diakun-Thibault, N., 2018. Review: the truth machine in the age of cryptocurrency. [online] 
Available at: <www.researchgate.net/publication/323547090> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Digitaliseringskommissionen, 2016. Digitaliseringens effekter på individ och samhälle – 
fyra temarapporter [The effects of digitalisation on the individual and society – four 
thematic reports]. [online] Available at: <www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/stat 
ens-offentliga-utredningar/2016/12/sou-201685> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
DuPont, Q. and Maurer, B., 2015. Ledgers and law in the blockchain. [online] Kings 
Review. Available at: <http://kingsreview.co.uk/articles/ledgers-and-law-in-the-block 
chain> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Ehrsam, F., 2018. Blockchain-based machine learning marketplaces. [online] Medium 
blog. Available at: <https://medium.com/@FEhrsam/blockchain-based-machine-learn 
ing-marketplaces-cb2d4dae2c17> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Ekholm, A., Karim, J., Nilsson, F., Riggare, S., Markovic, D., Wetter, E., Wahlgren, J., 
Olsson, J., Krohwinkel, A., Winberg, H., Rognes, J., Ahrnell, B-M., Sundström, P., Lin-
dencrona, F., Bokström, T. and Wieselgren, I., 2016. Bortom IT. Om hälsa i en digital tid 
[Beyond IT: on health in a digital era. [online] Institute for Future Studies. Available at: 
<www.iffs.se/publikationer/if-rapporter/bortom-it-om-halsa-i-en-digital-tid> [Accessed 
4 Sep. 2019].
Essén, A., Scandurra, I., Gerrits, R., Humphrey, G., Johansen, M., Kiergegaard, P., Koski-
nen, J., Liaw, S., Odeh, S., Ross, P. and Ancker, J., 2018. Patient access to electronic 
health records: differences across ten countries. Health Policy and Technology, 7(1), 
pp. 44–56.
Essén, A. and Värlander, S., 2018. How materiality enables and constrains framing prac-
tices: affordances of a rheumatology e-service. Journal of Management Inquiry, 28(4), 
pp. 458–71.
Ethereum, 2018. How to build a democracy on the blockchain. [online] Etherium home-
page. Available at: <http://web.archive.org/web/20190424032704/https://ethereum.org/
dao> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Faraj, S., Pachidi, S. and Sayegh, K., 2018. Working and organizing in the age of the learn-
ing algorithm. Information and Organization, 28(1), pp. 62–70.
Frey, C. and Osborne, M., 2017. The future of employment: how susceptible are jobs to 
computerisation? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114(C), pp. 254–80.
Galloway, S., 2017. The four: the hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. 
New York, NY: Penguin.
Gasser, U., Budish, R. and West, S., 2015. Multistakeholder as governance groups: obser-
vations from case studies. [online] Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2549270> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Blockchain centralization/decentralization 79
Gervais, A., Karame, G., Capkun, S. and Capkum, V., 2014. Is Bitcoin a decentralized cur-
rency? IEEE Security and Privacy, 12(3), pp. 54–60.
Gibson, J., 2015. The ecological approach to visual perception. New York, NY: Psychol-
ogy Press.
Gilbert, R., Goldstein, H. and Hemingway, H., 2015. The market in healthcare data. British 
Medical Journal, 351, pp. 1–5.
Government Offices of Sweden, 2016. Vision e-hälsa 2025 – gemensamma utgångspunkter 
för digitalisering i socialtjänst och hälso- och sjukvård. [Vision e-Health 2025 – shared 
departure points for digitalization of social and healthcare]. [online] Available at: 
<www.regeringen.se/4a1f04/contentassets/79df147f5b194554bf401dd88e89b791/
vision-e-halsa-2025.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Greenhalgh, T., Potts, H., Wong, G., Bark, P. and Swinglehurst, D., 2009. Tensions and 
paradoxes in electronic patient record research: a systematic literature review using the 
meta-narrative method. The Milbank Quarterly, 87(4), pp. 729–88.
Gropper, J., 2016. Powering the physician-patient relationship with HIE of one blockchain 
health IT. ONC/NIST use of blockchain for healthcare workshop. [online] Available at: 
<www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/7-29-poweringthephysician-patientrelationship 
withblockchainhealthit.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Gulliksen, J., Persson-Stenborg, A. and Backlund, A., 2016. För digitalisering i tiden. Slut-
betänkande av Digitaliseringskommissionen [Digitalisation today: final comments by 
the digitalisation committee]. [online] SOU 2016:89. Available at: <www.regeringen.
se/4af25c/contentassets/f7d07b214e2c459eb5757cea206e6701/sou-2016_89_webb.
pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Harari, Y., 2015. Homo deus: a brief history of tomorrow. London, UK: Harvill Secker, 
Penguim Random House.
Hashed Health, 2018. Press. [online] Hashed Health homepage. Available at: <https://
hashedhealth.com/media/press> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Hayek, F.A., 1948. Individualism and economic order. Chicago, IL: University of Chigaco 
Press.
Inera, 2016. Ineras ramverk [Inera framework]. [online] Available at: <https://www.inera.
se/globalassets/om-inera/styrdokument-och-rapporter/ineras-ramverk.pdf> [Accessed 
4 Sep. 2019].
Inera, 2017. Verksamhetsstrategi [Business strategy]. [online] Available at: <www.inera.
se/tjanster/journalen/Journalen/journalen-nationellt-ramverk> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Kivimäki, P., 2018. There is no blockchain technology in the X-Road. [online] Nordic Insti-
tute for Interoperability Solutions. Available at: <https://www.niis.org/blog/2018/4/26/
there-is-no-blockchain-technology-in-the-x-road> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Kuo, T.T., Kim, H.E. and Ohno-Machado, L., 2017. Blockchain distributed ledger tech-
nologies for biomedical and health care applications. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 24(6), pp. 1211–20.
Leonardi, P. and Barley, S., 2010. What’s under construction here? Social action, mate-
riality, and power in constructivist studies of technology and organizing. Academy of 
Management Annals, 4(1), pp. 1–51.
Lewis, A., 2017. A gentle introduction to self-sovereign identity. [online] Bits on blocks 
blog. Available at: <https://bitsonblocks.net/2017/05/17/a-gentle-introduction-to-self-
sovereign-identity> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Lippman, A., Ekblaw, A. and Halamka, J., 2017. The potential for blockchain to trans-
form electronic health records. [online] Harvard Business Review online. Available at: 
80 Anna Essén and Anders Ekholm
<https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-potential-for-blockchain-to-transform-electronic-health-
records> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Mold, F., De Lusignan, S., Sheikh, A., Majeed, A., Wyatt, J., Quinn, T., Cavill, M., 
Franco, C., Chauhan, U., Blakey, H., Kataria, N., Arvanitis, T. and Ellis, B., 2015. 
Patients’ online access to their electronic health records and linked online services: a 
systematic review in primary care. British Journal of General Practice, 65(632), pp. 
e141–e151.
MyHealthData, 2018. A new paradigm in healthcare data privacy and security. [online] 
MyHealthData homepage. Available at: <www.myhealthmydata.eu> [Accessed 4 Sep. 
2019].
Nakamoto, S., 2008. Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. [online] Available at: 
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Naylor, A. and Jones, E., 2017. Intelligent sharing: unleashing the potential of health and 
care data in the UK to transform outcomes. [online] Future Care Capital. Available at: 
<https://futurecarecapital.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Full-Report-Unleashing-
the-potential-of-health-and-care-data.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Newell, S. and Marabelli, M., 2015. Strategic opportunities (and challenges) of algorith-
mic decision-making: a call for action on the long-term societal effects of ‘datification.’ 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 24(1), pp. 3–14.
Nicol, P., 2017. The power of blockchain for healthcare: how blockchain will ignite the 
future of healthcare. Newington, CT: Author.
Nofer, M., Gomber, P., Hinz, O. and Schiereck, D., 2017. Blockchain. Business & Informa-
tion Systems Engineering, 59(3), pp. 183–7.
Office of National Coordination, 2016. News. [online] Office of National Coordination 
homepage. Available at: <http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170128063822/www.
hhs.gov/about/news/2016/08/29/onc-announces-blockchain-challenge-winners.html> 
[Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
OpenData, 2019. Den nationella dataportalen för öppna data [The national portal for 
open data]. [online] National portal for open data. Available at: <https://oppnadata.se> 
[Accessed 9 Aug. 2019].
Paquet, G., 2000. The new governance, subsidiarity and the strategic state. [online] Availa-
ble at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.580.8542> [Accessed 
4 Sep. 2019].
Patientory, 2018. Your health at your fingertips. [online] Patientory homepage. Available 
at: <https://patientory.com> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Peterson, K., Deeduvanu, R., Kanjamala, P. and Boles, K., 2016. Mayo Clinic: a blockchain- 
based approach to health information exchange networks. [online] Available at: <www.
healthit.gov/sites/default/files/12-55-blockchain-based-approach-final.pdf> [Accessed 
4 Sep. 2019].
Pinto, L., 2018. OpenNCP introduction. [online] Open NCP homepage. Available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/EHNCP/OpenNCP+Introduction> 
[Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Preukschat, A., 2018. Self-sovereign identity – a guide to privacy for your digital identity. 
[online] Medium blog. Available at: <https://medium.com/@AlexPreukschat/self-sov 
ereign-identity-a-guide-to-privacy-for-your-digital-identity-5b9e95677778> [Accessed 
4 Sep. 2019].
Redelmeier, D. and Kraus, N., 2018. Patterns in patient access and utilization of online 
medical records: analysis of MyChart. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 20(2), e43, 
pp. 1–9.
Blockchain centralization/decentralization 81
Reijers, W., Brochain, F. and Haynes, P., 2016. Governance in blockchain technologies & 
social contract theories. Ledger Journal, 1, pp. 134–51.
Risus, M. and Spohrer, K., 2017. A blockchain research framework: what we (don’t) know, 
where we go from here, and how we will get there. Business & Information Systems 
Engineering, 59(6), pp. 385–409.
Rothbard, M., 1978. For a new liberty: the libertarian manifesto. Rev. ed. For a new lib-
erty. New York, NY: Collier Books.
Sellberg, N. and Eltes, J., 2017. The Swedish patient portal and its relation to the national 
reference architecture and the overall eHealth infrastructure. In: M. Aanestad, M. Grisot, 
O. Hanseth and P. Assilakopoulou, eds., Information infrastructures within European 
health care. Paris, France: Springer, pp. 225–44.
Sparkes, M., 2014. The coming digital anarchy. [online] Telegraph online. Available at: 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10881213/The-coming-digital-anarchy.html> 
[Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Spiekermann, S., Acquisti, A., Böhme, R. and Hui, K., 2015. The challenges of personal 
data markets and privacy. Electronic Markets, 25(2), pp. 161–7.
Strong, D., Johnson, S., Tulu, B., Trudel, J., Volkoff, O., Pelletier, L., Bar-On, I. and Gar-
ber, L., 2014. A theory of organization-EHR affordance actualization. Journal of the 
Association for Information Systems, 15(2), pp. 53–85.
Swan, M., 2015. Blockchain: blueprint for a new economy. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly 
Media.
Taplin, J., 2017. Move fast and break things : how Facebook, Google, and Amazon 
cornered culture and undermined democracy. New York, NY: Little, Brown and 
Company.
Tegmark, M., 2017. Life 3.0: being human in the age of artificial intelligence. New York, 
NY: Knopf Publishing Group.
Tobin, A. and Drummond, R., 2017. The inevitable rise of self-sovereign identity. [online] 
Available at: <https://sovrin.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/The-Inevitable-Rise-of-
Self-Sovereign-Identity.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
UK Parliament, 2018. Written evidence volume: AI in the UK: ready, willing and able? 
[online] Available at: <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-
select/ai-committee/publications> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Vest, J. and Gamm, L., 2010. Health information exchange: persistent challenges and 
new strategies. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 17(3), 
pp. 288–94.
Vimarlund, V., 2014. Sociala innovationer i välfärden – Förutsättningar för ett E-häl-
sokonto. [Social innovations in welfare – prerequisites for an e-Health account] [online] 
Available at: <http://entreprenorskapsforum.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/UV_rap 
port_7_Vimarlund_webb.pdf> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
Vitaris, B., 2017. Swiss cryptovalley to create digital identities for its citizens on the 
Ethereum blockchain [online] Bitcoinmagazine online. Available at: <https://bit 
coinmagazine.com/articles/swiss-crypto-valley-create-digital-identities-its-citizens-
ethereum-blockchain> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019].
West, J. and O’Mahony, S., 2008. The role of participation architecture in growing spon-
sored open source communities. Industry and Innovation, 15(2), pp. 145–68.
Windley, F., 2018. How blockchain makes self-sovereign identities possible. [online] Com-
puterworld online. Available at: <www.computerworld.com/article/3244128/security/
how-blockchain-makes-self-sovereign-identities-possible.html> [Accessed 4 Sep. 
2019].
82 Anna Essén and Anders Ekholm
Winfield, A., 2017. Blockchain: libertarian, authoritarian, or somewhere in between? 
[online] Forbes online. Available at: <www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2017/07/07/blockchain- 
libertarian-authoritarian-or-somewhere-in-between/#2bdff0922e64> [Accessed 4 Sep. 
2019].
Yudkowsky, E., 2016. AI alignment: why it’s hard, and where to start. [online] Machine Intel-
ligence Research Institute homepage. Available at: <https://intelligence.org/2016/12/28/
ai-alignment-why-its-hard-and-where-to-start> [Accessed 4 Sep. 2019]. 
1 Introduction
1.1  Brief definition and history
This chapter considers the digitalization of health and health care in Sweden and 
other countries. The scope is digital health technologies (DHTs); digital services 
and technologies (DSTs); and how data are collected, analyzed, and used for dif-
ferent purposes. Sweden is used as an example because it is advanced in its use 
of digital technologies and gives lessons for other countries (Carter, 2015; Hardy, 
Boldt-Christmas and Tyreman, 2016; OECD, 2018). After a brief history, the 
chapter gives examples of DHTs and DSTs in Sweden, only some of which are 
potentially disruptive of traditional services. It discusses explanations for why 
digitalization in health has been slower than in other industries and more limited 
in the areas where it has been applied. It introduces the concept of “co-care” and 
describes services and devices that can empower patients to make decisions and 
perform self-management either independently from public-sector services or in 
cooperation with their publically employed clinicians and public services.
Swedish health care is mostly tax based, publically funded, and publically 
provided by local county councils within a national regulatory framework, with 
national grants to the counties to reduce inequities. The independence of counties 
is similar in some respects to that of the 16 German Länder and to the US and 
Australian state governments, and significant health reforms are made at both a 
county and national level. The 18 Swedish county councils, plus two regional 
bodies and one island municipality, referred to here as the 21 counties, are respon-
sible for providing health services (primary, secondary, and public health) and for 
a good standard of health in their populations.
In 1992, the responsibility for long-term inpatient health care and care for older 
people was transferred to local municipalities, and, in 1996, so was care for the 
physically disabled and people with long-term mental illnesses. These directly 
run or contract nursing homes or home care services. In addition, the 290 munici-
palities provide social services, financial assistance, childcare, school health ser-
vices, and environmental health, as well as non-health services for roads, water, 
sewerage, and energy. Both the county councils and municipalities raise tax from 




residents. Health care is financed 59 percent from county taxes, 23 percent from 
national insurance and state grants, 11 percent from patient charges, and 7 percent 
from payment by communes to county councils for some functions they have 
taken over (Anell, Glenngård and Merkur, 2012).
1.1.1 Terms used in this chapter
Co-care: shared decision-making and self-care supported by help from others, 
including clinicians and family (Øvretveit and Keel, 2014).
Digital services and technologies (DSTs): services provided over the Internet 
and technologies that collect and use digital data in different ways, includ-
ing different types of software and hardware.
Digital health technologies (DHTs): DSTs used in health services for dif-
ferent financial, management, and clinical purposes; for promoting and 
maintaining health; or for preventing, treating, or caring for illness 
(Øvretveit, 2017).
Digital technology application (DTA): a device, service, or software program 
applied to meet a particular need of a user (Øvretveit, 2017).
Electronic medical record (EMR): an electronic record of health-related infor-
mation on an individual that can be created, gathered, managed, and con-
sulted by authorized clinicians and staff within one health care organization 
(NAHIT, 2008).
Electronic health record (EHR): a repository of information regarding the 
health status of a subject of care in computer-processable form, stored and 
transmitted securely, and accessible by multiple authorized users (ISO, 
2005).
Patient-accessible electronic health record (PAEHR): termed “patient portal” 
if the patient accesses a health system record or “personal health record” for 
separate patient systems that often do not connect with the EHR (Øvretveit, 
2017).
Digitally enabled learning health system: a health system that collects, stores, 
analyzes, and presents clinical and other data at the time and place that 
users require the data, and in a way that enables better-informed everyday 
decision-making. Such systems also support longer-term learning and 
improvement through research and quality improvement projects (Øvret-
veit, Nelson and James, 2016a).
2 History
Sweden is relatively advanced in its implementation of DHTs. Partially this is due 
to public investment in digital infrastructures such as broadband and hardware 
in the mostly publically funded and owned health care services. Partially it is 
due to a computer-literate and educated public citizenry and clinician workforce. 
Sweden was one of the countries with high take-up and early use of personal 
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computers (PCs), Internet, and smartphones. People were ready for digital health 
information services and surprised by the slow deployment within public health 
care compared to other industries such as banking.
One of the earliest and most substantial uses of DHT was for electronic medi-
cal and health records. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of physicians used PCs, 
but it was not until the 1990s that different hospital departments began to adopt 
PCs and networked EMRs. The first Swedish hospital to introduce a hospital-wide 
system was a 190-bed hospital in southern Sweden (Kajbjer, Nordberg and Klein, 
2011). Many small commercial EHRs were developed, but most vendors went out 
of business because adoption was limited and problematic.
Cloud computing and developments by the larger EMR vendor systems led 
to a rapid take-up of EMRs in hospitals and primary care in the first decade 
of the millennium. This involved integrating into the system the physician 
medical records and the records for nursing and other health professions to 
construct an EHR. However, there was and still is limited shared patient data, 
especially between hospitals and primary health care, which often used dif-
ferent systems that could not be connected. One study on primary health care 
in Sweden in 2006, repeated in 2016, found limited used of the functionalities 
of an EHR compared to the United States (Øvretveit et al., 2007, Øvretveit 
et al., 2016b).
In 2009, the Swedish National Patient Summary initiative was launched in 
stages. Uppsala county was an early pilot site and, in 2012, became the first in 
Sweden to make EHRs accessible to patients (PAEHR). Later developments saw 
both clinical and welfare professions having authorized access to limited patient 
data. Research has found that some of the early EMR systems were unpopular 
with physicians (Boonstra and Broekhuis, 2010). Recent studies have identified 
one source of physician burnout and stress to be the demands of EMRs and other 
health information technologies. Many were not well designed to enable clinical 
practice and demanded extra time and effort to operate, even after physicians had 
become familiar with the systems (Wright and Katz, 2018).
A widely used security method was for authorized users to insert a credit card 
with a programmed chip into a chip reader that connected to the facility IT system 
and allowed and recorded the user’s access to the patient’s record. The Swedish 
patient data privacy law required the organization to register as a “data user” and 
to nominate a staff member as a data privacy officer to run monthly audits to 
check for unauthorized access.
Another significant development was the digitalization of the country’s national 
clinical registers. As of 2016, there were 106 national clinical “quality registers.” 
One example is the national orthopedic register that collects and stores data on hip 
and knee replacements, including data about the patient, procedure, prosthesis, 
and patient-reported outcomes (Larsson et al., 2012). Analysis of the data over a 
number of years led to the discontinuation of some hip replacement implants that 
showed unusually high re-operation rates due to implant deficiencies (Larsson, 
Lawyer and Silverstein, 2010).
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3 The situation now
3.1  Digital health technologies and services in the public  
and private sector in Sweden
A growing range of digital services and technologies are currently used by Swed-
ish patients, clinicians, managers, and others to meet their different needs. Most 
of the examples below are small pilot schemes, limited to one county, or sepa-
rately provided by private organizations. Some DSTs are used by patients only, 
and some functions are shared with others, especially patient data collection and 
analysis services, and this includes researchers and other health organizations.
3.2 Target high-need/at-risk populations
Over the last 20 years, more data from public national census surveys have been 
digitalized or entered directly into digital databases. These data and the software 
to analyze the data are used by health service planners, clinicians, managers, and 
researchers for a number of purposes. One example is software that presents geo-
visual displays to highlight geographical areas associated with high need (e.g., 
high rates of hospital admissions for heart attack from one local area). These data 
can direct attention to assessing causes (e.g., few health care services, unemploy-
ment, low income) and then to targeting interventions.
3.3 Display actionable information
Primary care physicians in some Swedish health centers can call up on their com-
puter screens a list of their patients and see the current health data and status of 
each. Lists of patients are displayed with each patient’s recent blood pressure 
rates, blood glucose, and other test results under different columns, so that a 
physician or nurse can quickly see which patients to follow up. Similarly, many 
nurses or social workers visiting patients at home can call up on cell phones or 
on mobile computer tablets basic data about their patients or clients and see alerts 
about tests, tasks, or help needed during the visit.
3.4 Patient data collection for more effective actions
Staff visiting patients at home can enter data about the patient directly into the 
patient’s record to update and provide these data to other care workers at the 
same time. They can record the medications the patient is taking and receive any 
relevant alerts from the software that checks this entry against what the doctor has 
prescribed. In other situations, when a patient visits some clinics or emergency 
departments, these services provide patients with computer tablets that present a 
series of questions for the patient to fill in while waiting to see the physician or 
nurse (Zakim, 2016). The tablet uses a computer program that records the data for 
each question and provides the clinician with a printed history and recommended 
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diagnosis that is often more accurate than that made by physicians without this 
computer-assessed method.
3.5 Peer sharing and patient experiences
The growth of patient associations is relatively recent in Sweden and has been 
accompanied by Swedish or overseas services that enable patients to share experi-
ence and information with other patients. The longest-running and largest is the 
UK PatientsLikeMe website that some Swedish patients also use. These patient-
run and patient-directed sharing sites are developing rapidly and independently 
from health care services, although some are partnering with researchers and cli-
nicians to enable patients to contribute their data for health research, such as CN3 
(2018).
3.6 Patient information and consults
The first digital services to be offered to patients were information websites, and 
many exist in Sweden and are also based overseas. “Patient portals” are another 
channel for patients to health information provided by or authorized by health 
systems: the Swedish 1177 care guide system provides patients with different 
services and access to its patient portal with information about tests and appoint-
ments and functionalities such as appointment booking systems (Stockholm 
County Council, 2016a). As of 2018, patients in Sweden have limited or no online 
access to health professionals’ notes or the ability to read or correct lists of their 
medications. In 2017, a pilot was started in Stockholm by the county council to 
allow patients to buy, at a subsidized rate of USD30, a consult with a privately 
contracted primary care doctor. This is one example of a potential disrupter being 
integrated into the public health system. In England in 2016, the national quality 
regulator found 24 of 28 online providers did not meet standards. A number did 
not confirm patient identity before prescribing drugs or communicate adequately 
with the patients’ registered GPs (Care Quality Commission, 2018).
3.7 Patient monitoring, feedback, and co-care
A rapidly growing number of consumer devices and applications are available to 
the Swedish public from within Sweden and overseas, one example being a con-
tinuous glucose monitoring device for people with diabetes to track their changing 
blood sugar levels minute to minute. The accuracy and effectiveness of monitoring 
devices appears to vary widely, but there is little research into their use, value, and 
limitations, including the dangers of inaccurate devices. Two forefront Swedish 
approaches are Parkwell (for Parkinson’s disease) and Genia, described in a later 
section of this chapter (OpenRatio, 2018; Genia, 2016). One service in use and 
under testing in different rural remote communities in Sweden is virtual health 
rooms, which are physical facilities that patients can use without assistance, but 
are physical facilities with devices for teleconsultations, self-administered blood 
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testing, blood pressure, heart rate, blood glucose tests, and Coumadin tests linked 
remotely to the patient’s EHR (Näverlo et al., 2016).
3.8 Adherence
Enabling some patients consistently to take prescribed medications and follow 
lifestyle practices to prevent ill health and remain healthy are two of the biggest 
behavioral health issues facing health care, especially for people with chronic 
illnesses such as diabetes or heart failure or at high risk of such illness. Nonadher-
ence leads to health deterioration, avoidable suffering, and high cost in terms of 
unnecessary use. Many influences contribute to nonadherence beyond an individ-
ual’s control, but reminders delivered by phone in text messages and smartphone 
apps can be effective for improving adherence. Various pill-box digital devices 
that send alerts when not opened at the required dose times, as well as “smart 
pills,” are useful for enabling patient adherence to medications.
3.9 Enhanced care management
Care management is the coordination of different carers that the patient needs at 
different times. It involves multi-professional assessment of needs and care plan-
ning with goals of treatment, ideally involving the patients and their close carers 
(Øvretveit, 1993). The work of needs assessment, goal planning, monitoring, and 
coordination of care and visits is greatly assisted by an integrated care manage-
ment digital health system with easy access by the patient and authorized persons 
giving services (Øvretveit, 2017). A common model is for an IT system only for 
care managers because of the complications of connecting this to the IT systems 
used by other providers, but this is of limited use. Future systems that can con-
nect to other providers are used by some US integrated health systems (Øvretveit, 
2017).
3.10  Software for detecting potential adverse events and  
artificial intelligence
There is increasing use of machine learning and artificial intelligence software in 
health care. One early and simple application is software that checks prescribed 
medication in EHRs and gives alerts for drug interactions, wrong doses, and 
allergy alerts (Wong et al., 2018). Later, more sophisticated software systems 
scan all EMRs for possible predictors or indications of medical error or adverse 
events such as surgical site infections (Savitz et al., 2014). Another example in 
Sweden is a patient history-taking system that uses a digital tablet to take a patient 
with chest pain through a series of questions and to assess the data for risk of heart 
attack and present a likely diagnosis and history to the clinician. This reduces 
time to diagnosis and assists in accuracy of diagnosis. In addition to this func-
tion, the system runs machine learning algorithms on data from each patient, 
which include data on the patients’ subsequent health to improve predication and 
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diagnosis (Zakim, 2016). Other examples are the use of machine learning for 
detecting pathology in images.
Will AI lead to specific services or devices that disrupt traditional health care 
service delivery? How advanced are these health care services in developing and 
applying AI for different purposes? At present only a few health care systems in 
Sweden and abroad are aggressively using AI, in part because of concerns about 
lack of independent evaluation of the accuracy and effectiveness of such systems.
3.11 Faster emergency response
It is difficult to imagine an emergency dispatch center or an emergency vehicle 
without an array of DHTs and DSTs. One example in Sweden is the ambulance 
services for stroke care, which include telemedicine connections to an emergency 
doctor and allow the health care staff to assess and authorize immediate treatment 
on the road as necessary.
3.12  Patient flow improvement
Many hospitals are using quality improvement methods to streamline the flow 
of patients through different services and departments along “patient pathways.” 
Radio frequency identification and other types of sensors attached to the patient 
transmit data that can be displayed on screens to track where the patient is located 
and to improve the flow. The data are then aggregated and displayed on man-
agement dashboards and used in different ways to improve short- and long-term 
management of patient pathways and hospital performance.
3.13 Surgery
One of the earliest digitally assisted devices used in surgery was the addition 
of digital technologies to laparoscopic surgery systems for gallbladder and other 
types of keyhole surgery. Many other systems are in use, including the da Vinci 
system for more accurate surgery and tele-surgery performed by a surgeon in one 
place guiding surgery directly on a patient’s body in another location using remote 
systems, as well as simulation systems (Wee Sim et al., 2016).
3.14 Robots
The physical surgery systems noted above are one type of robot, but perhaps 
more common are different material-transporting robots in hospitals. These are 
connected to systems that automatically detect low supply levels of materials in 
nursing and other units and collect and deliver supplies autonomously to different 
parts of the hospital (Stockholm County Council, 2016b).
The above only noted some of the more common DHSs and DSTs used in Swe-
den: the next section considers the disruption potential of different DSTs. Some 
of the issues that may limit rapid spread and adoption of these by both public 
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and private services are concerns about evidence of effectiveness and about cost 
effectiveness, data security and privacy, increased workload for clinicians, and 
other unintended negative consequences such as safety issues and dependence on 
and cost of maintaining a system, and, for private suppliers and services, support 
might no longer be available in the future. There are also concerns about increas-
ing inequities in access and in health when some older, less educated, or less digi-
tally literate patients may not be able to use online services, and that health care 
providers in wealthy areas would be more able to apply DHTs to improve their 
services, thus also increasing digital disparities.
4  The concept of co-care disrupts traditional relationships 
between patients and health care
4.1   Factors influencing the disruptive potential of digital  
services and technology
The above summarized a variety of both digital services and technologies in Swe-
den, provided by public-sector health organizations, independent private organi-
zations, or private-public partnerships. The following now considers DSTs that 
may disrupt traditional physician–patient relationships and services and also dis-
rupt the way in which public health care services in Sweden have traditionally 
been funded, organized, and run.
Some DSTs may be taken up by clinicians because of their convenience, time 
saving, or contribution to the quality of the services that they are able to provide. 
They may be used by clinicians in response to patient demands, such as exchang-
ing emails with patients outside of their formal health informatics systems, even 
though this may be prohibited practice. In many cases, clinicians may lead the 
development of disruptive DSTs: sometimes their frustration with a lack of sup-
port by the public health system for their digital innovations has led to them to 
develop and offer such innovations independently from the public health system, 
as happened in the past with some non-digital medical devices and technologies. 
Some DSTs may be taken up by patients for different reasons, and most use medi-
cal information websites, either publically provided, publically approved, or other 
international public or private sites.
The following advances a theory that an important and neglected factor 
contributing to the disruption of health care by some DSTs is patient wishes 
for self-determination and control over their own health and health data, as 
summarized in the concept of “co-care” discussed below. This wish is fueled 
by patient experience of the convenience and usefulness of other digital ser-
vices and by patient advocacy movements as well as other cultural trends. The 
following proposes that patient advocacy movements, patient organizations, 
and the rise in support by politicians for patient involvement in their health 
and health care is a background factor creating a precondition for the disrup-
tive potential of new DSTs. This, in turn, relates to changing attitudes regard-
ing the role of the individual and the state, which, in Sweden, has shifted over 
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the last 30 years from collectivism to more individualism with a wish for more 
choice and autonomy.
4.2  Co-care, digital services and technologies, and disrupting  
the patient–provider power balance
“Co-care” is shared decision-making and self-care supported by help from others, 
including clinicians and family (Øvretveit and Keel, 2014). Shared decision-making 
is one type of co-care where “clinicians and patients share the best available evi-
dence when faced with the task of making decisions, and where patients are sup-
ported to consider options, to achieve informed preferences” (Elwyn et al., 2010). 
Research has shown the benefits of self-care, especially for patients with chronic 
illness or at risk of such illness, as well as the benefits of shared decision making 
(Da Silva, 2012). Modern person-centered integrated care (PCIC) recognizes that 
most care is self-care, supported by family members and friends (“close carers”), 
and that the person must be at the center of the integration model, with health care 
providers supporting them and their close carers (Scholl et al., 2014; Redding, 
2013; Goodwin, 2016; PAF, 2018; Øvretveit, 2017).
Another concept driving these changes is “expert patient knowledge”: the 
knowledge that patients have about their symptoms and about “what works for 
me,” which are the strategies that they use that help them to manage their symp-
toms and their health. More patients are sharing and learning from other patients 
about such strategies (PatientsLikeMe, 2018; The Health Foundation, 2018). This 
individual and collective patient knowledge is different from a clinical profes-
sional’s knowledge about disease and treatment effectiveness, much of which 
relates to “the average patient” (Kent and Hayward, 2007). Patient knowledge 
is also about the activities and life goals that are now important to them after 
their diagnosis and experiencing the effects of their illness. Patient-driven care 
and treatment are choosing treatments, care, and self-care strategies that enable 
patients to perform the activities and achieve the life goals that are important to 
them at different times (Øvretveit and Degsell, 2020). Patient capacity for sharing 
care and self-care can be developed into competences for these activities, espe-
cially for patients classified as being from a disadvantaged group (Olry de Labry 
Lima et al., 2017).
In Sweden, a number of DHSs are being used to enable patients to perform self-
care, to support shared decision-making, and to implement co-care in different 
services. Some are being developed in private-public partnerships, while some are 
being developed privately and independently of the public health system. One is a 
symptom-monitoring tool used by patients to enhance the everyday management 
of cystic fibrosis (CF). This tool was developed by the chair of Cystic Fibrosis 
Association, who funded the company that owns and distributes the tool (Genia, 
2016). The CF Association organizes networking, collaboration, and shared learn-
ing among CF patients. The CF Association works with all CF Centres of the six 
university hospitals in Sweden to help develop the use of the CF national clinical 
registry and the Genia tool.
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Another self-tracking tool is the ParkWell smartphone application, developed 
by a patient-engineer in collaboration with the company Cambio, which tracks 
patients’ medication administration and related short-term motor symptoms 
(OpenRatio, 2018).
A third tool is the patient evaluation of co-care survey (PECS). This is a tool 
for patients to assess how much the service they have received has assisted them 
in performing the activities they now wish to achieve and that are made more dif-
ficult by their health condition (Degsell and Øvretveit, 2018).
A further patient-driven innovation that relies on an Internet platform for shar-
ing information and providing education are the site and applications associated 
with Swedish “Recovery Colleges.” These follow the examples established in the 
National Health Service in England (The Health Foundation, 2018). Those col-
leges aim at increasing people’s self-confidence in their self-management of their 
mental health and well-being. It is believed to help persons experiencing mental 
ill health to take control of and overcome or manage the challenges posed by their 
mental health difficulties.
One criticism of co-care is that it may meet the wishes of educated and wealth-
ier patients, but may disadvantage some patients who are limited in the extent of 
shared decision-making and self-care that they can undertake by socio-economic 
and educational factors. A compromise approach is that more self-care by the 
privileged might release resources to invest in support for those more challenged 
to perform self-care.
4.3   Will co-care and patient power contribute significantly to 
disruption by some digital services and technologies?
The above-described co-care is one approach that epitomizes features of the 
patient advocacy and consumer movements that are increasingly being supported 
by politicians in Sweden. The section described digital services and technologies 
driven by these influences and being applied to implement co-care in patients’ 
everyday lives. It noted the challenges that routine health care services face in 
integrating the functions and data from these services into health care services.
Disruption questions are whether these innovations are subsequently inte-
grated into the public health system after their development outside or are 
widely taken up and become a separate – and alternative – health service, or part 
of one, at a price and convenience that challenge the public-sector services. The 
latter may happen with private medical consultation services over the Internet. 
This then presents challenges for coordinating care, especially if many patients 
and clinicians are using a set of independent services and data that are not inte-
grated: a situation similar to patients using alternative medicines and treatments 
in addition to their public health care treatments. Options for public health care 
are to contract such services and to integrate their data and establish ways to 
coordinate care with them, or to copy the services and to offer patients the ben-
efits of integration and supposedly greater data security and privacy. The former 
model is under testing in Stockholm for patient–doctor video consultation, and 
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the latter model appears to be the one chosen by the English NHS (Marshall, 
Shah and Stokes-Lampard, 2018).
The integration of these devices and systems, the most rapidly growing sector 
being health-monitoring devices, depends in part on clinicians’ motivation and 
capacity to use the patient data and functions as part of a broader change toward 
more patient-centered care. Other factors affecting whether these DSTs develop 
into significant disruptions is patient trust in the security of their data, and also 
whether the public health care technical systems can interface effectively with 
the data systems of these DSTs. Perhaps as significant is the number of patients 
that take up active and sustained use of these DHTs: it is possible that the patient 
early adopters, who tend to be more educated and digitally literate, will remain 
the main users and that other patients will find it difficult to use these DSTs, 
thus also raising concerns about increasing health inequities and the growth of 
a digital divide.
5 Conclusion
There are general conclusions for other countries from this example. Electronic 
health records and patient health records are examples of the many digital services 
and technologies that were developed independently of public health care ser-
vices. More recently, public services have taken up this particular DHT on a large 
scale. However the connection of different EHR systems and also other DHSs to 
enable integrated care is a slow process, and the limited functionality of patient 
portals and their poor ease of use has meant that few patients use many public 
sector–provided services. Overall, the slow take-up of digital technology and ser-
vices by the public sector has led to some clinicians and patients independently 
developing services and applications. Some remain stand-alone services provided 
by private organizations in Sweden or internationally. Some are being developed 
in public-private partnerships, such as subsidized primary care remote physician 
consultations.
Patient advocacy and patient organizations are advancing a patient-centered 
model of care and co-care that is driving the creation and take-up of indepen-
dently developed DSTs. These DSTs, combined with these social movements and 
growing patient power, may lead to parallel systems and/or disruption of public 
health care services in ways that, for example, alternative medicine has not. We 
have yet to see if take-up and support of these systems by the more wealthy and 
educated patients will lead to lower-cost and easier-to-use systems that attract use 
by a larger majority or whether a growing digital divide may result. The potential 
for disruption is perhaps less for other devices and systems requiring significant 
investment: to date, private investors have not viewed the return on investment as 
sufficient to offset the risk and uncertainty of approval by regulators. Disruption 
may also be constrained by the concerns of patients and citizens about the security 
of health data and privacy issues. Whether justified or not, patients in Sweden are 
trusting of public health services to maintain their privacy, and this is one factor 
restricting disruption, especially by non-Swedish DSTs.
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1 Introduction – from population to personal
The past few years have seen a wide application of big data technology, including 
health care. Data from large populations drive analytics that have become better at 
defining public health conditions. Data analysis is used to better understand popu-
lations’ health challenges based on geography, age, race, gender, socio-economic 
background (Cooper et al., 2001; Mackenbach et al., 2015), and so on, as well as 
for public health surveillance (Brownstein, Freifeld and Madoff, 2009). Big data 
holds great promise to deliver vastly improved health outcomes at significantly 
lower costs but has yet to show full realization (Groves et al., 2013).
These are powerful tools in their own accord and have the potential to change 
how public health care can be managed and improved. However, population data 
have disadvantages that limit their usability. Collection of health care data is rarely 
done in “real time.” This means that any conclusions are based on data from past 
events, which is too late for individual intervention. It is not possible to prevent 
what has already happened, and predictive powers are limited to probability for 
groups of people, not individuals. Any conclusions regarding a subpopulation are 
only as good as the stratification used and will not necessarily predict the health 
outcome for any single individual therein. From the single individual’s perspec-
tive, population health is merely abstract statistics that are easy to ignore; that is, 
“this does not affect me.” Consequently, efforts to improve the health of a specific 
subpopulation risk becoming inefficient and/or a waste of resources.
In order to become relevant to the individual human being, big data must 
become personal. This means further developing the analytical powers of data 
analysis using deep learning algorithms, commonly known as artificial intelli-
gence, and expanding the number of data sources used for analysis while carrying 
a strong sense of consumer focus. In the example below, Richard is a consumer of 
a predictive and personalized health care analysis platform.
It had been another long day at work, and Richard was commuting back home 
in the evening. The day had been full of meetings he barely had control over; 
firefighting activities with belligerent participants and unclear responsibili-
ties. He mostly enjoyed his job, but the past six months had been worse than 
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usual, requiring him to refocus his time and spend more of it on work issues, 
bringing work home and even into bed with him, answering emails before 
going to sleep and first thing in the morning even before getting up. It was 
temporary, he told himself, as he gradually reprioritized his daily schedule to 
make more time for work – his gym membership was paid for, but he hadn’t 
been there for months; he’d been eating more fast food or skipping meals 
altogether, and less time had been spent with his family.
Richard’s smartphone suddenly flashed a “red alert” on his health-tracking 
app. For months, the health tracker had been sending him weekly reminders 
about exercise, meditation, and sleeping habits, which he’d been ignoring. 
It had been telling him about his degrading sleep patterns, and that his pulse 
and blood pressure had become elevated, indicating increased physiological 
stress levels. Combining data about his activity levels from movement sen-
sors, his nutritional choices from his meal tracking app, and his changes in 
habits from his calendar app, the tracker had warned him about the negative 
aspects of his lifestyle changes. Through the patient portal app, genetic data 
showing a predisposition for cardiovascular disease had been combined with 
family history data about his father and paternal grandfather both suffering 
myocardial infarctions before the age of 55. His latest blood tests from the 
company physical four months ago had shown increased levels of the stress 
hormone cortisol, micro-elevation in myocardial biomarkers, and a slight 
decrease in glucose sensitivity – although all falling within normal inter-
vals, together indicating increased health risk. In the background, a powerful 
health care AI was constantly comparing his combined health data with that 
of tens of millions of others, looking for patterns in the vast sea of data.
“Warning: compared to peers in your population, your health data indi-
cate that you are at 93 percent risk of developing a myocardial infarction 
within four weeks. Your primary health care provider has been alerted and an 
appointment for preventative intervention has been scheduled for tomorrow. 
Your calendar has been updated. Click here for details.”
In the vaguely futuristic example above, Richard had permitted access to his 
private health data to be used not only for his own sake but also for the benefit of a 
much larger population. By enabling access to the huge amounts of data that could 
be realized through this type of pooling, it will be possible to apply AI to look for 
patterns in the data of a larger population, unbound by national borders. In Rich-
ard’s case, the specific pattern had already been identified in the larger population 
but, until that moment, the conditions for matching him with the pattern had not 
attained a sufficiently high probability. Once the prerequisites had been achieved 
and the risk for an adverse health event identified, the platform could respond with 
automated medical advice and by integrating with Richard’s health care provider, 
even providing a suitable intervention.
By focusing on the individual and using data unique to that person, it will be 
possible to predict health and disease to a high degree of specificity. Through AI 
analysis of population data, it is possible to identify unknown patterns that can 
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be used to predict adverse health events for single individuals, as in the example 
above. The information is personalized and of higher relevance to the individual 
since it is based on their data. Information on personal health tailored to an indi-
vidual has greater impact on behavioral change, which is key to health improve-
ment and risk reduction (Celis-Morales et al., 2016). The requirement for such a 
platform to work, however, is access to patient and individual data in enormously 
larger amounts than previously possible.
As we will see below, advances are being made in several fields, including 
wearables and genomics, but these are all being developed within their own data 
silos. For personalized, predictive, and preventative health care to become real-
ity, multiple data sources – including medical history, genomics, behavioral data, 
and real-time data from medical devices – will need to be harvested and com-
bined across a large population and analytical results served back to the individual 
together with actionable medical advice (Flores et al., 2013).
This study looks at the prerequisites for creating a personalized, predictive, and 
preventative health care platform and how publicly financed health care would be 
affected by its emergence. The study takes its starting point in existing technol-
ogy and ongoing initiatives, and then extrapolates, speculating on the prospective 
platform development, considering that we are at least a decade away from seeing 
the described platforms emerge.
2 Discussion – building the platform
Richard’s story highlights some of the requirements for any system to provide 
personalized health care diagnostics and medical advice based on population data. 
In his work on systems medicine, Hood (2013) describes a system where medi-
cine is personalized, participatory, predictive, and preventative, called P4 medi-
cine. In the coming medical revolution, knowledge of how to diagnose and treat 
disease will not be based on the population as a whole, but on peers – the part of 
the population “like you” – using far more granular characteristics than age and 
gender. In order for this to become reality, it will be necessary to create a platform 
bringing together three major functionalities: gathering data on individuals from 
a large number of disparate data sources, with four main types of data sources 
identified; analyzing the data in the context of each individual as well as for the 
population as a whole, extracting predictions based on the patterns identified; and, 
finally, offering actionable medical advice back to the individual. The four data 
source types and the three functionalities are further defined below.
Setting patient health care data free – patient data, locked into a large number 
of siloed electronic medical records systems, need to be set free. Every EMR uses 
its own data models and nomenclature, making data interoperability challenging. 
Collected data will need to be cleaned and translated to a common nomenclature. 
Examples of data include medical records, radiological diagnostics, interventions, 
pathology reports, diagnoses, and medication history.
Involving the individual – moving from reactive, event-driven health care to 
proactive, participatory health care will require large-scale transformation, not 
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least of all to shift from only treating patients to also focusing on consumer behav-
ior. It will require motivating healthy individuals to get involved in their own 
well-being far before any illnesses or symptoms, encouraging them to share data 
that otherwise would be considered beyond the scope of traditional health care: 
nutritional habits, workouts and activity levels, lifestyle choices, social media 
presence, education, work information, and so on.
Incorporating DNA – genomics is rapidly becoming available to the general 
population due to decreasing costs of DNA sequencing and increasing knowledge 
of individual genes’ effect on health and well-being. Historically, genetic infor-
mation about an individual would be part of a person’s medical record, but this 
is quickly being eclipsed by the large number of people using publicly available 
sequencing services.
Measuring everything, now – wearable sensors are becoming far more preva-
lent due to decreasing prices and improving design. A bracelet can now contain 
sensors that measure heart rate, movement, sleep, workouts, and more. Other bio-
sensors enable the measurement of blood glucose levels, oxygen saturation, res-
piration, body temperature, body weight, and more. These data are often locked 
within their own data systems and seldom used for anything outside their strict 
area of use. It will be crucial to enable the real-time exposure of sensor data.
Predictive diagnostics – combining data from the above sources will provide 
a rich insight into each individual’s life and preconditions. Using AI, it is then 
possible to analyze the combined datasets for the entire population for patterns in 
health, illness, and well-being. These can in turn be used to identify individuals 
matching these patterns, but who have not yet had an adverse health event, such 
as in the previously illustrated example of Richard.
From prediction to advice – the final requirement for the system is being able 
to combine predictive diagnostics with medical advice. Initially, third-party pro-
viders of health care could be utilized to provide medical advice, to be replaced 
later with an AI advisor. The main source for medical advice today is based on 
the vast amount of medical studies available. It would be possible to train an AI 
to parse medical literature to create a set of best-practice recommendations, but in 
addition, AI could also analyze health care outcomes from peers in the population 
that have received treatment, identifying which treatments were more effective 
and carried with them better health care outcomes. The combination of these two 
sources – literature and population outcomes – would create the basis for person-
alized actionable medical advice.
In the next sections, we will look at each of these prerequisites in greater depth, 
discuss the most likely market actors involved, and examine the possible conse-
quences of this type of platform and how this will affect publicly funded health care.
2.1  Setting patient health care data free – the personal  
health record
A key obstacle to creating health care data platforms is the lack of access to health 
care data. Data protection regulations ensure privacy but also mean that health 
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care data are usually only available within the confines of organizational bounda-
ries of health care providers, such as single hospitals or single counties/regions. 
Health care data from traditional sources, such as EMRs, as well as newer sources, 
such as medical devices, are estimated to globally grow from 153 exabytes 
(= 153 billion gigabytes) in 2013 to a staggering 2314 exabytes in 2020, the 
amount of data doubling each year (Stanford Medicine, 2017). Many health care 
providers and payers are looking to use health care analytics to make sense of 
their data to improve operations efficiency and the health of their population 
under treatment. The global health care analytics market is predicted to reach 
USD18.7 billion by 2020, up from USD5.8 billion in 2015 (Singh, 2016). How-
ever, the analytics conducted have limitations: the datasets are often too small to 
train AI for other purposes than general administrative automation and simpler 
predictive powers such as determining probable length-of-stay or risk of readmis-
sion in 30 days (Cohen, 2017).
EMRs contain information that answers the “what” in health care. Health 
care data provide a rich background of diagnostic data in the form of radiologi-
cal imaging, laboratory tests, pathology tests, and clinical observations. Of equal 
importance, the records contain information on outcomes – what the patient was 
diagnosed with, what the treatment was, and what the outcome was. The infor-
mation is, in itself, enough to start the process of training AI to spot patterns on 
clinically produced data alone. Unfortunately, EMR data are siloed by proprietary 
data models with low interoperability, and health care providers are often unable 
to exchange anything more than rudimentary patient information across organi-
zational boundaries.
An AI-driven predictive health care platform would require a huge amount of 
data records to become meaningful, often much more than what is found within 
a single county or region. For countries with a limited population size such as the 
Nordics, this would require gathering data at a national level. From a national 
perspective, a government agency would need to be appointed with responsibility 
of developing a national EMR platform. Historically, this has been challenging, 
with low participation by counties and with unclear use cases. Trying to enlarge 
scope would entail amendments to the laws regulating health care data privacy, 
which would be challenging.
An alternative is to move ownership of and access to health care data to the 
patient through what is called a personal health record (PHR). Patients can grant 
direct access to their health care data to any party they see fit. This is an elegant 
solution to the problems of data privacy, since in the case of a PHR, the patient 
is in control of the data, thereby bypassing patient data laws. It therefore comes 
as no surprise to see collaborations such as between Apple and 12 US hospi-
tals announced in January 2018 (Apple, 2018). Through Apple’s Health Record, 
patients are able download, synchronize, and access their medical records data in 
a PHR on the Apple device platform. Through the PHR, patients are able to grant 
access to their data to a third party, such as Apple, enabling access to medical data 
that were previously legally inaccessible. This was made possible through Apple’s 
2016 acquisition of Gliimpse (Farr and Sullivan, 2016), a company that developed 
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PHR software that can scrub medical records for medical data, populating a PHR 
with meaningful and correct data. Making the health care data interoperable is 
a crucial step – without interoperability, it would not be possible to collate an 
individual’s data from multiple EMR sources, and neither would it be possible to 
compare data between individuals with data from different sources. The two steps 
of setting patient data free and making them interoperable are therefore instru-
mental to succeed at any kind of meaningful analysis of health care data.
2.2 Involving the individual – behavioral data
If medical data, as described above, are the answer to “what,” behavioral data are 
part of the answer to “why.” The majority of acquired diseases are caused by a 
varying mix of nature (genetics) and nurture (background and behavior). Involv-
ing the individual will allow us to capture data directly from users, as well as 
providing communication with the user to convey results and advice.
It is well known that cardiovascular disease is at least partly influenced by 
behaviors associated with nutritional habits (Bazzano et al., 2002), physical 
exercise (Mora et al., 2007), and psychological factors such as stress (Kivimaki 
et al., 2002), as well as loneliness (Valtorta et al., 2016). Similarly, behavioral 
factors have been linked to many other forms of disease, including diabetes type 
2 (Spruijt-Metz et al., 2014), certain types of dementia (Rakesh et al., 2017), and 
various forms of cancer (Khan, Afaq and Mukhtar, 2010).
An individual’s behaviors are expressed in a multitude of ways in the digital 
world. To understand the individual, we do not even have to have access to the 
data describing traits or behaviors directly: correlative data can be utilized to infer 
certain traits and behaviors indirectly, for example, with users’ choice of social 
media profile pictures, which could be used to accurately determine personality 
(Liu et al., 2016).
Already now, digital users are using applications for recording a large amount 
of behavioral data. These include recreational social media with images and infor-
mation on peers and social events, professional social media with information 
on education and work information, fitness apps for logging exercise, calendar 
applications with information on schedules and time allocation, and nutrition/diet 
apps for logging dietary data.
As more people start using these applications in their daily lives, and as the 
applications continue evolving to become more user friendly, the information 
gathered through them will become more valuable. In a similar way to how 
patients can permit access to their medical data through a PHR, these applications 
can be leveraged to provide behavioral data, enabled by users permitting the use 
of their data.
2.3 Incorporating DNA – genomics
Genomics is rapidly becoming available to the general population due to the 
decreasing cost of DNA sequencing. From an initial cost of approximately 
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USD300 million for whole-genome sequencing of the first full human genome 
completed in June 2000, the cost for whole-genome sequencing had dropped 
below USD1000 in 2016 (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2016), an 
astounding decrease in cost. There are multiple companies now offering genetic 
analysis aimed directly at consumers without a specific diagnostic purpose, 
including companies such as 23andMe (2018) and myDNA (2018). Many of these 
services enable customers to download the raw genetic data, and there are even 
third-party services offering further genetic analysis using genetic data generated 
from other providers, for example, Promethease (2018).
This is highly advantageous since it means that access to genetic data is already 
enabled within the industry. The data models describing genetics are well under-
stood, and genetic variations and their correlation with disease are being identified 
at a rapid rate. Having users upload their genetic data to the platform will create 
a huge pool of genomic information for a very large population. Combining these 
data with medical records and behavioral data will provide a complete picture of 
an individual’s historic and present health and well-being, enabling AI analytics 
for pattern recognition.
2.4 Measuring everything, now – wearables
We are currently seeing the rapid emergence of generally accessible medical 
technology (MedTech) devices that were previously only available to health care 
institutions. MedTech devices would often be large, cumbersome, and compli-
cated to use; the results difficult to interpret; and expensive to purchase, making 
it all but impossible for consumers to acquire privately. Now, practically anyone 
can buy digital devices with biosensors to measure blood pressure, pulse, move-
ment, oxygenation, sleep patterns, caloric output, electrocardiogram (ECG), and 
much more. With the more advanced MedTech on offer, data are automatically 
collected, stored to the cloud, combined with previous data, and analyzed, and 
the results interpreted and delivered back to the user in accessible graphical inter-
faces. Additional services are combining results with medical recommendations 
or can be used to trigger other services such as alarms.
A recent example is the device Coala Heart Monitor by the Swedish company 
Coala Life (2018), which offer users the ability to self-monitor their heartbeat 
in the form of a simplified ECG. Together with the app on a smartphone and a 
service subscription, the user is alerted to any abnormalities and given recom-
mendations depending on the result. Abnormal results can also be automatically 
relayed to a health care specialist for personalized advice. Another example is 
the use of wearable devices with an accelerometer for use among the elderly 
to detect falls, which has shown high specificity and sensitivity (Kangas et al., 
2008). Reducing the time from fall to intervention decreases rehabilitation time. 
Yet another example is continuous blood glucose monitors for type 1 diabetics 
that automatically take measurements, helping users identify trends and better 
calibrate their insulin treatment (McGill and Ahmann, 2017). Treatment can also 
be simplified using an insulin pump instead of manual injections. There are recent 
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advances in developing combined devices known as sensor-augmented insulin 
pumps (Steineck et al., 2017). The first devices have already been approved by 
regulatory agencies for medical use (US Food & Drug Administration, 2018), but 
the technology is still in an early phase and subject to debate in regard to device 
security (Klonoff, 2015).
The wearable MedTech devices market is expected to grow from USD6.22 bil-
lion in 2017 to USD14.41 billion in 2022 (Research and Markets, 2018). There 
is also rapid innovation and development of recreational wearable devices, which 
are becoming far more ubiquitous. Traditional MedTech companies are under 
increasing competitive pressure by newer actors such as Apple, with its market 
entry of the Apple watch.
The criticism against recreational MedTech devices is that they are unsuitable 
for the medical monitoring of high-risk individuals. Trusting a workout bracelet 
with the task of monitoring individuals with, for example, a serious heart condi-
tion would clearly be in error, but this does not invalidate the use of the devices or 
the data they produce. Quite the opposite: for the purpose of generating the enor-
mous amounts of vitals data necessary for training health care AI, it is necessary 
to accept and encourage the widespread use of recreational MedTech devices. In 
time, the commercially available sensors will develop in quality and further drop 
in price, as well as new biosensors becoming available as the market grows.
It also makes sense to approach the issue from a perspective of prolonged well-
being instead of monitored disease. High-risk patients are few compared to the 
large number of healthy individuals. Their data are also generated after disease 
onset: to find disease onset patterns in populations, it is better to study healthy 
people falling ill rather than retrospectively looking at already ill people who can-
not supply data from before illness onset.
2.5  Predictive diagnostics – artificial intelligence
The previous four sections have mainly been concerned with from where and 
how data can be gathered. As we have seen, it is through the users that data can 
be accessed – users give the platform permission to the various data sources for 
genomics, wearables, and behavioral and medical records. Even without a full 
complement of data sources for all users, it would still be possible to apply AI 
and start looking for patterns. Still, more data sources, more users, and more data 
will provide a better basis for precise pattern recognition: a case of more is more. 
Through continuous learning, patterns recognition is constantly being improved 
in both sensitivity and specificity, against which identified users’ data are tested. 
Where a positive match is found, the user can be alerted to predicted diagnoses 
for the individual.
Medical records contain information on diagnoses that have been previously 
established: the platform AI is trained to recognize patterns that are common for 
diagnosis outcomes, which establishes the “what.” Data from both the medical 
record as well as the other data sources are used by the AI to elucidate the “how” 
and “why.” The more data available, the more precise the AI can become in its 
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predictive capacity. Unfortunately, due to the nature of how deep learning works, 
it is not possible to understand the reasoning as to why the AI matches users with 
a specific outcome. To this end, it is only possible to test if the AI is accurate in 
its predictions.
The intrinsically alien mechanisms of how AI operates present a challenge to 
both users, consumers and clinical staff. A profound shift in how health care oper-
ates is necessary, where users, despite not understanding the reasoning behind 
predictive diagnostics, still trust the conclusions enough to act on the information.
Predicting diagnoses is only part of the predictive capabilities of an AI trained 
on platform data. AI can also be applied to understand treatment and intervention 
data in a far more complex way than today. For example, the majority of pharma-
ceutical studies are performed with a minimum of simultaneous medications to try 
to isolate the effects of the drug under observation. However, in real populations, 
patients with chronic illnesses often have a broad array of medications, so-called 
“polypharmacy.” AI can analyze the underlying population data for a multitude of 
concurrent variables and better understand which treatment options might exist, 
precisely selecting the best option based on an individual’s background.
2.6 From prediction to action
The final step for a personalized, predictive, and preventative platform is going 
from new knowledge to creating a compelling argument for action based on best 
practice, available evidence, and knowledge of the individual. It is through action 
of the individual that prevention can be achieved. Information on a predicted 
health outcome is not enough – the platform must also provide the user with per-
suasive advice on how to act on this knowledge.
The two major hurdles to providing AI-driven medical advice are regulations 
regarding medical responsibility, and trust from users. Can an AI be trusted? Can 
an AI be held responsible if we do not understand how it works? These ques-
tions are difficult to answer and almost philosophical in nature. They will almost 
certainly require clarification or amendment to the current legal system if fully 
automated medical advice would become a reality.
For these reasons, it is likely that the first versions of predictive platforms 
will limit themselves to providing health insights and advising users to contact 
their regular health care provider if any alarming matches are made. This is 
similar to how paramedical services (genomics, wearables) are offered today. 
The platform could simplify this process by offering users contact with third-
party health care providers integrated through video chat, such as Kry (2018) or 
Min Doktor (2018).
The next phase of development would be providing paramedical advice, mostly 
relating to behavior. This type of advice is usually not considered medical treat-
ment and therefore not regulated under health and medical services laws. Typi-
cally, this type of advice will focus on diet, sleep, and exercise. Again, third-party 
providers could be able to offer this type of advice through the platform. However, 
behavioral advice could also be generated using the AI to quantify behavioral 
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change achieved by peers on the platform. The AI could identify behavioral com-
monalities among the peers that have had successful outcomes, reducing risk for 
illness, and presenting this as a possible course of action to the user.
Finally, and most challenging, the platform could offer the user medical advice 
on potential treatment options to decrease risk of identified possible adverse 
events. There are a number of regulative challenges that need to be met, such 
as in the opening questions above. This step would also require more intimate 
cooperation with local health care providers since the system would directly be 
responsible for creating demand for health care. Health care providers would need 
to be involved to understand how the system operates and how to handle users 
who have been given recommendations. There is also the question of what hap-
pens when medical professionals disagree with the diagnosis or recommended 
treatment (as further discussed in Section 2.8.2).
More so challenging, the AI would need to be able to act as a medical profes-
sional. Clinicians will, based on their experience and medical literature known 
to them, advise patients on the best course of action, using information on the 
patient’s specific set of circumstances. The choice between several possible treat-
ments is thus based on very different sources of information: research, experience, 
and patient background. However, clinicians face a problem of their own, which 
AI could help solve: digesting the immense number of medical studies available, 
which continue to grow at a daunting rate (Jinha, 2010). In 2016 alone, 870,000 
new medical citations were added to MEDLINE,1 or about 1.6 citations added 
per minute (MEDLINE, 2018). Even if only 1 of every 1000 citations were to 
have direct relevance to a clinician, it would still require reading two published 
papers every day of the year to keep abreast of current research. An AI trained on 
medical literature could be potentially developed by a third party and offered as a 
service through the predictive platform. Together with the medical advice based 
on the AI trained on population health outcomes, the two sets of advice could be 
combined to give the best possible advice to each patient, based on the specific 
circumstances.
Given the complexities involved, however, it would be overly optimistic to 
believe that an AI would be giving unassisted medical advice within the next ten 
years. Far more likely is that the two AI platforms will be developed separately, 
and primarily offered to health care providers, so clinicians can offer better sup-
port to patients.
2.7 Assembling the pieces
In the previous sections, we have looked at the three major functionalities needed 
to build a platform that would enable personalized, predictive, and preventative 
health care: data collection from a large number of disparate sources, pattern recog-
nition using AI to predict health outcomes, and finally leveraging medical knowl-
edge to generate actionable medical advice. Understanding the challenges, we can 
now look more closely at which market actors are most likely to have the necessary 
capabilities and infrastructure to be involved in the creation of a platform.
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There are five main arguments about why we should expect large technology 
companies, rather than nationally owned initiatives, to build a predictive platform. 
These are: 1) technological experience, 2) speed of innovation, 3) required popu-
lation size, 4) past initiatives, and 5) regulatory compliance.
1 Technological experience – any market actor hoping to create a robust, com-
prehensive platform for a large number of disparate data sources would need the 
knowledge and experience of how to plan and build large-scale data aggrega-
tion platforms. They would also need to have deep experience of AI and how to 
implement an AI system for pattern recognition. Typically, regional or national 
authorities do not possess this experience, and in the few cases where large-scale 
platforms have been created, external knowledge and expertise are brought in. 
More likely, it will be large technology companies with access to large digital 
infrastructure and previous AI experience that could develop a platform.
2 Speed of innovation – simply put, governmental agencies are not known for 
either innovation or speed of implementing new technology. It is unlikely that 
radically transformative change will emanate from within the health care sector 
itself, or any agencies linked to them.
3 Population size – to gain a large enough dataset to use for analysis, it will 
probably be necessary to go beyond regional boundaries, possibly beyond national 
boundaries. There is no method of knowing exactly how much data are needed 
to train an AI, but generally nonlinear algorithms such as AI, complex data, and 
complex patterns all require more data. In addition, as more data are added, the 
precision of pattern recognition will improve in both specificity and sensitivity, 
making the platform more valuable. With the sizeable number of variables for 
pattern recognition in the dataset – medications, diagnostics, genetics, wearables, 
behaviors – the dataset would likely need to be in excess of the possible number 
of users within the population of any single Nordic country. A market actor with 
the capability of acting across national boundaries is more likely to gather a large 
enough user base. The complexities involved in setting up a cooperative initiative 
between governmental agencies make such a solution unlikely. Private companies 
have more agile organizations and could therefore more easily solve the problem 
of gaining an international user base.
4 Past initiatives – all the Nordic countries have at least one national initia-
tive with the purpose of providing a national, common patient health care record. 
Focus for the initiatives has mostly been health care providers, more seldom direct 
to consumers. Experience has shown that these initiatives have been cumbersome 
and often do not achieve the goals set. In Sweden, there have been two large-scale 
initiatives, Nationell patientöversikt (NPÖ), a national longitudinal patient record 
(Inera, 2018), and Hälsa för mig, a PHR (E-Hälsomyndigheten, 2018). The lon-
gitudinal patient record is geared toward health care providers and aims to collect 
patient medical records from health care providers across the country. Currently, 
all 21 counties/regions in Sweden have integrated with the service, even though 
the level of use varies markedly. In some counties, the system is updated for every 
patient visit. In other counties, the integration requires manual synchronization. 
In addition, private health care providers are not necessarily included. The system 
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has not become widely popular despite having launched in 2009, possibly because 
of the low number of patients moving across county boundaries, and probably 
also because it is impossible to know if the information available shows a com-
plete record or not. The launch of the PHR Hälsa för mig was initially delayed 
for several years due to regulatory issues regarding patient data laws (Datains-
pektionen, 2018). In October 2018, the responsible agency abandoned the project 
altogether after the Swedish administrative court (Swe: Förvaltningsdomstolen) 
ruled that the platform’s data-sharing policy was in violation of patient data laws 
(E-Hälsomyndigheten, 2018). Both cases show that there are considerable barri-
ers to creating large patient data platforms, and that governmental agencies might 
have additional challenges because of their assignment, unlike private companies, 
who are unaffected by such challenges.
5 Regulation compliance – a key obstacle to gaining access to data are the poli-
cies and laws regulating patient data. Most countries, especially in the Nordics, 
have regulations prohibiting sharing patient data across county/regional bounda-
ries, unless specifically permitted by the patients themselves on a case-by-case 
basis. It would be impossible to create a data-driven predictive platform with 
these limitations. It is therefore necessary for two things to happen: the individual 
must take ownership of the data (both medical and personal), and the individual 
must permit the use of his or her data by the platform for general purposes. Health 
care organizations would not be permitted to operate a platform based on these 
regulations. An alternative would be a national agency with the assignment to 
create a platform, similar to the PHR solution covered in the previous section. 
This places the agency in the same position as any private company, however, and 
existing technology giants already have considerable experience in handling data 
privacy and security, placing them at a distinct advantage.
We can see that it would be far more likely for a successful platform to be 
created and operated by one or more large technology companies. However, 
publicly funded initiatives still have an important role to play in enabling their 
success, for example, through innovation funding, support from national agen-
cies, and amending national regulations to ease access to data and cross-border 
data movement.
2.8 Consequences
The creation of a personalized, predictive, and preventative health platform will 
fundamentally change how health care is consumed. First, health care utilization 
will likely increase as accessibility and availability of health care increase (van 
Loenen et al., 2015). To a large extent, medically related questions that can be 
answered through knowledge alone could be provided through the platform itself, 
or through third-party providers offering medical advice through the platform. 
Second, analysis predicting the need for medical treatment would create demand 
for additional diagnostics such as radiography or laboratory, which would affect 
both private and public health care by driving costs. Third, if a need for medical 
intervention is confirmed, the individual would need to receive treatment – a core 
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competency of publicly funded health care. Together, these factors affect both 
supplier-induced and consumer-induced demand on health care (Feldstein, 2012).
We can define five separate groups of market actors that would be affected 
by the transformation generated by a predictive platform: 1) consumers/users, 2) 
health care providers, 3) health care payers, 4) government and agencies, and 5) 
platform operators and third-party actors. Each of these groups faces distinct chal-
lenges and opportunities.
2.8.1 Consumers/users
Maybe the largest opportunity offered by a predictive platform is the empow-
erment stemming from users owning their data, being able control its use, and 
gaining real benefit from sharing it. Users would become more independent from 
health care providers since they would be able consume nonphysical health care 
through the platform and associated third-party providers. By having access to 
health care recommendations based on a holistic picture of their data, users would 
be able to make better-informed decisions regarding their own health and well-
being. AI would be able to compare treatment outcomes based on the same type 
of pattern recognition as for prediction of health issues. This could be used to 
support the patient with recommendations on both what treatments to look for, as 
well as which health care providers are best at delivering care.
Of course, decisions based on data produced by an individual cannot be better 
than the quality of data provided. The platform would need to rely on data gener-
ated by wearables and biosensors that are beyond qualitative control of the plat-
form. Because of this, there is risk of false positive and false negative matches, 
resulting in both overdiagnosis and underdiagnosis. Some of this risk can be miti-
gated through requirements on participatory devices and manufacturers but can-
not be fully avoided. Consequences include risk for unnecessary diagnostics and 
treatments that might even cause more harm than they avert. Worse still, false 
negatives might mean completely missing diagnoses and unnecessarily delaying 
treatments.
Health care providers will need to adopt new strategies in how to meet expec-
tations of users seeking diagnostic confirmation or treatment for a predicted 
diagnosis. Due to personal experience and knowledge, clinicians might arrive at 
conclusions contradictory to those of the predictive platform. Assuming a high 
level of sensitivity and specificity of the AI predictions – which will improve over 
time as more data are collected – clinicians will need to learn to understand the AI. 
From the perspective of the platform, this means exposing patient data and con-
textual decision support to the clinicians. It also means that clinicians will need 
to become technology and data literate to understand the information provided by 
the platform, knowing when to question or trust predictions.
There is also a risk of increasing inequality of access to health care. Since plat-
forms most likely will be operated by private enterprise, there will be some kind 
of cost associated with use of the platform. This means that financially enabled 
consumers could have better access to the services provided, while less fortunate 
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individuals might not be able to afford using the service. This becomes even more 
apparent if we also factor in the cost of genetic testing and various wearables pro-
viding detailed health data, costs the users must carry themselves. Lower digital 
literacy would also be a probable barrier to use, further increasing inequality as 
these groups – often uneducated, lower-income, and/or elderly – would likely 
benefit the most from participation (Choi and DiNitto, 2013).
The discussion about inequality in health care and well-being will become 
even more important as digital services evolve. Inequality carries a high societal 
cost when creating groups of haves and have-nots; research has shown that with 
increased equality in society, health becomes better for all social groups (Pickett 
and Wilkinson, 2009). It will be up to citizens and politicians to decide what type 
of society to build.
2.8.2 Health care providers
Health care providers are perhaps the organizational market actors that will be 
most profoundly affected by the transformative changes that a predictive platform 
could provide. Today, health care providers are accustomed to being in charge – 
they control patient data, they control the domain knowledge, and they decide 
what patients need, effectively controlling diagnostics and treatment. When indi-
viduals are empowered with medical knowledge about themselves, they will be 
on more equal terms with health care, being able to place greater demands on 
providers. Since data on treatment outcomes will become available, users will 
also be able to make better choices about where to go for specific treatments. In 
many ways, this is what health care providers have been talking about for years – 
putting the patient first – but it is unlikely that providers are prepared for the trans-
formation required to succeed. Patients will need to be treated as customers and 
consumers first, rather than patients without choice. For example, this will require 
removing the use of queues as a barrier to health care. Another effect of empow-
ered patients is that providers will need to improve their health care outcomes 
in order to stay relevant as a choice for patients. This will decrease variation in 
health care outcomes, improving quality in care at a domestic and possibly even 
international level (The NHS Confederation, 2004).
These same factors could also risk driving costs through unnecessary diagnos-
tics and perhaps even unnecessary treatments. Besides possibly causing harm to 
the patients, this also increases the risk for inequality between patient groups, 
where vulnerable groups2 might be outcompeted for health care resources (Chang 
et al., 2004; Waisel, 2013).
A risk that a data-based analytical platform might induce is that of treatment 
suboptimization. At any point in time, the data available will only contain infor-
mation on existing treatments, and treatments that are well established will have 
more data available. There is therefore the risk that these treatments will be over-
represented in the data, falsely showing better outcomes compared to new or 
novel treatments, where there typically is a learning curve. This imbalance could 
introduce a barrier to newer and better treatments to enter the market. The role of 
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health care providers will become important in judging if a given patient would 
have better outcomes using a new technique rather than the common option; clini-
cians face a difficult task, sometimes needing to convince the patient of the need 
to act contrary to the advice of the platform.
2.8.3 Health care payers
With the introduction of a personalized platform, health care payers can look for-
ward to the opportunity of decreasing the cost of health care by a sizable amount. 
Decreased costs would come about through two separate ways: first, by shifting 
some of the cost of health care to the consumer through subscriptions and self-
treatment, and second, through decreasing the need for resources such as first-line 
health care providers, as this service could be offered through the platform.
For countries with a publicly funded universal health care system, this could 
introduce a risk of decreased willingness to pay high levels of tax, such in Sweden 
and the Nordics. As more users start paying for health care advice outside of the 
regular health care system, more people will question the validity of the current 
organization and funding of health care.
For systems with private insurance health care, there are risks that the payers 
could cherry-pick customers, turning away those they identify as carrying too high 
risk/cost. This does not represent a real difference to insurance companies’ current 
business models, but the effect would become far more pronounced given power-
ful and reliable predictive tools. For consumers, it would therefore be important 
to understand how their health care data are used and who has access to them.
2.8.4 Government and agencies
In countries with universal health care insurance, such as the Nordics, decisions 
on resource allocation are based on available knowledge of the population’s needs. 
The enormous amounts of health care data pooled by the platform will provide a 
rich dataset for understanding the needs of the population, and therefore also pro-
vide the tools for better resource management. Pattern recognition could provide 
advance warning for changes in population health such as influenza outbreaks, 
or slower changes such as increasing prevalence of chronic illnesses. Similarly, 
analysis of health care data could provide better understanding of the population 
under care, allowing for better segmentation so that health care initiatives could 
be properly targeted for maximum impact.
There are some challenges in that data might not be easily accessible to authori-
ties wishing to make use of it. If the platform with collected data is operated by 
a private enterprise, access to data might be regulated and limited, especially if 
the platform is international. Authorities would likely need to collaborate with the 
platforms, possibly even becoming part of the revenue model.
Possibly, the largest challenge lies in preventing inequalities in access to health 
care that might become exaggerated through a participatory platform. As noted in 
the section on consumers, it is through a user’s active participation, and therefore 
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through their digital literacy, that an individual user can gain the most from the 
platform. Vulnerable groups may not have the capacity to make use of these 
services.
2.8.5 Platform operators and third-party actors
The creation of a personalized, predictive, and preventative platform will provide 
the basis for an ecosystem of associated third-party actors and services. The mar-
ket for wearable devices and biosensors will explode as demand for continuous 
monitoring equipment increases. Depending on the openness of the platform, it 
will be possible for third-party analytical services to offer medical advice and ser-
vices directly to consumers. Anonymized data could be used for medical research 
in for example epidemiology, providing researchers with a far larger data source 
that previously ever available. It is likely, as noted above, that health care provid-
ers, health care payers, and governmental agencies all will become part of the 
ecosystem – either providing data or medical advice or extracting analytics.
3 Conclusion
Technological development is pointing in the direction of ever more complex 
systems where AI will become the central nervous system. Both Tegmark (2017) 
and Kurzweil (2005) argue that an AI-driven future is closer than we think, and 
that every aspect of human life will be changed by it. Health care organizations 
are generally resistant to change, so it is likely that changes in health care will be 
forced through changed consumer behavior (Edwards and Saltman, 2017). In the 
story at the beginning of this chapter, we could see how Richard, through per-
sonal use of technology, was empowered by his own data to act preventatively to 
improve his own health and avoid serious illness. The demand for health care was 
driven by a consumer-powered, automated system relying on AI to deliver predic-
tive, preventative, and actionable advice directly to the end user, an extension to 
P4 medicine as described by Hood (2013).
The first steps toward building a personalized and predictive platform are 
already underway, with technology giants such as Apple and Microsoft heavily 
investing in the creation of PHR platforms, allowing patients to open up access 
and share their health care data. As the user base increases, more data sources 
will be added – such as genomics, wearables, and behavioral data – focusing on 
consumer needs. As consumer health care data are aggregated, the platform opera-
tors can apply their considerable expertise in the area of AI to identify patterns in 
the data, training the systems to predict adverse health events before they occur. 
The platforms will attract a large number of third-party providers, looking to offer 
health care advice and additional analytics. This ecosystem of providers will offer 
consumers high-quality monitoring and advice at low cost and without the cum-
bersome qualities of the current physical health care system, exhibiting long wait-
ing times and low consumer satisfaction scores. Publicly funded health care will 
need to transform their business models, as the platforms will outcompete some 
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services, such as acute primary care, and will complement others, such as treat-
ment of patients with chronic conditions.
A possible solution to several of the challenges noted in this chapter would be to 
form partnerships between platform providers and national agencies governing health 
care payers and providers. Although disrupting current models of health care, a per-
sonalized, predictive, and preventative platform would provide benefits to all sides.
Eventually, the platforms will become sufficiently advanced to the point of 
being able to automate medical advice, although such scenarios are beyond the 
next decade.
Notes
 1 MEDLINE is a journal citation database containing over 25 million references to bio-
medical and life sciences journal articles dating back to 1946, gathered from more than 
5200 scholarly journals published around the world.
 2 In this setting, “vulnerable groups” refers to population groups that have either an 
impairment of decision-making capacity, are unable to defend their rights to health care, 
or are unable to make use of modern information technology. Examples include the very 
young and the very old, individuals with serious mental disabilities including dementia, 
and individuals without equal access to information technology including the socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged and individuals with literacy or language barriers.
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1 Introduction
The concept of digital dentistry pertains to the dental technologies used to incor-
porate digital, or digitally controlled, components to perform dental procedures as 
opposed to using mechanical or electrical tools (Ito, Hamid and Ichikawa, 2016). 
The purpose of using digital dentistry is that it is more efficient than mechani-
cal tools in conducting dental procedures. This applies to restorative as well as 
diagnostic purposes. Digital dentistry was developed as a means of meeting the 
increasing demands among patients for a faster, more secure, and more conform-
able experience. Digital dentistry has also been developed as a means of dealing 
with the shortage of resources in primary care. For instance, in the United States, 
this primary care shortage has led to an increased need to improve health care by 
increasing the utilization of existing health care providers (Giddon et al., 2013). 
Specifically, Petterson et al. (2012) forecast that the United States will require 
approximately 52,000 more primary care doctors by 2025, of which the major-
ity (33,000) are required due to population growth. Other factors such as aging 
and insurance expansion will require an additional 10,000 and 8000, respectively 
(Fodeman and Factor, 2015). Needless to say, this creates an unsustainable situ-
ation, as shortage of primary health care workers may compromise the quality 
of patient care. Smith (2019, para.3) states that “each primary care physician is 
estimated to spend more than 17 hours each day in the provision of acute, chronic, 
and preventative health care.” Moreover, this is not a problem that is restricted 
merely to the United States, but is rather a challenge that has become prevalent 
worldwide as similar trends and developments have been observed across Europe, 
Asia, and other regions as well (Wu and Lam, 2016; Kuhlmann et al., 2015; Com-
mittee on Pediatric Workforce, 2015).
What is more, in recent years, the shortage of dentists has become even more 
prevalent internationally, and various outlets are now calling the situation a “cri-
sis” (Minjarez, 2017; Beek and Davidson, 2016). This is likely to have even more 
detrimental consequences in geographic areas that are already underserved and 
where the incentive for a market-driven solution to the dentist shortage is low 
(Voinea-Griffin and Solomon, 2016). This is of particular concern, as the role 
of dentistry has often been overlooked in the overall discourse on health care 
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(Giddon et al., 2013). This is in spite of the fact that dentistry is one of the world’s 
oldest medical professions, harkening as far back as 7000 BC (American Dental 
Education Association, 2019). Much like primary care, it is predicted that in the 
United States, increases in dentist supply will not meet the increases in demand 
for dentists. This will, in turn, lead to an exacerbation of the existing shortage, and 
it is anticipated that the entire United States will experience a dentist shortage by 
2025 (US Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Ser-
vices Administration and National Center for Health Workforce Analysis, 2015).
Just like with primary care, this dentistry situation is reflected in several other 
countries worldwide as well. For instance, in the Netherlands, the workforce 
of practicing dentists is rapidly decreasing due to aging. In 2017, there were 
approximately 10,000 dentists working in the Netherlands. From this selection, 
only 29 percent were younger than 40 years of age (Schreijer, 2018). Beyond 
that, 56 percent of those dentists under 40 were female (Schreijer, 2018; Van der 
Zande et al., 2015). In the Netherlands, it is not uncommon for women to com-
bine their careers with their families by working part-time (Pieters, 2018; Kalmijn 
and Luijkx, 2006). This means that the effective amount of full-time employed 
dentists is not enough to saturate the market consisting of an ageing workforce. 
Moreover, the annual number of new dentists graduating and entering the profes-
sion (roughly less than 240) is not in parity with the number retiring each year 
(approximately 300) (DutchNews, 2019). On this account, it should be noted that 
approximately 78 percent of all Dutch people visit the dentist at least once a year, 
and out of this group, each person will visit their clinic about 2.7 times per year 
on average (Versteeg, 2016).
In the United Kingdom, the British Dental Association (BDA) figures published 
in 2018 indicated that 68 percent of National Health Service (NHS) practices in 
England struggled to fill vacant posts, which was an 18 percent rise on the 2016 
figure (British Dental Association, 2018). In past few years, it has been reported 
the recruitment crisis at the United Kingdom’s largest provider, Mydentist (with 
10 million patients on its books), has become so dire it has left thousands of Brit-
ons unable to see NHS dentists (British Dental Association, 2019). This resulted 
in patients having to wait several months to see a dentist (Ford, 2019; Gupta, 
2017). While there are a few countries in Europe where the number of recruited 
dentists has increased in the past few years (such as Lithuania), several other 
countries have shown a downward trend (including Greece, Denmark, France, 
etc.) (Fedcar, 2017).
A 2017 study showed that a lingering consequence following the 2008 Euro-
pean financial crisis is that fewer people with low incomes tend to visit the den-
tist today (Elstad, 2017). The same study also concluded that Ireland, Spain, 
and Switzerland were among the countries with the worst insurance coverage 
of health services, while several Eastern European countries, such as Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and the Czech Republic, had the best dental coverage. The reason for 
this is that these countries have to a large extent preserved much of the state-
run health system that was present during the Cold War era (Elstad, 2017; Balci, 
2017). These countries do not face the same projected population growth as many 
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of the Western European countries, and introducing a similar type of state-run 
health system in the rest of Europe will likely be impossible for political and 
market reasons. Moreover, many of the state-run subsidies only cover routine 
visits and check-ups. In Slovakia, for instance, dental care is chiefly private, with 
dentists being paid on a fee-for-service basis, and specialized dental treatment 
(e.g., crowns and bridges) will cost the patients extra. To exemplify, depending 
on the material used, a cavity treatment can in itself cost up to €80 (EURACTIV 
Slovakia, 2012). The situation in the Czech Republic follows a similar pattern, 
with dental insurance largely covering basic dental care. This entails limited num-
bers of the most usual treatment measures, with those wishing to pay out of their 
own pocket being more likely to gain access to more advanced dental equipment 
(Manski et al., 2015). Moreover, in some European countries, such as Germany, 
the dental health service is to a large extent included in the normal health service 
insurance schemes. In other countries like in Norway, most adults would need to 
fund their regular dental health services entirely out of their own pocket, even 
though private insurances may provide a solution to some people who have a 
subscription (Balci, 2017).
One may thus conclude that the dental welfare deficit is a twofold problem. On 
the one hand, there is the matter of a shrinking dentistry workforce. On the other 
hand, there is a matter of unaffordable dental care for large parts of the population 
in many parts of the world. Thus, the situation would seemingly call for a new 
and radical approach to address these problems. To this end, arguments have been 
raised in regard to digital dentistry and its potential to stem the tide. Specifically, 
the contention is that the application of digital dentistry could take some of the 
workload off dentists for less complex procedures, as these could then be han-
dled by midlevel providers, which in turn results in more accessible dental care 
at lower cost. Hence, by discussing extant literature and best-practice develop-
ments in the area, this chapter aims to investigate the potential for digital dentistry 
to address the dental welfare deficit problem in its aspiration of providing more 
effective and more affordable dental care in the future.
2  The origins of digital dentistry: computer-aided  
design/computer-aided manufacturing
In the words of Schleyer (1999, p. 1713), the aim of digital dentistry is to develop 
“a cadre of experts in dental informatics, relying on sound research principles, 
effectively disseminating best practices and developing strategic objectives for 
the implementation of technology.” At bedrock, digital dentistry is in itself not a 
new concept per se, as computer-aided design and computer-aided manufactur-
ing (CAD/CAM) had already been invented in 1973 and implemented in prac-
tice more regularly during the 1980s (Ritter, Boushell and Walter, 2019; Lin, 
2018). While there is no question that dental CAD/CAM revolutionized dentistry, 
it was in its early stages considered to be somewhat of a unwieldy novelty, as 
it required a disproportionate amount of time to produce a viable product due 
to slow speeds and a cumbersome interface (Tang, Medioni and Duret, 1998). 
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The purpose behind the development of the CAD/CAM was that, before its 
inception, it was difficult for dentists to construct crown and bridge structures, 
as this requires capacity to freely design a three-dimensional crown form, that 
is, full occlusal proximal, labial (buccal), and lingual surfaces, freely (Ueda and 
Yamaguchi, 2017). In time, use of CAD/CAM became the quintessential way to 
support the processing method and workflow. Dental CAD/CAM systems have 
continued to advance rapidly, and nowadays 3D model scanners and dental CAD/
CAM systems are used worldwide (Ueda and Yamaguchi, 2017). Today there are 
a multitude of different chairside and laboratory-based CAD/CAM systems, such 
as Procera (Nobel Biocare), Lava (3M ESPE), Cercon (DENTSPLY Ceram-co), 
CEREC (Sirona), and E4D (D4D Technologies), just to name a few examples. 
These systems are used to design and manufacture metal, alumina, and zirconia 
frameworks, as well as all-ceramic and composite full-contour crowns, inlays, 
and veneers (McLaren, Culp and White, 2008).
3 The next steps in digital dentistry
Nowadays, digital dentistry has evolved far beyond the mere use of CAD/CAM, 
and several other digital technologies are currently used by dentists all over the 
world. For instance, intraoral cameras (IOCs) are cameras used by dentists to 
show a patient the interior of their mouth, rather than using a mirror. They were 
first developed in the late 1980s as oversized mobile units, and have through the 
decades shrunk to pocket-sized lightweight wands (Darby and Walsh, 2015). 
An advantage of using these is that they have the ability to magnify teeth 40 to 
60 times their original size, making it possible for the dentist to identify defects 
within the oral cavity.
In more recent years, however, there have been particular advancements in the 
development of 3D printing and virtual reality (VR) and augmented (AR) reality. 
Three-dimensional printing, for instance, has been hailed as a disruptive tech-
nology that will change the very essence of manufacturing. Three-dimensional 
printing has a particular resonance with dentistry, with its use including every-
thing from “the production of drill guides for dental implants, the production of 
physical models for prosthodontics, orthodontics and surgery, the manufacture of 
dental, craniomaxillofacial and orthopedic implants, and the fabrication of cop-
ings and frameworks for implant and dental restorations” (Dawood et al., 2015, 
p. 521). In other words, 3D printing may be used to for a variety of different pro-
cedures, such as printing physical models of digital images taken with intra-oral 
scans, making appliances, temporaries, surgical guides, and so on (Oberoi et al., 
2018). Essentially, 3D printing in dentistry can be used for anything from repair-
ing broken teeth to making dental flossing easier.
3.1 Three-dimensional printing
It should be stressed that in dentistry, there is a need for 3D printers to be par-
ticularly accurate. This means that the most common technologies used are 
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stereolithography (SLA) and digital light processing (DLP) (Hay, 2019). The 
advantage of 3D printing is that it may be used in the dentist’s office as well as in 
labs. Hence, it brings a new level of speed and ease to old procedures. Also, the 
advantage of using a 3D model in dentistry as opposed to a plaster model is that a 
3D model is more stable, durable, and precise (Borgwardt, 2017). While 3D print-
ing is still a comparatively new phenomenon in dentistry, it is still in a growing 
and developing stage, while also being a multimillion-dollar industry (McCue, 
2017; Haria, 2017). Hence, there should be a future incentive for the market to 
continue investing in dental 3D printing.
While there are seemingly infinite ways for dentists to use dental 3D printers, 
there is still a need for a “community of practice” and common standards that is 
thus far largely bereft from dentistry, although it can be expected that such will 
emerge in the coming decade. Also, although 3D printing carries many advan-
tages, there are some additional disadvantages. Specifically, 3D printing carries a 
considerable cost of running, in addition to the cost of materials, maintenance, and 
skilled operators. This technology also places new demands on postprocessing as 
well as adherence to strict health and safety protocols. There may also be some 
additional environmental concerns, as 3D printing tends to consume exorbitant 
amounts of electricity and may lead to harmful emissions (Pearson, 2018).
3.2 Virtual reality and augmented reality
An even newer phenomenon is the occurrence of VR and AR in dentistry. Both tech-
nologies are useful for educational purposes, that is, training new dentists. In this 
way, both of these technologies are likely to radically alter the future clinical train-
ing of dentistry and encourage the use of reflective forms of assessment. This may 
include having dentistry students undertaking greater degrees of self-assessment 
procedures in order to identify individual learning needs and self-directed learn-
ing. In that way, VR and AR may serve to lower the costs of the educational pro-
cess, thereby enabling the funding of more dental students. These technologies 
may also to increase educational quality by providing new tool to dental schools 
so that future dentistry graduates may perfect their skillsets and aptitudes further 
(Roy, Bakr and George, 2017; Dutã et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2018).
Notwithstanding, VR and AR are not exclusive only to dental students, as the 
technologies may also continue to have practical usefulness during patient inter-
action. To the point, the VR technology inherently requires a large headpiece that 
covers the eyes, thus “inserting” users in a virtual world where they can interact 
with their new surroundings. In dentistry, the advantages can be seen primarily in 
the enhancement of the patient experience. For instance, VR can in some cases be 
used to help ease patient anxieties or even offer pain relief, as studies have shown 
that VR can lessen the perception of pain (Benham, Kang and Grampurohit, 2019; 
Wiederhold et al., 2014). VR thus allows for patients to become immersed in an 
interactive experience, thereby distracting them from the dental procedure.
AR, on the other hand, is distinguishable from VR in the sense that it pro-
vides not only virtual information, but also interacts with the environment that 
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surrounds the user. AR provides the user with a great degree of freedom, and 
unlike VR, it does not need to cover the user’s eyes and does not necessitate any 
unwieldy, bulky pieces of equipment. While VR provides for a greater sense of 
immersion in a given, set scenario, AR allows users to practice procedures regard-
less of where they are. As such, AR in dentistry is chiefly concentrated within the 
surgery realm (Kwon, Park and Han, 2018; Huang et al., 2018). To this end, den-
tists can practice complex procedures with no risk to patients and with minimal 
costs, as no material (save for some electricity) is disposed of during the practice 
runs, making it a cost-efficient solution.
Just like with VR, AR can also be used to enhance the patient experience for 
certain procedures. For instance, with AR, rather than taking a cast of the patient’s 
mouth, sending it off to a dental lab, and waiting for it to be processed and sent 
back, the dentist has the advantage of giving the patient an immediate visual rep-
resentation of the completed proposed treatment (Jain, 2017). This may include 
orthodontics, crown and bridgework, implants, and so on. This saves both time 
and money for the patient as well as the dentist and the welfare system (if funded 
via that route) while also proving the patient with a greater sense of what to expect.
4 Concluding discussion
This chapter set out to discuss if and how digital dentistry could offer a solution 
to the impending dental welfare deficit problem. The problem is in part caused 
by the sheer number of diminishing active dentists in the workforce, and in part 
by the unaffordable dental care that is keeping large parts of the population from 
seeking dental care. In answering these questions, this chapter has investigated 
some of the most prominent new technologies found in digital dentistry, with an 
emphasis on 3D printing as well as VR and AR.
The future applications of said technologies are for all intents and purposes 
limitless.
Three-dimensional printing could provide for the possibility of instantaneous 
manufacturing of needed products, effectively eliminating, or at least heavily 
reducing, the need for processing casts and imprints and so on at specialist labs. 
In that way, the automation process also reduces the likelihood of human errors, 
ensuring a greater degree of predictability in the final results. It may also allow for 
greater precision and higher quality of dental appliances manufactured. Assuming 
that the 3D printer is operated by someone with the right competency, it should be 
less labor intensive than other techniques. This means that manufacturing models 
and appliances would become a fully automated, unsupervised process. This, in 
turn, will save the dentist much valuable time.
Moreover, if a dentist were to be able to take instantaneous virtual scans of 
patient’s mouth, or even if patients would have the technological means to take 
scans of their own mouths, after which custom-built pieces could be manufac-
tured, dentistry as we know it would be a thing of the past. Seeking initial dental 
care would in many cases be no more cumbersome than standing in line at the 
grocery store. Keeping the length of each appointment as short as possible, while 
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keeping the number of required repeat visits to a minimum, is in the best interest 
for both patients as well as dentists. If digital dentistry can help shorten lead times, 
much time may be saved, which may help lower fatigue rates among practitioners, 
or alternatively increase patient volume.
Other potential advantages brought forth by digital dentistry are the possibili-
ties of having an overlay of information displaying a wider range of patient data 
and metrics for monitoring during dental procedures. Another possibility would 
be for dental students to digest information more rapidly with an AR-supported 
course that could provide helpful illustrations and/or interactive visuals along 
with the lecture.
If these technologies were utilized in a way that made it possible to make them 
work together, it would increase efficiency, lower costs, and enhance the patient 
experience profoundly. Nevertheless, while digital technology can present the 
physical means of addressing the dental welfare deficit problem, the problem will 
never get resolved unless there is also a political as well as a market incentive to 
do so. For instance, using digital dentistry to cut costs and save resources during 
dental education programs could provide schools with the means to accept more 
students each year. By reducing waste of time and resources in dentistry, dentists 
may find themselves in a less stressful environment while also being able to see 
more patients. By being able to craft the necessary material needed for dental 
procedures through 3D printing, it is easier to estimate costs and the amount of 
resources needed. This should in turn provide for more affordable dental care. 
Still, these areas are by and large to a large extent governed by regulation as well 
as by market incentives. Once the technology is perfected and in place, it is there-
fore important to raise awareness among policy-makers so that the technology 
will be utilized in an optimal fashion that benefits dentists, patients, and society 
at large.
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1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss the structure of the Swedish social care sector and 
explore how different ventures handle this structure in the development of solu-
tions for social care and well-being. By looking at the current structure, it is pos-
sible to highlight challenges that emerging services face. We present how social 
care is structured in Sweden and what the enabling forces and driving factors are 
behind the development of solutions based on the Internet of Things. Second, we 
investigate the business challenges preventing the development uptake of new 
solutions based on digital connected devices. Finally, we discuss the implication 
of those challenges in terms of the recommendations for development of solutions.
We argue that the social care structure in Sweden has intrinsic challenges that 
prevent the uptake of solutions based on digital connected devices. However, 
these services could improve quality of life and reduce costs; patients can moni-
tor their status regularly and get a comprehensive view of what affects a disease 
activity and how effective medication and self-care are (Ahlen, 2016). The drive 
to achieve the potential gains is resulting in distinctive development patterns to 
overcome, or circumvent, the existing barriers. The implications show how inno-
vative initiatives are addressing the existing challenges. There are three distinc-
tive development patterns in different sectors that are followed by emergent new 
services in Sweden – 1) the public sector, 2) the private sector, and the 3) well-
being sector.
The convergence of information and communication technologies (ICT) and 
social care industries can be considered a nascent market, considering that it still 
lacks formal rules and awareness governing business relations among competi-
tors, suppliers, and customers (Fligstein and Calder, 2015). Digital solutions to 
improve the delivery of social care have been considered a nascent market since 
the mid-90s, but only recently are the benefits becoming evident.
One reason for the slow adoption of ICT in social care and well-being are 
organizational models and revenue models (Vannieuwenborg et al., 2014; Fife 
and Pereira, 2011), which still remain a challenge and open research topics (Barry, 
2013; European Commission, 2014; Steinhubl, Muse and Topol, 2015). The com-
plex and vague environment of actors that are the subject of intense collaboration 
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results in unclear, and unbalanced, distribution of costs and benefits: “often is the 
investing actor not the one which will benefit the most” (Vannieuwenborg et al., 
2014, p. 3). Forsstrom (2013) and Labrique et al. (2013) highlight the need to 
promote horizontal models with open and shared approaches, rather than vertical 
solutions developed in isolation for niche markets. Along the same lines, Käl-
lander et al. (2013) conclude that the main challenge is still to move from pilot 
projects to national scalable programs that engage workers and communities.
Our approach to studying the convergence between social care and ICT is to 
explore the existing business ecosystem for health and social care services in 
Sweden. This context represents an area of interest since the phenomenon of ser-
vices based on connected devices is emerging in abundance (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
this setting, it is possible to observe multiple examples and extract recurrent pat-
terns (Granqvist, Grodal and Woolley, 2013). The term “business ecosystem” is 
commonly used and has been widely adopted in the high technology community 
(Moore, 2006). Moore (2006) defines business ecosystems as networks of buyers, 
suppliers, and makers of products or services within a socio-economic environ-
ment that includes institutional and regulatory framework. It includes how the 
contribution of each actor will be modularized and which type of firm will provide 
particular elements (Ozcan and Santos, 2015; Moore, 2006). As synthesized by 
Anggraeni et al. (2007), a business ecosystem stresses the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of economic agents, with a focus on the relationships between 
firms and the business network around them.
ICT have been part of social care services for decades, but the recent trend to 
move from health care interventions to become proactive in health has increased 
the focus on preventive care and improving physical and mental performance 
(Schraefel and Churchill, 2014; Rozenfeld, 2015; Free et al., 2013). Services 
based on the IoT and connected devices are beginning to play a key role in pre-
ventive health care; they can provide remote connectivity and access to relevant 
patient information. In this sense, they are related to social care and well-being.
2 Method
We use qualitative data to show the underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations 
to innovate in social care and well-being based on digital connected devices, and 
present recurrent challenges affecting innovation in the context of Sweden. The 
aim is to uncover patterns in opinions and development of new solutions. The 
strategy is exploratory in nature, in that is divergent and open to varied inputs and 
sources.
Due to the emerging nature of services covered, we consider an extended scope 
that allows the inclusion of any digital service in the context of well-being and 
social care. Given the nature of the services considered in this chapter, we do not 
limit the study to predefined labels or claims (Granqvist, Grodal and Woolley, 
2013). Therefore, we include services and solutions based on the use of digital 
technologies, which to date include labels such as remote care, telehealth, elec-
tronic health (eHealth), mobile health (mHealth), smart devices, and wearable 
devices (Iyawa, Herselman and Botha, 2016).
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We use a longitudinal cumulative case study research strategy to explore 
the recurrent challenges and innovation paths for services based on connected 
devices. Cumulative case studies aggregate data from several sources at different 
times (Mann, 2006; Davey, 1991).
For the review of challenges, we use stylized facts to accumulate published 
knowledge based on empirical data (Jurisch, Wolf and Krcmar, 2013; Loos 
et al., 2011; Houy, Fettke and Loos, 2015), pointing at empirical regularities 
(Helfat, 2007). The aim is to accumulate evidence from different sources that 
follow qualitative and quantitative methods in order to represent relevant pat-
terns in empirical data (Heine, Meyer and Strangfeld, 2005; Houy, Fettke and 
Loos, 2015; Helfat, 2007).
We consider a business ecosystem study to develop an organizational map and 
find suggestions on the way forward to develop solutions for health care based on 
connected devices. This map is important because there are diverse views and no 
clear boundaries in the emerging market.
The sources of primary and secondary data include semi-structured interviews; 
research projects with focus groups on challenges for innovation in health care, 
business models, and collaboration in solutions based on the IoT; and attendance 
at industry conferences focused on social care and welfare technologies; primary 
data sources are presented in Table 8.1. Based on data collection activities, we 
uncover recurrent challenges and recommendations on how to overcome such 
challenges in the creation of digital service, following the framework shown in 
Figure 8.1.
3  Challenges and current conditions affecting the 
development of solutions
3.1 Overview
Canning and Eamonn (2015) infer, compared to previous innovation in social 
care, that there is an emerging approach based on multisector ecosystem solu-
tions supported by availability of information, including mobile phones, social 
media, cloud computing, data analytics, and the IoT. Nevertheless, there are key 
challenges affecting the development and adoption of these solutions in Sweden, 
which are presented next, and correspond to (Laya, 2017):
1 The social care structure and governance
2 Public-sector barriers
3 Unclear incentives and reimbursement models
4 Interoperability and coordination
The social care structure and governance in Sweden is decentralized, which 
allows each region to implement solutions based on its own needs, but it had led 
to interoperability issues among systems and regions (Falan, 2016, para.1; Axels-
son, 2000). For example, it is argued that decentralization at the county council 
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the same work, resulting in sharply expanding administration costs for care pro-
viders (Friberg et al., 2015; Axelsson, 2000); this is in addition to the substantial 
resources and expertise needed to meet the requirements for procurement and 
development at 20 different county councils (Friberg et al., 2015).
There is an extensive network of actors in Sweden collaborating in the estab-
lishment of guidelines (Laya, 2017). The aggregated work is evident; however, it 
is not clear who is providing the guidelines to set the structure and who is appoint-
ing the infrastructure. The management of social care is fragmented, and the divi-
sion of roles between the different actors is unclear and subject to reinterpretation 
based on what benefits their operations (Friberg et al., 2015).
Public-sector barriers for innovation in social care can be discussed as early 
digitalization phases, since they relate to a lack of competence and awareness of 
the available technologies and their benefits (Dahlberg, 2015, p. 9). In addition, 
there a long procurement processes and a resistance to adopt new technology that 
has not been used on a large scale since it is perceived as a risk factor. A problem 
with public procurement is that there are always appeals. Some incumbents use 
the appealing process to exhaust the resources of smaller providers. It is always 
possible to find something to appeal on a public procurement process, “if they 
don’t win, they will appeal.”1 It creates delays and increases the costs for every-
one. Small companies cannot bear several procurement processes.
Unclear incentives and reimbursement models are a factor impeding the adop-
tion of digital solutions in social care, the main reason being that payback periods 
for digital technologies are longer than public budgeting cycles (Laya, 2017). 
Currently, just a few county councils and municipalities can prescribe digital ser-
vices (in the form of eHealth services). The lack of appropriate reimbursement 
models for these services prevents their widespread use (Widén and Haseltine, 
2015, p. 15).
In Sweden, every county council uses a combination of reimbursement models. 
There is a trend to replace the fixed and variable costs with bundled payments, 
that is, payments per diagnosis. This provides an incentive to increase efficiency 
Challenges
Social care structure 
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Figure 8.1  Research framework. The identification and description of each challenge is 
presented in Section 3. Recommendations for different actors are presented in 
Section 4.
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(European Commission, 2017, p. 21), but it could reduce the quality of the ser-
vice. Nevertheless, the patient’s freedom of choice in Sweden will counteract and 
incentivize providers to improve the quality (Högberg and Lindvall, 2012, p. 17). 
A study by Högberg et al. (2012) reviews the health care reimbursement models in 
different counties. They show the move toward quality indications and outcomes. 
This will allow a transition from fee-for-service payments to capitation or bundled 
payment without affecting the quality of the service.
Interoperability and coordination are a recurrent challenge since most solu-
tions are developed using a vertical approach. The vertical, or siloed, approach 
to innovation has hindered the ability of achieving more sustainable and efficient 
health and social care delivery (European Commission, 2017). “Lack of inter-
operability is both a reason and a result of market fragmentation. It perpetuates 
market fragmentation and creates significant barriers to entry, especially for inno-
vators and SMEs” (European Commission, 2017, p. 24).
Even if some developers follow standard specifications, there are over 45 inter-
operability standards for health care information management, according to the 
StandIN project (Nordgren et al., 2016); the main issue is a lack of awareness and 
unclear requirements demanded from the customer side. Without clear require-
ments on standards adoption and guideline specifications, the result is usually 
lock-in effects and high maintenance costs, particularly when deciding to inte-
grate different solutions.
3.2 Recapitulation and synopsis of the challenges
A summary of the challenges is presented in Table 8.2, synthetizing the main 
findings and suggesting the negative implications that each challenge poses to 
the actors affected by it. We see a close relation among some of the challenges 
previously presented; however, their origins and implications highlight different 
sides that explain the struggles to provide innovative solutions. For instance, the 
existence of bespoke solutions for specific localities is closely related to social 
care structure and governance. These two aspects can be regarded as the cause 
of interoperability issues. However, structure and governance point to the lack of 
guidelines to foster innovation in the public sector, while the challenge of inter-
operability and coordination points to the lock-in effects and scalability issues 
raised by solutions developed in isolation, without considering integration with 
other systems and solutions.
We stress the side of newcomers with innovative solutions as the main type of 
actor affected by these challenges. However, it is evident that other actors are also 
affected. For instance, local governments with limited budget allocation for social 
care might see the potential of new solutions, but there are no clear guidelines 
on how to properly assess the benefits and risk of adopting new solutions. Along 
the same lines, individuals requiring complex assistance from municipality social 
care often encounter a lack of coordination among public entities.
The challenges are described from the public-sector perspective. Even if many 
solution providers understand the clear benefits of being part of the approved 
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service providers in the public sector, it is a cumbersome process to reach that 
stage. Some ventures take alternative routes toward the same objective, depend-
ing on their actual offer, resources, and expertise.
4 Discussion
In this section, we bring up implications of the challenges for innovation in social 
care. We do it using examples and cases from Sweden and focus on how this can 
be of value for practitioners. We have identified three themes that we will discuss 
below:
1 Public-sector cooperation with private companies
2 Local government guidelines
3 Focus on well-being for innovation
4.1 Public-sector cooperation with private companies
In an environment with digitalized home care, public actors need stronger coop-
eration with private companies to provide new services. Private companies tar-
get focus on value-driven solutions and bring flexibility to public-sector services. 
Hence, one strategy is to innovate within the public sector to overcome inter-
operability and coordination challenges. This type of initiatives can be driven 
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by authorities and coordination bodies such as the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (Swe, Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting – SKL). We 
have identified some examples of this.
The municipality of Västerås was early in the introduction of e-home care ser-
vices. The initial driver was to improve the quality of the elderly, but it soon 
turned out that the different initiatives resulted in substantial improvements of 
working efficiency and reduction of costs (Marklund, 2012; Dahlberg, 2015). 
According to an industry expert:
[The case of ] Västerås is not private investment or private ideas, is something 
that they wanted to do and it has not been done in the private sector. The 
municipality had people with good ideas and good management that wanted 
to try them.
Other pilots in Sweden have shown the potential of digital health solutions. The 
Connected for Health project in the Swedish city of Hudiksvall had the task to 
develop and test a social care alarm system to send event messages.2 The alarm 
system showed considerable cost savings for the municipality, based on staff effi-
ciency (European Commission, 2016). Taking into account demographic changes 
and shortage of “young people,” a local authority said:
In the homecare staff; people are expensive and in short supply. It is not on 
how to replace them, but how to utilize them in the best way.
Yet another example of how to exploit the contacts with technology providers 
is how the Swedish municipality of Nacka procured IT new systems for IT ser-
vices for home care. Instead of buying separate technical functions or solutions 
for elderly (e.g., alarms, messaging, and night cameras), they employed an overall 
approach. Key components in this approach were:
• To make scenarios and use cases looking to the daily life of the elderly.
• To put together interested providers (i.e., also competitors) to brainstorming 
sessions.
• To make the specifications for procurement based on brainstorming sessions; 
here, a key result was that all interested actors were aware of the process and 
requirements.
In summary, there are many examples where municipalities and county councils 
interact closely with companies to specify, test, and deploy new solutions. We 
believe that this is different from the large industry approach with phases like 
technology research, standardization, development, and large-scale production. It 
is not that “one size fits all”; the technical solutions also need to include organiza-
tional and working process aspects.
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4.2 Local government guidelines
Local governments should follow clear development guidelines; otherwise, pub-
lic social care providers will encounter challenges and obstacles related to the 
introduction of new technology. Examples of this are:
• Lock-in effects from technology suppliers
• Scalability and integration challenges after initial deployments
We have identified examples illustrating that municipalities in many cases have 
understood the need to change conditions, organization, and/or roles in order to 
fully exploit the benefits of new solutions.
Again, using Västerås as a case, there is an example of the role of the munici-
pality in provisioning e-home care (Forsstrom, 2013; Markendahl and Laya, 
2013). The traditional broadband provider had problems being the Internet service 
provider (ISP) for e-home care, mainly due to issues with support and helpdesk 
functions. Then, the municipality IT department stepped in and took the ISP role. 
They act as system integrator and service provider and take full responsibility for 
the technology package for e-home care services.
Other insights can be gained from the stories told at the event MVTe 20153 by 
two Swedish municipalities about the strategy for introduction of digital locks 
in home care. In one town, the key-free home service works quite satisfactorily 
after some years, but it could work better. The introduction of key-free home ser-
vices had a tight schedule, focusing on time registration of home care and not on 
key management. Six years of experience have led to many ideas about what we 
would do instead if we were to introduce it today. If we compare the two towns, 
the first one introduced the new services on top of existing organization and pro-
cesses. This is in contrast with the other town, which created a new organization 
in order to fully support the new IT functions and working processes. Examples 
are dedicated IT technicians being part of the digital lock team and a new process 
for storing the old locks that were removed (and later to be restored) when new 
digital locks were installed.
The municipality of Linköping made an attempt to foster the adoption of ICT by 
social care service providers. The approach was to include assignment of digital 
technology implementation in the procurement process for service providers. Many 
of the potential supplies fulfilled the digital technology points in their bids, but solu-
tions were often quite basic and without technical novelty. An expert commented:
We wanted to introduce a new demand in our requirements that you should 
use new technology. And that will be scored, not so high, but it will give you 
some kind of points. And everyone did answer on that requirement, but it was 
very low tech and nothing new.
We can see that agencies and organizations like the Swedish eHealth Agency, 
Inera,4 and SALAR are trying to coordinate efforts and initiatives at the national 
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level. For example, they are driving national coordination in the creation of guide-
lines to select standards and increase technical interoperability within health and 
social care. Also, cooperation within the other Nordic countries has been launched 
to jointly develop the standardization of welfare technologies (eHälsomyn-
digheten, 2016).
To summarize, we can see both efforts and insights from municipalities and 
national bodies to be proactive in the procurement and implementation of new 
technology for social and home care services. This includes both stepping up and 
being active in issues related to standards and interoperability as well as being 
prepared to identify the need to change the organization and/or working processes.
4.3 Focus on well-being for innovation
The restrictive regulatory frameworks in the public sector have pushed innova-
tion in sport and well-being areas (Laya, 2017). This has had the effect of pushing 
small innovative companies outside the public care system, even if some of them 
have a long-term goal to be part of the social and health care market. By focusing 
on well-being and sports, it is possible to show the potential of digital solutions 
while avoiding some of the challenges of addressing the public sector.
One consideration is that, to avoid additional regulation, some solutions must 
reduce theirs claims to avoid being labeled as a health care device and becom-
ing subject to additional regulation. In Sweden, the Medical Products Agency 
abstains from regulating general products in the wellness area. The head of strat-
egy of a startup incubator in the area commented:
Digital care companies are targeting consumer market directly because it 
is easier. Many of the developers come from the gaming industry, and they 
do not really know how to deal with the regulatory aspects and are used to 
develop directly to end-consumers.
The well-being focus is also instrumental in avoiding the long-term validation and 
procurement processes, while interoperability is achieved by following frame-
works provided by incumbent IT companies such as Microsoft, Samsung, Apple, 
and Sony. This last point has also been presented as an advance by newcomers, 
suggesting that while the regulatory challenges are lower, there is an immediate 
possibility to reach a global market.
In summary, the well-being focus targets the end-consumer market. A clear 
motivation for small companies is to be able to initiate tests, show potential, and 
gain experience, even if the long-term goal is to enter procurement processes in 
the public sector and access the public health and care system.
5 Conclusion
We have discussed how the current structure of the social care sector results in 
challenges limiting innovation based on digital solutions for social care in Sweden. 
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With the identified challenges, we present recommendations for the development 
of new solutions, based on how different actors are currently dealing with the 
existing challenges. What we see in Sweden is not that non-governmental actors 
will overrun anyone when it comes to social care services. Looking at established 
services, collaboration between private companies and providers of innovative 
solutions is required. This is partly due to regulation, but it will also combine 
know-how.
From a research perspective, all these cases, insights, and findings clearly illus-
trate the fact that innovation in the social care sector is not only a matter of fixed 
buyer–seller relations and discussion about ready-made solutions. Most of the 
services that have been set in place are the result of joint efforts involving actors 
from different parts of the ecosystem, in several cases through research and aca-
demic projects together with municipalities or social care service providers. What 
is important to highlight is that innovative services for social care in Sweden 
tend to emerge from alignments between needs identified by the public sector and 
solutions developed to target those specific needs, usually provided by flexible 
and small-sized companies. Finally, we stress how newcomers are focusing on 
providing solutions in sports and well-being in order to avoid regulatory hurdles 
and long procurement processes. In the future, these solutions will become reli-
able sources that should be integrated into public systems; that is, this sector will 
create external pressure to adopt and accept innovation in the public sector.
Notes
 1 Based on expert opinion given at a roundtable discussion on the VINNOVA project on 
IoT ecosystems, help, and KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden, 
in the spring of 2016.
 2 In Sweden, the industry refers to safety or security alarm. In the rest of Europe, it is 
referred to as social alarm.
 3 Meeting place for welfare technology and e-health (Swe: Mötesplats välfärdsteknologi 
och e-hälsa – MTVe) 2015, held in Stockholm, Sweden.
 4 Inera is a company owned by the county councils, which provides independent public 
eHealth development. It coordinates the county council and region collaborations for 
eHealth.
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Part II
Education    

1 Introduction
Sweden is among the European countries with the best access to bandwidth and 
connectivity and has a high student-to-computer ratio (Wastiau et al., 2013). 
Ninety-three percent of Swedes between the ages of 16 and 85 have access to 
the Internet in their homes (SCB, 2017). Furthermore, Sweden is the home of a 
wide range of technology- and software-based companies (Teigland et al., 2018). 
Entering in third place, Sweden, together with Denmark and Finland, are the top 
three countries for advanced digital economies according to The Digital Economy 
and Society Index (European Commission, 2019). As such, the Nordic countries 
are well placed to avail themselves of new and emerging educational technolo-
gies. EdTech is an emerging concern in the broader European context, too, dem-
onstrated not least by the establishment of the European Institute of Innovation & 
Technology (EIT) in 2008. In 2018, the European Commission launched a digital 
education action plan that acknowledges the importance of supporting the use of 
technologies in education (European Commission, 2018b).
Disruptive innovations have the potential to unlock and create new markets, 
or radically change the ways in which current markets operate, displacing estab-
lished market-leading practices and products (Christensen, Raynor and McDon-
ald, 2015). Common examples of such innovations include the personal computer, 
which disrupted the development of mainframe computers, rendering them almost 
obsolete. In a similar way, mobile phones have made fixed-line telephony almost 
a thing of the past. Educational technologies have the potential to cause disrup-
tions in the educational sector with a view to providing key services for govern-
ance, services that provide new ways of interacting with educational material, but 
also through services providing new ways of certification, both in compulsory 
and higher education. While we acknowledge that some EdTech innovations have 
the potential to be somewhat disruptive, the traditional Christensen, Raynor and 
McDonald (2015) definition does not translate well to the scope of compulsory 
and higher education sectors. Disruption in the educational sector comes slowly 
for a number of reasons, for example, path dependency in public infrastructure, 
laws regulating public procurement of services, and also data regulation laws. 
This chapter presents a number of potentially disruptive or transformational 
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innovations and considers the conditions needed for EdTech to play a part in 
displacing and transforming current practices. In doing so, we consider the dif-
ference between digitization and digitalization and acknowledge the transforma-
tive nature digitalization of practice could potentially involve. Finally, we present 
and discuss three different EdTech-oriented themes, artificial intelligence, digital 
exams, and global content providers, which extend across the educational sec-
tors, and comment on how they could have a transformative effect on educational 
practice.
1.1 EdTech as the grand narrative of modernity
EdTech is often sold as offering unbounded possibilities and a grand narrative 
of modernity. A positively oriented EdTech discourse is one that comes with the 
promise to replace a rigid education system with fast-moving technological devel-
opments, where insights into technology will have fundamental effects on how 
people learn. This juxtaposition of new and modern with old and antiquated is 
often touted from within the EdTech industry itself and should perhaps there-
fore be treated with skepticism by policy-makers and educators. For example, in 
AOL’s TechCrunch magazine, one could recently read:
For the past 150 years or so, most learning models – especially regarding 
children – have barely changed: A teacher or lecturer stands at the front of 
the classroom explaining ideas or introducing facts while students sit and 
listen with the learning materials being mostly physical textbooks or print-
outs. Now, however, digital technologies are starting to transform today’s 
classrooms. More students are using computers or tablets, and teachers are 
increasingly using screens to illustrate aspects of their lessons. Physical text-
books are being replaced by online, interactive services that are more up-to-
date and in-depth, which allows learners to explore and learn at their own 
pace. This is important because of two contributing factors. First, students 
are born with digital DNA.
(Bainbridge, 2016, paras.10–12)
Other notions, such as digital nomads and digital natives, are projected in the 
media landscape, further enhancing the apparent and almost existential shift 
that is occurring through the advancement of technology-enhanced education. 
Advances driven by EdTech are, in reality, much more modest, where we, at times 
and at best, can identify some more or less strong correlations between learning 
in the classroom and the use of EdTech (Linderoth, 2016). Still, the grand nar-
rative of disruptive EdTech is one that returns at regular intervals; in the early 
2000s, flipped classroom instruction was going to have a profound impact on 
the classroom; 2012 was the year of the massive open online course (MOOC), 
when MOOCs were predicted to have an irreversible impact on how education 
was offered; and currently, we are in the midst of a hype of expectations with 
reference to how AI, big data, and learning analytics will affect how we teach and 
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learn. Only recently, a Swedish EdTech company claimed to be able to utilize AI 
to closely personalize content to the needs of each student. This promise is made 
at a time when access to user learning patterns is poorly documented, when public 
access to learner data is becoming increasingly restricted, for example, because of 
the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). To confound matters even 
more, when user data are documented, they are rarely shared and aggregated or 
put to use in conventional learning contexts to systematically develop teaching 
(EU GDPR Portal, 2019; European Commission, 2018a).
2 An overview of EdTech in the school setting
In Swedish schools, teachers and students have access to and use digital resources 
on a daily basis in the classroom. Common arguments from the municipalities for 
implementing new technologies include such notions that education needs to keep 
up to date with the technological developments in society, and the argument that 
one can draw advantages from the possibilities to improve the pupils’ performance 
is also often invoked (Tallvid, 2010; Hylén, 2013; Grönlund, 2014). However, it 
is difficult to establish a clear relationship between increased access to new tech-
nologies, leading to their increased use, and improved performance and grades 
(Lei, 2010). For example, if we consider the results from the International Pro-
gram for Student Assessment (PISA) from 2012, in countries that use technology 
on a daily basis, students’ results declined between 2000 and 2012 (OECD, 2015). 
One reason for the decline in students’ achievement could be the lack of adequate 
teaching methods when using technologies in the classroom (OECD, 2015). In 
other words, previous research can identify some specific advances in learning, 
but it is difficult to identify causal relationships and “a general fix” for education 
using EdTech. As such, EdTech does not offer a panacea to student learning and 
achievement, but there are still many good reasons to use it. EdTech might not 
facilitate and in itself make learning and teaching more efficient. However, tech-
nologies can affect the way teaching, learning, and assessment are perceived and 
conducted in schools and universities (Åkerfeldt, 2014a). For example, the pos-
sibility to store, retrieve, edit, and collaborate when writing a text challenges the 
notion of writing if we compare writing with using pen and paper only (Åkerfeldt, 
2014b). Writing using different technologies has increased in schools and higher 
education, and a recent investigation identified Google Docs as one of the most-
used EdTech tools in the classroom in the United States today alongside YouTube 
and Google Drive (Molnar, 2017).
Previous research on technology and education suggests that the most success-
ful tools, when it comes to implementation of software and digital systems, are 
those that have been developed to align with teachers’ established teaching meth-
ods (Kennewell, 2017), but in reality this is perhaps is not always the case. For 
example, one example of a digital tool that has been widely adopted in the United 
Kingdom during the beginning of the 21st century is the interactive whiteboard 
(IWB). The implementation of the IWB was not based on research; instead, the 
initiative was driven by policy-makers in the hope of modernizing educational 
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settings and introducing new and innovative teaching methods. Moss and Jewitt 
(2010) studied the implementation of IWBs, and their findings suggest that some 
of the teachers were using the IWB as a traditional blackboard. Many teachers 
did not use features, such as saving and sharing content created on the IWB, with 
learners. Moss and Jewitt (2010, p. 32) find that the “ways in which teachers use 
technology is strongly shaped by their existing pedagogic practice, the context of 
the school, and the demands of particular school subject areas and topics.” Thus, 
the promise that IWBs would bring about a transformation of pedagogy and revi-
talize classroom teaching was far from being realized in the classroom.
3 Digitization and digitalization
The example of the IWB above acts as an introduction to a discussion on the dif-
ference between digitization and digitalization. Digitization, we postulate, is an 
evolutionary process of replacement, involving the creation of a digital version 
of analogue or physical artifacts. Examples include keyboards replacing pens and 
paper or computers replacing paper documents and physical books. Analogous 
to health care, when you transfer patient data to digital health cards, in education 
you can transfer student’s performance data or admission data to digital “cards” 
or files. As a result of a move toward a digital society, companies are offering 
schools and municipalities the possibility to accommodate new digital solutions 
to old analogous problems. Such needs include the digital signing of certificates 
or offering digital exams, replacing practices that were previously performed on 
pen and paper, or offering software for a wide range of uses. These practices may 
not constitute a disruption of practice akin to the introduction of the mobile phone, 
but instead they may constitute a natural evolution of practice toward digitization, 
offering minor tweaks as opposed to radically changing the marketplace.
Conversely, we argue that the digitalization of education practice has a trans-
formative nature. So, for example, when introducing digital technology in the 
classroom or incorporating digital tools in the classroom, there is a need to con-
sider the basis for how educational and information technology can best service 
the learner and the teacher. Digitalization prompts questions such as: “What does 
the digital tool afford the teacher and the learner that the analogous version did 
not?” and “How can the digital tool enhance learning?” and so on. First, after 
answering these and other related questions, new digitally oriented pedagogies or 
new approaches can be developed that enhance learning.
3.1  EdTech as a tool for transforming teaching and  
learning
Transforming teaching and learning does not come solely by introducing digital 
technology into education settings. The transformative process is made up of dif-
ferent layers, conceptual and practical, depending on how one views learning, 
teaching, and assessment. As the printed text moves to the screen with the pos-
sibilities to provide visual and auditory modes, these modalities, in turn, offer 
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specific ways of interacting with the learning material. The move from printed 
text to the screen has the potential to reshape content and therefore also the mean-
ing of printed text. Jewitt (2002) shows in her study how the novel Of Mice and 
Men by Steinbeck was perceived by students both when represented as a printed 
text and on the screen. The findings suggest that the characters were conceptually 
reshaped differently by the students, depending on which media form was used for 
reading the novel. Furthermore, the characters’ relations to each other and even 
the narrative in the novel communicated different meanings. “The electronic reor-
ganization of the original text into the CD-ROM became fractured, the narrative 
was disrupted” (Jewitt, 2002, p. 20). The findings suggest that using technology to 
facilitate learning can involve a deeper transformation of how learners shape their 
meaning through different modes and media, which might have consequences for 
teachers’ practice when using EdTech solutions in the classroom. However, as the 
IWB example above demonstrates, a practice-oriented transformation does not 
occur just because of the implementation of technology. So, how could EdTech 
have a disruptive or transformative effect in the context of teaching and learning, 
both in compulsory and higher education? That is the focus of the next section.
4  EdTech as a potential game changer:  
three examples
As mentioned above, technological advances continue to play a central part in 
most forms of education and have an impact on how people interact with subject 
content, through the introduction of digital tools and platforms offering students 
at different levels of education access to vast amounts of knowledge and access to 
peers across the globe. EdTech innovations also have the possibility to play a more 
disruptive or transformative role in how educators engage with their students and 
how students engage in their learning processes, but also how EdTech providers 
could play a key role in the nexus between teaching and learning. Below, we iden-
tify three different EdTech-driven themes and consider further how the different 
types of EdTech solutions might constitute a transformative change in practice for 
teachers and learners.
4.1 AI-enhanced learning solutions
We are currently witnessing the emergence of a number of AI-oriented solutions 
with specific relevance to the educational sector, for example, recently the results 
of AI research have been translated into a tool used to identify and determine 
reading difficulties in children. In Stockholm’s municipality, a large project has 
been started in which more than 15,000 students, spread across the municipal-
ity’s primary schools, will carry out eye-screening tests to determine and identify 
students with reading disabilities. The test is currently offered at a low cost and 
is projected to be time effective, as it promises to take only two minutes for each 
student to complete. As early as 2016, four Stockholm schools were part of a 
study that tested the new AI tool developed with researchers from Karolinska 
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Institutet (KI) (Nilsson Benfatto et al., 2016). The new AI tool is not a diagnostic 
tool per se that can determine the cause of reading and writing difficulties; instead, 
the tool identifies the reading difficulties. Students read a short text on a computer 
screen while their eye movements are recorded by a camera. The eye movements 
are understood to represent cognitive processes in the brain, the results for each 
student are compared with a large database containing reference material, and the 
results are analyzed with the help of artificial intelligence (Nilsson Benfatto et al., 
2016). The students who show deviating eye movements may have some form of 
reading or writing difficulties. Traditionally, testing could take half a day for each 
student, but the new tool promises to finish the test in two minutes per student. 
Once a student has been found to have problems with the help of the screening, 
special education interventions may be offered with support measures specific to 
each student’s needs (Jällhage, 2017).
This is just one example of a transformative innovation on a relatively small 
scale, identifying specific problems in the educational context. The innovation 
has a potentially transformative effect on one category of teachers in the sense 
that special educators can devote their time to implementing measures instead of 
conducting the tests. The tool also means that testing can now be done at a scale 
with many students, addressing a second issue in the Swedish educational context, 
namely the lack of special-ed teachers.
Other examples of AI in the education context include using machine learning 
and neural network software to make predictions based on a participant’s scores 
on diagnostic tests, where individual learning patterns can be identified and pro-
posed. The Swedish company referred to above recently won a global AI com-
petition, beating other AI platforms in predicting mistakes that language learners 
would make based on their previous errors, and was able to suggest unique learn-
ing trajectories for individual learners. These advancements in AI and learning 
pathway prediction offer some interesting insights into potential possibilities for 
EdTech in the future. At the same time, there is a significant difference between 
learning language via an app and the reality of a school environment that is 
socially and culturally situated and that follows conventional assumptions about 
meaning-making and methods of information delivery.
4.2 Digital exams
There is a current and widespread emergence of digital exam vendors in the Swed-
ish context. In their simplest form, digital exams constitute a form of digitization 
whereby conventional exams are migrated to digital spaces and tools (Llamas-
Nistal et al., 2013). Digital exams offer a tool or a range of tools; for example, 
when students log on to a platform via a computer, the system can be configured 
so that it locks down other elements of the computer, meaning that the student can 
only focus on the digital exam. The research on digital exams is still nascent at the 
moment, but there is ongoing research into automatic correction of open-response 
tests. This field of research combines natural language processing and artifi-
cial intelligence techniques, but empirical results are still scarce. Digital exams 
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also afford teachers a legible reading experience, and as a bonus if connected 
to a single-sign-on system, the results can be registered digitally, thus reduc-
ing the time for teachers to document students’ results. Computer-based assess-
ment such as digital exams, multiple choice quizzes (MCQs), single best answer 
(SBA), and other online tests are commonly used to assess students’ knowledge. 
Computer-based assessment can, for example, reduce the teacher’s workload, 
as the students’ answers can be corrected automatically (currently limited to the 
preresponse selection type of questions such as MCQs). Moreover, it is possible 
to randomize the questions, and it is also possible to increase reliability, as the 
exams can be taken and corrected anonymously. In an interview study with 33 
university teachers, the teachers stated that online MCQs were used as they saved 
time and they felt a pressure to adopt more efficient forms of assessment, even 
though some teachers questioned whether this was good practice (Bennett et al., 
2017). The use of video and simulations was also mentioned as a technology that 
could offer efficiency. Simulation was used to assess students’ practical skills, for 
example, in paramedics when students worked with simulated patients. However, 
creating new forms of assessment was perceived as time consuming and challeng-
ing. Conversely, teachers wanted to discuss foremost students’ achievement rather 
than starting directly to implement technologies in their assessment practices. In 
this sense, the pedagogy and technology were disconnected (Bennett et al., 2017).
In Sweden, the national tests for compulsory and secondary school will be digi-
tized by the end of 2022. In doing so, the government argues that the tests will 
be delivered digitally, corrected fairly, and provide reliable data (Government 
Offices of Sweden, 2017). Through digitization, all students will be subject to 
the same test. Testing reliability, it is argued, can be obtained when the students’ 
answers are anonymized and are corrected by another teacher than the one that 
has been teaching the student. Previous investigations show that teachers tend to 
be more generous in their assessment and grading if they teach the student than if 
they do not know the student (Begler and Bremberg, 2012).
The digitization and digitalization of exams offer entirely new opportuni-
ties that utilize digital exam systems, but in ways that require a transformative 
approach to teaching and learning. Another aspect of the digitalization of assess-
ment practices is that it can potentially transform how assessment is carried out 
in schools. In contexts where technologies are used on a daily basis for teach-
ing and learning, assessment practices are changing and moving toward assess-
ment for learning (Erstad, 2008) instead of assessment of learning. Through the 
use of learning management systems, educators have the possibility to follow 
students’ learning and knowledge progress over time. Teachers using technolo-
gies in their classroom claim that they can determine students’ grades before the 
students have handed in the final assignment. The teachers feel that they have 
been informed through the digital systems about the students’ learning process 
(Hernwall et al., 2018).
New ways of approaching exams in a digital fashion are needed today; for 
example, it is not uncommon for large student cohorts in medicine, law, and com-
puter science to do pen-and-paper exams, as there are no exam facilities for digital 
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exams for large groups in many of Sweden’s university cities (n = 300–500). The 
solution to this problem, however, is not to provide 500 computers or tablets to 
the students; instead, new ways of conceptualizing and practically implement-
ing changes are needed that take advantage of digitization and use EdTech as a 
catalyst for digitalization. Here, EdTech can offer solutions; however, the ques-
tion remains: Are schools and universities open and able to capitalize on the new 
opportunities?
4.3 EdTech as global content provider
In this section, we identify EdTech as a content provider, that is to say, specific 
EdTech companies offer courses or content material. We acknowledge that there 
are a wide range of forms of content providers on the marketplace that provide 
service and target compulsory education as well as higher education, both in Swe-
den and globally. However, in this part of the chapter, we will focus specifically 
on MOOCs as an EdTech phenomenon. MOOCs are not a specific EdTech inno-
vation per se; instead, they are an aggregation of different educational technolo-
gies cohosted on a platform. MOOCs often offer tools that are broadly accessible 
and commonplace already, such as video-recorded lectures, multiple-choice ques-
tions, and discussion forums. Other innovations used in MOOCs are 3D modeling 
and virtual patients. This chapter uses the MOOC phenomenon to illustrate dif-
ferent views on how EdTech could be used in the context of higher education to 
disrupt current practices, and gives comments on developments so far.
MOOCs are courses that are hosted on globally accessible platforms. Initially 
MOOCs were open to everyone who had access to a computer and an Internet 
connection, and a certificate of participation was offered to students who passed 
courses. However, as business models have developed, it has become increas-
ingly common for MOOC vendors to differentiate between audiences, offering 
some content for free (without certification), certification of participation for a 
fee (ca. USD 50), and corporate-specific education at a higher fee (starting at, for 
example, around USD 200 per one-week course). MOOCs came to wide public 
attention in 2012 and brought the promise of being a new force in higher educa-
tion, promising to revolutionize but also disrupt traditional higher education (Ross 
et al., 2014; Yuan and Powell, 2013; McGrath et al., 2017). However, even though 
MOOCs offer the promise of open education resources (De Freitas, Morgan and 
Gibson, 2015; Czerniewicz et al., 2017), the broad transformative and previously 
promised revolutionary effects on higher education learning have yet to material-
ize (Eisenberg and Fischer, 2014; Siemens, 2015; Stöhr et al., 2019).
Arguably MOOCs could be a disruptive force in a number of ways, for exam-
ple, they could empower a change in the demographics of higher education, ena-
bling nontraditional students to gain access to higher education. MOOCs could, 
given their massive outreach, bring about a change in the certification of higher 
education credit, they could afford universities new ways of addressing learners’ 
needs, and they could also involve university teachers in new ways of practicing 
and teaching their subjects.
Educational technology (EdTech) 151
In the Swedish context, the response to MOOCs thus far has been moderate. 
Some of the larger universities, for example KI, the Royal Institute of Technol-
ogy (KTH), and Chalmers University of Technology all provide MOOCs via the 
edx platform, and Lund University offers courses on the Coursera platform. The 
current courses are either offered as introduction courses or as highly specialized 
courses, often requiring a good pre-understanding and several years of previous 
study.
Data on MOOC participants suggest that while there is wide geographical 
diversity – for example, KI’s course on urology had participants from 172 coun-
tries (Henningsohn et al., 2017) – most MOOC participants already had a college 
or university degree (Breslow, 2016). In other words, the MOOCs themselves are 
not disrupting the traditional pathways to higher education studies but instead 
seem to be attracting and offering continued education to well-educated profes-
sionals, providing opportunities for them to solidify or refresh their knowledge. 
At the same time, research suggests that lay people and students alike can benefit 
from MOOCs, (Henningsohn et al., 2017; Stöhr et al., 2019).
MOOCs, given their specific attention to online learning and mass participa-
tion, could also allow universities to provide mass education in basic introductory 
courses traditionally offered by universities. In doing so, it would be possible to 
allow many people to attend “MOOCified” versions of introductory courses in 
medicine, engineering, and law, just to name a few. Georgia Tech has MOOCified 
one of its master’s programs (McKenzie, 2018). Some initial data suggest that:
• An enrollment of 6365 makes it the largest master’s degree program in com-
puter science in the United States.
• New categories of people are attending the program. The typical applicant 
to the online program is a 34-year-old midcareer American, while the typical 
applicant to the in-person degree is a 24-year-old recent graduate from India.
• Students admitted to the online program had slightly lower academic creden-
tials than those admitted to the in-person program; online students performed 
slightly better in identical and blind-marked final assessments.
• Tuition to the MOOC program costs USD 6630, which is one-sixth of the 
cost of the in-person program.
MOOCs could also afford universities new ways of addressing learners’ needs. 
Given the mass participation, MOOCs provide higher education institutions with 
large datasets that could be used to better optimize the learning of certain subjects 
using learning analytics to identify gaps in student learning for on-campus stu-
dents. However, a quick look at the MOOC strategies of KI, KTH, and Chalmers 
reveals that none of the universities have active policies for exploring how learn-
ing occurs in MOOCs. Instead, the research done on MOOCs is conducted on the 
same competitive grounds as other research and is self financed. Given the high 
costs associated with developing MOOCs (a one-week MOOC costs between 
SEK 350,000–700,000 to produce), it is interesting that the universities do not 
employ learning analysts to understand how MOOCs can be translated into a 
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return on investment in terms of educational practice and financial responsibility. 
It is clear to us that MOOCs could break open the higher education sector, offer-
ing access to higher education to new categories of students. Such digital learning 
resources could also change the way in which we select students for advancement 
through higher education. MOOC introductory courses could be used as a way 
of providing students with access to continued studies. This could mitigate con-
cerns raised by the Swedish National Agency for Education (2018) that secondary 
school grades are not always the best predictor for successful university studies. 
By allowing students to attend the same MOOC, then performance scores on the 
MOOC could act as better predictors of performance in higher education. How-
ever, Swedish universities have a well-defined and path-dependent infrastructure 
that is based on quasi-meritocratic grounds. A loosening up of this system could 
have far-reaching consequences that may be more or less desirable and predicta-
ble, such as, for example, disturbing merit-based approaches to university access.
5 EdTech as a disruptive force – looking ahead
So far, we have considered the difference between digitization and digitalization, 
and we introduced the idea of transformation as a key concept when consider-
ing the disruptive nature of EdTech. The chapter has also presented a number of 
different EdTech-oriented innovations that extend across the broader educational 
sector from preschool to higher education, and we have commented on how they 
may or may not constitute a transformative effect on educational practice. We 
endeavored to acknowledge a distinction between what may constitute disrup-
tions of the education sector and what otherwise might be viewed as opportunities 
to transform, in more or less radical ways, educational and learning practices. Our 
focus on transformation of educational practice is driven by our experiences as 
practitioners and researchers in education.
In this final section, three strands are presented that will form a starting point for 
a discussion about the use of EdTech in education: 1) IT education strategies are 
needed on several levels; 2) challenges when new technologies face policy, laws, 
and regulations need to be addressed; and 3) collaboration between researchers, 
teachers, and EdTech ventures can lead to mutual benefit.
We emphasize a need for strategy as a key feature when considering the digitiza-
tion and digitalization of the education sector. Consequently, and for the purposes 
of this chapter, we conducted a mini-survey of a few Swedish higher education 
institutions, asking two brief questions related to digital learning strategies. The 
two questions were directed to the central communications departments at the 
universities and do not provide an adequate examination of how the universities 
approach digitalization and learning, but the results may be of interest, nonethe-
less. The questions were:
• Do you have a strategy document for IT with a view on education practice 
within your university?
• Does your university have a chief digital officer?
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The outcomes are listed in Table 9.1.
None of the universities consulted reported having a dedicated digital learning 
strategy at this point in time. In the cases where there are strategies, they are part 
of wider IT infrastructure strategies. The fact that some of Sweden’s foremost 
universities do not have digital learning strategies is perhaps not surprising – after 
all, Sweden’s first chief digital officer (CDO), Åsa Zetterberg, was only recently 
(2018) appointed – but it does suggest that EdTech may not really play a disrup-
tive part in the near future, at least simply for the reason that strategies may be 
needed to drive financial investments and strategies are run by key people within 
the organization. Looking ahead, we see a need for municipalities and universities 
to have digital learning strategies that are aligned to data-sharing laws and that are 
user focused. In addition, they must also have a strategy for developing university 
teachers’ digital competence.
We identify that laws regulating public procurement of services and also data 
regulation laws constitute major obstacles to EdTech ventures, and we argue that 
strategies along a number of lines are needed. Laws regulating the public procure-
ment of services may also act as obstacles, at least initially, to the development of 
the new, previously unthought-of services. The public procurement act regulates 
the way in which public bodies, universities, and municipalities conduct procure-
ment and stipulates that a public procurement contest must be organized that is 
open to all and arranged by a contracting authority with the aim of acquiring a 
plan or design selected by a jury. Other restrictions entail no one contractor being 
treated more favorably during the procurement process. Such a process makes 
sense from the viewpoint of authorities’ legal obligations via-à-vis the law. Still, 
we wonder if this may in some ways act as an obstacle to the development of 
specific new innovations in the public sector. The implementation of the new data-
protecting regulations (GDPR) also means that vendors may be more restricted 
when collecting data from learners in the context of the EdTech industry. This 
Table 9.1 Survey of digital learning strategies at a selection of Swedish universities
University Do you have a strategy 
document for IT with a view on 
education practice within your 
university?








KTH, The Royal 
Institute of 
Technology
No response within time frame No response, but KTH has a 
digitalization officer
Lund University There is no overall digital 
learning strategy, but Lund 
University has an IT strategy
No
Umeå University No response within time frame No response within time frame
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presents a major challenge, not least for the development of personalized learning 
solutions and also for researchers and practitioners in the educational field.
We believe that there is a lack of experience and knowledge about how research-
ers can collaborate with EdTech ventures. However, there are attempts to bridge 
this gap between research and ventures. For example, universities in Sweden have 
created software in order to encourage researchers to think about how they could 
commercialize their research and create new innovations with companies, or how 
they could start their own business. Researchers are paired with a business mentor 
who supports the researcher for one year to think more in terms of commercializa-
tion of their research findings. One challenge that the participants in the program 
faced was that the academic organization did not have the appropriate “know-
how” about business models, laws, intellectual property, copyright, and so on.
In conclusion, we acknowledge that EdTech has a prominent place in the 
Swedish educational context, and we identify many middle-way transformative 
outcomes that use EdTech to drive a change in practice; such examples include 
flipping the classroom and other blended learning techniques. We have shown 
how open-source software circumvents the procurement law, enabling students 
to access and learn code and coding. “Scratch” is an example of an open-source 
web-based application, where the user through block-based programming can 
create, for example, stories and games. However, we also acknowledge that these 
advances do not come quickly, nor are they adopted radically or systematically, 
but occur more sporadically. Furthermore, closer partnerships with end users are 
needed to promote mutual benefit.
In this chapter, we did not address corporate learning, where companies and 
global corporations may have a more direct decision-making process and whereby 
they could potentially have a very strong financial drive toward implementing AI 
in their corporate educational programs. Similarly, we have not discussed how 
other forms of continued professional development could be enhanced by educa-
tional technology.
Finally, we should consider the value that teachers and educators provide to 
students’ learning experience, and offer a word of caution. Teachers and educators 
offer unique experiences to students at all levels of the education system, and offer 
critical voices that act as a counterbalance to many taken-for-granted ideas. They 
also act as creators of knowledge, by breaking knowledge down into intelligible 
bits and pieces that are shared, critiqued, and used to build further knowledge in 
our society. Are we willing to embrace the full effects of educational technol-
ogy? If so, then what is the role for educators? Will they be reduced to curators 
of content created by artificial intelligent systems in Silicon Valley? We believe 
there is an inherent value that educators are cocreators of intellectual output and 
on-demand solutions that enhance their own teaching efforts and the efforts of the 
students they meet and engage with.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to explore the ongoing evolution of public educa-
tion in the United States, with a particular focus on the risks and rewards of digital 
transformation. There are a number of dimensions of public education that merit 
review: funding, access, content, methods, teacher qualifications, and infrastruc-
ture, to name a few. Arguably there are no institutions, formal or informal, that are 
immune to the effects of widespread technological innovation – from the dawn 
of the Internet through the rapid proliferation of digital connections in the early 
2000s, to today’s deeply ethical considerations of the potential impact artificial 
intelligence, gene editing, robotics and automation, and data sharing and analyt-
ics, among other manifestations.
Education will be argued as a core and abiding component of viable democratic 
economies and societies, and the current range of digital transformations (and 
related policies) stand to either bolster the public good that quality education can 
create, or further damage and divide public education in ways that exacerbate 
existing disparities. I will be examining public education in the United States 
only, with references to global comparative data where applicable and available. 
It is my hope that the reader gain some useful information from this chapter and 
ask questions about the state of digital influence on this particular public good and 
what she or he can do to direct investments, programming, policies, and conversa-
tions in ways to support it.
2 Material
2.1 A brief history of public education in the United States
At the turn of the 20th century, the United States was poised at the edge of an 
educational crisis: the industrial revolution was in full swing, yet there were not 
nearly enough workers who had basic skills to run machines and participate in the 
booming assembly-line industries expanding across the country. The federal gov-
ernment established the Department of Education, and each state in the union was 
given some budget and latitude to levy its own taxes for public education, and to 
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interpret and implement federal education guidelines. Over the years, states deter-
mined their own methods of funding public schools – either through management 
at the state level (with funding through state taxation), through localized counties 
or districts (with funding largely based on property taxes), or some combination 
of both.
Times were tumultuous, given the racially divided country, stemming from a 
century or more of subjugation of African Americans. Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, a landmark ruling of the US Supreme Court decided in 1954, called for all 
states to integrate their schools, and while the legal intent was there at the federal 
level, many states were slow to implement the guidance (taking more than a dec-
ade), leaving a legacy of great disparity in the funding of schools, largely based 
on the populations they serve. In many cases, school districts were formed around 
zones of wealth and districts organized around neighborhood schools, such as 
in the state of Connecticut. Combine that with the fact that the largest portion of 
public school funding in Connecticut comes from local property taxes, and we see 
large disparities in levels of funding for local schools, with poor students attend-
ing dilapidated schools (CT School Finance, 2018). For more on the Connecticut 
example, see Thomas and Kara’s 2017 report (Thomas and Kara, 2017).
The importance of the Brown v. Board ruling and the realities of state-level 
funding policies should be held in consideration as we think further below about 
the implications for equal funding and access to modern educational tools. As 
Chief Justice Warren stated in the ruling in 1954:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but 
equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
(United States Courts, 2018, para.15)
As we will see below, these funding disparities have a direct effect on how digital 
transformation is evolving in this sector.
Public education in the United States has been undergoing a digital transfor-
mation for decades, and that transformation, since the advent of the Internet, has 
accelerated with a host of new technologies available. The Internet, born out of 
early sharing of research data between US governmental agencies and academic 
institutions, was a key turning point for education, affecting everyone involved – 
from teachers, to students, to content producers, to school building designers, and 
of course to governance and financial managers.
As a former public school teacher, I began my teaching career in the 1980s 
using the same technologies that I had had experience with as a student decades 
before: overhead projectors, filmstrip projectors, the occasional vinyl record or 
tape, and of course plenty of mimeographed copies to go with well-worn text-
books and chalkboards. This was the state of learning technology at start of the 
1990s, and it looked like it could stay that way forever – until the expansion of 
personal computers.
In the mid-90s, I was there to open the first boxes of hardware that arrived 
at my public elementary school. Owing to thin budgets, I volunteered my time 
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to learn all about databases, email servers, networking protocols, HTML, and 
hardware installation. This was a radical time, as everyone – parents, teachers, 
administrators, and students – wandered into the web to figure out what it was and 
what it could mean. After having corralled a group of parent volunteers together 
to run a “Net Day” at our school in which we ran wires to the classrooms and 
connected as many computers as possible, it became clear that the “soft side” of 
this transformation needed just as much care and attention. The teachers needed 
help understanding what this new world would mean and how to integrate the 
rapidly growing toolset into their instructional practices, evaluation methods, and 
curriculum design.
And now, as the 21st century has begun, the pace of technological innovation 
has accelerated from the boom at the end of the 20th, placing traditional educa-
tional practices and structures in the crosshairs of potential innovation. Examples 
of this innovation include rising student access to digital learning resources (DLR) 
and the incorporation of those tools and resources into the educational experi-
ence. Access, however, does not necessarily equate to increased performance, and 
the United States may be falling behind. According to the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ (NCES) 2017 report, US teenagers, solving problems in a 
technology-rich environment, performed at a lower level than the OECD average 
(Hussar and Bailey, 2014).
Certainly multiple factors (income levels, access to resources, parental educa-
tional levels, etc.) have come into play. In 2015, only 62 percent of households 
had Internet access in the state of Mississippi (Hussar and Bailey, 2014). If there 
is an expectation that students access online tools, content, and experiences, equal 
access to the Internet will need to be resolved. This history of digital transforma-
tion, coupled with federal and local policy-making, has placed public education 
squarely in the intersection. Will there be equitable and democratic access to high-
quality public education, powered by technologies? Let’s take a closer look at 
how these factors are playing out today.
2.2 The current state of digitalization of education
Over the past ten years, the open Internet and the proliferation of digital tools 
have not delivered the degree of democratization of education that we once pre-
dicted. Some great examples of this democratization do exist, to be sure: Salman 
Khan and his Academy (www.khanacademy.org), the genesis and proliferation 
of massively open online courses, the wide use of live webinar platforms, open-
source learning management systems (e.g., Moodle), and myriad digital learning 
experience and content authoring tools. During this time we’ve seen educational 
business models evolve, including the purely digital “freemium” models for 
online coursework as well as an expansion of for-profit colleges and universi-
ties (e.g., University of Phoenix as a prime example). Based on NCES data, we 
can expect today a total of 27 to 28 million students enrolled in post-secondary 
schools in the United States (NCES, 2019). This is indeed a large market to be 
served.
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What has failed to keep up, however, are smart regulations that ensure that 
infrastructure is equally available across school systems and that options are 
available for the many students who do not have reliable (or any) Internet or 
computer access outside of school. Nowhere is this more pronounced, perhaps, 
than at the K–121 level, where the United States has seen a significant relaxation 
of regulations regarding the number and structures of charter and private schools. 
While these schools promote the benefits of “choice” in schools, those choices 
are rarely available to the populations who arguably most need them – namely 
the underserved, lower middle class, and poor communities. Charter and private 
schools are typically exempt from providing transportation, meals, or special ser-
vices for children with exceptional needs, and the result is a further widening of 
the gap between those who have choice and access to well-funded schools and 
those who do not.
What is more, the data on performance do not typically bear out the promises: 
in a 2016 study of school performance in Louisiana, charter and private schools, 
on average, underperformed their public school counterparts (Mills et al., 2017). 
Additionally, there are widely varying governance structures and standards: many 
private or charter schools do not require their teaching staff to have any formal 
education or qualifications in instruction or child development. Frequently there 
is little to no recourse for parents if their students are underserved; these students 
eventually find their way back into the public school stream.
This is not to say that all charter or private schools fail to provide quality educa-
tion. This is, however, to bring focus on a critical piece of the overall landscape 
to consider as we look at digital transformation and examine the arguments for 
school choice that present deeper funding challenges for public schools (Walker, 
2016). With potentially more limited funding reaching public schools, and greater 
concentrations of wealth in fewer school districts, there is a growing concern for 
equal access to the latest that digital tools and methodologies can offer.
We have also seen a lack of accountability and standards with regard to the 
quality of many privatized, online education providers, often leaving students with 
incomplete educations and a significant pile of debt. Examples of failed for-profit 
universities abound, and the number of current and former students struggling 
with a mountain of student loans to repay is staggering. Forbes, the Brookings 
Institution, and others have reported on the perversion of higher education toward 
revenues and shareholder returns, resulting in what is now 1.3 trillion dollars of 
debt owed by students – many (35–47 percent, depending on source) of whom 
will default (Simon, 2018). Public and for-profit universities have been offering 
increasing numbers of distance education courses and garnering a growing share 
of student participation – totaling nearly 30 percent of all students in 2015 (Sea-
man and Seaman, 2017). The digital wave may have brought new possibilities 
for access to education, but in too many cases educational outcomes have been 
limited due to mounting debt.
While we in the United States continue to struggle with these issues of afford-
ability and access, there are still great examples of digital innovation that illustrate 
the right blend of educational design and technology integration. There are better 
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and better learning apps that provide not just another boring channel for pushing 
content, but that connect content to context. The University of Adelaide’s Allan 
Carrington has integrated the SAMR model (substitution, augmentation, modifi-
cation, and redefinition) along with Bloom’s Taxonomy to identify over 125 apps 
that can be used on the iPad for instructional purposes (Carrington, 2016). For 
example, there are apps that deliver content based on geolocation or through the 
use of beacons, giving learners relevant information, questions, and tools for a 
particular place in the world – be that in an art gallery or during onboarding at a 
new office job.
We have also seen the early growth of virtual and augmented reality tools in 
teaching, learning, and performance support applications. Apps, on tablets or 
phones, now incorporate augmented reality tools – just point the camera at an 
object, a map, or a photo and a contextual overlay appears. Surgeons have used 
augmented and virtual reality views of a patient’s heart muscle to identify particu-
lar approaches to correcting a blocked artery – in the operating theatre (Zhang, 
2018). There are many, many applications of augmented reality – through head-
sets or handheld devices – that provide learners and workers real-time guidance 
during particular procedures, be that in the automotive garage or on an oil rig out 
at sea. Students at Georgia Tech University enrolled in Professor Ashok Goel’s 
Interactive Computing course have their online questions fielded by Jill Wat-
son, an artificial intelligence engine that functions as a virtual teaching assistant 
(Maderer, 2017). And this has been going on since 2015.
These immersive experiences are but one aspect of positive impact of digital 
transformation today. There is also the improving use of online platforms, pow-
ered with data analytics, that allows for greater insights into student performance, 
engagement, and smart suggestions for further, personalized, study paths. We 
have seen the disaggregation of some services to allow for interoperability – with 
many thanks to standardization on using xAPI technology to create links between 
content warehouses, LMS activities, and online learning events. Systems are now 
linking up, and learning can (with the right hardware and access) happen just 
about anywhere.
Today’s reality for digital transformation in education is part of a larger context, 
of course. Here in the United States, there is an ongoing debate about net neutrality. 
Recent actions by some of the service providers have sought to split up service lev-
els of Internet access, providing more opportunities for these companies to charge 
for their services. If you have a large dataset or rich streaming media experience 
you want to access, that could require greater levels of payment. As we think about 
the benefits of immersive education (gaming, virtual reality, live streaming, etc.) 
and the role of public education as a potentially equalizing force in our democracy, 
these debates over net neutrality2 will hopefully result in fair access for all students, 
irrespective of their income (Hitlin, Olmstead and Toor, 2017).
2.3 Considerations for the future
Projected enrolment in 2022 in public elementary and secondary schools in the 
United States is expected to be at 53 million students (Hussar and Bailey, 2014), 
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according to the National Center for Education Statistics (US). This is just around 
the corner. What will children and high-schoolers’ experience be? How will digi-
tal transformation show up for them?
Will campuses be ready? According to a 2018 article by EDUCAUSE President 
and CEO John O’Brien (2018, para.6):
digital transformation is affecting the entire higher education enterprise, of 
course. Yet evidence from EDUCAUSE research shows that comprehensive 
approaches to digital transformation are not evenly distributed. Around one-
third of institutions . . . show clear signs of campus-wide digital strategy 
either already in place (3%) or exerting a ‘major influence’ (28%) on their 
emerging IT strategy.
Looking into the future is, of course, a guessing game. Disparities in access have 
been outlined above, and other trends that are disrupting our “today” may be 
themselves disrupted and supplanted by others in quick order. We can, however, 
take the directionality of the previous storylines and some data from current eco-
nomic projections and extrapolate on a few points.
First, let us consider the “why” of education in the future. Many are argu-
ing now that the combination of artificial intelligence (pulling big data from an 
Internet of Things) and robotics will revolutionize many industries, destroying 
long-held jobs (and career paths), creating new ones, and therefore spawning an 
entire wave of new learning and development requirements. The Pew Research 
Center’s report (Rainie and Anderson, 2017, para.5) summarizes current expecta-
tions nicely, and points out that:
A central question about the future, then, is whether formal and informal 
learning structures will evolve to meet the changing needs of people who 
wish to fulfil the workplace expectations of the future.
With artificial intelligence managing the paperwork and assessing the best cases 
and points of law from thousands of sources in hours rather than weeks, many 
legal jobs stand to disappear. With routinized work such as welcoming guests at 
hotels, processing paperwork at doctors’ offices, and performing quality controls 
on assembly lines in the AI crosshairs, many more jobs are at risk.
From an educator’s perspective, I think there are big opportunities here, as well 
as risks. First, let us consider the pedagogy of technology and how that will shift 
as some tasks are automated with smart systems and perhaps even some forms 
of robotics. Artificial intelligence will continue to evolve to power such smart 
learning systems and to provide increased predictive tools for high degrees of per-
sonalization in the learner’s experience. To some extent, “curricula” will become 
detached from standard process, and an individual will, with these enhanced sys-
tems, be able to demonstrate success at his or her own pace. And with differ-
ent methodologies available based on their preferences, the learning experience 
of “courses” will be much more individualized. Granted, there will always be a 
need to understand processes and procedures in a standardized fashion (thinking 
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about medical training, for example), but for many other topics, content, and skill 
development areas, the future will be highly differentiated thanks to these new 
technologies.
And as jobs themselves become more specialized, so too will the role of those 
smart recommendation engines be for the ongoing learning and development of 
individuals in many different fields. Consider radiology: there are already nearly 
a dozen subspecialties in this field, each with its own evolving set of technologies, 
procedures, and protocols. It is not far-fetched to imagine much of this work being 
performed by machines, with interpretation of results informed by an AI entity 
that quickly compares vast data sources to the very specific profile of the patient 
in question to produce a potentially greater accuracy in assessments. The jobs of 
the future may well be in the specialization of AI and data analytics for radiology, 
along with innovation in technologies that perform the various tests. Will this 
mean fewer lab coats? More data engineers?
From the side of learning administration and credentialing, there is likely to be 
a shift to the use of artificially intelligent systems that recommend courses and 
modules based on preparatory testing and/or learner habits and expressed inter-
ests. This will be a more widespread application of what we are currently experi-
encing as “recommendation engines.” I can easily imagine these recommendation 
engines having a presence like Amazon’s Alexa or Apple’s Siri, speaking and 
interacting with the learner to further personalize the experience.
This shift is going to happen either by design or by default. As individuals gain 
access to greater resources online, tracking of completion of various coursework 
and qualifications may no longer reside in formal institutions, but in individually 
held, publicly recognized repositories. This is where blockchain technology and 
learning record management will become services that individuals and institutions 
depend on and subscribe to, and that provide continuity of verified learning from 
academics and expert systems, from formal educational processes through ongo-
ing, employment-based and job-specific development. The learner will control 
her credentials and “own” them – we may actually see the waning of the diploma 
as the ultimate credential and the waxing of the badged portfolio of learning and 
work experience, secured and verified through blockchain-powered services.
We may see an expansion of individual contractor teaching staff, who depend 
on these independent systems to track their own reviews, ratings, and qualifica-
tions, and who rely on more technologies to deliver live and recorded learning 
lessons, experiences, and coaching. We already have services such as Teachable 
and Thinkific that are turn-key solutions for individual instructors and educational 
service providers. Other content and teaching aggregation services such as Gooru 
and Khan Academy will likely expand and diversify, offering more and more vet-
ted, well-designed content and services to individuals and institutions of learning.
And even if not an individual contractor, the classroom of this future may 
be a much more blended environment, including more distributed students real 
time, in a highly interactive, collaborative, and data-rich setting. Virtual and aug-
mented reality technologies will become commonplace as tools for connecting 
and interacting. New display technologies; expanding distribution of high-speed 
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networks; and better, smaller, faster cameras could revolutionize “being there” – 
as virtual field trips place students in the moment, creating new immersive learn-
ing experiences.
Another potential future shows the rise of platforms such as LinkedIn as career 
managers. What we already have seen is the purchase of Lynda.com by LinkedIn, 
and the service is following the “freemium” approach to offer paid assistance in 
being the Match.com of careers. I can see additional potential here, as LinkedIn 
or other platforms continue to acquire content, knowledge, education, and career 
management services. Marrying this idea with the aforementioned need for inde-
pendent and validated housing of learning records, I can easily imagine LinkedIn 
(or something similar) becoming the one-stop shop for learning from grade school 
through late-stage careers.
From a topical level, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) has been the focus for the early part of the 21st century, owing to the 
growing need for students and workers with skills in these areas to become the 
authors of computer code, developers of apps and hardware, and managers of 
data. With the expansion and eventual standardization of artificial intelligence 
communication (much like xAPI in recent years), systems will become self main-
taining, and many of those jobs that required hard technical skills will begin to 
go away.
I foresee a time when a return to human sciences occurs, especially as the opera-
tional side of human existence becomes more automated and deeper philosophical 
and ethical questions emerge. We are already seeing the beginning of this with the 
move to extend general data protection regulations to preserve individuals’ pri-
vacy and agency over data shared across networks and devices. Deep and shared 
understanding of human factors, ethics, history, social constructs, and so on will 
be in great demand as technologies expand in reach and potentially threaten our 
ability to understand and empathize with others, leading to what Sherry Turkle 
(2011) describes as a situation of being “alone, together.”
Public policy will need to evolve in sync with new technologies, bearing in 
mind the greater good and supporting not just a nation-state level of health and 
well-being, but also a global and integrated perspective that reflects the inter-
connectedness of economies, access to core services, digital trade flows, and of 
course education and skill development. Internet service providers may continue 
to challenge net neutrality, and if they win, we may be in for a further bifurcated 
world of haves and have-nots, and this will have a direct impact on the quality and 
availability of education. We may also see advanced applications of bio-hacking, 
embedding technologies that are designed to monitor, send, and receive data con-
nected to learning and performance. This will open up its own set of concerns as 
we think about health factors, data privacy, and related issues.
And while all this is going on, learning science will advance, and organizations 
will further increase their focus on connecting learning to performance, spawn-
ing an increase in the number of digital tools available to bridge the knowledge 
to application gap. We have already seen the development of learning platforms 
designed to create this bridge. Those platforms, in the future, will be augmented 
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with all manner of data capture and reporting mechanisms, owing to the Internet of 
Things and the eventual shakeout of standards for interoperability. And, while con-
tent and platforms will expand to meet a growing opportunity for online, ubiquitous 
learning and development, a premium will be placed on the creation of immersive 
learning experiences. What we postulated as a possible future in our work in virtual 
worlds ten years ago will become a vivid reality, accessible through lightweight, 
multisensory virtual reality gear. We can easily imagine a version of Ernest Cline’s 
(2011) Ludus from Ready Player One – a virtual galaxy of three-dimensional loca-
tions where simulations of all forms are developed and experienced.
3 Conclusion
Education as a public good sits squarely in the intersection of digital innovation 
and economic and social policy. We cannot consider the design, development, and 
implementation of new technologies in educational settings without also consid-
ering factors relating to equal access and quality assurance. The current ongoing 
debate and legislation related to privatization of education is critically important 
to this: The World Economic Forum has stated that education is a human right 
(Brende, 2015), and if we are to meet the needs of the millions of learners glob-
ally, young and old, we will need to advocate for policies that ensure access for all 
to the many benefits of digital transformation.
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Notes
 1 K–12 = kindergarten to 12th grade. That is, primary and secondary free education for 
publicly supported school from kindergarten all the way up to 12th grade.
 2 This is a highly politicized debate in the United States, and the attempts to garner public 
comment on the issue were stymied by hacking. Fifty-seven percent of comments sub-
mitted to the Federal Communications Commission, through online forms, were made 
from duplicate or temporary email addresses.
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Part III
Citizen protection    

1 Introduction
Citizens evaluating domestic security might ponder two aspects of their trust in 
the government. First, does my government have the capability to protect me? 
Second, do I trust my government’s intention to protect me? These assessments 
of a state’s capacity and motivations are fundamental to citizen perceptions of 
internal security, with consequences for private responses. Due to wide-ranging, 
accelerating technological advancement, digital innovation has enabled effective 
and extensive private efforts with the potential to disrupt traditional governmen-
tal roles. Herein, we study how digitalization has affected historical citizen pro-
tection functions using a capabilities and intentions framework. This framework 
does not assume any baseline trust levels, and it is important to emphasize that 
we do not assume that citizens automatically trust their governments. We measure 
citizen trust with public opinion polls, and present this evidence alongside a time 
series analysis of other sources of public trust.
First, we broadly define citizen protections and summarize their historical ori-
gins in the United States and their recent evolution. We hypothesize that private 
government contractors – all with a major digital component that bolsters citizen 
security – signal increasing concern with threats, vigilance, and protection in the 
age of digitalization. However, during the same time period, public institutions 
charged with citizen protection have also pursued and exhibited these same con-
cerns and intentions. After highlighting extensive public-private collaboration 
across a wide range of protective functions, we identify important considerations 
that this hybrid model raises in the coming years. This chapter addresses serious 
structural and moral issues inherent to large government efforts, but we avoid 
diverting into lengthy treatments on civic topics that merit entire library sections. 
We therefore balance tension between terseness and tedium in order to emphasize 
our argument that citizen protection roles have evolved recursively between pub-
lic and private institutions in this age of digitalization.
1.1  Defining citizen protection
We define citizen protection as the work of institutions aimed at minimizing 
public harm and ensuring enumerated fundamental rights, including: inalienable 
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rights such as “life, liberty and security of person” (UN General Assembly, 1948); 
human rights to private property and self-defense (Barnett, 2004); and legal rights 
including a fair trial (The Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI). Due 
to its size and global influence, we focus this analysis on US public security insti-
tutions and the accompanying industrial complex; however, the interpretation and 
conclusions transcend national boundaries and government structures. These data 
describe how digitalization affects citizen protections and welfare both within and 
beyond any country’s public security apparati.
Within the broad realm of citizen protection are three key distinctions that clar-
ify the structure and function of organizations and their general missions.1 We 
explore each dimension below.
1.1.1 International vs. intranational protection
Security requires parallel efforts – international and intranational protection – each 
with different sets of responsibilities and legal constraints. International security 
encompasses protection from hostile foreign actors. In the United States, this duty 
belongs primarily to well-known public defense and intelligence organizations: 
the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National 
Security Agency. Intranational security efforts safeguard citizens from internal 
actors (i.e., other individuals within the state). Intranational security has primarily 
been led by public entities, including the police and courts, though in many parts 
of the United States, there remains a strong custom of self-protection via firearm 
ownership that is rooted in US history and values, including “culture of honor” 
norms and the primacy of rights to liberty (Cohen et al., 1996; Kocsis, 2015).
Guarding against both inter- and intranational threats is an evolving chal-
lenge in the digital age. In a digital world war, national boundaries are practically 
irrelevant to an enemy that plans attacks and recruits fighters worldwide (Ullah, 
2017). Instead of focusing on the characteristics of these resilient and amorphous 
enemies, this chapter focuses on public and private efforts to guard against them.
1.1.2 Public vs. private protection
Traditionally, citizen protection efforts have fallen under the purview of local, 
state, and federal government entities. However, beyond the historic use of hired 
soldiers in armed conflicts (Avant, 2004), beginning in the early 20th century, 
governments began to collaborate with private entities in their efforts to promote 
citizen security for reasons ranging from financial efficiency to technological 
superiority (Markusen, 2003). Today, governments stand at a critical juncture 
where new technology is evolving at a rapid pace and financial incentives have 
changed, such that the consumer market for innovation has surpassed the public 
sector. As a result, governments are no longer the primary drivers of the inno-
vation agenda (FitzGerald and Parziale, 2017). In this changing landscape, citi-
zen protection efforts are distributed across a public–private continuum, and the 
lines between public and private efforts are blurring. This trend, rooted in the 
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development of digital technology, has augmented private entities’ capabilities to 
play a larger – perhaps, even leading – role in citizen protection. Some defense 
scholars have suggested that private capabilities will continue to grow such that 
they eventually supersede the power and relevance of public structures (Lean-
der, 2005; Minow, 2005; Singer, 2005, 2008). We explore those claims with data: 
markers for protective capabilities and intentions across both public and private 
institutions. We proceed to interpret those trends and speculate about the future of 
this public-private collaboration.
1.1.3 Direct vs. indirect protection
We focus on direct protection: citizen protections from physical threats that 
directly imperil rights to life and immediate “security of person” (UN General 
Assembly, 1948). This definition excludes many indirect protections, and in some 
cases, makes distinctions on certain security tactics depending on their ultimate 
aim. For example, this chapter’s scope includes online surveillance by technol-
ogy organizations who attempt to prevent imminent terrorist attacks, but excludes 
organizations who aim to protect citizens from hate speech on the Internet. Dis-
tinctions like these narrowed the list of public and private organizations we stud-
ied (see Section 2: “Methods”).
1.2  Overview of citizen protection structures in the  
United States
The US government is a model hierarchical bureaucracy, consisting of deline-
ated departments with complementary missions. Among 15 cabinet departments 
within the executive branch (agriculture, commerce, defense, education, energy, 
health and human services, homeland security, housing and urban development, 
interior, justice, labor, state, transportation, treasury, and veterans affairs), five 
departments pursue citizen protection as a primary mission: the Departments of 
Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), State (DOS), Justice (DOJ), and 
Energy (DOE).2 In addition to these cabinet departments, we review the protective 
functions of intelligence agencies, the US judiciary branch (i.e., public courts), 
and local law enforcement. Appendix A briefly sketches out the histories, func-
tions, and counterparts to these direct citizen protection structures.
1.3 Evolution of citizen protection in the United States
Although public entities have delivered protection to citizens since the coun-
try’s founding, more recently, non-governmental actors have augmented the 
government’s capabilities. Since the 1950s, public structures (see Appendix A) 
have been transformed by privatization, primarily resulting from expectations 
of cost efficiencies and greater technological prowess (which, in recent decades, 
has included digital technology). Despite the increased ability of private enti-
ties to engage in citizen protection, we propose that the acceptance of such an 
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arrangement depends on citizens’ beliefs about public and private capabilities 
and intentions.
1.3.1 Evolution of international protection
In this section, we highlight growing privatization within various forms of inter-
national protection, including the nation’s armed forces and intelligence efforts. In 
the United States, this privatization has generally taken the form of public-private 
partnerships. Although private companies play increasingly important protective 
roles, they typically work in close collaboration with public entities.
Military and diplomatic protection: international defense endeavors comprise 
a major portion of the US annual budget, chiefly via the DOD. Until recent dec-
ades, the most significant technological advances within citizen protection in the 
United States were driven by the public entities reviewed in Appendix A, whether 
directly (i.e., technologies developed within government agencies) or indirectly 
(i.e., through government-sponsored grants) (FitzGerald and Parziale, 2017). 
However, today private contractors play important and growing roles in interna-
tional citizen protection, as evidenced by a US defense contractor workforce that 
had expanded to 3.7 million by 2015 (Light, 2017; Prem, 2018). The extent of this 
privatization is somewhat unique to citizen protection: Security-related agencies 
and departments, including the Departments of Defense and Energy, rely more 
heavily on outsourcing than other public entities (Markusen, 2003). In fact, a 
review of 1996 data revealed that, by this date, five contract and grant jobs existed 
for every DOD role, with a ratio of only 1.5-to-1 in areas of government not 
dedicated to citizen protection (Light, 1999). Similarly, the share of defense roles 
accounted for by private contractors grew to 50 percent in 2000 from 36 percent 
in 1972, whereas military and Pentagon (i.e., the US DOD Headquarters) civilian 
employees’ share decreased from 64 percent to 50 percent during the same period 
(Markusen, 2003). There is much more privatization within the citizen protection 
sector.
Explanations for this shift to privatization are often rooted in claims about the 
greater efficiency and expertise of private entities; their operations are seen as more 
agile and less costly than similar efforts would be if managed publicly (Rosen-
berg, 2016; Markusen, 2003). Since the 1970s, the scope of work outsourced to 
contractors has grown, and these entities have responded to increasing calls for 
less “bloated” government by expanding their offerings to provide a wider range 
of services, from troop training to base maintenance (Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2009; Markusen, 2003). This is a recursive process by which governments have a 
need, private organizations respond to that need by expanding their offerings, and 
government structures come to rely on those broadened skillsets. Over time, this 
partnership expanded from garrison services to combat operations.
However, cost efficiency is not the only driver of security privatization; digi-
talization and technological aspirations also play an important role in this process. 
As an example, consider the advancement of military capabilities: In the first half 
of the 20th century, thanks to the emergence of new technology (air warfare), the 
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US government looked to the private sector for the development of advanced air-
craft (Markusen, 2003). Following private success in developing ballistic missiles 
in the 1950s, the Air Force’s strategic reliance on private contractors prevailed 
over the Army’s preference for public research and development (Kelsey, 1982). 
In the decades that followed, the majority of weapons development has been led 
by private entities contracted by government forces (Markusen, 2003). This trend 
is also reflected in the US nuclear program: Although a wide range of public 
entities both oversee the country’s nuclear arsenal (e.g., the DOE) and work to 
prevent the spread of such technology (e.g., the Bureau of International Security 
and Nonproliferation) (Holgate, 2018), private contractors play a leading role in 
the development and production of these weapons. This public-private partner-
ship enhances the government’s effectiveness in maintaining a strong nuclear pro-
gram, as these private entities’ capabilities are superior to the public’s (Cole and 
Vermeltfoort, 2018).
Beyond weapons technology, privatization within international citizen protec-
tion has also been driven by research and innovation more broadly. In their review 
of DOD commercial activities programs, Tighe et al. (1996) found that military 
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) increasingly relies on 
the work of private entities; for example, the Navy outsourced only 30 percent of 
RDT&E activities in 1970, and by 1996, this share had grown to 50 percent. Pub-
lic security reliance on private technology is even more evident when examining 
the financial growth of companies with government contracts, such as Computer 
Sciences Corporation, whose defense sales exceeded USD 1 billion by 1997 (Ber-
teau, 1998); for a more modern perspective, Leidos’s defense contracts exceeded 
USD 6.8 billion in 2016 (Washington Technology, 2017). Though some citizens 
have raised concerns about this privatization of international security, the outcry 
has not been loud enough to prompt any change (Leander, 2005).
Evidenced by little resistance to public-private partnerships, citizens appear 
to consider defense contractors trustworthy enough. Americans indicate positive 
feelings toward technology firms that are likely responsible for digitalization: 
71 percent indicate that tech companies have a “positive effect on the way things 
are going in the country” (Doherty et al., 2015). Beyond the greater capabili-
ties of these private organizations, this strong privatization trend may also reflect 
citizens’ mistrust in the motivations of public entities. Public opinion studies 
have tracked American sentiments toward defense with polls depicting tenuous 
confidence in public protection. From 2002 to 2012, public opinion on defense 
spending showed a reliable trend of more people thinking that the United States 
spends too much and fewer people thinking that the United States spends too 
little (Corman et al., 2015). Other polls confirm waning trust in the US govern-
ment; in 2015 only 19 percent of Americans reported trusting the government 
always or most of the time, as compared to a peak of 77 percent in 1964 (Doherty 
et al., 2015). These public-private hybrids thrive in times of waxing and wan-
ing government trust alike. Taken together, these two poll investigations indicate 
that trust in US government institutions has been generally lower than trust in its 
private defense industry and indicates taxpayer openness to joint public-private 
176 Mark A. Conley and Emily Nakkawita
protection efforts. Citizens generally do not deconstruct, it appears in these polls, 
which exact aspects of public-private hybrids are trustworthy; if either component 
appears trustworthy, that quality bestows citizen trust upon the whole unit.
Digital surveillance: this reliance on public-private partnerships extends into 
cyberspace. US intelligence agencies have worked closely with private organiza-
tions to cultivate citizen protection via digital surveillance of foreign actors. For 
example, through its PRISM program, the NSA partners with the FBI and CIA 
(with oversight from the DOJ and the Judiciary) to collect digital data on foreign 
intelligence targets from private Internet service providers (Director of National 
Intelligence, 2013). This public-private collaboration is no surprise: Given that 
these companies own the technology platforms and data that individuals around 
the globe use to browse, learn, and communicate (Blumenthal, 2018), public enti-
ties will be most successful in identifying potential threats through public-private 
partnerships, as the private entities’ capabilities are vastly superior.
Despite the strong protection of individual rights for US citizens, these interna-
tional protection efforts (whether public or private) do not extend those individual 
privacy rights to foreign actors. Warrantless surveillance against noncitizens is 
approved through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) section 702 
(Pulver and Medina, 2018), and while some groups have voiced concerns over 
these tactics (Weber, 2015), more than half of Americans find it acceptable for 
the US government to conduct digital surveillance of foreign actors (Rainie and 
Madden, 2015). Similarly, as of 2016, the Pew Research Center found that US 
citizens were more concerned with protection from terrorism (49 percent) vs. civil 
liberties (33 percent) (Doherty, Kiley and Johnson, 2016). These trends suggest 
that US citizens trust the capabilities and intentions of these hybrid public-private 
entities regarding international surveillance.
1.3.2 Evolution of intranational protection
In the United States, despite the existence of strong public institutions with citi-
zen security responsibilities, the realm of intranational security has historically 
included a considerable private component thanks to the country’s revolutionary 
foundation and strong protections for individual firearm ownership. Be that as it 
may, similar to the international space, intranational protection has evolved to 
place even stronger emphasis on private security thanks to the emergence of digi-
tal tools. These technologies have bolstered the capabilities of private entities and 
have better positioned those entities to play a larger role in citizen protection. In 
addition, powerful, readily available, and relatively inexpensive digital technol-
ogy has increased citizens’ personal protection capabilities relative to traditional 
law enforcement.
Private commercial security: the commercial use of private security forces 
has grown in recent years, as evidenced by the presence of uniformed guards in 
seemingly innocuous establishments from supermarkets to shopping malls. Today 
the United States is the world’s largest private security market, employing 1.5 
to 2 million individuals; nearly three private contractors exist for every single 
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member of the public police force (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009). Interest-
ingly, in this age of relative peace, these private security companies often work in 
alignment with public entities, forming a loosely organized group of actors Abra-
hamsen and Williams term “global security assemblages” (2009). The relative 
lack of public protest against this trend suggests citizen trust in the capabilities 
and intentions of these private guards. US students view private security offic-
ers’ professionalism and goals positively (Nalla and Heraux, 2003). These posi-
tive citizen perceptions of private security appear even stronger among students 
in countries in “emerging” and “flawed” democracies; perhaps in such systems 
where a lack of confidence in public institutions is common, the intentions of pri-
vate contractors are viewed as more trustworthy by comparison (Nalla, Maxwell 
and Mamayek, 2017).
Private home security: beyond this growth in the commercial security mar-
ket, digital technology has also increased citizens’ own protection capabilities. 
This protection takes several forms, including the rise of a private home security 
market. Following an increase in crime after World War I, the notion of home 
security systems, installed and managed by private companies, grew in popular-
ity (Electronic Security Association, 2018). Despite the industry’s modest begin-
nings in which human “door shakers” would confirm that customers’ doors were 
locked each evening, by the 1940s, the American District Telegraph company had 
installed the first automated burglar system connected via telephone to a central 
monitoring center (ADT, 2018). The availability of improved camera technology 
in the 1970s sparked the widespread installation of what are now considered mod-
ern home security systems, complete with video surveillance (Electronic Security 
Association, 2018). Today, an ever-growing number of mobile- and WiFi-based 
home security options are available to consumers, from the Ring video doorbell 
and security camera, to the wireless SimpliSafe home security system, to former 
NSA contractor (also former CIA staff) employee Edward Snowden’s Haven app, 
which converts any Android smartphone into a mobile surveillance tool (Green-
berg, 2017). Additionally, despite falling crime rates, the home security market is 
growing (NextMarket Insights, 2014), suggesting that consumers trust both the 
capabilities and intentions of these purveyors of private security.
Private individual protection: advocates purport that widespread private gun 
ownership serves a citizen protection function (Kleck and McElrath, 1991; Lott Jr. 
and Landes, 1999). Also, see Hemenway (1997) and McDowall (2005) for rigor-
ous rebuttals. Those claims follow from the US Constitution’s suggestion that gun 
ownership is a necessary structure for security: “A well regulated militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, 
shall not be infringed” (The Constitution of the United States, Amendment II). 
Centuries after its writing, that security structure was reinforced by a US Supreme 
Court decision that interpreted the Second Amendment to guarantee gun owner-
ship at the level of the individual (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). It is 
remarkable that this form of citizen protection is the only structure that delegates 
security tasks to the individual citizen. The explicit rights in the Second Amend-
ment in effect hire out part of the government’s otherwise robust citizen protection 
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role to private citizens. Unlike most government contracts, however, the labor is 
unpaid; in fact, the security providers purchase and maintain their own equip-
ment. It appears that gun owners accept the government’s mandate; gun owners 
cite defense as their primary reason for gun ownership, not recreation or hunting 
(Dimock, Doherty and Christian, 2013). Beliefs about the benefits of gun owner-
ship parallel this trend: 79 percent of gun owners find that owning a gun makes 
them feel safer, and only 7 percent report that it makes them feel uncomfortable 
(Dimock, Doherty and Christian, 2013).
This unusual protection structure has been resistant to digital transformation. 
Many technological advances in guns are traditional improvements to ballistics, 
harmonics, and optics. Some proposed new technologies are digital transforma-
tions; biometric trigger lock devices are fingerprint identification surfaces that 
would allow only a specific person, ostensibly the adult owner of the gun, to 
access the trigger. This digital technology affects firearms only until these locks 
are disabled; after that, the firearms function as usual. There are a variety of analog 
locks and safes that perform the same function; biometric trigger locks are not an 
innovation that have transformed citizen protection functions as much as they are 
an innovation aimed to prevent accidents (Kloepfer et al., 2018). Also, see Moss-
berg, Kluwe and Kinion (2001) for a similar digital innovation.
Like other methods of protection we have reviewed, steady support for private 
self-protection appears to be driven by a lack of trust in public entities’ capac-
ity and motivation to carry out their protective duties. For example, in rural 
areas where law enforcement response times are greater (indicating a deficiency 
in the public capability to protect), citizens support Second Amendment rights 
more strongly (Parker et al., 2017). This perspective appears related to a con-
struct called legal cynicism, in which people view law enforcement as incapable 
of executing its protective duties: “unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure pub-
lic safety” (Sierra-Arévalo and Crowther-Dowey, 2016). Legal cynicism in this 
domain is also summarized blithely, “When seconds count, police are minutes 
away.” Among gun owners, negative perceptions of police correlate positively 
with seeking private gun ownership as a defense alternative (Sierra-Arévalo and 
Crowther-Dowey, 2016). Independent of opinions toward police, perceptions of 
the state of the world can drive gun ownership. Gun owners are sensitive to dif-
fuse threats that the world is inherently dangerous (Stroebe, Leander and Kruglan-
ski, 2017; Ziegenhagen and Brosnan, 1990; Parker et al., 2017).
Case study: school shooting prevention efforts: consider the first paragon of a 
school shooting in America – the Columbine massacre – and compare that with 
the most recent notorious school shooting (at the time of this writing) in Parkland, 
Florida. The perpetrators of both crimes wrote prolifically about their intent. The 
Columbine shooters scrawled ink into private notebooks; the Parkland shooter 
uploaded his dark musings to YouTube for anyone on the Internet to access. Digi-
talization has transferred even male teenage written angst that precedes deadly 
violence from private to public view. Private citizens read the Parkland shooter’s 
comment, “Im [sic] going to be a professional school shooter” on YouTube, and 
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reported him to authorities, including local sheriffs and the FBI (Goldman and 
Mazzei, 2018). Those private citizens certainly acted with intent for citizen pro-
tection, but whether public authorities were capable of delivering that protection 
is debatable. These macabre examples portray how digital tools may augment the 
both private and public capabilities for citizen protection. Private citizens noticed 
the threat; public security forces were incapable of executing to deter the threat. 
Despite this catastrophe, it is reasonable to hope that the sequence of events in this 
case will inform future public citizen protection procedures. If so, both private 
and public capabilities for citizen protection will be enhanced by digital tools.
1.4 Behind the evolution
Broad acceptance of changes to citizen protection structures, roles, and respon-
sibilities should depend on widespread perceptions of the capabilities and inten-
tions of both the public entities typically tasked with this protection and the 
private organizations that may support or supplant them. If citizens find their 
governments’ capabilities to be deficient or motives to be questionable, and they 
also believe that private companies can not only fill those roles but also act with 
benevolent intentions, citizens will allow public-private defense partnerships to 
thrive with taxpayer support. To this end, private companies use digital tools to 
tout their capabilities and reinforce their protective intentions.
For these reasons, understanding the role of digitalization in citizen protection 
requires the present capabilities and intentions framework. In the “Methods” sec-
tion below, we describe our linguistic measurement tool that captures the degree 
to which organizations signal their ability to protect and their benevolent motiva-
tion. In keeping with our framework, we constructed a robust sample of private 
and public citizen-protection entities and tested for differences in their communi-
cation of protective capabilities and intentions over time.
2 Methods
2.1 Overview
This chapter’s arguments rest upon the proposed capabilities and intentions 
framework for understanding the roles of different actors in the citizen protection 
landscape. For this reason, we operationalized the signaling of protective capabil-
ities and intentions using a modern linguistic analysis. Organizations, both public 
and private, communicate their ability to protect citizens effectively, as well as 
their positive motivations, in the way they outwardly describe themselves. In the 
digital age, organizations disseminate these self-descriptions on their websites – 
particularly on their “About Us” web pages. We aimed to measure the amount of 
protective language on those pages among public vs. private organizations. This 
linguistic analysis quantifies the extent to which private and public entities each 
signal their concerns for citizen protection.
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2.2 Data and sample
The government departments and agencies discussed in Appendix A comprise 
our sample of public organizations. Every government entity with a primary mis-
sion for citizen protection is included in the sample. We compare those defense- 
oriented government organizations with the top government contractors – private 
companies with citizen-protection capabilities. Although the top 100 govern-
ment contractors are publicly available in ranked order (Washington Technology, 
2017), we constrained this sample to organizations with a 2017 government con-
tract over USD 500M. This constraint limited the size of the private sample to 40 
organizations to compare to 12 public entities. Each of these private organizations 
performs its roles using digital tools, strives for digital advances, and capitalizes 
on digital transformations.
2.3 Measures
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) is a text analysis program that 
measures valuable psychological content in digitalized written samples (Pen-
nebaker et al., 2015b; a). For example, LIWC can measure markers for analytic 
thinking and emotions (Ritter, Preston and Hernandez, 2014), motivations and 
risk (Gamache et al., 2015), and even fear and aggression (Soroka, Young and 
Balmas, 2015). For the purposes of the present analysis, we constructed a dic-
tionary that is sensitive to written markers that signal concern for citizen pro-
tection. We adapted the motivational LIWC dictionary (Gamache et al., 2015) 
to also measure common military and defense terminology (US Department of 
Defense, 2018).
2.3.1 Independent variable
To measure increasing communication of citizen protection, we used time as 
our predictor variable to show the evolution of concerns for threat manifested 
in company descriptions. We mined the Internet for a historical record of 
organizations’ self-descriptions over time using the Internet Archive’s Way-
back Machine (available at https://archive.org). This website allowed us to 
capture the language each organization used to describe itself every year dat-
ing back to its inaugural website (beginning in the year 1996, when the Inter-
net Archive was founded). For standardization, we attempted to capture all 
text-based content contained in the first available snapshot of each organiza-
tion’s “About Us” page for each calendar year. For the many cases where the 
website for any given year was unavailable, we proceeded forward in time to 
the closest available update. The dates for each observation, and the sample 
text we analyzed, are available on the Open Science Framework at https://




The Citizen Protection LIWC dictionary yields a continuous measure that is 
a ratio of key citizen protection words to the total word count in the sample 
text. As a result, we analyzed 1077 scores from the text of 52 entities (40 
private organizations and 12 public entities), from the present back to 1996, 
where available. Given that the “About Us” page of an organizational website 
is intended to convey the entity’s strategic positioning and capabilities to the 
public (both potential government clients and private citizens alike), each of 
those scores serves as a proxy for the organization’s intention to signal its 
capacity and motivation for engaging in protective efforts at that moment in 
history. This continuous outcome measure allows for the detection of change 
over time.
2.3.3 Control variables
Our analyses controlled for protection-focused investment, measured using pub-
licly available annual contract sizes for every private defense contractor and 
annual budgets for every public entity (both from the most recent available cal-
endar year). The three statistical models presented below include budget size as 
a covariate. All reports hold at the same significance level with and without this 
covariate included in the regression model.
3 Results
Three notable trends emerged. First, concerns for citizen protection have been 
reliably increasing, creeping upward, among private defense firms (t = 8.35, 
p < .001). Further, this same trend is detectable among US government security 
entities (t = 5.37, p < .001). Importantly, and perhaps surprisingly, testing for 
differences between those slopes reveals that the government’s concerns are 
growing significantly more rapidly, approximately twice the rate of its private 
contractors (t = 4.09, p < .001). Figure 11.1 reflects increasing private and pub-
lic concerns for citizen protection, and also shows their significantly different 
slopes side by side.
4 Discussion
4.1 Findings
These results indicate increased signaling of protective capabilities and intentions 
by both public and private entities from 1996 to 2018. Based on this pattern of 
data, it appears that the organizations within our sample are increasingly con-
cerned with conveying their interest in citizen protection to individual citizens 
(across both organization types) and, potentially, clients within public entities 
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responsible for awarding government contracts (in the case of private organiza-
tions’ websites). Combined with the general evolution of citizen protection in 
the direction of public-private collaboration, these data suggest that this hybrid 
approach to citizen protection can be expected to persist.
4.2 Key considerations
Despite some doubts about the capabilities and motivations of the government, 
94 percent of Americans still report believing that the government should play 
a major role in a particular type of citizen protection: “keeping country safe 
from terrorism” (Doherty et al., 2015). Public views of private institutions 
have also improved: when comparing 2015 to 2010, the percentage of Ameri-
cans believing small businesses had a positive effect on the country grew by 
11 percentage points, and large corporations by 8 percentage points (Doherty 
et al., 2015). These numbers suggest an environment ripe for more frequent 
and extensive public-private partnerships. With this in mind, we identify sev-






























































Figure 11.1  Private and public “About Us” statements. Although both continue to signal 
growing concerns for citizen protection, public institutions outpace private 
organizations.
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4.2.1 Key consideration #1: navigating borderline cases
Despite apparent public support for privatization and digitalization within cer-
tain domains, the distinctions between intranational and international citizen 
protection have blurred and thus create a wide range of potential “gray areas.” 
For example, consider the protection of citizens from terrorists within the state: 
What is the appropriate balance between maintaining citizen security and yet 
still adhering to domestic privacy norms? Further, given that these efforts will 
certainly involve digital surveillance, what might be considered a responsible 
level of data encryption, whereby law-abiding citizens’ rights to privacy are 
upheld yet the activities of potentially dangerous actors can be monitored? 
Similarly, consider the protection from the state within the state (an issue that 
underlies the right to bear arms within the US Constitution): To what extent 
should Second Amendment rights allow citizens to prepare a defense against 
their own government, digitally or physically, should it turn tyrannical? This 
line of inquiry also raises questions about private oversight of the state: To what 
extent should private citizens be privy to military plans, operations, and spend-
ing information (an especially timely question given the prevalence of digitally 
facilitated leaks)?
We propose that when the distinctions between inter- and intranational 
protection are unclear, as illustrated in the examples above, privatization 
efforts should be accompanied by extensive oversight safeguards, audits, and 
reviews revisited often. This recommendation becomes even more important 
when tactics typically assigned to international security (which may fail to 
uphold individual privacy rights, for example) would be used for the purposes 
of domestic protection. The importance of this distinction is illustrated by 
recent events, in which the New York police department shared plans in 2012 
to use terahertz (“T-Ray”) imaging technology that facilitates long-distance 
gun detection, enabling public police officers to detect if an individual is car-
rying a gun under their clothing (Parascandola, 2017). This technology was 
originally developed by the Department of Defense for international security 
purposes: specifically, to detect suicide bombers carrying explosives. Though 
this technology might help police officers identify potential offenders at vul-
nerable events, it also conflicts with strong privacy protections in the United 
States ensuring that no citizen or their property can be searched without rea-
sonable cause and a warrant (The Constitution of the United States, Amend-
ment VI). Not surprisingly, the New York Civil Liberties Union pushed back 
on the adoption of this technology, and the police department subsequently 
decided to abandon its use (Parascandola, 2017). This example acts as a useful 
case study for future protective initiatives that cross the inter- vs. intranational 
divide; proactive engagement with respected civil libertarian groups prior to 
the adoption of new technology may enable protective entities to identify digi-
tal solutions that simultaneously pursue citizen security and uphold funda-
mental civil rights.
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4.2.2  Key consideration #2: maintaining necessary oversight  
of private entities
As citizen protection structures grow ever more complex through a wide range of 
public-private partnerships, it naturally becomes more challenging for any “cen-
tral” public entity to maintain oversight of the associated network of organiza-
tions. One important type of oversight relates to the coordination of work among 
entities that share responsibility for a specific protective function. Given that each 
involved organization maintains its own internal hierarchy, which indirectly con-
nects with similar hierarchies within partner organizations, the ultimate chain of 
command across various entities is necessarily more convoluted (and contains 
additional points of potential failure) than if a single entity were responsible for 
the same work (Markusen, 2003). If not carefully managed, a complicated cross-
organizational structure may also create a lack of transparency within which cor-
ruption can thrive. Further, various working groups within this cross-organizational 
team may suddenly vanish, for all intents and purposes, if the scope of work 
changes or entities’ management cannot align on or adhere to a contract, creating 
a great deal of operational risk for the “central” entity. Managing these risks and 
maintaining contingency plans requires substantial oversight, a burden that must 
be balanced against the apparent benefits of such public-private partnerships.
A second and important type of oversight relates to the assumed cost savings of 
privatization. Research into the financial realities of public-private partnerships sug-
gests that the cost efficiencies that often drive privatization are ultimately specious; 
the long-term contracts underlying these partnerships are written in order to impede 
competition from other firms and flexibility within the scope of work (Avant, 2004). 
Further, given the limited number of large prime contractors in each realm today, 
some speculate that these organizations function as an oligopoly and likely engage 
in some price collusion (Markusen, 2003). This challenge seems only likely to grow 
given the steep degree of technological expertise required to compete as a contrac-
tor within modern weapons development and digital surveillance. Due to these 
challenges, public entities should maintain vigilant oversight, conducting frequent 
audits to ensure that partner organizations are delivering the benefits promised.
4.2.3  Key consideration #3: ensuring equitable protection  
for all citizens
A third challenge for privatization (particularly as it pertains to intranational pro-
tection) relates to the unequal distribution of resources inherent in private markets. 
In its report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (2009) warns that the privatization of protective functions 
jeopardizes a nation’s ability to guarantee fundamental rights. The report argues 
that privatization reduces citizen protection to a product that can be retained only 
by those with the resources to purchase it. Beyond these demand-side challenges to 
equitable citizen protection, private intranational security solutions are also likely 
to proliferate within larger and wealthier markets where greater profit margins 
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can be expected. Thanks to these supply-side differences, rural and low-income 
areas may experience a dearth of private interest and, as a result, the citizens of 
these regions may find themselves with diminished access to protection vs. their 
more affluent, urban-dwelling counterparts (Isima, 2009). For these reasons, it is 
critical that public organizations maintain a focus on ensuring democratic access 
to citizen security. In many cases, this emphasis on equal protection will constrain 
the extent to which these intranational functions can be privatized.
4.2.4  Key consideration #4: aligning public and  
private objectives
Finally, public entities may find that, at some point, their objectives are no longer 
aligned with those of their private counterparts. Markusen (2003, p. 490) shares 
a well-considered list of challenges in her paper arguing against the privatization 
of international protection:
What happens when a firm’s home government’s interest and its employers’ 
interest diverge? How will the potential to sell army and air force moderniza-
tion advice worldwide affect the proliferation of conventional weapons and 
techniques? Might not these private arrangements alter the career strategies 
of members of the armed services? These questions begin to convey the 
extraordinary challenges facing a world in which the best Western military 
training and experience is offered for sale on the private market.
In the past 15 years, those predicted challenges have come to fruition. As govern-
ments today embark on extensive partnerships with private organizations, they 
should and can now measure the long-term implications of their collaborations. 
Specifically, the DOD should track publicly available information on defense con-
tractors: what percentage of their revenue comes from which nations; what per-
centage of the work in these companies is devoted to the United States compared 
to all other nations. To address Markusen’s third question above, the DOD can 
capture in exit surveys the proportion of military retirees who have been hired by 
a defense contractor and conduct more research on whether that opportunity com-
pelled them to leave active duty. Since noncompete agreements are valid between 
government contractors, would such agreements be tenable between the govern-
ment and defense contractors? The government might care about the answer to 
that question only to the extent that it deems the loss of experienced military offic-
ers into private employment deleterious to the government’s capabilities. This 
concern would be intensified in a public-private model where the intentions of the 
private organizations are less trustworthy.
5 Conclusion
The growing public-private hybrid model where private organizations master dig-
ital innovations and apply them toward public citizen protection missions shows 
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no sign of fading and no sign of tilting heavily toward either side. The relationship 
is symbiotic and recursive, and is supported by public opinion; citizens trust gov-
ernment capabilities and intentions. The borderline cases where governments face 
dilemmas in order to deliver protection, the challenges of oversight, the concerns 
for equity, and the tenuous alliance all make these public-private partnerships one 
of the most important issues in the defense industry.
The sturdiness and longevity of public-private hybrids foment interest in the 
potential dangers they pose. Consider this contrived scenario that depicts a public-
private partnership gone awry where the public entity loses some capability to 
protect its citizens, while the private component’s intentions are unknown. Imag-
ine a government funding a private organization to build a particularly destruc-
tive weapon or capability. Perhaps that contractor and its employees could wrest 
control of material capabilities from any government oversight, access, or failsafe 
procedures onsite. The government has lost control of the weapon, the capability, 
and the private aspect of the hybrid might be able to wield that new threat against 
the government or against the citizenry. Alternatively, the private organization 
might offer to protect the citizenry against the government with these hijacked 
capabilities.
Many practical realities undermine the plausibility and dampen the severity of 
these or similar scenarios. First, a government with military competence enabled 
by digitalization is likely to deter any rogue takeovers. Next, the decentraliza-
tion of public-private partnerships would benefit the government in this scenario, 
where that rogue private organization would represent just one of many capa-
bilities, with the other security relationships intact. Most important, digital com-
munication tools would enable that government to maintain citizen trust. The 
implausibility of the above scenario underscores and offers some explanation for 
the endurance of public-private hybrids. Simply put, the size and scope of the 
existing security apparati in developed countries acts as a check to the dangers 
new hybrid ventures pose.
As digitalization increases government capabilities, whether in isolation or via 
partnerships, dangerous scenarios become less, not more, of a legitimate poten-
tial danger. Public institutions are incrementally bolstered by the results of these 
hybrids, and those reinforcements discourage disruptions to the recursive capabil-
ities and intentions framework. Despite these serious concerns, digital innovators 
secure large government contracts and expand their defense capabilities, but the 
government is still leading the public-private hybrid model for citizen protection.
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This appendix provides a cursory description of key US government citizen pro-
tection entities. These brief illustrations of mission sets, histories, and interoper-
ability notes may serve to familiarize readers from outside the United States, and 
may spark recognition of the roles and responsibilities of parallel ministries and 
departments within other governments.
The US Department of Defense
The DOD is the largest and longest-standing US government agency, with a pri-
mary mission to “provide the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our 
nation’s security” (US Department of Defense, 2019, para.1). The DOD lists on 
its website that it was founded in conjunction with the American Revolution (US 
Department of Defense, 2019). The site describes that although the Army, Navy, 
and Marine Corps were created before the country’s official founding, in 1789 the 
War Department was established. However, the website notes that all branches of 
military remained under separate direction and, despite several reorganizations, 
were not unified under a single department until the creation of the National Mili-
tary Establishment in 1947, and formalized as the Department of Defense (along 
with the newly formed Air Force) under the National Security Act in 1949. Today, 
the DOD’s website notes that it is responsible for the training and deployment of 
all branches of the US military. Many nations around the world have a Ministry of 
Defense that is similar in structure and mission set to the US DOD.
The US Department of State
The DOS leads US diplomatic efforts. The department’s website notes that its mis-
sion is to “lead America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assis-
tance” (US Department of State, 2019a, para.2). The site describes that the DOS 
underwent a similar pattern of expansion and reorganization to the DOD since its 
founding, also in 1789. Primary drivers of the department’s expansion were the 
two world wars in the first half of the 20th century and the ending of the Cold War 
in the second half; the accompanying changes in the world prompted the United 
States to enhance its abilities to diplomatically respond to issues ranging from the 
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new global economy to terrorism (US Department of State, 2019b). Importantly, 
the DOS also contains dedicated groups with specific citizen protection roles. 
For example, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation prevents 
global threats relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (US Department of State, 
2018a). The Bureau of Consular Affairs warns citizens about country-specific 
threats through its travel alerts and warnings, found on the Bureau’s Travel Advi-
sories webpage as well as on its network of embassy and consulate websites (US 
Department of State, 2018b). Many nations around the world have a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that is similar in structure and mission set to the US DOS.
The US Department of Energy
The DOE website describes that the department aims “to ensure America’s secu-
rity and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and nuclear challenges 
through transformative science and technology solutions” (US Department of 
Energy, 2019c, para.1). The department’s role within citizen protection encom-
passes the maintenance and security of the country’s nuclear arsenal, efforts to 
protect against threats to critical energy infrastructure, and oversight of emer-
gency energy supplies such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (US Department 
of Energy, 2019d). Since launching the Manhattan Project in 1939, the DOE 
has played a leading role in both the development of nuclear technologies in the 
United States and their regulation around the globe (US Department of Energy, 
2015). Similar to the DOS, the DOE maintains several organizations with a focus 
on citizen security. For example, the Office of Nuclear Energy is dedicated to 
the use of nuclear power as an energy resource, and its focus on citizen protec-
tion resides in both promoting the country’s energy security and minimizing the 
risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear technology (US Department 
of Energy, 2019b). Conversely, the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) was founded in 2000 to oversee military applications of nuclear energy, 
including oversight of the country’s stockpile of nuclear weapons (US Depart-
ment of Energy, 2019a). The analogous department in some other countries is the 
Ministry of Energy.
The US Department of Homeland Security
The DHS website describes that the department was established in 2002 following 
the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, combin-
ing 22 distinct federal agencies and departments into a single department with 
the objective of coordinating the country’s homeland security efforts (US Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, 2016). The site lists DHS goals as “preventing ter-
rorism and enhancing security; managing our borders; administering immigration 
laws; securing cyberspace; and ensuring disaster resilience” (US Department of 
Homeland Security, 2016, para.2). The Ministry of the Interior in many countries 
performs roles similar to the US DHS.
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The US Central Intelligence Agency
The CIA describes on its website (2013) that the agency was founded in 1947 
under the National Security Act with the purpose of collecting and evaluating 
intelligence (often with a special focus on human intelligence) to ensure national 
security. In support of this mission, the CIA indicates on its website that it invests 
in the development of technology for intelligence purposes. The site also describes 
that the agency has established dedicated teams with specific citizen protective 
roles: “nonproliferation, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, international 
organized crime and narcotics trafficking, environment, and arms control intel-
ligence” (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2013, para.10). Almost every nation 
around the world has a similar primary intelligence service.
The US National Security Administration and Central 
Security Service
Established in 1952 following World War II, during which time the coun-
try’s code-breaking abilities proved critical, the NSA works with its CSS col-
leagues within the armed forces on the United States’ cryptology efforts (US 
National Security Administration, 2016). Collectively, these organizations 
serve two primary missions: signals intelligence, the collection of digital intel-
ligence required for national security purposes, and information assurance, the 
protection of vital United States digital systems from violence and theft (US 
National Security Administration, 2016). Very few countries perform citizen 
protection with a robust signals intelligence comparable to the scale and scope 
of the NSA.
Intranational citizen protection structures
The US Department of Justice (DOJ)
The DOJ’s website describes its mission as “[t]o enforce the law and defend the 
interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against 
threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal leadership in preventing and 
controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; 
and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans” (US 
Department of Justice, 2019, para.1). The site further describes that although the 
Office of the Attorney General was created as a single position in 1789 as part 
of the Judiciary Act, the DOJ was not officially established until 1870. This new 
department was intended to oversee both criminal and civil cases with federal 
interests at stake. Since then, the DOJ has evolved structurally to become “the 
world’s largest law office and the chief enforcer of federal laws” (US Department 
of Justice, 2019, para.6). Ministries of Justice in other countries perform similar 
protection roles.
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The US judiciary
The judiciary consists of the federal court system, including the Supreme Court, 
and is primarily responsible for interpreting the meaning of laws in regard to 
individual cases and determining if laws violate the Constitution (US Govern-
ment, 2019). Meanwhile, the judiciary was founded with the establishment of 
the Supreme Court “under Article III of the Constitution to administer justice 
fairly and impartially, within the jurisdiction established by the Constitution and 
Congress” (US Judicial Branch, 2019a, para.1). Beyond the Supreme Court, with 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the broader federal court system was established with a 
structure that has broadly remained intact today (The Library of Congress, 2017). 
Though they share a similar name, the judicial branch is distinct from the DOJ, 
and these two structures work closely together; for example: “The Department of 
Justice, which is responsible for prosecuting federal crimes and for representing 
the government in civil cases, is the most frequent litigator in the federal court 
system” (Eastern District of Washington, 2018, sec.1.4).
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI was established in 1908 as the first federal organization dedicated to 
addressing national law enforcement (US Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019a). 
Since the founding of the FBI Laboratory in 1932, the Bureau has led the use of 
the latest scientific and technological advances in promoting national security, 
which originated in practices including fingerprint and handwriting analysis (US 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019c). Today, the FBI strives to protect Ameri-
can citizens from threats within the country, including terrorism, cyberattacks, 
civil rights violations, large crime organizations, and “significant” violent crime 
(US Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019b). The Ministry of the Interior in many 
countries performs roles similar to the FBI.
US state courts
In the United States, state courts hear both civil and criminal cases, including tort 
cases, contract cases, and family cases (US Judicial Branch, 2019b). They are 
also responsible for interpreting state laws and constitutions (US Judicial Branch, 
2019b). As it concerns citizen protection, these courts work with law enforcement 
officers within the criminal justice system in the trial and judgment of individuals 
who commit crimes.
Police power
Police in the United States are responsible for local law enforcement, based on 
states’ authority to enforce lawful regulation of citizen behavior (Barnett, 2004). 
Importantly, the police force is distinct from the military because military forces 
are not trained to manage citizen security, which has unfortunately led to human 
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rights violations in certain circumstances (Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, 2009).
Though an important and public-facing component of citizen protection on the 
local level, police power is not specifically delegated within the United States 
Constitution and was applied inconsistently within writings from the period of 
the country’s founding (Barnett, 2004). In his seminal treatise on states’ legisla-
tive power, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Cooley (1871, p. 572) described the 
police as an entity that seeks:
not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences against the State, 
but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of 
good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a con-
flict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, 
so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.
Other scholars have conceived of police power more broadly, which has impor-
tant implications when weighing individuals’ rights (e.g., to privacy) vs. promo-
tion of the “common good” – even if this means prevention of crimes that may or 
may not take place (Barnett, 2004).
Table 11.1  Citizen Protection LIWC dictionary. This word list facilitated quantitative meas-
urement of protective language signaled by public and private organizations
Prevention motivational dictionary Additional words: citizen protection
Accuracy Loss Attrition Mitigate
Afraid Obligation Avert Monitor
Careful Ought Constrain Patrol
Anxious Pain Counter Preserve
Avoid Prevent Curb Recover
Conservative Protect Deny Regulate
Defend Responsible Deport Rescue
Duty Risk Duress Restrict
Escape Safety Evacuate Retain
Escaping Security Guard Safeguard
Evade Threat Hostage Save
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Table 11.2  Military, armaments, and defense. More Americans think the US spends “too 
much” on military, armaments, and defense, while fewer Americans think the 
US spends “too little”
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Too little 32 35 25 24 27 25
About right 46 39 33 33 38 43
Too much 22 26 41 43 35 32
N 1324 1367 1442 965 986 965
Source: Adapted from Corman et al., 2015, p. 169.
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Notes
 1 Beyond these three key distinctions, other scholars have called attention to the differ-
ence between preventive vs. reactive protection and positive vs. negative protection. 
We believe the first is self-explanatory; for more detail on the second, see the Report 
on Citizen Security and Human Rights (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
2009).
 2 Although the Department of Energy may not be readily categorized as a protection-
focused organization, security and protection feature prominently in the DOE mission 
statement.
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1 Introduction
Digitalization-enabled agility and learning concepts are important for the conduct 
of emergency response, but not only that; they are critical to the development of 
effective societal security capabilities that are able to meet future challenges and 
set clear objectives and requirements for the society in its broadest sense. Collabo-
rative research in digitalization is essential. Sweden needs extensive knowledge 
building and investments in digitalization research, development, and innova-
tion to secure its societal security capabilities. This chapter addresses two central 
research questions:
RQ 1: How does digitalization affect society and its societal security capabilities?
RQ 2: How do we create and organize Sweden’s collective digitalization knowl-
edge base that leads toward necessary future societal security capabilities?
1.1  Brief definition and history
Swedish society depends on a steady and reliable welfare state, but the distri-
bution of resources and responsibilities between commercial entities on the one 
hand, and government and municipal agencies on the other hand, has changed 
drastically since the beginning of the 1990s (Government Offices of Sweden, 
2017). These changes are due to both public and market sector deregulation, wide-
ranging changes in geopolitical affairs, and the information revolution. Swedish 
society is neither structured nor organized as before. The population is more edu-
cated than ever but lacks basic skills to cope with the hardship of long-term crises.
1.2 Current state of digitalization of societal security
Digitalization brings great efficiency benefits in peacetime, but it also introduces 
vulnerabilities and risks. Digitalization can be both a strength and a weakness 
in that the very same, highly efficient, digitalized infrastructure, systems, and 
services normally used to serve and assist the population, can also – by their 
design – have inherent weaknesses that may expose these systems to the risks of 
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unanticipated vulnerabilities and specific antagonistic exploitation of these vul-
nerabilities. Digitalization has brought extensive changes to society and has an 
impact on our daily lives. An extensive body of international research provides 
both deep and broad insight in the realm of digitalization and its current manifes-
tations, for example, financial technologies, artificial intelligence, and machine 
learning. On December 20, 2017, the Swedish Defense Commission presented its 
annual report (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017). The Defense Commission 
notes that the Swedish civil and total defense must, in principle, be built up from 
the ground.
1.3 Potential future impact of digitalization on societal security
New concepts for national resilience, robustness, and redundancy need to be 
developed to ensure welfare, health care, food, water, energy, shelter, and security 
in times of hostilities or societal disruption or during naturally caused disasters 
(Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2018). The Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency has also defined five future scenarios as part of its long-term strategic fore-
sight (Wahlberg, Jonsson and Lindberg, 2013). The Swedish Defence Research 
Agency (FOI) highlighted societal weaknesses and threats in a scenario descrip-
tion to be used in Sweden’s national preparedness planning (Johnsson, 2018). The 
Swedish government has analyzed experiences from emergency response mis-
sions, antiterrorism operations, natural disasters, critical events in health care, and 
collapses in the global financial system (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017). 
This analysis indicates that Sweden’s national security and protection system 
must possess a range of agile capabilities, enabled by strategic level digitaliza-
tion. In 2018, the global dimensions of digitalization – AI in particular – were 
studied and analyzed by a network of universities and research institutes, ranging 
from the Future of Humanity Institute to the University of Oxford, along three 
distinct security domains: digital security, physical security, and political security 
(Brundage et al., 2018). They illustrate possible changes to threats within these 
domains through representative scenarios in which digitalization-enabled capa-
bilities could be used for malicious purposes in each of the digital, physical, and 
political security domains. Consequently, the authors of this project propose a 
number of recommendations to be acted upon today:
• Analyzing and (where appropriate) experimenting with novel openness 
models
• Learning from the experience of other scientific disciplines
• Multistakeholder dialogues on the risks in particular domains
• Accelerating beneficial research on promising defenses
2 Methods
A review of selected business agility literature and models is presented, as well 
as the latest developments within military studies of organizational agility. The 
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relevance and impact of digitalization on agile and learning organizations is 
applied to four real-world scenarios. Discussion and conclusions on the impact of 
digitalization on societal security are presented.
2.1 Agility in management theory: the business perspective
The term “agility” was introduced in business studies and industry by Nagel and 
Dove (1991) at the Iacocca Institute, Leigh University. Since then, the concept 
has been used in several studies and its definition has been developed. Agility is 
defined as dynamic, context specific, growth oriented and aggressively embracing 
change. It is less about increased effectiveness or diminished costs. Instead it is 
about success, market share, and customers in the very heart of competition and 
conflict. Dove (1994) states that being agile means mastery of change – enabling 
an organization to do whatever it wants whenever it wants.
The definition was further developed by Nelson and Harvey (1995), who 
declared agility to be a capability; it is the organization’s capacity to quickly and 
effectively seize unforeseen opportunities and to proactively develop solutions for 
potential needs.
Kidd (1995) characterized agility as a rapid and proactive adaptation of enter-
prise elements to unexpected and unpredicted changes, which represents a new 
and radically different business model. Holbrook (2003) concluded that change is 
perpetual and that the agile enterprise must be able to nimbly adapt to and exploit 
emerging opportunities.
Based on a review by Sherehiy, Karwowski and Layer (2007), the following 
main attributes for an agile enterprise can be distinguished:
1 Flexibility and adaptability
2 Responsiveness
3 Speed
4 Integration and low complexity
5 Mobilization of core competences
6 High quality and customized products
7 Culture of change
Prince and Kay (2003) regard agility as the capability of a firm to reconfigure itself 
in response to sudden change in a manner that is effective, opportune, robust, and 
with broad reach. Sharifi and Zhang (2001) view agility as encompassing two 
major elements: 1) to respond to changes (foreseen or unexpected) in appropriate 
and opportune ways, and 2) to exploit changes and turn them into opportunities.
According to Tsourveloudis and Valavanis (2002, p. 330), agility is more for-
mally defined as “the ability of an enterprise to operate profitably in a rapidly 
changing and continuously fragmenting global market environment by producing 
high-quality, high-performance, customer-configured goods and services.”
The predominant concepts and theories in business studies and research address 
different approaches to managing the ever-changing and unpredictable business 
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environment. This stance affects how we view change and leads to making a dis-
tinction between episodic change (that we always have been accustomed to in 
business studies) and continuous change (that has emerged through the latest stud-
ies on managing complexity and organizational learning).
2.1.1 Dynamic and agile organizations
Dyer and Shafer (1998) suggested a model of organizational agility that they 
define as a necessary core competence for organizations operating in dynamic 
external environments. Agile organizations strive to develop a built-in capac-
ity to shift, flex, and adjust, either alone or with alliance partners, as cir-
cumstances change, and to do so as a matter of course. The goal is to keep 
internal operations at a level of fluidity and flexibility that matches the degree 
of turmoil in external environments, a principle known as requisite variety. 
Ashby (1956) formulated the widely used concept of requisite variety, and 
Weick and Quinn (1999) made a well-researched distinction between change 
that is episodic, discontinuous, and intermittent and change that is continu-
ous, evolving, and incremental.
Dyer and Shafer (2003) cite Dee Hock, the former president of Visa Interna-
tional, who described agile organizations as “chaordic,” a combination of chaotic 
and ordered in order to be agile. According to this concept, in an agile organiza-
tion, it is possible to release as much innovation and initiative as possible (chaos) 
while still having the means for coordination and cooperation (order). Arranged 
in a matrix (Figure 12.1), the agile organization would be the one with the high-
est degree of “direction, stability, and order” while simultaneously presenting the 
highest degree of “experimentation, discovery, and flexibility.”
How organizations hold competitive advantage on the marketplace was inves-
tigated by Dyer and Shafer (2003). They suggest that dynamic organizations 
(DOs) compete through organizational and marketplace agility and point at stra-
tegic human resource management (SHRM) as a critical success factor. Dyer and 









Figure 12.1 Organizational agility as a product of chaos and order
Source: Adapted from Dyer and Shafer, 1998, p. 7.
202 Arne Norlander
levels engage in proactive, adaptive, and generative behaviors, bolstered by a sup-
portive mindset” and identify four critical success factors of agile organizations:
1 Reading the market, intended as the ability to scan the external environment, 
locate and analyze emerging developments, and quickly turn the resulting 
information into actionable decisions.
2 Mobilizing rapid response, as the capacity to quickly and easily make deci-
sions and translate these decisions into action. In some cases, this involves 
little more than making a series of relatively small-scale accommodations 
to evolving customer needs or competitors’ initiatives. In others, it involves 
making major adjustments in product or service offerings or critical business 
processes. In either case, the key to success seems to lie in two factors: mind-
set and resource mobility.
3 Exploiting temporary advantage, which refers to the capacity to quickly and 
easily enter new markets and to deliver competitively priced products or ser-
vices to these markets as long as, but not longer than, they remain the most 
attractive options on the horizon.
4 Embedding organizational learning, as the creation, adaptation, and replica-
tion of knowledge to improve organizational performance. The authors refer 
to the two types of learning: adaptive, or single loop, and generative, or dou-
ble loop.
2.1.2 Dyer and Shafer’s model of organizational agility
The critical success factors above are essential to meet the demands of maintain-
ing competitive advantage. The authors developed a model of how these organi-
zational competencies are developed, introducing a criterion that is critical to the 
issue of sustainability: organization and organizational capability. Dyer and Shaf-
er’s (1998) suggested model of organizational capability (the systemic interaction 
of key components, of which people are but one) for an agile organization is 
depicted below, with a relatively stable inner core and a constantly moving frame 
that consists of reconfigurable components. Dyer and Shafer suggest that the inner 
core, almost paradoxically, thanks to its stability, provides the energy that allows 
constant change, because it is grounded in an expansive vision and including 
change and adaptability as key performance metrics. The outer ever-moving ring 
becomes the place where continuous evolution, experimentation, discovery, and 
adaptation are operationalized.
Dyer’s and Schafer’s original agile organizational capability model is depicted 
in Figure 12.2.
2.2 Agility in military thinking: a complementary perspective
Crisis management operations (CMO) span a broad and diversified spectrum of 
conflicts, with very different characteristics. The capability to shift between dif-
ferent approaches to manage each sort of crisis situation is critical to maintain 
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operational effectiveness. Deployed forces need to rely on interaction and col-
laboration within and between different organizational cultures; between people 
with different backgrounds, education, and experience; and on managing and 
maintaining technological and doctrinal effectiveness and interoperability.
CMO – be they military missions, counterterrorism, or emergency response – 
comprise complex, laborious, and dangerous tasks, requiring resolute and deter-
mined teamwork under extreme conditions (Worm, Jenvald and Morin, 1998). 
Deployed units must be able to operate independently and with little support 
while still ensuring operational security and mission efficiency without risking 
excessive resource depletion.
New technology will offer extensive support in every aspect of CMO. The 
potential of digitalization, including high-capacity information processing and 
real time interaction in distributed, dynamic mission environments, is yet to be 
fully exploited (Norlander, 2011). Future decisions will be made in situations 
where operational and system characteristics are highly dynamic and nonlinear, 
that is, minor events or actions might have irreversible consequences on the entire 
mission.
Additionally, success in future military and emergency response missions 
requires highly capable understanding, based on a correct perception and inter-
















Figure 12.2 A model of agile organizational capability
Source: Adapted from Dyer and Shafer, 1998, p. 11.
204 Arne Norlander
foresight required for effective decision-making (Norlander, 2011). Every com-
mander and operator must develop a capability for sense-making to enable a com-
prehensive appreciation of the situation and a detailed system insight, leading to 
safe and efficient mission accomplishment (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005).
Finally, the circumstances around CMOs can often be characterized as a 
“wicked” environment, where adopting an approach that is appropriate for “tame” 
problems might be, at least, misleading, and often counterproductive. The term 
“wicked problem” was introduced by Rittel and Webber (1973). They found tra-
ditional planning methods to be inadequate for the ill-structured problems they 
encountered in city planning. Conklin (2006) states that situations often involve 
a combination of tame elements and wickedness. Conklin also generalized the 
concept of problem wickedness to areas other than planning and policy. Conklin’s 
defining characteristics of wicked problems are:
1 The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution.
2 Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3 Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong.
4 Every wicked problem is essentially novel and unique.
5 Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one shot operation.”
6 Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions.
Based on these findings, building an agile and adaptive organization begins with 
recognizing and accepting the complexity and wickedness of the enterprise and 
its circumstances, and letting go of the idea that it can be tamed and controlled. 
This requires a major shift in mind-set, at both individual and organizational lev-
els, and embracing digitalization as an enabler of agile and adaptive behavior; the 
implementation of new methods, procedures, or organizational charts would not 
be sustainable without this major shift in attitude. This, in turn, requires support at 
policy level, an organizational culture based on flexibility, openness to change and 
tolerance for error (a learning culture), and an organizational design that supports 
and enhances such properties, rather than mortifying them (as it is often the case). 
An agile and adaptive enterprise needs these competencies in any department and 
at any level of command, and it needs to be strongly sustained by the adequate 
leadership, doctrine, and policy.
Alberts (2011, p. 190) defines agility as “the capability to successfully effect, 
cope with and/or exploit changes in circumstances.” The phrase “changes in cir-
cumstances” has strong connotations of situations arising or events unfolding 
over time, not only external but also internal ones. A NATO research task group 
defined six enablers of agility, listed as enablers 1 to 6 below (NATO, 2014).
Dodd (2011) complemented this agility model with three additional enabling 
concepts: proactivity, learning, and collaboration, listed as enablers 7 to 9. The 
complete list of agility enablers is found below:
Enablers of agile capabilities are:
1 Resilience – able to recover from or adjust to misfortune, damage, or a desta-
bilizing perturbation in the environment
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2 Responsiveness – able to react to a change in the environment in a timely 
manner
3 Versatility – able to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations, 
and conditions
4 Adaptability – able to change the organization and/or work processes
5 Flexibility – able to employ multiple ways to succeed and having the capacity 
to move seamlessly between them
6 Innovativeness – able to do new things or able to do old things in new ways
7 Proactivity – able to conduct proactive and preemptive actions to drive and 
shape change or protect continuity
8 Learning – able to learn and unlearn from experience and develop and utilize 
continuously evolving procedures and cooperation structures
9 Collaboration – among people, technology, and organizations with a readi-
ness to capitalize on the benefits of emerging information age technologies
The enablers of agility constitute an “agility value chain” that includes the set of 
links that connects various entity characteristics and behaviors to entity agility. 
Figure 12.3 depicts agility to be a function of the enterprise, the entities, and the 
circumstances of the mission and mission environment.
The following operational scenarios are authentic examples ranging from acci-
dents and natural disasters to deliberate antagonistic influence and coercion, all 
exacerbated or in some cases even directly enabled through dysfunction or failure 
People ProcessesOrganization Technologies





Figure 12.3  The agility value chain – the agility value chain is not a simply a string of 
links, but is in reality a mesh or network of interdependent variables
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of digitalized capabilities. Each case was analyzed using the nine agility char-
acteristics and rating to what degree they were accomplished, and how human, 
technological, and organizational agility in some cases have been reshaped and 
improved to better respond to the requirements for different dimensions of soci-
etal security.
2.3  Autonomous vehicle operating within a non-supportive 
infrastructure
The increased use of autonomous vehicles presents risks that might cause colli-
sions due to changes in the traffic environment, its information, or other circum-
stances. This scenario involves a fatal car crash involving a car with a built-in 
vehicle automation suite that collided with a heavy semi trailer. The car’s recog-
nition algorithms did not recognize the turning semi trailer as a dangerous object 
and continued at the same speed and direction, killing the car driver (NTSB, 
2017). The interpretation of a traffic sign or a difficult traffic situation can become 
different or inconclusive due to specific alterations or disturbances in the vehi-
cle’s sensors or through a malfunctioning automated situation recognition and 
response system in the vehicle. This could be caused by either poorly designed 
algorithms or by an antagonist hacker to cause traffic interference and injury. 
A healthy human driver would easily recognize a damaged traffic sign as still a 
traffic sign, or interpret complex, dynamic traffic situations correctly, and steer 
away from the danger. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) rec-
ommends a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication system, transmitting warn-
ings and basic safety information (speed, position, heading, brake status, etc.) to 
all other vehicles in the surrounding traffic environment; a system like this would 
generate complex requirements, and draw unprecedented economic resources into 
road-based networked critical infrastructure. The scenario showed agility defi-
ciencies in responsiveness, adaptability, proactivity, and collaboration from both 
the human operator and the technology perspectives.
2.4  Digitized networks and procedures in an electronic  
intensive care unit
Another example is the recent communications failure of the medical electronic 
intensive care unit (EICU) system at the New Karolinska Hospital near Stock-
holm, Sweden, which experienced several breakdowns of the internal EICU net-
work during the fall of 2017 and early in 2018, seriously affecting patient safety 
and hospital resource management. EICU nurses had to leave several of their ordi-
nary duties of monitoring and responding to patients via the Karolinska Hospital 
EICU network to take on manual management and coordination tasks, with little 
or insufficient training. An investment in network infrastructure is often motivated 
by increased efficiency but often generates costs of time, effort, and resources for 
training EICU nurses and physicians in the networking procedures. In fact, it is 
not unusual that digitalization in health care can cause negative effects on patient 
Societal security 207
safety. Digitalized systems introduce the need for resilience, adaptation, learning, 
and collaborative capabilities. Professional physicians and nurses, having thor-
ough experience, knowledge, and skills for the medical specialist responsibility, 
will have to acquire skills as managers and coordinators of distributed teams, 
working in a digital health care management system. This paradox is thoroughly 
described by Anders et al. (2007). The scenario showed agility deficiencies in 
resiliency, versatility, adaptability, learning, and collaboration from all perspec-
tives: human, technological, and organizational.
2.5  Crisis response and command and control in a  
large forest fire
As part of a government evaluation of a forest fire in Västmanland, central Swe-
den, in 2014, Johansson, Trnka and Berggren (2016) conducted a study where 
an assessment template developed by a research group in NATO’s Science and 
Technology Organization (NATO, 2014) was used to identify, collect, and analyze 
evidence concerning the manifestation of agility of the capabilities deployed in 
the fire-fighting operation. The fire evolved in a rapid and complex pattern due to 
unusual weather conditions. Hundreds of firemen, soldiers of the Swedish home 
guard, and volunteers worked around the clock to fight the fire, which at its most 
critical point spread over two kilometers per hour. More than 20 helicopters and 
airplanes assisted the ground force. The fire raged for nearly two weeks before the 
incident commander could report that the fire was under control. One person was 
killed and one person was badly burned, 13,800 hectares of forest were destroyed, 
and the total cost of the emergency operation and damages was estimated to be at 
least SEK 1 billion.
The large number of engaged agencies and other organizations, each one with 
its specific command structure, mandate, and responsibilities, faced a number of 
complex management and command challenges (Uhr et al., 2016). The analysis 
emphasized the need to be prepared for scenarios that are not commonly encoun-
tered (Worm, Jenvald and Morin, 1998). The deployed organizations failed to 
reach the appropriate levels of performance, mainly due to agility deficiencies in 
responsiveness, adaptability, flexibility, and collaboration during the initial and 
intermediate phases of the firefighting mission. The unusual and challenging con-
ditions of the forest fire contributed to the failure, but it also underscored the need 
for a capacity to activate and create supporting capabilities to be able to achieve 
proper shared situational awareness with support from a common operational pic-
ture. This capacity proved insufficient throughout the operation.
2.6   A campaign of influence and coercion on a  
digitized society
Estonia has, since its independence from the Soviet Union, invested heavily and 
broadly in digitalization; Estonia’s strategy and its implementation, called E-Estonia, 
is the most ambitious project in technological governance today, including all 
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members of the government and affecting every citizen’s daily life. The normal 
services that government is involved with, legislation, voting, education, justice, 
health care, banking, taxes, policing, and others, have been digitally linked across 
one platform, connecting the nation.
In 2007, the Estonian government attempted to relocate a Soviet-era war memo-
rial to a military cemetery outside of the city center of its capital, Tallinn. This 
decision met aggressive protests from the Russian minority in Estonia, the Rus-
sian government, and Russia-friendly media. Estonia had recently joined NATO 
at that time, and a foreign cyberattack against Estonia was launched, aiming at 
projecting foreign power and influence over the Estonians and sending a broader 
message to countries neighboring Estonia warning them of the consequences if 
they also joined NATO. Estonia was attacked in several operational dimensions, 
including physical, psychological, and cyber. Street riots flamed up, and Nashi (a 
Russian political youth movement) instigated a siege of the Estonian embassy in 
Moscow during which the Estonian ambassador was physically harassed. Russian 
authorities have denied any involvement.
Estonia’s digitalized society, designed to simplify and streamline every citi-
zen’s daily life, had weaknesses that could be exploited by an antagonist, but the 
weaknesses were continuously identified and mitigated.
This type and form of attack showed Estonia’s national agility deficiencies in 
adaptability, innovativeness, proactivity, and resiliency; the Estonians had no pro-
cedures for dealing with this kind of situation, and at the time of the attack, Esto-
nia lacked a national digitalization and cybersecurity strategy. However, Estonia 
drafted and approved its first strategy for national cyber protection in 2008. Based 
on its experiences, Estonia now has set up a voluntary civilian cyberdefense force 
as a complement to its national military defense force. Estonia is also reinforcing 
its capabilities to meet a full-scale cyberattack through other safeguards. Esto-
nian government agencies have invested in shared situational awareness and a 
common cyber-operating picture for analysis and response in real time, and in a 
dynamic exploratory manner, with support from national and international organi-
zations, such as the Computer Emergency Response Team for Estonia (CERT-EE), 
Ministry of Defense (MoD), NATO, and national and international information 
technology experts. The Estonian government has created a server capability in 
Luxembourg, containing a backup of its national systems. It is created using the 
same body of international law as a physical embassy, locating the servers and 
their data (virtually but still legally) on Estonian soil. Whether digitally or physi-
cally attacked, Estonia’s governance will shift to a mirror site abroad.
3 Results and discussion
The study results from the four scenarios described above shows that digitalization- 
enabled agile capabilities can be seriously affected by situational dynamics and 
mission complexity to the level of severe degradation or failure in all cases. 
A summary is found in Table 12.1.
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The impact and value of digitalization for both society and its citizens can be 
increased by 1) expanding the number and variety of approaches an entity can 
choose among (a larger, more diverse organizational and technological “toolkit”); 
2) enabling entities to select and adopt the most appropriate approach to specific 
needs and circumstances; and 3) making individual approaches and the systems 
that support them more responsive, versatile, flexible, and resilient, enabling citi-
zens and organizations to be more adaptive and innovative.
3.1 Research questions revisited
Each of the concepts and scenarios described above, whether from the business 
or government/public domains, provides insight and presents specific elements 
that can be critical to achieving digitalization-enabled agility. The two research 
questions were a useful vehicle for directing and analyzing the scenarios. We 
consider RQ 1 to be answered to a certain extent in that the scenarios show the 
impact of digitalization from a societal security perspective. The essence of RQ 
1 is the effect on society’s capabilities and its consequences for the individual 
citizen. Hence, the scenarios lead to the conclusion that digitalization’s impact 
is profound and will indeed be of a revolutionary character. Citizen protection 
will be both enhanced and jeopardized by digitalization, and an interdisciplinary, 
overarching approach to digitalization is fundamental. Nearly every capability 
component and dimension of society will be affected by digitalization, and agil-
ity and adaptation will be significant and critical characteristics of all digitalized 
solutions. Regarding RQ 2, we found it difficult to answer in a straightforward 
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and coherent manner. The main point of RQ 2 resides not in implementation or 
effects but in policy and strategy. Building a digitalization knowledge base on a 
national level means integrating policy areas, commercial interests, and societal 
needs, and will depend on political accord. A central part of RQ 2 is the com-
mon underlying requirement of continuous learning and adaptation, both central 
enablers of agile capabilities but on a different level than that of RQ 1. We con-
clude that the truly agile and adaptive organization is not the one that can handle 
the problems of today, but the one that is able to be evolutionary to manage the 
problems of tomorrow. Not because the agile and adaptive organization tries to 
foresee what the problems of tomorrow will be, but because it is prompt and quick 
in learning about them as they rise, and adapts accordingly. It implies an evolu-
tionary way of being, encompassing all aspects of the organization. Theories of 
organizational change have highlighted the difficulty and various forms of resist-
ance to change, also when accepted and advocated, not only at the individual, but 
also at the organizational and strategic level.
3.2 The importance of policy and organizational culture
As organizational culture is the personality of the organization, we are advocat-
ing agility and learning as a way of being, and organizational culture plays a 
major role in this issue. A learning organization requires a culture of curiosity 
and dynamism, where initiative is rewarded and the bar is set high for excellence. 
Policy sets the framework for these issues and, not the least, for decision-making. 
In fact, decisions are only made within the realm of what is seen and accepted. 
In this sense it could be stated that decisions are made at the policy level, as this 
is where the conditions and circumstances are determined, whereas within the 
organization, decisions are taken (within the framework set by the policy level). 
An organization where there is no place for new ideas or constructive criticism is 
far from evolutionary, and doomed to failure.
4 Conclusions
Societal security is a complex endeavor, where operational and system charac-
teristics are highly dynamic and nonlinear; that is, minor events or actions might 
have irreversible consequences for the entire mission. Based upon an analysis 
of the empirical evidence from case studies, supported by organizational agility 
theory, our first conclusion is that it is imperative to increase agility and learning 
in societal security capabilities, because doing so improves the likelihood of mis-
sion success. An organizational entity’s increased agility and learning contribute 
to mission success by facilitating entities to adopt more appropriate approaches to 
societal security in more situations and to adjust their approaches as the mission 
and circumstances change. Digitalization enables this because
1 The concepts of agility and learning have proven to be critical factors in soci-
etal security, and digitalization can offer significant improvements.
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2 Organizational agility in societal security and the variables that impact it are 
observable, are measureable, and can be influenced, shaped, and controlled 
by digitalization.
Given the variety of situations and circumstances, collectives of entities must be 
able to meet these challenges. Agility, learning, and collaboration are at the core 
of organizational culture; there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to societal secu-
rity. Hence, organizations need to be able to employ more than one approach, 
understanding when different approaches are appropriate, and have the ability to 
efficiently transition between approaches in a timely manner.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, we have become accustomed to everything from emails that 
“phish” for our passwords to the use of our individual data on social media sites 
being used for purposes we did not explicitly consent to – and even being sold to 
third parties. We have even gotten so used to the ubiquitous “cookies” notice in 
our browser that we seldom stop to think about the data that are being collected.
Digital trace data, or data that are generated as a result of interactions 
online, have come to be used from everything to optimizing advertisements 
to detecting fraud, and more (Ingram Bogusz, 2018b). In fact, it is almost a 
paradox that although we know that data are used to solve problems and create 
products – both useful and sinister – we are often unaware, and cannot keep 
track of, our own data in these processes. As a result of the ubiquity of these 
data, and their use, policy-makers and the public sector have become increas-
ingly interested in how these data are collected, monetized, and managed. This 
chapter provides an overview and some analysis of this emerging phenomenon 
with policy-makers in mind. In particular, it considers the role of the public sec-
tor in this phenomenon.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the existing models of digital identity 
verification and digital data management before analyzing and contrasting some 
existing solutions and offering food for thought for policy-makers as this phe-
nomenon moves forward. It then outlines some suggestions around how these two 
distinct, but important, phenomena might converge to allow individuals better 
dynamic control over which data are collected, by whom, and for what purposes.
Parallel to the development of data-driven problem-solving and products, both 
public and private actors have developed digital identity verification systems for 
use by individuals and firms across the globe. Some of the best known are digital 
identities used to access bank services, for instance, through mobile IDs, one-time 
passwords, and smart cards. Others include the use of digital biometric data, for 
instance, in passports and civic identity cards.
Moreover, with the rise in these digital ways of verifying one’s identity has 
come an increased awareness from individuals that their data are being used – as 
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well as a rise in digital identity theft and fraud. Both individual demand and the 
potential for exploitation point to the need for us to have more control over both 
our identities and our data online, and potentially even be compensated for these 
data. This movement from digital identity verification to digital data management, 
with identity verification a key element, has led to the emergence of several nas-
cent solutions – but comprehensive data management nevertheless faces a number 
of challenges and risks.
1.1 Tackling the tension between commerce and control
Data, as part of a broader move toward digitalizing both private and public ser-
vices, have come to be seen as lifeblood of many competitive economies. Indeed, 
the collection of data and the development of new services and products reliant on 
data has been likened to an “oil rush” (The Economist, 2017).
Smartphones and the internet have made data abundant, ubiquitous and far 
more valuable. Whether you are going for a run, watching TV or even just 
sitting in traffic, virtually every activity creates a digital trace – more raw 
material for the data distilleries. As devices from watches to cars connect 
to the internet, the volume is increasing: some estimate that a self-driving 
car will generate 100 gigabytes per second. Meanwhile, artificial-intelligence 
(AI) techniques such as machine learning extract more value from data. Algo-
rithms can predict when a customer is ready to buy, a jet-engine needs ser-
vicing or a person is at risk of a disease. Industrial giants such as GE and 
Siemens now sell themselves as data firms.
(The Economist, 2017, para.4)
However, even as more and more data are collected, so, too, is there competition 
between firms to collect as much data as possible – and many countries see facili-
tating access to data, whatever the cost, as fueling innovation. This has led to what 
the Financial Times calls an “arms race”: not only are Internet giants racing to 
collect and control the most data, whether they can use it or not, but governments 
have found themselves unsure how to balance the lure of the innovation promised 
by easy access to large volumes of data against individuals’ calls for limitations 
and protections (Financial Times, 2018).
What has emerged is a polarization of approaches: on the one hand, one has an 
approach championed by countries within the European Union and exemplified 
by the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679). Such 
approaches place requirements around the need for firms not only to get specific, 
limited, and informed consent from individuals around both how data are col-
lected and what those data are used for, but also to get rid of data that have not 
been used within a certain time frame – and to obtain new consent if they wish 
to use old data for a new purpose. On the other hand, one has the deliberately 
laissez-faire approach exemplified by the likes of China; not only are there few 
limitations on what data can be collected and for what purposes, but a cultural 
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acceptance of oversight in exchange for convenience and innovation has emerged 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017).
This difference in policy and cultural approaches also highlights a policy 
conundrum. Individuals have expressed and are often perceived to have the right 
to have some control over the data about them that are collected and how they are 
used. However, firms and governments often argue that better access to individu-
als’ data not only drives innovation and entrepreneurship, but also value creation 
more generally.
Today, it is unclear to see how to reconcile these two approaches. This is espe-
cially in light of the fact that data is often treated as a by-product of online activity, 
rather than a product in its own right (Ingram Bogusz, 2018a).
Thus, digital identity solutions today are only infrastructures for confirmation 
and consent. Few have records of the consent, and only a small number, mostly 
pioneered by start-ups, have built infrastructures that confirm identity, tag and 
trace data related to that identity, and offer a dynamic management infrastructure 
for individuals to revoke consent at a later date.
This chapter will examine how digital identities are being used today before 
presenting the case for an expansion of the digital identity verification model to a 
fine-grained digital data use and management system and offering some nascent 
examples. Last, it presents some areas for consideration by public actors as we 
approach the possible integration of the two.
2 Data identity and data management
The first step toward management of an individual user’s data is for that individ-
ual to be considered a distinct user on the Internet. In other words, not only must 
data be collected, but it needs to be connected to a unique user – with a unique 
identity and the ability to control that identity through verification and control. 
This kind of unique identity is what is called an “identity verification” system, 
and a functioning identity verification system – whatever form it might take – is a 
prerequisite for better management of digital data online.
2.1 Static, restricted, and binary
Management consulting firm McKinsey & Company estimates that the market for 
identity verification services was, in 2018, close to USD10 billion. They predict 
that it has the potential to create economic value worth between 3 and 13 percent 
of global GDP by 2030, with developing countries like Nigeria and India set to 
benefit most (White et al., 2019). When they talk about identity verification ser-
vices, what they refer to are services that 1) verify that an individual is a person 
and not, for example, a bot, and 2) that they are who they say they are. While 
identity verification is relatively frictionless in the offline world, in the digital 
world it can be cumbersome – and different alternatives have emerged. These are 
summarized in Table 13.1.
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The first of these, often used by banks and similar, links your digital identity 
to documents that show your identity in the real world. In many countries, this 
means sending a scanned copy of a driver’s license or identity card. In the Nordic 
countries, digital verification takes the form of a service in which one can use 
one’s identity number and a pin code to identify oneself; in Sweden this is known 
as BankID. In this kind of identity verification system, what is important is not 
just that you have signing rights over a particular account, but also that you are a 
real person – for example, so that you can open a bank account. These verification 
services are often therefore used as a form of control to avoid fraud and money 
laundering.
In contrast, the second and third forms of identity verification verify not that 
you are a real person, but that you have the right to access the account in ques-
tion. These services include both two-step verification procedures, for exam-
ple, when you are sent a pin code every time you try to log in to a website, 
and dynamic knowledge-based identification, for instance, where you answer a 
predetermined question. These services verify that you have access to the right 
device and knowledge, respectively, to confirm that you have the right to access 
an account. Some examples from both the public and private sector are dis-
cussed in this section before the strengths and weaknesses of existing models 
are discussed.
2.2 Examples from the Nordics
Nordic countries are known for their high levels of digitalization; this digitali-
zation extends beyond just the willingness to execute transactions online, to 
Table 13.1 Some typical digital identity verification services in use in 2019
Verification type Commonly used by Examples
Identity Verification Governments and banks, and 
linked to national registries 
(for example, of identity 
numbers)
BankID application 




Online services to confirm that 
person attempting to log into 
an account is the same as the 
one who set up the account, 
via a pre-verified device
Text message 
identification by 
Google, Facebook sent 




Online services to confirm that 
person attempting to log into 
an account is the same as the 
one who set up the account, 
through a number of pre-
verified questions
Pre-verified questions 
asked to ascertain 
individual’s knowledge 
of the answers (and 
thus identity)
Source: Author’s summary.
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provision of services to support safe transactions in various sectors. Among the 
most lauded of these are the e-Identity in Estonia and BankID in Sweden.
2.2.1 Estonia
Estonia offers three forms of digital identity – some only to physical residents, 
and others to so-called “e-residents.” These include a digital ID card, a Mobile 
ID, and a Smart ID. The ID card operates not only as a form of legal identifica-
tion when, for example, traveling elsewhere in Europe, but also allows holders 
to identify themselves online, for example at a bank, to submit tax returns, or to 
check medical records. This card carries embedded and encrypted files, and works 
together with a card reader and a PIN code that is unique to each care. It is the 
combination of the card, code, and reader that allows an individual to use a card 
that exists in the physical world for digital purposes.
The Mobile ID offers a similar system – through a dedicated sim card. Like the 
ID card, it can be used to access secure web and public services, as well as sign 
documents, but does not require a card or card reader. Instead, it only requires a 
pin code and a working smart phone. Mobile phone operators (e.g., Tele2, Telia, 
and Elisa) provide the sim card, and it costs an individual €10 to sign up, and a 
further €1 per month to maintain the service.
A Smart ID works in much the same way, through an app-based, rather than 
sim-based system. In other words, it relies on an application being run on a mobile 
phone, not a unique SIM card contained within the phone. Unlike the Mobile ID, 
however, the Smart ID is free. According to e-Identity service providers, as of 
November 2018 it has the same legal status as both the ID card and Mobile ID 
(SK ID Solutions, 2018). However, while the ID card can also be used as a form 
of physical identification, the latter two cannot.
2.2.2 Sweden
BankID in Sweden is said to boast eight million users, or close to 100 percent 
of the adult population (BankID, 2019; Statistics Sweden, 2019). This system 
was developed as a collaboration between the large banks in Sweden in the early 
2000s and, as such, is not linked to a single actor or authority. Like Estonia’s 
e-Identity, the Swedish system offers both mobile and online versions of their 
service. However, they do not offer a card version. Also like Estonia, the system 
relies on an individual first verifying their identity with reference to a state iden-
tity document like a passport or driving license before they can be issued a digital 
identity. The system is centrally controlled by a limited liability firm in the coun-
try, and provides services to banks, as well as to both other private companies and 
state agencies after a rigorous compliance process.
However, lack of understanding by individuals has led to weaknesses in this 
system through mistakes at the point of use: BankID is often exploited through 
scammers asking people to identify themselves over the phone, leading to losses 
through illicit transactions. This pattern of exploitation has been perpetuated 
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because there is no transparent way for users to identify, track, or manage how 
their identity (and any associated data) have been verified and used.
Other examples include the use of Ethereum to build land registries and stream-
line new registrations, as the Swedish Land Survey has done. However, there 
seem to be few end-to-end digital identity management systems being developed 
by states; rather, these are being implemented by private actors.
2.3 Examples from digital giants
Over and above password methods, to which few of us need any introduction, 
private firms make use of a number of tools to enable us to identify ourselves. The 
overwhelming majority of these services, whether they offer simple passwords or 
more complex – and therefore secure – alternatives, are linked to a single service. 
That is, they are restricted to a certain service (e.g., a web platform) or service 
provider (e.g., Google’s services). Many of them have developed application pro-
gramming interfaces1 or a platform with a standardized code base and rules for 
ease of access. This means that you can use your credentials from one service 
to identify yourself in another (e.g., by using Facebook to log into a third-party 
application), making them less restricted. They are, nevertheless, still static.
Many Internet services (among them Google, Amazon Web Services) use what 
is called a “time-based one-time password algorithm” (TOTP) to support two-step 
authentication. This is a system whereby a single-use password is generated that 
can only be used for a certain amount of time, and where the times on the user’s 
(receiving) device and the server from which the password is sent are roughly the 
same.
However, although all of these approaches have their merits and are well estab-
lished in what has thus far been a digital economy in which users have little con-
trol over their data, they are largely inadequate on their own when it comes to a 
digital economy that includes elements of individual data management.
2.4 Toward alternatives
These services have three characteristics, summarized in Table 13.2. First, they 
are static; that is, they allow an individual to give consent through identity verifi-
cation only at a single, fixed point in time. Although many keep records of when 
consent has been given, it cannot be revoked once given.2
Second, they are restricted; that is, they either support a single service (for 
example, Google), or are offered as a service only to prescreened parties. Last, 
they are binary; that is, they either allow for consent or nonconsent, not partial 
consent or other kinds of more nuanced interactions.
With the rise of smart phones, it is expected that digital data – and with it digital 
identity – are only likely to increase in volume and important. The World Bank, 
for instance, anticipates that 4.8 billion smartphone devices will come online by 
2020, many of these in developing countries where few digital services are pro-
vided by governments today (Bujoreanu, Mittal and Noor, 2018).
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Having discussed what kinds of identity management systems have emerged, 
and how existing systems suffer from shortfalls that make new identity manage-
ment desirable – and even likely – this chapter turns now to discussing data man-
agement, which relies upon a functioning digital identity service. Of note is that 
some identity management systems are implicit in data management systems, but 
may equally exist independently of them.
3 Selective and decentralized data control
Thus, three parallel shifts mean that digital identity verification services need 
to shift. The first of these is the rise of smartphone use, and with it the need for 
digital identity services that support digital identities that are not restricted to 
certain geographies or services. The second of these is a rise in data generation 
and data collection – and with it demand for data, with or without individuals’ 
consent. The last of these is an existing pattern of behaviors among digital firms, 
wherein they collect data without thought for how they will be used, how they 
will be stored, or whether consumers might be concerned that their data are 
being collected.
In response to these developments, new forms of data controls have arisen. 
These have typically taken the form of products and services developed by private 
firms (e.g., Civic and Datacoup), although the Mydata model (2018) from Finland 
is unique in that it was developed in response to requests and support from the 
Finnish government.
Below, this chapter classifies these models into three nonexhaustive and non-
exclusive categories, namely self-sovereign identities, data marketplaces, and 
new infrastructures. It then analyzes how they allow for more dynamism in how 
data are controlled than existing digital verification systems. These exist over 
and above the centralized, often state-managed, digital identity systems already 
described above.
Table 13.2 Characteristics of commonplace digital identity management services
Description Problems
Static Consent through identity 
verification at a single, 
fixed point in time
Consent cannot be revoked 
digitally, once given
Restricted Either support a single service 
(for example, Google), or 
are offered as a service only 
to prescreened parties
Only certain verification services 
work in certain contexts; there 
are no universal services
Binary Allow for either consent or 
nonconsent
Users cannot give partial or limited 
consent, or agree to certain 
contract terms but not others
Source: Author’s analytical summary.
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3.1 Self-sovereign identities
So-called “self-sovereign” identities are digital identity services individual users 
create and manage themselves, which do not rely on a central organization or 
authority, and which can, in principle, be used in either the digital or the physical 
world.
Many of the self-sovereign identities that exist today rely on public key cryp-
tography; users have a private key that should be kept secret and is paired with a 
public key. Both are unique to each individual user. The public key is visible to 
others, like a finished signature or address, but can only be “signed” through using 
the secret, private key. In other words, a person can sign a document such that a 
public key is visible to others by using the private key. Indeed, the ability to gener-
ate the public key from the private key is the “proof of ownership” that makes this 
form of identity self-sovereign.
Public keys are then typically linked to other identifiers, for instance, one’s 
bank or university. A registry of public keys and associated identifiers is then 
maintained, in most cased using blockchain technology. This decentralized 
maintenance not just of public-private key pairs, but also other associated iden-
tifiers, allows for a system wherein data about individuals cannot be altered 
without their consent (because there is no central authority), and where changes 
are verified at scale through blockchain verification mechanisms (Böhme et al., 
2015).3 The work of both conducting maintenance of the database and verifying 
changes is typically rewarded within the system, making the whole thing self 
sustaining.
Thus, the overall picture is of a digital (and physical) identity that is 1) decen-
tralized, and therefore not subject to control by either a single government or a 
single-point hacking attack; 2) permissionless – and therefore equally open to 
everyone with Internet access; and 3) self sustaining, and therefore not reliant 
on any single company, country, or individual for its survival. Instead, incentive 
systems mean that users of the system either directly pay maintainers (through 
payments for verification), or algorithms in the system generate tokens that have 
market value, with which maintainers are paid.
Of note is the fact that many of these otherwise decentralized systems allow a 
user to create a new public-private key pair should they, for example, lose their 
private key. Although this makes practical sense given how often individuals for-
get or misplace their passwords, it presents a weakness in the system in that it 
could allow for an individual’s identity to be hijacked, depending on the methods 
involved to create this new pair and link them to a pre-existing digital identity or 
set of identifiers.
Examples of these kinds of identities include Civic and LifeID. Of note is the 
fact that the most simple self-sovereign identities are typically static and binary. 
However, they are typically not restricted at the point of delivery – but being able 
to use a self-sovereign identity at, for example, a public library, will require that 
that library accept the identity and have the digital infrastructure to process and 
verify it.
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However, many point to the fact that a self-sovereign identity, while internally 
coherent, does not necessarily link back to the physical world. That is, although 
the digital elements of the identity may point to an individual with a single set of 
permissions, this does not mean that the individual is who they say they are – or 
even that they are a real person; they could be a company, another person, or 
even a bot.
3.2  Data marketplaces, cooperatives, and new  
infrastructures
The twin problems of identity verification, on the one hand, and data control and 
monetization on the other, have been approached in three main ways: first, by the 
creation of marketplaces for data, second by the creation of data cooperatives, and 
last through whole new infrastructures that allow for both control over identity 
and data. These different approaches, and examples of each, are discussed below.
3.2.1 From industry to personal data marketplaces
Another way in which the details of our data are being managed differently 
include those conducted through data marketplaces. These marketplaces provide 
an interface through which data providers and data consumers can buy and sell 
data from one another. The use of business data marketplaces, wherein compa-
nies buy and sell industry data, is well established and relatively uncontroversial. 
Such marketplaces are common when it comes to, for example, recent investment 
activities, insurance claim statistics, or price data in different markets.
Among industry data marketplaces, data are typically taken from multiple dif-
ferent sources; sometimes the data are bought from the different sources, with the 
aim to combine the data and thus make them collectively more valuable, or pre-
venting data from being lost or wasted.4 They further take unstructured data and, 
by structuring them, make it easier for other organizations to use – whether for 
comparisons, machine learning, or less complex analytics. In other words, they 
break down silos, standardize data flows, and facilitate price-setting for otherwise 
hard-to-price information. Some examples of these in the international context 
include Bloomberg, which sells company and financial data, and CKAN, which 
releases data from national and regional governments, for example, around the 
operation of public transport and other public utilities.
However, many of these marketplaces rely on repositories of data that, while 
not standardized, are nevertheless fairly structured from the outset. One of the 
main problems with data linked to individual identities is that they are so distrib-
uted: individual data are generated across multiple contexts (e.g., multiple social 
media sites), multiple devices (e.g., smartphones, computers and tablets), and for 
completely different purposes (e.g., cookie data on a news site, or search data 
through a search engine). The task of building a personal data marketplace with 
standardized flow of data that breaks down silos is therefore a more challenging 
one – but perhaps more valuable for it.
Digital identity – beyond verification 223
There are many nascent examples of personal data marketplaces, and many of 
the marketplaces that offer portals to personal data also provide access to organ-
izational data. Some examples include Openprise, which serves as an integra-
tion platform that structures data from other sources. While it offers organization 
integration, for instance by allowing users to integrate Salesforce data, it also 
links up to other repositories of individual-level data, like Kickfire and Zoominfo, 
which sell individuals’ contact details. While Openprise does not standardize or 
set prices for data, it does integrate and make data comparable across multiple 
datasets. Crucially, it does not allow individuals to sell or control their own data, 
however.
In contrast, Datacoup is an example of a data marketplace that allows individu-
als to sell data generated from their different social media profiles through a single 
marketplace. This service matches firms looking for granular data – more granu-
lar than the contact details sold by many data resellers today – with individuals 
looking to sell their data. Individuals’ personal data are collected from existing 
applications, like Facebook or LinkedIn, through APIs controlled by those firms. 
Multiple data sources are then integrated by the platform, subject to a price setting 
mechanism, and then sold on.
Analysts expect that “data as a service,” or a subscription model for access 
to data, will be a USD10.4-billion market by 2021 (Tang et al., 2018). These 
services are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to selling individu-
als’ data. However, many services rely on existing APIs – or do not allow 
individual-level control of where, and to whom, data are sold. This is largely 
a consequence of the fragmented nature of data generation and data collection 
on the Internet today – a set of problems that new data infrastructures seek to 
overcome.
3.2.2 Data cooperatives
Still another model is that of the data cooperative. This model is often used in sci-
ence and in niche industries, and is typically reciprocal and not-for-profit. Unlike 
data marketplaces, the focus of data interaction is on standardization and integra-
tion, allowing for the provision of aggregate-level data, with less emphasis on 
price setting and data sales. Often, but not always, cooperatives work with data 
collected by multiple organizations – but some niche platforms also work with 
individual data.
Take, for instance, the health data cooperative Midata (2019). This Swiss data 
cooperative not only allows individuals to gather all of their data securely in one 
place (standardization), but also allows individuals to work with different doc-
tors and medical teams – and even share their individual-level data (in whole or 
in part) with, for example, medical researchers. Another cooperative is one for 
investment data, the European Data Cooperative, which not only collects and 
standardizes data about industry activities around investments, but also makes 
these data more broadly available – and even conducts analysis itself (Invest 
Europe, 2018).
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3.2.3 New, decentralized infrastructures
One way in which identity and data control have been tackled has been through 
the creation of typically blockchain-based systems that track the data that users 
generated, link that data to a self-sovereign identity, and then provide an access 
control system for the individual user to control (and potentially monetize) that 
data. Instead of being hosted by a single centralized server, this system relies on 
decentralized or distributed computational and storage “work” by users through 
the blockchain, in what has come to be known as the “decentralized Internet.”
One example of this is Blockstack, which is a blockchain-based ecosystem 
that, once a user has created a Blockstack identity (ID), through the Block-
stack browser, allows them to collect the data that are generated by their online 
activities – and store them on their own computer. This data could then be 
accessed, with permission, by Blockstack-based applications. These applications, 
called DApps, connect not to a centralized API to collect data, but rather to indi-
vidual users’ APIs – through which a user’s identity can be accessed and author-
ized, and their data accessed.5
According to proponents of the decentralized Internet, the use of this kind of 
system solves resource problems for both users and developers. On the user side, 
not only do users regain control and ownership of their data (through the use of a 
self-sovereign identity), but web developers no longer have to worry about serv-
ers, hosting data, or protecting individuals’ privacy.6 Instead, users maintain the 
decentralized equivalent of a server and release their data when and if they want 
to. Currently, it does not seem as though users can sell the data. Instead, one leg-
acy of the existing Internet system remains: trading data for service/DApp access.
However, there is no shortage of other solutions that have built decentralized 
data marketplaces that build on the same tenets as above: identity creation, author-
ization, data collection and standardization, and individual data sale. Some of 
these include Ocean Protocol (2019), which additionally bundles data for training 
machine learning algorithms; Wibson (2018), which is aimed at individual mon-
etization; and Enigma Data Marketplace (2018), which aims not only to provide a 
data marketplace, but monetize the computing power of individual users, beyond 
just their data.
A widely admired model for data control is the Finnish Mydata model. This 
model emphasizes standardization, control, and interoperability: individual users 
create an identity, and they use it to authorize the use of their data by third parties. 
According to their white paper, “The primary function of a MyData account is to 
enable consent management – the data itself is not necessarily streamed through 
the servers where the MyData account is hosted.” This leaves a certain amount 
of flexibility around where the data are securely stored: users could store the data 
themselves or allow a trusted third party to do so. Either way, the intention of this 
model is to facilitate better user control over their data.
3.3 From standardization and scaling to control
Overall, the move toward both greater control over one’s online interactions, and 
with it better control over the data generated, gathered, and ultimately used, has 
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moved apace. Although data marketplaces and data cooperatives are well estab-
lished, new technologies and demands – notably enabled by the blockchain – have 
given rise to the creation of self-sovereign identities, and with them the creation 
of decentralized infrastructures.
Overall, the commodification of data has involved four main steps, namely the 
collection of data in a standardized format, the integration of data so that it can 
be aggregated or used at scale, the setting of data prices (per user or for aggregate 
databased), and a central platform for data release or resale. These steps are sum-
marized in Figure 13.1.
While data marketplaces and cooperatives have made the collection of indi-
vidual (and activity) data both commonplace and easily monetized, the need for 
standardization and scale has meant that these activities have required the pres-
ence of a central actor. These central actors have not only reaped rewards from 
their activities, their presence has also meant that those to whom the data pertain 
do not always have full control over them – which has legal, ethical, and security 
implications.
However, the advent of decentralized infrastructures, and with them better pos-
sibilities to create identities that are not centrally controlled – but which neverthe-
less are interoperable with the non-digital world – has given rise to new possibilities 
around data control and its subsequent release and sale (see Table 13.3).
Not only that, the digital nature of the chains of control means that we can move 
beyond static, restricted, and binary controls over data to allowing for changes to 
consent over time (non-static consent), interoperability (non-restricted consent), 
and partial consent or subset consent (non-binary consent). Having discussed both 
the background to the need for changes to how, and by whom, data are collected and 
sold, I now turn to discussing the hurdles and opportunities implicit in implementa-
tion of these new systems, before concluding and raising some policy concerns.
4  The risks, opportunities, and policy concerns in 
implementation
Both entrepreneurs and public actors have made inroads into the implementation 
of systems not only whereby data can be shared and sold, but where this sharing 
and sales can be done dynamically and with a clear trail of consent. Implementa-
tion, however, is still emerging: although state-controlled identity and consent 





Data Release or 
Sale
Figure 13.1  How data are collected, cleaned, and sold in 2019, typically through data 
marketplaces and cooperatives
Source: Author’s summary.
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hand, are commonplace, they typically have not been integrated. Moreover, the 
nascent attempts at integration, notably by combining self-sovereign identities 
with decentralized infrastructures, are still in the very early stages.
This section therefore delves into the possibilities associated with the idea of 
individuals’ management of their data, and decentralized infrastructures in par-
ticular, and the obstacles that their implementations are likely to face. Of note is 
the fact that all of these areas are typically areas in which policy-makers operate, 
generally to mitigate negative externalities or support market conditions. These 
hurdles and opportunities fall into three broad categories, namely 1) networks 
effects, 2) externalities, and 3) interoperability and value. The section immedi-
ately after discusses the implications of this chapter, provides some concluding 
analysis, and discusses whether states or private actors are best placed to provide 
dynamic, end-to-end data management services.
4.1 Network effects
The single biggest hurdle that any new system, irrespective of its benefits, will 
have to cross is that there are already existing systems whereby data are shared, 
used, and harvested. Notably, these systems are of the data-for-a-service model; 
firms like Google and Facebook collect individuals’ data through their web 
Table 13.3  A comparison of the emerging models of data control, use, monetization, and 
interoperability
Data control Data use Monetization Interoperability
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presence and standardize and use it. In exchange, users obtain access to services, 
for instance, social media and search engines, for free. For most people, this 
model works reasonably well. In fact, many of us barely think about the trade that 
we are making: data for services. Moreover, the reach of firms like Google and 
Facebook means that large numbers of individuals already use their services, the 
services are well developed and interdependent, and they have already collected 
significant volumes of data.
One often talks about the importance of network effects when it comes to plat-
forms; in the case of existing data-for-service models, there are network effects 
on both sides. Take, for instance, Google. Google runs a number of interdepend-
ent services, from their Search tool to Gmail and word-processing tools. From 
the perspective of users, the fact that so many people use these tools means that 
1) search results are already well tuned to their needs – they have already been 
trained on one’s own, and others’, data; 2) the fact that many people already use 
and are familiar with these tools makes them easy to use for collaboration; and 3) 
given that the tools work well and are well integrated with one another, there is 
little incentive to switch; that is, there are switching costs.
From the perspective of the platform, the reach of these tools means that: 1) 
they do not have to suffer the “cold start” of attracting new users; 2) they do not 
have to assess who provides useful data and who does not – they can offer the 
same services to all users, and aggregate the data for maximum value; and 3) 
access to volumes of data and existing models means that they can easily fine-
tune services to suit users (and advertisers), giving them a competitive advantage.
4.2 Externalities
Moreover, the switch from existing exchanges of data (without control) for ser-
vices to data (with control, and potentially even remuneration) for services intro-
duces a host of possible externalities.
The first of these is that disruption of existing business models – wherein adver-
tisers pay for user data/optimized advertising that cross-subsidizes services – will 
come under threat. This will likely mean that advertising on the Internet will 
decline, undermining sales for advertisers, and thus with knock-on effects for 
regional and global firms reliant on sales.
The second of these is, in response to the collapse of the advertising model, 
should we expect to pay for services? From the perspective of users today, data for 
services is a straight trade; if we switch over to a model wherein we can control – 
and sell – our data, should we also expect access controls and costs to arise when 
it comes to the provision and use of online services like those already provided by 
the likes of Facebook and Google?
Third, there is nothing to guarantee the veracity of the data for sale. With 
increased control and awareness, and with them the possibility of getting paid, the 
rewards for data create incentives to “game” the system, at one extreme, or just 
to tweak one’s data to make them more desirable. When it comes to manipulat-
ing the system, it is likely the data “bots” that create data and sell them are likely 
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to become commonplace – undermining the veracity of the system as a whole. 
Moreover, when individuals are more aware that they are being watched, they are 
more likely to change their behavior, in what is known as the “Hawthorne Effect” 
(Adair, 1984).
Last, what is there to prevent a so-called “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 
1968)? While many self-sovereign identity services and data markets generate 
income from their services, most of those providing whole new decentralized 
infrastructures do so for ideological – not financial – reasons. Without clear finan-
cial models to support the development, scaling, and security needs of these ser-
vices, the risk is that they are used without being maintained, threatening their 
long-term viability.
4.3 Interoperability and value
One of the benefits of data collection and use being better controlled – and bet-
ter tracked – is that it is likely to generate new signals of value, for better or 
for worse. For instance, where there are standardized forms of data, standardized 
APIs, and better connections between different data repositories and services, this 
would not only undermine the stranglehold that existing digital giants have on 
Internet services, but allow for the creation of new services.
Among these new signals of value are records of individuals’ social and data 
networks, the volume of data that they generate, and the veracity of the data gen-
erated. Take, for instance, an individual who regularly generates large volumes of 
data that are largely internally consistent – pointing to repeated patterns of interest 
and behavior about that person. Not only do they become a “valuable” source of 
data, but their interactions with other users (“data sources”) might become impor-
tant points of reference in relation to those users, too.
This could be both positive and negative. On the one hand, the risk is that this 
creates a tiered system of data users: those who create lots of consistent data are 
valuable, while those who do not (or who opt out) are seen as less valuable.
Moreover, increased interoperability also brings with it the risk of increased 
oversight: not only can private firms get better views of (consenting) data- 
generating users, but so too can governments. One of the benefits of decentralized 
infrastructures is that they limit the ability of governments to influence data col-
lection systems or force reporting. However, as with the signals of private value 
discussed above, should interoperable data systems become a reality, failure to opt 
in could also raise concern from government officials.
5 Conclusion
Overall, the case for a move from users “paying” for services with their data on a 
case-by-case basis to the creation of infrastructures for better individual control of 
their data is a complex one. On the one hand, there is no question that the existing 
ways of exchanging data for services work: they have led to the creation of valu-
able firms, free services that are nearly universally accessible, and personalized 
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communications services through, for example, social media. However, there 
remain problems with this system: the first of these is that there is no way for 
individual users to limit what data are collected, and there is little transparency 
to where the data go once they have been collected. Although laws and ethics 
across the globe increasingly mean that users have to give informed consent to 
the collection and use of their data, this consent is given at a single point, is all or 
nothing, and cannot easily be amended or revoked after the fact. Moreover, under 
the existing ways of doing things, data are often siloed and cannot be transferred 
from one service to another. Further, individuals increasingly feel – rightly or 
wrongly – that if their personal data are so valuable, they should be financially 
remunerated for their collection and use, especially when digital giants are mak-
ing profits off the back of these data.
In contrast, a model of data control that allows for better control over when, 
by whom and to what extent users’ data are collected and used offers a number 
of benefits. These include improved interoperability across services, the poten-
tial for the creation of new signals of value, incentives for the creation of more 
data, and – crucially – a more nuanced approach to data management, including 
more transparency. A comparison of the existing data-for-services model and the 
emerging controlled model is summarized in Table 13.4.
However, much depends on the form that the controlled model takes, and 
whether it relies on a self-sovereign or public identity service. In parts of northern 
Europe, like Sweden and Estonia discussed above, it has become the norm for 
Table 13.4  The characteristics of the existing “data-for-services” model, against the 
emerging “controlled model” of data use and control
Data-for-services model Controlled model
Access to services Free services are nearly 
universally accessible
Access to services may become 
more limited – and possibly 
even pay-to-use
Consent Given at a single point
All or nothing
Cannot easily be amended 
or revoked after the fact
Nuanced consent models likely, 
depending on the controlled 
model that comes to dominate
Transparency Little to no transparency Likely to be more transparent, 




Likely to be interoperable by 
design
Identity Does not rely on any 
identity system
Could rely on either a state or 
self-sovereign identity system
Risks Model has become standard 
and is well-understood, 
continues to dominate 
due to network effects
Risks of:
– Data becoming unreliable
– Undue pressure and oversight
– Two-tier access to services
Source: Author’s depiction.
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identity control and verification to become a public service. However, people in 
countries with governments that either are known for less professionalism in their 
public service delivery, or for using civil services for political ends, might prefer 
for centralized versions of these services to be privately controlled and therefore 
subject both to better oversight by courts and to market forces.
Culture and history aside, there are a number of areas for consideration when it 
comes to assessing whether a digital identity management system should be state 
or self-sovereign. One of the main benefits of a self-sovereign system is that it 
offers a system that prioritizes interoperability over all else. As a result, data con-
trol (and identity as a service) can be scaled across multiple industries, and even 
multiple countries. This is important when one considers how important digital 
identity is likely to become beyond the scope of data management: a 2015 Swed-
ish survey suggested that 91 percent of businesses believed that digital identity 
services facilitated business transactions and relationships (Hyborn, 2015).
Further considerations include questions around how to pay for maintenance 
and development of the identity service, and with it any data management ser-
vices. Swedish and Estonian service providers, by making digital identity services 
public, have dealt with this problem by paying for them from state coffers – mean-
ing that these services are free at the point of use and thus available to all. Self-
sovereign identities, depending on their business models, may not be free at the 
point of use – or may come with other strings attached. Unfortunately, because of 
the risk of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” discussed above, free digital identity 
services seem not unlikely to emerge, but undesirable.
Overall, the benefits and risks associated with if, and how, identity verification 
services and data management services converge on a new model for dynamic data 
control will depend on implementation. Indeed, while there are clear calls for better 
data management in places like the European Union, it is not clear that the hurdles 
described above can be overcome at all. Should users prioritize control and transpar-
ency over convenience, then the possibility exists that data management systems that 
are more interoperable and nuanced than what we have today are likely to emerge. 
However, much depends on what kinds of business models prevail: which kinds of 
data management systems, and how data are controlled and potentially monetized. 
Moreover, given that there are already so many established players in the market, the 
space for new entrants is small. In particular, the costs of bringing a broad product 
that competes with the likes of Facebook and Google to the market are prohibitive: 
as outlined above, network effects mean that these services tough to compete with.
However, should these kinds of management systems come to exist, it seems 
likely that it will be possible to overcome the tension between commerce and con-
trol described earlier in this chapter: not only will it be possible for firms to make 
use of individuals’ data to, for example, train algorithms, but users will have better 
oversight over how, and by whom, their data are being used. And maybe even get 
paid in the process.
For public actors and policy-makers, there is considerable food for thought: the 
path forward when it comes to identity management is full of opportunities for 
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individuals, but also numerous areas in which effective policy – and even state 
service provision – could affect the future of identity management solutions. In 
particular, many states have a long history of correcting for externalities and sup-
porting markets for services deemed to be in the public interest; identity manage-
ment services are among these services.
Notes
 1 An API defines a standardized way, including coding languages and access points, for a 
developer to write a program that requests services from an operating system (OS) and/
or other application.
 2 That is, once data have been obtained through an identity, it cannot easily be reclaimed 
or permission revoked retrospectively. Future use of the person’s data, or prospective 
revocation, is, however, often possible.
 3 For a detailed discussion of how blockchain-distributed database maintenance and veri-
fication occur, please see Nakamoto (2008).
 4 Over 99 percent of all generated data are thought to be either lost or unused (White et al., 
2019).
 5 See Blockstack (2019).
 6 All increasingly important considerations in light of regulations like GDPR in the Euro-
pean Union.
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Part IV
Future of the welfare state    

1 Introduction
The payment market is undergoing a digital revolution. Sweden is a country that 
has always been eager to build an image of being a trailblazer of digitalization at 
large, and has therefore also endeavored to take on a pole position in this particu-
lar digital race. With a widespread shift to digital payments and rapidly diminish-
ing cash services in banks across the country, the existence of cash is quickly 
dwindling from Swedish society (Rogoff, 2016). Some predict a totally cashless 
society in less than a decade (Arvidsson, 2018; Alderman, 2015). The idea that 
Sweden will eventually become cashless has taken root on many fronts, including 
private individuals, businesses, and public organizations. Sweden is often held up 
as a model for the move toward a cash-free society as a success story in cutting 
costs and reducing crime (Olsen, 2018; Rogoff, 2016). In reality, however, the 
development has been far less utopian. Many are now asking whether the trans-
formation has benefited society at large or just the bottom line of the large banks. 
For instance, in February 2018, the Swedish National Bank’s (Swe: Riksbanken) 
governor, Stefan Ingves, called for new legislation in order to secure public con-
trol over the payment system, contending that the ability to make and receive 
payments is a “collective good” (Crouch, 2018).
We, the authors, Björn Eriksson and Ulrika Sandhill, have long been follow-
ing the development of the cash issue in Sweden. The aim of this investigative 
commentary is to look at the development of the cashless society in Sweden, the 
driving forces behind it, the actual outcome, and its ramifications on the overall 
welfare, thus providing some “best-practice” insights using Sweden as a case in 
light of similar nascent developments across the digitalized nations.
2 The concept of money then and now
Cash is probably one of the world’s most sophisticated inventions. We have made a 
collective agreement that paper notes and metal pieces hold a special value, which 
we can exchange between us for goods and services. For more than 2000 years, 
cash has been a legal means of payment, but is now increasingly substituted for 
digital ones (Weatherford, 1997; Koblitz and Menezes, 2016). Until just a few 
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decades ago, the value of the money supply in Sweden and in other developed 
countries was backed by the equivalent value of some sort of asset. For instance, 
up to 1931, the Swedish National Bank employed a system of “gold standard,” 
that is, owning gold equivalent to its money supply, but had to abandon the system 
in the aftermath of World War I (Haavisto and Jonung, 1999). After that, Sweden 
attempted to tie the Swedish krona to other types of values, such as the US dollar 
or other currencies of EEC countries, until ultimately surrendering the idea of a 
fixed exchange rate in 1992. This was following a desperate attempt to defend the 
krona against currency speculation. Today, the Swedish krona is a floating cur-
rency, meaning that it is not backed by gold or assets, and its value fluctuates due 
to supply and market expectations (Jonung, 2000).
To control the money supply, the Swedish National Bank is exclusively entitled 
by law to issue and cancel banknotes and coins. However, this law has never been 
updated to consider digital money, and the amount of hard cash today is exceed-
ingly small compared to digital cash. In fact, estimates show that only roughly 
8 percent of the entire money supply exists in physical form, whereas the rest is 
electronic (Buntinx, 2017; Price, 2016). Commercial banks actually create large 
amounts of money by issuing digital credits when approving loans to their cus-
tomers (Focardi, 2018). The Swedish National Bank therefore no longer controls 
the money supply. When commercial banks lend money, they only need to cover 
a small fraction thereof with equity. Even if the capital adequacy requirement has 
become higher after the recent financial crisis, banks lend significantly more than 
they have – a risk that the global central banks, including Swedish National Bank, 
and societies globally obviously accept (Cervenka, 2017).
In recent decades, indebtedness has increased exponentially, both at an individual 
and at a country level. At the same time, there has been a shift in how we per-
ceive money; it is no longer obvious, for example, that a debt must be repaid. Some 
speculate that we are living in an economic bubble. Nobody truly knows, and so far, 
money and debt keep growing. Still, the fact remains that the banking system would 
go immediately bankrupt if, for some reason, trust were to be disturbed and droves 
of people were to rush to the ATM network with withdrawal requests. In this light, 
cash represents a threat to the banking system as we know it.
3  Forgotten public service ambitions in the  
deregulation era
In Sweden, the disassembly of the payment system started in 2005. That year, 
the Swedish National Bank – which had previously been responsible for cash 
management through its depots throughout the country – decided to outsource the 
cash management process to the four major commercial banks present at the time 
(Forskning.se, 2013). It was the golden age of liberalization, and trust in market 
forces soared. If the market could handle it all unaided, why should the State bear 
the cost and responsibility for cash management?
In hindsight, it is obvious that handing over the responsibility of cash manage-
ment from the public to the private sector in reality meant entrusting the fox to 
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guard the henhouse. Since cash carries significant handling and storage costs, 
the commercial banks almost immediately developed a strategy aimed at ridding 
them of these costs. A common deposit system and ATM system were established. 
In reality, a monopoly situation was created, which has allowed the banks to use 
their pricing power to shift payment flows from cash to digital payments. At pre-
sent, the banks are shutting down ATMs, closing down branches, and raising the 
price of cash deposits and withdrawals. The ultimate goal is to have customers 
carry out banking services by themselves from their homes. For the banks, this 
is a win-win situation: They can cut back on staff and office space, while gaining 
control of all transactions, which opens up a plethora of opportunities, such as 
introducing new fees and enabling surveys of various kinds. They also conjure 
away the risk of bank runs, given that customers no longer – at least in theory – 
can withdraw their money from the bank.
Having said that, the actions of the banks are in no way surprising or unex-
pected. As private companies, they are expected to put the shareholders’ interests 
before that of the well-being of society. If delivering cash or financial services to 
disadvantaged groups in rural areas are not profitable, for example, they will sim-
ply “drop the ball.” In retrospect, it appears surprising that no one had seriously 
contemplated the consequences of placing an infrastructure that is essential to the 
country in the hands of private actors. On the other hand, at the early stages of the 
Internet era, no one could have predicted that the liberalization reform would have 
meant that our citizens would be left without cash.
4  Cashlessness affects the civil society and  
the countryside
In our work, we are often contacted by people who feel abandoned by the banks. 
Retirees, people living in parts of the country with poor or no mobile phone cover-
age, immigrants, disabled people with difficulties in using digital tools, tourists, 
market traders, small businesses – many are those who are disappointed and upset 
about the situation. It is becomes evident that the glue holding the civil society 
together evaporates when people can no longer pay for a waffle at the market, 
deposit the earnings from a lottery ticket, or hand out a few bucks to the guy who 
mows their lawn. For some, the situation creates no more than a minor annoyance 
and inconvenience in their everyday life, while for others it threatens the survival 
of their entire communities.
Researchers and experts engaged in heated debates claim that these issues 
are temporary, because the elderly will eventually die off and there will soon be 
broadband coverage across the whole of Sweden (Eriksson and Olofsson, 2016; 
Swedish Government Official Reports, 2016). In our view, the argument is not 
just cynical, but it is also not true. The elderly do not just “pass away.” The popu-
lation ages continuously and new individuals will lose their cognitive abilities. 
If one adds rapid technology development on top of that, the picture becomes 
even clearer. The problems will persist, albeit in different forms and with new 
people. Also, relying solely on digital solutions without a functioning backup plan 
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is naïve. To this end, cyber-experts have attested that if someone really wants to 
hack into a system, they will sooner or later be successful (Skarec, 2017; Waldrop, 
2016; Snyder, 2018).
5 Digitalization creates vulnerabilities
There is some contention that Swedes appear to be somewhat “peace-damaged” 
(New Eastern Europe, 2015). As a people, we Swedes may have forgotten that we 
are vulnerable because we have been consistently spared from crises and wars. 
When the Berlin Wall fell, we thought that was the last threat standing. Eternal 
peace was bound to reign supreme, making armies and civil defense a nuisance to 
do away with – as we did (Wieslander, 2017; Platen, 2015).
History, however, keep unfolding. Today, serious global concerns persist, and 
Russia, our eastern neighbor, has made its ambition felt. At the same time, glo-
balization and digitalization interweave our societies. An increasing number of 
organizations have emerged with branches in numerous countries and integrated 
IT systems, endless chains of subcontractors, and information stored in different 
cloud services. While this arrangement proves effective when it works, it also 
makes our society exceptionally vulnerable.
Major parts of our critical infrastructure, that is, energy, transport, drinking 
water supply, payment systems, health care – stand firmly in cyberspace. This 
makes it harder to draw boundaries between internal and external security, to 
understand what threats look like and from where they come. Future attacks will 
be carried out by keystrokes on computers. In Sweden there have already been 
several occurrences involving extensive hacking, an example of which was the 
disastrous attacks on the Transport Agency’s IT-system in 2017 (Government 
Offices of Sweden, 2018a). In that case, the procurement favored a low-cost 
approach to secure data management under the self-deceiving mantra: “What 
could possibly go wrong?”, in spite of various Swedish authorities having been 
subjected to repeated similar hacker attacks since 2012, that is, following the out-
sourcing of data to private companies (Crona, 2017).
The fact that all digital transactions are visible and traceable also makes us 
vulnerable at an individual level. While some fail to see that as a problem, others 
regard privacy as a human right. In any event, we should be aware of the risks 
attached. Prescription of medicine, hotel bills, liquor purchases, and contributions 
to communities and political organizations are examples of information that can 
be assembled into detailed patterns of data about specific individuals. As such, 
consequences may be indeed dire should it fall into the wrong hands, as this could 
entail anything from extortion to bringing about new political scenarios.
6  On the frontier of technical development  
or simply naïve?
In other countries, cash is perceived as self evident and necessary (Anderson, 
2017; Cerulus and Contiguglia, 2018). Therefore, many people from abroad look 
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to Sweden in awe. What’s going on up there, in the small country in the north? 
Up to this point, we have met with many enquiring journalists.1 Their opinions are 
nearly unanimous: Swedes seemingly have an unprecedented confidence in the 
state in addition to their perception of “benevolent authorities.” Many journalists 
have living historical references to oppressive regimes and have been sincerely 
wondering about the seemingly naïve Swedish approach to the matter. “The Stu-
pid Swedes” was heard a few times during our meetings with these journalists. 
In their view, Swedes are unwittingly rushing head-first into a cashless transfor-
mation experiment, without stopping to question the potential consequences of 
abolishing the only safe and privacy-friendly means of payment available to the 
population.
Perhaps the cash issue will divide the population into two camps (a develop-
ment we are already witnessing). That is, global digital “natives” on the one side, 
and those who experience the emerging society as exclusionary on the other side. 
The latter group will ultimately end up in a dependency position of the former 
group, as their freedom and independence erode. Brexit, the 2016 United States 
presidential election, and new populist winds in European politics can be part 
of the same phenomenon, expressing resentment against the “establishment,” 
against the politicians and decision-makers who are seemingly snubbing their citi-
zens. Perhaps the wrath in people’s minds has actually forced the hand of those 
purporting that cash is an analog contingency to safeguard the people?
7 Conclusions – the tide is turning?
Now, there are some signs that the tide is turning. Issues about security and cyber-
crime are now being highlighted by researchers and experts in Sweden. More 
and more people seem to realize that security is of strategic value, and thus the 
operation of essential IT systems should not be jeopardized for short-sighted cost 
reasons. Following this logic, we also must have a secure payment system in the 
event of a crisis or war.
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s (MSB) 2018 publication “If Crisis 
or War Comes” suggests that Sweden’s inhabitants must stock up on cash in cri-
sis situations (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2018). In its publication, the 
MSB states that analog technology that is not interconnected is the most robust 
technology available. While digital payments rely on electricity, telecommunica-
tions, and IT systems to work, cash works regardless of the existence of electricity 
or who wields political power. The ability to pay with cash offers a permanent, 
physical security no matter the crisis or emergency situation. The laissez-faire 
attitude toward the development is clearly being substituted for a greater aware-
ness of the consequences of going cashless. It is becoming more obvious that the 
digitalization of the payment system creates an unwanted and unexpected shift 
of power, both from individuals and from the state, to global, private banks and 
financial institutions.
A clear sign of this awareness is the parliamentary investigation that has been 
proposed at the time of writing, which suggests that banks above a certain turnover 
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should be mandated to handle cash (Government Offices of Sweden, 2018b). 
Another sign is that the Swedish National Bank, as the first national bank in the 
world, is now is looking into creating its own e-currency as a means of defending 
itself from the threat of having a system of payment solutions that is solely owned 
and managed by private big banks without government influence. As such, the use 
of an e-currency is a means of reclaiming the power over the money production 
and supply from the private banks back to the Swedish National Bank (2018).
Thus, if private companies are able to consolidate power over the state by 
means of digitalization, the government and the Swedish National Bank own the 
political arsenal to steer the markets adequately. Time will tell whether the gov-
ernment and the Swedish National Bank are swift and cunning enough to stop the 
scramble for a cashless society before it is too late.
Note
 1 The corresponding author of this chapter, Björn Eriksson, has conducted over 50 inter-
views on the subject with reporters from all over the world.
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1 Introduction
Welfare was originally a term that described citizens’ prosperity and is nowadays 
often used as a collective term when talking about the social security system and 
welfare services like education, health care, and social care. In this regard, Swe-
den makes for a relevant case to study, given that its welfare services are well 
established and integrated into the welfare state inasmuch that they aim to pro-
mote prosperity and individual autonomy. Likewise, the welfare policy is based 
on universal principles that all citizens should have access to high-quality welfare 
services (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016; Nationalencyklopedin, 2017).
1.1 Background
The public sector in Sweden has served an important purpose in making ser-
vices such as education and health and social care, as well as civil contingencies 
and protection services, available to all citizens. With digitalization, consump-
tion of services in the public sector is likely to merge with consumption of any 
other service. The sector faces new user demands. At the same time, global and 
regional development is putting an increased pressure onto service providers. If 
the world is to find solutions to the global sustainability challenges, including 
climate change, water, and sanitation, we need ten times the speed of innovation 
to be successful (Cartina, 2018). Given societal challenges such as an increasingly 
aging Swedish population, fewer young people to finance care for the elderly 
people (SCB, 2018), and the transformation into a fossil-free society, it is obvious 
that the public sector will have to find ways to increase resource efficiency and 
accessibility through for example automation and innovation of services (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011; IVA, 2016).
In the future, would we perhaps be able to receive the same public services, but 
from other, more niche and specialized players? Or might we even be serviced 
by large global actors built upon substantial economies of scale? Will the pub-
lic sector even be fit to compete with those players in terms of relevance, qual-
ity, customization, value for money, and efficiency? The logic of digital services 
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implies both cost efficiency and a high level of quality and relevance – opposite 
the traditional competitive edge built on either price or quality. Digital players 
have already shown their strength in competing in the business world, causing 
industry borders to blur and with a firm focus on meeting consumer demand with 
an ecosystem approach, rather than sticking to traditional definitions of industries.
Our life is full of digital services: we communicate with our friends, family, 
and colleagues; read the news and search for information; book our travels, res-
taurants, haircuts, or any other appointments. Consumers spend almost four hours 
a day online, in the digital world. In the next five to ten years, these consumers 
will lift their heads from 2D screens and will most likely interact with devices in 
a much more complex way, including using all senses and a much wider array of 
technologies than today (IIS, 2016; Porter and Heppelman, 2017). This all will 
enable the shift.
In the future, consumers will no longer be willing to waste time waiting for a 
doctor’s appointment, and they will demand getting instant access to the educa-
tion they want, accessible for anyone from anywhere. No one will be willing to 
wait for months or years for bureaucratic processes to handle simple matters that 
could be solved swiftly by an algorithm. However, at the same time, the human 
resources available to cater to the needs of the older population will be scarce. 
Automatization and data-driven services are therefore a must. The future society 
will not be able to shoulder the cost of a welfare model like the one we apply 
today (Vartiainen, 2017). In the future, we will most certainly face home care staff 
that are humanoid robots.
Not only robots will become humanized, humans will become roboticized, too 
(Cartina, 2018). Some argue that we will be upgraded by technology and that our 
human abilities will be enhanced. A technology like this has the potential to make 
us all smarter, healthier, and more efficient, but it might also increase our fears, 
make us more vulnerable, and even kill us if we do not manage to master the ethi-
cal aspects of this development. Until now, technology has demanded much from 
us in terms of understanding how to use it properly. In the years to come, technol-
ogy will be more like an extension of ourselves, demanding less interpretation and 
enabling much more precision in how we do things. Shared values and a common 
view on ethics, responsible behaviors, and rights and wrongs will be the key to 
preventing technology from working against us.
In the future welfare system, the overarching currency will be data. Consumers 
tend to lean toward either wanting a high degree of control over personal data, 
making well-thought-through decisions with a high level of perceived control – or 
they lean toward a convenient approach where personal data is the main facilita-
tor in their life, freeing up time when their service provider already knows their 
preferences and makes services available with a very limited need for decision-
making and choice.
The future welfare services must meet the demand from citizens expecting the 
same level of innovation, simplicity, efficiency, transparency, and accessibility to 
welfare services as with any other service. Although global initiatives, such as rec-
ommendations from the OECD in 2016, are pushing Sweden and other countries 
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to work harder toward a digital transformation of the public sector, we are still 
only in the beginning of this journey. The recommendations that governments 
should develop and implement digital strategies and use digital technologies to 
create open, inclusive, and trustworthy public sectors needs further attention, as 
do initiatives to bring governmental and non-governmental actors together to 
achieve national development and long-term sustainable growth (OECD, 2016). 
Important steps have been taken in the Swedish market lately. The Swedish gov-
ernment appointed a Minister of Housing and Digital Development in 2016, a 
Chief Digital Officer for the nation in 2017, and a new public agency to maintain 
the digital infrastructure and capital in 2018. Sweden also established an eHealth 
Agency in 2017 (OECD, 2018).
1.2 Aim and research question
The aim of this project is to describe four scenarios encompassing different future 
outcomes. These scenarios are in turn contingent in part on which players in the 
market are most dominant, which players succeed in offering the best services, 
and what consumer behavior emerges as the most prevalent. Our approach is 
iterative. This means that the approach follows a theoretical framework wherein 
a scenario planning method (known as the “four scenarios”) will be developed, 
the outcomes of which are built upon the result of the study. All four scenarios are 
likely to co-exist, but the different scenarios are based on trends and drivers that 
may be stronger or weaker over time. For the purposes of this study, all scenarios 
are presented in forecast of the year 2030. This was done in order to serve as a 
thought-provocative prognostication of the future market, as well as to allow ade-
quate time for the forecasted changes to become fully implemented in practice.
Key questions to be answered in this study:
• What scenarios can best describe the main possible differences in consump-
tion of welfare services from the citizens’ point of view?
• In each scenario, we will describe:
• What are the main characteristics of the expectations that a citizen has of 
the welfare system?
• Which players are successful?
• Which business models and offerings do we see?
• What is the role of the state?
• What is the purpose of public welfare services?
1.3 Methodology
This study is based on a scenario analysis conducted in Sweden during Octo-
ber 2016 to June 2017 named “The Future of Consumption Patterns 2025” (Car-
tina, 2017). This is an extension of the same study focusing on the public sector 
and how future consumption patterns will affect how Swedish citizens might want 
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to consume welfare services in the future. The general scenario planning logic 
from the original study is kept intact, but we will add the perspective of how 
future consumption of welfare services would change in the different scenarios.
This qualitative study was conducted through a series of face-to-face interviews 
and workshops and built upon scenario methodology and design thinking, devel-
oping the four previously mentioned alternative future paths of development. The 
respondents/participants came from both the public and private sector and repre-
sented both small (<50 employees), medium (<250 employees), and large (<1000 
employees) companies with a disruptive business model, where innovative new 
services have been developed. Experts within digital and sustainable business 
development also participated in interviews and workshops.
All participants cited in the study have given their informed consent to appear 
with their names and the companies they represent.
Table 15.1 shows all participants in interviews, workshops, and discussions in 
the study.
Table 15.1 List of participants












Ehle, Petra Head of Business Unit 
Mail
PostNord Logistics





Co-Founder CareChain IT and healthcare
Ferndahl, 
Torbjörn
Managing Director Säkerhetsbranschen Security
Forslund, 
Daniel
Innovationslandstingsråd Stockholms läns 
landsting
Public services






Golan, Jonas Health Care Lead Microsoft Sweden Computer software







Head of Business 
Development
AMF Fastigheter Real estate
Hafstad, 
Joachim
Director of Operations KRY Health
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Name Title/position Company Industry





Head of Fintech & 
Financial Services 
Nordics







Country President Securitas Security





Kernell, Daniel Co-Founder & CCO Doktor24 Health
Krés, Ulrica Head of Marketing Swedbank Bank
Lindstedt, 
Monica
Founder Hemfrid Household services
Melander, 
Helen
















Co-Founder CareChain IT and health care
Stenberg, 
Frippe




Scandic Hotel and travel
Thörner, Tina Founder School4you Education
Torell, Anders CEO Kronans Apotek Pharmacy








CEO Avarn Security Security
Ziemsky, David CEO Bellpall Technology
1.4 Study content
This study presents global mega trends along with large and important consumer 
trends that we believe will influence the future Swedish welfare system, consump-
tion patterns, and the ecosystem as a whole. This study also seeks to present sepa-
rate ways in which the world might develop that affect the public sector, welfare 
services, private companies (including their business strategy), and market com-
petition, as well as consumer preferences. Based on our aforementioned scenario 
analysis, and depending on how these aspects progress, we see four potential sce-
narios outlining how individuals would like to consume welfare services in the 
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year 2030. In each scenario, we illustrate which triggers will enable the scenarios 
the most as well as which societal values and capabilities politicians and business 
leaders must strive to develop. The scenario names reflect the characteristics of 
how future citizens will consume welfare services. Specifically, these four scenar-
ios are as follows: 1) data-driven state, 2) commercialized welfare, 3) efficiency 
game, and 4) global choice.
Readers of this chapter will thus gain an understanding of how to spot triggers 
that can change the development, while increasing the ability to assess how digi-
talization and sustainable development may change the society and the world at 
large. The scenarios can be used as an instrument to develop future-proofed strate-
gies in each scenario. By understanding threats and opportunities in each scenario, 
companies can also distinguish a robust position and strategy that encompasses 
elements of several scenarios.
2  Digitalization of Swedish welfare services is  
lagging behind
Sweden has been known all over the world for its welfare system enabling all cit-
izens to take part in schooling and health care in a safe society where institutions 
generally can be trusted. These welfare services have seen incremental develop-
ment but have not changed much in 50 years compared to the development in the 
private sector. With digitalization, the public sector faces a major shift, which 
will force the sector to transform the foundation of the welfare system. The need 
to create excellent citizen experiences, automate processes and ways of working, 
become data-driven, and innovate business and financing models will be just as 
important in the public sector as anywhere else. From the customers’ and citi-
zens’ point of view, the distinction between a service delivered by a public insti-
tution and one delivered by a private company will be blurred and customers will 
choose the service that meets their needs in the most relevant manner. Digitaliza-
tion disrupts the way we pay for services, and this means that it will tear up value 
chains and monetize parts of the welfare system in a completely different way. 
Online/digital doctors, along with telemedicine/eHealth at large, are excellent 
examples (Evans, 2016; Wachter, 2015). Private actors define a need for a better 
experience, not having to spend precious hours at a care center, which means 
automating processes that are inefficient in the physical world and then getting 
instant advice and medication. New financing models will certainly emerge as 
services are refined and different levels of customer value are distinguished. An 
immense challenge related to digitalizing the public sector that Jenny Gejke, 
Head of Digital Channel Development at SJ, the Swedish state–owned passenger 
train operator, brings up is that we need significant investments in infrastructure 
from both the public and private actors – in as an extensive manner as was done 
100 years ago – and that we are currently nowhere near that. This can become a 
major obstacle for Sweden and hold back our development in relation to the rest 
of the world. Sweden is used to being ahead, but right now many other countries 
are moving at a much faster pace.
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Some parts of the system, such as the Swedish Systembolaget, a government-
owned chain of liquor stores, and the Swedish National Tax Board, have already 
today managed to create services that the Swedish people are very satisfied with. 
But on the other hand, there are many examples of areas where the public sector is 
lagging in terms of digitalization and citizen centricity – especially when it comes 
to developing customer-focused solutions. Magdalena Gerger, CEO of System-
bolaget, emphasizes how important it is to have a multistakeholder perspective 
and understand that, in the end, the citizens are the clients who must be satisfied 
with the service. Each cost needs to be evaluated with the effect of quality in mind. 
This, in turn, will be the key to success. Agreeing on the priority among purpose, 
cost, and quality of the services offered will be crucial. Systembolaget’s specific 
challenge is to balance the appreciation of alcohol consumption with the poten-
tial risks and damages it causes to the individuals’ health, to their families, and 
to society at large in terms of increased health care costs. They have focused on 
treating customers according to their own beliefs and values that taking a broader 
responsibility for people and society with care and respect for the individual will 
increase societal value creation and not merely function as an authority – control-
ling and inspecting people. This has played a major role in the journey toward 
becoming customer-centric and gaining both confidence and satisfaction in their 
services. This way of thinking could be translated into other areas such as health 
care and education, where citizen satisfaction with the service delivered is uneven 
or low. All areas partly or fully owned by the public sector will experience lobby-
ing, competition, and pressure to change from the private sector.
Monica Lindstedt, Founder of Hemfrid, a household service company, argues 
there will be an increased focus on meeting consumer needs through offering 
consumers more complete services. Working full-time with a family of six, she 
longed for a service to help at home, available not only for a small, high-income 
segment but for a larger market. She established Hemfrid 20 years ago to meet the 
need for cleaning services at home. This service is today in most cases a once-a-
week assignment but could likely turn into a full-responsibility “keep my home 
clean” service. Hemfrid is piloting a service with Electrolux where they bring 
their robot vacuum cleaners into people’s homes to serve the daily need for clean-
ing that is not met in their own current service offering. Other services could be 
added; cleaners could, for example, receive and take care of groceries or other 
purchases. The smart home is happening now, and there will be an ecosystem of 
players wanting to get into people’s homes with their products or services, with a 
more holistic, service-oriented offering, likely in collaboration with partners they 
have never thought of before.
2.1   Health care is inefficient and new players are  
entering the scene
Health care is an integrated and important element of almost every society. Swed-
ish society’s current development entails an increasing need for health care, 
combined with the challenges of financing high-quality health care with good 
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availability for all citizens. The solution lies in the improved efficiency and pro-
ductivity of the health care provided. Health care is on the brink of a paradigm 
shift whereby digitalization is opening up new ways of providing health care, for 
communication between patients and health care providers, and for patients to 
take control of their own health and treatment.
Today, long queues and waiting times to see a doctor and an inefficient process 
to get access to care drive the development of digital services such as KRY, Dok-
tor24, and Doktor.se, among others. A recent OECD (2017) report stated that one 
Swedish doctor treats 692 patients a year, in comparison to the average of 2295 
patients a year in OECD. In Germany alone, a doctor treats 2416 patients a year 
(OECD, 2017). This means that the long queues may not only depend on the 
scarcity of doctors, but also be due to inefficiency in the health care sector. At the 
same time, Sweden has among the highest costs for health care in OECD, while 
still garnering low levels of satisfaction from Swedish patients (OECD, 2017).
Many people today also expect flexibility and time efficiency when it comes to 
health care services, much like any other service. Daniel Kernell, CCO and Co-
Founder of Doktor24, a Swedish digital health care service, mentioned some of 
the greatest challenges facing Swedish health care today. Health care in Sweden 
is in general organized with productivity in mind, focusing on how to “optimize 
the production” instead of focusing on the patients and their journey. There is a 
logic to this, given that the Swedish health care system is publicly funded, but 
the lack of patient journey perspective has affected accessibility negatively. The 
Swedish referral system is also to a large extent mail based, resulting in long 
lead times in the patient journey. At the same time, people have gotten used to 
an increased service level in other industries through digitalization. This has led 
to higher expectations and a lower accepted “minimum care” within health care. 
Swedes in general agree to pay high tax rates because they feel they get a lot in 
return. However, the low accessibility and long lead times in health care, and the 
increase in service expectations, all risk reducing the popular trust in the publicly 
funded health care model. This is one of the reasons digital players are starting 
to take over parts of the value chain within the primary health sector in Sweden. 
From June 2016 to December 2017, there were almost 230,000 digital health care 
visits, and the numbers continue to grow. It is primarily families with young chil-
dren (0–4 y/o) and young adults who tend to use the digital health care services 
(Blix and Jeansson, 2018).
According to Fredrik Bergström, CEO of Länsförsäkringar, a Swedish insur-
ance company, the concern for our health has never been higher, and there is an 
explosion within the area of proactive health in the form of diets, gyms, sports, 
yoga, mental training, and so forth. He believes insurance companies could take 
on a much more active role in proactively promoting activities that lead to good 
health. One example of this is for companies to provide mental coaching in order 
to avoid stress and long sick leaves. He also believes insurance companies can use 
the data and insights they possess to a much greater extent. Assuming that this is 
handled in a trustworthy manner, consumers are not only willing to share data, but 
will also receive better services from insurance companies.
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Anders Torell, CEO of Kronans Apotek, a Swedish pharmacy chain, brings up 
the lack of consumer perspective in the health care sector. Today, consumers are 
left to handle their health care needs by themselves, seeking information, finding 
out who to contact for different matters and where to go – each and every step 
in the so-called “patient journey.” He believes digitalization will enable major 
improvements to this experience and make it significantly more adapted to each 
individual. This will happen through smarter data usage and utilizing artificial 
intelligence, and it will increase transparency for the consumer. He shares Berg-
ström’s view that consumers are willing to share data if they are used for a good 
purpose, that is, improving the customer experience.
2.2 Teacher scarcity and lack of control over student data
When it comes to education, the system of today faces great challenges. We will 
see a scarcity of teachers in the coming years, and that will propel digitaliza-
tion and push for increased efficiency in education according to Helen Melander, 
Associate Professor in Education at Uppsala University. Teachers must be able to 
educate more students in the same amount of time. We need to evaluate the role of 
teachers and how they interact with, and enhance the adaptation of, new technol-
ogy in education.
When it comes to individualized support and managing student data, we need 
to solve how data can be shared between different parties, according to Peyman 
Vahedi, Principal at the senior high school Ådalsskolan in the urban area of Kram-
fors. He regards this as the biggest challenge of today – that student data are 
owned and managed by two private actors in Sweden. Hence, the state is paying a 
lot of money to get access to relevant data such as name, address, guardians, and 
so on. He describes this as a major obstacle, since we cannot work with data until 
this information is owned and handled by the state. This implies we do not have 
full access to the infrastructure needed to develop relevant services for teachers, 
students, and parents. The school needs to be digitalized, but the limited access to 
data stands in the way.
Tommy Jarnemark, Chief Operational Officer at AcadeMedia, Northern 
Europe’s largest education company, also brings up the importance of getting the 
right technology infrastructure in place for schools to become more digitalized 
and data driven. He believes teachers will still be a core component of a school, 
but they will work differently from today. We will not digitalize away teachers, 
but we may decrease the need for the physical location. Learning will be more 
real time based and we will need to continue learning through our whole lives. 
According to Jarnemark, this must be enabled by private actors, and the public 
sector can handle the foundation for everyone to get the same start. His opinion 
is that it is old fashioned to spend 12–16 years in school before we go to work for 
the rest of our lives. Instead we will switch between education and work several 
times during our lifetime.
The Swedish rally navigator and Founder of School4you (global education 
tools), Tina Thörner, describes the challenge in school today from the student’s 
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perspective – “children today are demotivated since we have an ancient school, 
far from the world they live in.” The rewarding system does not meet their expec-
tations of instant feedback, and they get bored and lose interest, instead of being 
motivated and inspired. She has a strong belief that schools must adapt to children 
and technology – and not the other way around.
2.3 Increased need for security and safety solutions
According to Torbjörn Ferndahl, Managing Director at Säkerhetsbranschen – a 
Swedish association for security companies – people in Sweden feel more inse-
cure and have an increased need and demand for safety today, even though actual 
security levels are higher than ever before. International and local occurrences of 
terror threats are making us perceive the world as more dangerous than before, 
and the picture that media communicates makes us feel unsafe. The violence of 
today is perceived as more severe, probably because we have access to informa-
tion in a completely different way than before and we tend to pay more attention 
to bad news than good news.
People satisfy the need for safety by investing in home alarms and other digital 
security products and services. We get to hear that community resources such as 
the police force are not being sufficient, and hence citizens start to “buy” their 
own safety. Torbjörn Ferndahl also adds that we are already starting to see gated 
communities, something he believes will be more common in the near future. The 
mission of the police is to fight crime in society, and therefore they will mobilize 
their resources to areas that need them the most, not patrolling in areas that are sta-
tistically “safe,” even though the citizens might want them to. The police should 
be where the crime is, and citizens’ perceived security needs will be handled by 
private actors. We see more and more cooperation between community services 
and private actors within the security sector, where, for instance, security guards 
are taking over some of the areas from the police. One example is the subway 
system in Stockholm (the Stockholm Metro), where security guards are tasked 
with maintaining safety rather than directly involving the police in the event that a 
threatening situation emerges. Digitalization among private actors is ahead of the 
public sector. Predictive analysis of certain behavioral patterns to prevent certain 
incidents is but one such example.
3 Future thoughts on digitalization
3.1 Global developments are impacting future needs
3.1.1 Strong incentives for a digital transformation of public services
The political incentives for improving efficiency, effectiveness, and governance 
of public services are clear. Governments look increasingly to digitalization as a 
strategic driver and tool to achieve the changes needed. Digitalization of some 
of the most workforce cost–heavy public welfare service areas, for example, 
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education, health care, and protection has great potential that has yet to be real-
ized (OECD, 2016).
3.1.2 Changing demographic landscape
One strong development trend affecting public services is the changing demo-
graphic composition. In the next 30 years, there will most likely be more retired 
people than there will be children and youth, at least in Sweden and other OECD 
countries. Due to this shift, dependency ratios are increasing, meaning that fewer 
citizens are contributing to growth. A smaller working population leads to lower 
GDP, a lower national income, and further strains on pension budgets (Gujral and 
Beer, 2015).
3.1.3  Increasing chronic diseases highlight the need for  
preventive care
The aging population has a significant impact on both the demand for and delivery 
of public services. Changes in the demography require flexibility and scalability 
in the delivery of, for example, education and health care services. Chronic dis-
eases such as diabetes, obesity, and certain cardiovascular diseases are increasing 
and placing additional pressure on the health care sector, which stresses the need 
for preventive care (OECD, 2016).
3.2 Consumer trends
Consumer behavior and trends from the private sector will have an increasing 
impact on the consumption of welfare services. Citizens will make no difference 
between public or private services but demand simpler, faster, and cheaper access 
to welfare services. Adopting new technologies and getting better insights regard-
ing customer experience, as well as developing the ability to build an ecosystem 
around consumer and citizen needs will be necessary to stay competitive and offer 
a customer-centric service.
3.2.1  New user interfaces challenge the ownership  
of the relationship
Screen usage, as our primary user interface, has evolved from computer screens 
to mobile screens. Within the next few years, voice, virtual reality, and augmented 
reality will most likely become our next primary interfaces because of conveni-
ence and efficiency. In addition, more and more objects will be connected and 
start collecting consumer data from real life. Cars, lamps, fridges, work desks, 
and so on will all be connected in the future, analyzing behaviors to recommend 
solutions that simplify or improve the lives of consumers. This will create new 
opportunities for innovative solutions and it will dramatically affect the growth 
of digital services. In the future, citizens will be able to keep better track of their 
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health with interconnected devices such as smart bracelets, weight scales, and 
fridges. Citizens will expect service providers to present smart options for how 
to connect and leverage their personal data from devices with the services they 
provide. For instance, health service providers should be able to connect to the 
patient’s fitness app or smartwatch and use the insights to give better health care. 
At the same time, there will be more solutions like the digital dietician and the 
digital doctor that help you get daily health advice and coaching. Voice control 
will probably be more integrated in daily routines and used, for instance, as an 
interface when asking for support in different welfare service errands. For welfare 
service providers to meet future citizen demand, it will not be enough to focus on 
providing the welfare service itself – they will need to start leveraging upcom-
ing digital technologies in their service delivery and continuously find innovative 
ways to reach citizens using new interfaces and communication channels.
3.2.2 The artificial relationship
Primitive chatbots are already widely in use. They serve as substitutes to personal 
customer support for less complex questions and inquiries. Leading tech com-
panies are all developing their own artificial personas (e.g., Siri, Alexa, Cortana, 
Google Now), making them even more intelligent and useful. Even though the 
level of sophistication is limited, the speed of improvement is increasing expo-
nentially. In the very near future, the sophistication level is expected to be much 
higher. AI, chatbots, and personal assistants will be natural points of interaction 
for everyone. We will interact with our artificial assistants several times a day 
when we need help and assistance in a wide range of situations and with a multi-
tude of tasks. This means that some of us will allow artificial intelligence to make 
decisions for us. While this will make our lives more convenient, it also means 
that we will hand over more power to whomever owns the intelligence. Trust will 
be key, and we as citizens and customers will not tolerate mistakes or bad service, 
lest we turn elsewhere. For incumbent welfare service providers to maintain their 
roles in this future, they will need to build capabilities, internally or through part-
nerships, to integrate AI and big data into their service delivery. If not, newcom-
ers and global tech giants will likely take over large market shares in the welfare 
services market by leveraging AI and other technologies.
3.2.3 The seamless customer flow
Current expectations of great customer experiences will continue to grow. Giants, 
like Uber, Spotify and Netflix, with their core in customer experience and user 
interface technology, drive development as well as the market. They make us 
as citizens expect the same level of experience from local services, schools, and 
health care providers. A lot of companies and service providers have therefore 
focused on creating an omni-channel experience and being more customer centric. 
Now more and more companies and service providers are focusing on improving 
the overall experience throughout the whole customer flow. This starts from the 
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first interaction point with the customer and ends with the last. The key is to look 
at service delivery from a service receiver point of view and provide a seamless 
flow throughout the entire journey, connecting different ecosystems with each 
other. The need to provide a seamless flow will be central in all value chains and 
service sectors, regardless of whether it is to get an appointment with the doctor, 
alert the police, or report to school that your child is sick – our expectations of 
a seamless experience will be extremely high. Welfare service providers need to 
think similarly to any other type of service provider when it comes to creating 
seamless experiences, because if citizens’ demands are not met, we will not hesi-
tate to switch to other service providers.
3.2.4 Regulatory changes open for new innovations
Changes in directives and regulations open new possibilities to create innovations 
based on new conditions for competition. In many industries, banking, for exam-
ple, regulation is the foundation of trust for customers. New rules and regulations 
enable new players to compete on the same terms as incumbents. Three examples 
of directives and regulations that will have high impact on most businesses are 
Digital Single Market, Payment Service Directive 2 (PSD2), and General Data 
Protection Regulation. GDPR enables new innovations related to novel ways to 
manage data and create new ways to deliver services with less data available. 
These new regulations can also have an impact on the way we will consume wel-
fare services, as data, payments, and digital solutions are evolving in this area.
3.2.5 Public sector needs to become fast moving
Changes in regulations and directives disrupt traditional industries, resulting in 
new competitive landscapes. Incumbents and the public sector have similar pre-
requisites and they will have to keep up with the pace of new entrants or see 
themselves lose ground to companies that offer what consumers really want. An 
example is digital health care companies such as Doktor24 and Kry, taking over as 
the first point of contact in the Swedish primary health care journey. While being 
small and new implies a disadvantage in terms of trust and scale, it is a competi-
tive advantage not to be burdened by legacy. Incumbents struggling with old IT, 
old business or financing models, and non-agile ways of working will see their 
customer base shrink. They must realize that new competition will arise and that 
their historical advantage will not save them. Even public service providers need 
to adapt and be flexible to deliver the expected value to the taxpayers. Those who 
manage to adapt their operations to keep up with citizens’ evolving demands will 
be able to compete with new players and use their scale and trust as an advantage.
3.2.6 Integrity awareness
A higher online presence for everyone, along with the digitalization of everything 
from government documentation to family photos, increases the need for control 
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of one’s own content. Both economic and legal aspects will drive higher security. 
GDPR is one example of how legislators address personal integrity and security 
online. A safe and sound handling of personal information is in fact becoming an 
increasingly important competitive advantage. GDPR will change the way busi-
ness is done in the EU. As of May 25, 2018, every organization must meet the new 
data protection rules. Failure to comply will render a hefty fine (up to €20 million 
or up to 4 percent of the annual worldwide turnover of the preceding financial 
year in the case of an enterprise, whichever is greater.). Everyone needs to state 
when they are collecting data from a citizen, hence the importance of understand-
ing which data are stored and processed will increase to comply with the new 
regulation.
3.2.7 Increased expectations, wants, and needs
Citizens are pampered with great innovations, better online customer service, 
and shorter delivery times. Thus, citizens have come to expect more from every 
encounter they have with a company, brand, or public institution. In addition, citi-
zens have low tolerance for unsatisfactory services or products and are quick to 
switch to other service providers. In the upcoming years, citizen expectations will 
only increase, as people will expect solutions to be part of everyday life and work 
smoothly with their chosen lifestyles and day-to-day routines. Citizens will expect 
getting instant access to public services when needed, for instance, home delivery 
of pharmaceuticals and customized security solutions that can be integrated to 
their daily lives. Touch points will become more omniscient, and partnerships 
will allow for solutions with broader spans in services. If companies and public 
institutions manage to meet expectations well, they will gain an advantage over 
alternatives. To succeed, they must invest in becoming customer centric and strive 
to continuously meet changing demands.
3.2.8  Diversity in diverging expectations between segments  
calls for more personalization
With a rapidly growing population and increasing globalization, the citizen base 
is becoming more diverse than ever. This calls for a greater need for tailored 
services. For instance, differences in preferences and needs between generations 
cause dilemmas for service providers, both public and private, by making it dif-
ficult to know how to prioritize different demands. For public providers, this 
becomes increasingly challenging since they need to provide services that are 
accessible to the public and therefore cannot risk excluding any segments. When 
citizens expect public services to be accessible, transparent, and responsive, it is 
important to have a citizen-centric approach and solve the actual needs that citi-
zens have. It is not enough to offer an online portal or call center, if these do not 
meet the expectations of the public (Dudley et al., 2015). Many citizen segments 
can, for example, be keen on physical meeting points, which means there is a 
challenge in satisfying both types of citizens and combining digital and physical 
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experiences. The choice to go all digital is therefore not an obvious one. Even 
though understanding the new digital citizens is very important, neglecting the 
current citizen base would be a mistake. Tailoring services to fit both new and 
current segments will hence be a great but unavoidable challenge.
3.2.9  Integration of services is necessary even in  
the public sector
To compete with new innovative startups and meet the increased need for tailor- 
made solutions, service providers have begun to integrate their services. For 
example, in 2015, Lloyds Pharmacy announced a cooperation with Kry and 
several logistical companies to enable everything from digital health care 
counseling to last-mile delivery of drugs (Dagens Apotek, 2015). This type of 
integration can help service providers offer services beyond their core offer-
ing without expanding their core operations. Enabling this type of collaboration 
across the public and private sectors will be necessary to meet the expectations 
from citizens, who will otherwise be forced to turn to private-sector providers. In 
the years to come, this trend will only further develop thanks to disruptive tech-
nologies, such as cloud computing and a new generation of people who expect 
greater transparency. This trend implies that both the private and public sectors 
need to look at how they can increase efficiency and generate greater service 
experiences through integration with other providers. This requires adopting a 
new organizational mind-set and breaking down barriers for collaboration. The 
next step for organizations is to identify assets that have complementary value 
to others, then find partners with offers that extend their own, experiment itera-
tively, and scale it once it works while maintaining the flexibility to change 
course at a later stage.
3.2.10 David and Goliath: future friends or foes?
We see partnerships between unlikely associates, both across and within indus-
tries and across the private and public sectors. This is likely to become more 
common due to the increasing complexity of the marketplace, calling for new 
and outside-the-box solutions in all parts of the value chain. To create syn-
ergies, large established incumbents, as well as public organizations, partner 
with innovative startups. Such partnerships enable both organizations to uti-
lize each other’s strengths, while still staying flexible by avoiding mergers. 
These types of partnerships are fragile and can be dissolved as soon as they 
become unproductive. However, if they are successful, the combination of sets 
of skills from different industries will benefit the involved parties and society 
by generating new services or products. Larger organizations, like public ones, 
struggle to adapt to fast-changing surroundings, so utilizing partnerships can 
help them to more quickly deliver improved services to citizens. Partnership 
is a cost-effective way to experiment with the market and to better understand 
citizen needs.
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3.2.11 Evolving service models focusing on win-win-win value creation
With an increasingly digital climate, new business and financing models emerge. 
Historically, making successful company partnerships has proven challenging, 
since parties seek to maximize their own profits. Partnerships between private 
and public parties can be challenging due to potentially misaligning objectives 
(profit-seeking vs. policy driven) and differences in decision-making processes. 
However, the increase in customer expectations forces both businesses and pub-
lic organizations to evolve. Companies need to move away from “win – as much 
as possible for us” and start “winning” for the customer as well. Similarly, public 
organizations are pressured to change and provide more personalized services 
for their citizens as expectations increase. Beneficial partnerships that integrate 
services to increase the value for the service receiver enable a win-win-win situ-
ation for all involved. The rise of digital aggregators that do not own physical 
assets and that create a digital marketplace for merchants has started taking con-
trol over communication with citizens. By offering the possibility for citizens 
to compare service alternatives, from public and private actors alike, service 
providers are being pushed back behind the interface of the aggregators. The 
service consumer will therefore choose the provider with the most beneficial and 
customer-centric offer.
3.2.12 Tech giants enter welfare services
There is no doubt that large tech firms such as Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, 
Tencent, and Alibaba have substantial power and influence over people’s lives 
through their products and services. They show no signs of slowing down in their 
mission to become our primary interface and platform. During the past decade, 
we have seen them develop services way beyond their core competences. Google, 
which probably is the role model for this trend, started as a search engine in 1998, 
but have since then launched several services that have little in common with 
the initial product. Like Google, other organizations now develop services way 
beyond their core. To name a few, the Chinese E-commerce giant Alibaba has now 
launched a new online bank, Amazon recently launched the food store Amazon 
Go to the public in January 2018, and it is rumored that Apple has been working 
on an electric car since 2014 (Jones, 2015). We even see this trend within welfare 
services, where Google have invested largely in EdTech and educational AI (Gar-
tenberg, 2018). There are also indications that Amazon is taking more and more 
interest in the health care sector beyond prescription drugs and toward full-scale 
hospital services (Farr, 2018). What this will mean for the future of public-sector 
service providers, only time will tell.
3.2.13 The digital era needs evolving regulations
The topic of tech giants and the need for increased legislation is being raised more 
frequently than ever. The digital era causes new moral and ethical dilemmas to 
emerge and it calls into question what tech giants should and should not be able to 
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do. Regulations are not keeping up with the technological advancements that are 
greatly influencing our society. This will have effects on the structure of the wel-
fare services markets by creating an imbalance in freedom between different types 
of organizations. Public-sector organizations tend to be heavily regulated and pol-
icy driven, which in turn makes them less agile and makes it more challenging for 
them to respond quickly to changing citizen demands. Global tech companies, on 
the other hand, have been able to operate very freely due to slow-moving legisla-
tion processes and a lack of governmental technological prowess. A big challenge 
appears when global tech companies start to enter completely new sectors, such as 
providing welfare services on a global scale using digital solutions. Governments 
will need to adapt legislative processes to promote citizens’ interests and to level 
the playing field for all market actors – by enabling the public sector to become 
more agile and putting necessary restraints on global technology companies.
3.2.14  Governments and the public sector should  
be more digital
At the media festival/conference South by Southwest (SXSW) in Austin, Texas, 
2018, James Barbour, spokesperson and Head of Press Diplomacy at the EU Del-
egation to the United States and Shawn Powers, Executive Director at the US 
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, spoke about the dilemma that politi-
cians focus on the negative aspects of AI – the “dark side.” They requested more 
discussions on productive ways of using AI and digitalization. How can we use 
technology to do better things?
An example is making digital IDs that can provide refugees with an ability to 
vote. Estonia is an example of a country that has digitalized government practices, 
for example, with digital passports. Today the time spent on manual administra-
tive work in many public-sector organizations is high, which represents human 
resources that could be used to deliver faster or better services to citizens instead. 
During their speech, Barbour and Powers suggested that governments and the 
private sector should initiate more conversations. If they can come together, it 
will be easier to be more proactive, when it comes to legislation but also when it 
comes to understanding how new technology affects the development of society.
4 Uncertainties about the future
Uncertainties, unlike trends, describe areas where participants in this study have 
differing opinions or are unsure of where development is heading forward. The 
uncertainties we have discovered in this project concern citizens’ demand for 
niched, customized services versus standardized services and whether we are 
willing to make a lot of effort in choosing our consumption versus preferring 
convenience and letting go of personal data to gain efficiency and more personal-
ized services.
Our key question was:
What will future citizens demand and what will future solutions to their needs 
be like?
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4.1  Uncertainty 1: will we prefer customized or  
standardized platform solutions?
Customized or standardized platform accessibility results in variations of global 
and local limitations, AI status, privacy regulations, and logistical solutions. The 
term “customized” as we know it today will most likely be on a standardized scale 
by 2030, so we need to consider what this new potential customized world will 
look like – and what and where the limitations will be. What will be possible from 
a legislative, technological, and consumer perspective? However, there is huge 
uncertainty regarding platform use and accessibility on a global scale for 2030.
Customized solutions mean lower platform dependency and specialized play-
ers. For this to work smoothly, the AI needs to be highly developed to function 
as a guiding tool between the many customized service offerings. Consumers are 
willing to pay for customized solutions since they offer exactly “what I want, 
when I want it, and where I want it.”
Standardized solutions will entail a world dominated by few giant platforms 
that solve everything. In a standardized platform situation, an AI is not as cus-
tomized to meet specific needs, but rather to create efficiencies and economies of 
scale within each platform. AI is a true competitive edge for platform players with 
the aim to dominate the market and make us dependent on their offerings.
4.2  Uncertainty 2: will we prefer active choices or do we crave 
solutions that make decisions for us?
These two ways of consumption result in completely different services, logistical 
solutions, and ecosystems. Depending on if we will see severe world events such 
as data hacking, climate change, and political instabilities that make us feel more 
insecure and unsafe – or if we experience reasonable peace and stability that make 
us confident letting someone else make decisions for us based on our data – it will 
affect our sense of what is “normal” in terms of sharing data.
I do it myself stands for the urge to make conscious decisions, purchasing 
locally and less, valuing high privacy, and taking part in a sharing economy life-
style – thoughtful choices, trusted relations, and role models who spark communal 
efforts, true empathy, and care for other people and the locality.
Do it for me will embark on a more laid-back way of living, where sustainable 
consumption is sought, but not lived by – where comfort beats privacy. Consum-
ers feel the pain of having too little time and want to make the most of the time 
they do have. Automation is key, along with full-on global services.
5 Four scenarios describe development
We have developed four different scenarios describing possible future outcomes. 
The names of the scenarios are data-driven state, commercialized welfare, effi-
ciency game, and global choice.
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5.1 Data-driven state
5.1.1 The state protects citizens from data misuse
The world has experienced an increasing misusage of personal data, starting off 
with political elections and moving into increasingly sophisticated solutions that 
trick consumers into believing and buying into messages and choices where they 
have realized again and again that they are misled. There has been an explosion 
of content where politicians, businessmen and women, and celebrities are com-
municating “fake news” and people have been fooled to make choices based on 
false grounds. To halt this development, politicians have intervened and taken the 
role to protect citizens’ data from misuse.
5.1.2 Reluctance to share data
In the data-driven state, citizens and consumers are reluctant to share their per-
sonal data with commercial players since they have experienced the downside of 
commercialized data. There has been an overflow of advertisements and breeches 
of handling data in a trustworthy way, and consumers choose to secure their per-
sonal data by not letting them out. This said, consumers still want the services and 
efficiency that sharing of data enables. Therefore, the state has taken on a role to 
handle personal data, being the quality assurance that citizens need to be able to 
share data in a much more controlled way.
5.1.3 New government body with focus on data intelligence
A new government body has been created with the mission to develop a state-
of-the-art data-driven ability to handle citizens’ personal data. This new body is 
the heart and core of the welfare system. The data belong to each citizen and can 
never be used without a citizen’s consent. This is a major step forward from the 
personal numbers each Swedish citizen used to have. Each citizen profile consists 
of all data regarding school, health, income, criminal record, vehicle ownership, 
and so on. It will also know our geographical positioning. This feature will cause 
a lot of debate, but due to continuous terrorism and an increased demand for secu-
rity, citizens will accept this to feel safer. Citizens can log in to their profiles and 
allow sharing of information between chosen parties. It can also be shared with 
employers and companies.
5.1.4 Data-driven modern welfare
The state is allowed to use the data on an aggregated level to be able to plan for 
the development of welfare services. This increases the efficiency in the welfare 
sector and enables a significant improvement in proactive arrangements to meet 
citizens’ needs. Sweden re-establishes itself as a frontrunner in creating the next 
level of a modern welfare system, based on data and intelligence to serve its citi-
zens’ needs. This model is then exported to other countries.
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5.1.5 Data-driven health
Due to the great amount of data available on citizens and their health, health 
care institutions in Sweden can make sophisticated predictions of health issues 
at a population level. This is one of the reasons most individuals choose to share 
their data with the state. The state is optimizing for its citizens and provides short 
waiting lists for more advanced medical treatments and surgery, as well as great 
investments in research and development of new medicines and cures. The state 
benefits from healthy citizens and therefore provides them with free basic medi-
cal tools to keep at home. Health care is easily accessible for all people in Swe-
den, and machine learning is used to analyze data of medical histories to forecast 
health issues and risks at a country level. The potential for large savings due to 
reduced sickness among the population is the main argument for the state to invest 
heavily in this technology.
5.1.6 Self-care centers at home
Most diseases within the primary health care area will be cared for at home, with 
help from information and guidance from smart technology meters. In most peo-
ple’s homes, there will be a self-care center with all necessary tools for examining 
and treating individuals in a family. There will also be sensors installed in almost 
every room to generate information about a person’s overall health, which will be 
alerted if something seems not normal or worrisome and you need to contact a 
health service provider. Besides providing warnings, the sensors will also provide 
information on genetic risks and current stress levels. Even though the technical 
solutions may be from a third-party service provider, all data are confidential and 
owned by the individual. However, these data are often shared with the state – to 
enable more preventative care.
5.1.7 Health care is free of charge
Sweden has few health centers for primary care, but several larger-sized and more 
advanced health care clinics for more complex and demanding care outside the 
home. All health care is free of charge for citizens of Sweden. Foreign patients 
can pay fees to get specialized treatments in Sweden as well – however, this is 
expensive since the state and health care institutions do not have all required 
information about the individual, which makes it more complicated to offer indi-
vidualized care.
5.1.8 Peer-to-peer learning
In this scenario, the demand for trust is high and we turn to people that we confide 
in. To handle the scarcity of teachers, the system is transformed into a peer-to-
peer learning platform where students teach other students. Students no longer 
go to classes in their own age group, but rather with students with more or less 
knowledge than themselves in a certain topic, either to teach others or to be taught 
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themselves. The logic behind this learning process is more similar to how knowl-
edge is transferred in a company today, from more experienced to younger or less 
experienced colleagues within a certain topic.
5.1.9 High-quality educational platforms
Investments by the state have been significant to create a high-quality educational 
platform ensured by experts and recent research. Students access the platform 
through their digital student identity issued by the state. Initially, there is a limita-
tion to the content of the platform, but it grows steadily as it develops over the 
years.
5.1.10 Teachers are experts or coaches
In this scenario, we see two types of teachers, experts and coaches. The experts 
contribute to the production of content to the educational platform. They are pas-
sionate about their subject and strive to find pedagogical ways of visualizing and 
distributing their knowledge. Other teachers become coaches. Through the edu-
cational platform, these “teacher-coaches” get a thorough understanding of each 
student’s performance and potential. The teacher coaches the student to find the 
right selection of other students for learning and training of others in areas where 
this student excels or needs extra help.
5.1.11 Security cameras everywhere
In this scenario, we have a constant feeling of unsafety and insecurity and we 
also lack confidence in larger corporations and institutions. Companies that are 
trusted with guarding our neighborhood and monitoring our home deliveries have 
a strong local presence and are often structured as a peer-to-peer neighborhood 
watch. Security cameras are common goods and we share them with people we 
trust or in a trusted community. Not all neighbors are necessarily included unless 
we are confident that they are reliable. In order to get accepted and to prove your 
credibility to the community, a complex rating system applies. This is because 
data, other than what people freely share with you, are closely guarded by the 
government, and one way to ensure trust from people is by collectively gathering 
the communities’ aggregated opinion of each individual. The classic proverb “it 
takes 20 years to build a reputation, but 5 minutes to ruin it” has never been more 
accurate. As such, it is difficult to get a second chance once your reputation has 
been thoroughly tarnished.
5.2 Global choice
5.2.1 Forced to take on a global perspective
National borders are less important, and we take on a global perspective to solve 
our planetary challenges. Climate change is a fact, and there is a burning platform 
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for change. Severe instabilities among world leaders have nearly caused World 
War III. As the war has been averted at the last second, a global agreement comes 
into place with a common focus on solving the uneven distribution of resources 
among people in the world.
5.2.2  Tax legislation is transformed and consumers choose business-
minded philanthropists
Large corporations have tricked the legal system by tax avoidance and caused 
a collapse of tax systems as we knew them. The need for a global tax system 
is inevitable given that almost every company acts on a global market. Digital 
giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Google, Apple, Alibaba, and Tencent have suf-
fered from legislation hindering their rampage, and they have been struggling to 
transform their businesses. Only those with a strong focus on ethics and morals 
have succeeded to stay competitive. New giants arise with a combination of phi-
lanthropist and business perspective based on an ecosystem approach including 
consumers and their values in their own system.
5.2.3 Consumers use their purchasing power
Consumers in this scenario use their purchasing power to reward and distinguish 
good players from bad. They demand a full focus on the whole value chain with 
full information on how companies are delivering on the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. The transparency is total and there is no way to hide misconduct.
5.2.4 The state must find its global unique selling point
The Swedish welfare state has met competition from a global arena, and citizens 
choose to use services where they are produced at a reasonable price with high 
quality and in a sustainable way rather than based on location. Since the state no 
longer has the power of regulating the tax system, it must secure its relevance by 
specializing in providing a world-class level of welfare services in chosen, spe-
cialized areas. Sweden has created a world benchmark and decided to focus on 
providing AI-based proactive health care promising record life length and educa-
tion, with a focus on what makes society create a sustainable life. In this scenario, 
Sweden has invested in securing a strong focus on creating the most sustainable 
welfare services possible. It has increased costs, and to finance this development, 
the system has been opened up to global citizens who are able and willing to pay 
for services they can trust to be responsibly produced.
5.2.5 A proactive view on health
A proactive perspective on health and health care has been a major focus to dimin-
ish global costs and even out differences in knowledge about and accessibility to a 
healthy life. The world has experienced a substantial improvement in treating dis-
eases early in their progress. We have programmed ourselves away from cancer 
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and other similar diseases through combining our knowledge within medicine, 
biology, and technology. There have been intense discussions on how much we 
want to know in advance about our future health, but we have pushed our former 
beliefs into prioritizing knowledge over ignorance.
5.2.6 Global schools serve global students
Schools take part in global networks, and education is free to everyone. Philan-
thropic companies have focused on producing high-quality content and making it 
available to students all over the world. This way, they can pick out students with 
high levels of engagement and knowledge within their own specific focus areas. 
The ability to catch the highest level of talent is truly a global competitive advan-
tage and the major difference from one company to another. The most prominent 
companies offer education as an integral part of their ecosystems.
5.2.7  Data-driven education aimed toward  
sustainability goals
Swedish schools have a long tradition of teaching sustainability awareness to chil-
dren from a young age. The Swedish state decides to strengthen this focus even 
further into every subject and project. This makes the Swedish school a world 
leader in sustainability and attracts both students and teachers from all over the 
world who wish to develop and improve their competence within this area.
5.2.8 Escalating terrorism drives technology development
Escalating terrorism with creative new forms of attacks increasingly toward spe-
cifically vulnerable institutions, companies, and individuals has further increased 
the need for global measures. The aim of the attacks has been to shut down critical 
functions such as financial systems, utilities, media broadcasting, and so forth. 
The need for secure and robust systems is palpable and investments in develop-
ing, for instance, blockchain, technology enabling significantly safer transactions 
have been prioritized.
5.2.9 Security firms – the National Security Agency of the future
Since a more efficient and scalable way of hurting and robbing citizens is through 
hacking cars, homes, boats, and/or other belongings, security firms have devel-
oped a large anti-hacking service. Large corporations have the technical advan-
tage and the leading anti-hacking solutions since our home is only based on one 
smart home platform built on solutions from companies like Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Alibaba, and Tencent. Through their data and their philanthropic view 
of society, they have won the whole value chain, from protecting and monitoring 
your children and securing your home to bringing home the public procurement 
of predicting and protecting cities from riots based on search engine diagnostics. 
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The big five have a stronger position in society than the governments around 
the world thanks to the combination of trust from the consumer, a sustainable 
approach toward the value chain, and the inefficiency and incompetence of our 
old institutions.
5.3 Commercialized welfare
5.3.1 Freedom drives the gig economy
The sense of freedom has a strong impact in this scenario, with financial and 
institutional as well as corporate freedom. We long for a life without a boss – 
and being your own boss is highly valued. The gig economy flourishes and 
many switch between different commitments in just one day. Influential power 
is stronger than anything but requires much more specialization than in the early 
days when influencers entered the scene. True followers are hard currency and the 
only way to attract them is by staying exceptionally relevant to a specific target 
audience. The value of a low-interest mass market is gone. Companies, as well 
as institutions and politicians, look for influencers with strong engagement from 
their followers, but they have also developed their own capabilities to understand 
their target group better.
5.3.2 High customization – preferably at home
Consumers demand a high level of customization, preferably centered around 
their own living space. Time spent working at home has increased significantly, 
and people value the opportunity it gives to spend more time with children in the 
daytime – working flexible hours at all possible moments of the day. The notion 
of work hours from 9 to 5 is completely obsolete.
5.3.3 Artificial intelligence is a core competitive edge
In a commercialized welfare system, artificial intelligence is the backbone. It is 
necessary to customize services the way citizens want them. All of our personal 
data are made available, of course with our own consent, because we expect it to 
be used to make our lives easier. Behavioral and preference data must be shared 
across an ecosystem of different parties from the private and public sectors. Not 
all ecosystems look the same, so the challenge here is to design the most attractive 
service with the right set of partners.
5.3.4 The new shape of an influencer – the direct influencer
Everyone is an influencer. That means that the old characteristic of an influencer 
wanting to gather as many followers as possible is over. The hit rate for com-
panies wanting to reach their potential audience by mass-market influencers is 
just as poor as broadcasting on TV. Every marketing effort is meticulously data 
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driven, and small influencers with extremely relevant audiences rule. They influ-
ence their audiences directly and can move their thoughts and demand from one 
day to another. This is a challenge for politicians who want to reach the masses 
but need to be relevant to many smaller audiences. Many citizens are making their 
living as influencers, and technology and constant measurements are making this 
possible. It is a sensitive game where a bankruptcy or loss of confidence can occur 
overnight for a single influencer. But for politicians or companies, the risk can be 
spread among many different contributors.
5.3.5 The state employs more robots than humans
Commercialized welfare has implied severe competition from private actors and 
the state has been forced to cut down both its commitment in general and number 
of personnel. We see an extensive use of AI and robotics to handle administrative, 
caring, educational, and security issues. The role of the state is to automatically 
make predictions on citizen needs and make this information readily available to 
the ecosystems of actors that can solve these issues. The way of meeting different 
needs will be highly customized and delivered as a full-scale service. People turn 
to the ecosystem of companies that best treat a specific disease or teach a certain 
specialization, encompassing all aspects of life. If you have diabetes, you will 
be helped with everything from shopping for the right meals to getting the right 
medicine and suitable training – individually customized just for you.
5.3.6 Daily and proactive recommendations for citizens
Real-time information gathered by the sensors in the home will be translated into 
daily recommendations provided by digital assistants. For example, “Mr. John-
son, please reduce your coffee drinking as it will reduce your ability to sleep 
tonight,” or “Mrs. Nordlind, I would recommend you to take Medicine X, instead 
of Medicine Y as it suits your body better for the moment.” The recommendations 
are very much individualized and have a connection to online shops so that the 
data can be used in real time to make orders or automatically change a restaurant 
reservation for the evening.
5.3.7 Me first – whatever it takes
In this scenario, citizens expect instant health care – wherever they are. In case 
a citizen gets sick, the disease will be identified at an early stage, often before it 
is noticed. With help from an analysis made by intelligent cameras and sensors 
in your home that identifies the “healthy” you, you will be able to receive care 
quickly. Besides getting help very quickly, even the most complicated operations 
will be able to be carried out in your living room. A specialized doctor will “be 
there” virtually and, through robotic surgery, AR, and other technologies, will 
be able to serve you almost all types of health care in your home, whenever it 
suits you.
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5.3.8  One issue, fact-based government with certifications to vote in a 
specific area
In this scenario, you choose which areas are important for you to be able to influ-
ence politically. This is a one-issue, direct democracy society. But direct democracy 
cannot work if people are not educated and well prepared in a certain question. The 
risk of random beliefs is too great. Instead, you will need a certificate evaluated via 
the educational system to grant you the right to vote on a certain issue.
5.3.9 Education on demand customized to each student’s needs
The notion of basic education that should be available to everyone is gone. This 
is not because it cannot be made available, but because it is considered irrel-
evant to spend too much time on “basic” knowledge. Students learn by identify-
ing problems and dissecting them into facts and solutions. Subjects are handled 
increasingly simultaneously: languages and technology, mathematics and biol-
ogy. Often we use the different perspectives in all sciences at once when looking 
at a single issue. A student can choose subjects freely since education is more 
about problem-solving than learning a certain foundation of facts. In this scenario, 
research has shown that previous categorization of sciences is irrelevant and even 
counteracts the ability to solve problems creatively. Students no longer become 
engineers, economists, journalists, biologists, or humanists. They are a mix of all 
these things, but focused on a specific topic or issue to solve.
5.3.10 Gig teachers are the new influencers
Teachers work sometimes by and for themselves, sometimes in loose networks. 
They take on the same role as today’s influencers, building up their reputation 
online, combining digitalized preproduced content with live-streaming and inter-
active learning platforms. Some teachers may act in a national arena, but oth-
ers are global with world-class content and a pedagogic approach. We will have 
“super-teachers” with millions of followers but also specialized “micro-teachers” 
with thousands of super-relevant and loyal followers.
5.3.11 Security as a service
In this scenario, everything comes as a service. Consumers do not buy food, they 
buy the service never to have an empty fridge. Consumers do not buy a vacuum 
cleaner, they buy a clean house service. To meet the demand for all services, home 
delivery during times when consumers are not home will be necessary. Inside 
monitoring with smart locks and alarms provides trust to the product-as-a-service-
system. Companies enter into partnerships with security companies to be able 
to enter people’s homes. Security companies also provide rigorous back ground 
checks for all employees to improve trust. Employment will be rendered impos-
sible unless you share your data with these firms. To experience freedom in this 
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gig economy society, you will be forced to give up your right to privacy. Security 
firms also partner with the health care sector to get access to the widely advanced 
security system.
5.4  Efficiency game
5.4.1 Time is a scarce resource
Getting the most out of every minute is of key importance in this scenario. We 
are struggling to keep our lives together, and we look for easy solutions in every 
situation. In reality, we do not have that little time, but our experience is that we 
are victims of technology and a society driving our lives. We spend enormous 
amounts of time in the digital world, either to socialize, consume media, work, or 
just make sure we are up to date with the world. We are obsessed with optimizing 
everything we do – and end up being quite inefficient.
5.4.2 The welfare state as we know it is dead
The Swedish welfare state has met competition from global commercial players 
and citizens choose to use services that are produced efficiently and meet their 
own demands reasonably well. Welfare is common goods, and the overall distri-
bution of welfare in the world has evened out. Economies of scale have hit the 
welfare sector through commercial players. Common diseases, learning difficul-
ties, or problems shared by many are easily handled or even programmed away. 
Abnormalities are harder to handle and are constantly met with lower priority. The 
state has a weak position, and the citizens do not care or consider whether there 
is a difference between the public sector and the private sector. To them, the part 
meeting their need most efficiently is the one they choose. The concept of offering 
welfare services to ensure the same service to all citizens is out of date.
5.4.3 Global commercial actors within welfare
Amazon opens hospitals worldwide, and to many people this is their first “go-to” 
whenever they feel sick or need some health advice or a very specialized surgery 
performed by the most intelligent robot available. Facebook is a major security 
player and has moved far beyond being the place to sign off as “safe” in terror 
attacks to taking care of one’s whole security needs, irrespective of location – at 
home, at work, in school, en route, or in any other circumstance. Google has taken 
over education all over the world, and we now have a world standard for require-
ments at each educational level.
5.4.4 Efficiency over customization
Efficiency is king. Too much customization is costly, and it is simply not worth 
it. Citizens do not want to pay extra to get a personal treatment, individualized 
service, or anything that disturbs the automated efficiency game.
Future consumption of welfare services 271
5.4.5 The Amazon clinic
Hospitals by Amazon are available worldwide and are more common when you 
feel sick than primary health care institutions offered by the state. Amazon is 
more efficient and provides both digital health care advice and more complex 
operations in a physical space. Since Amazon has extreme amounts of data, it is 
able to forecast variations and predict times when citizens normally get sick, and 
make plans accordingly. It is also possible to receive your medicines at the door, 
in the same package as your other orders at Amazon. Efficiency is the keyword 
for health care in Sweden in this scenario, and hence citizens would rather go to 
Amazon than the few primary health care institutions that are still struggling to 
survive.
5.4.6 Global platforms teach global citizens
Schools no longer have national borders. The number of locally adjusted sub-
jects is as limited as the number of truly local shops in big cities today. “The 
big chains” – in this case, the digital platforms with large volumes of data and 
knowledge, have taken over schooling and turned it into a lifelong commitment 
combining work and studies from an early age and lasting all life through. The 
global platforms will know what kind of capabilities will be important to develop, 
and they will steer students’ choices in that direction.
5.4.7 Blurring the border between education and work
Digital giants do not consider the difference between education and work the 
same way as the national state and private companies used to. They utilize student 
projects for research, to collect data and gain insights. They give students assign-
ments that improve their own or others’ services. For this, they charge clients 
and incentivize students – increasing the efficiency in the educational system. 
Students are no longer a burden to society for 15–20 years of schooling. This 
development is met by resistance and fear for students being duped into playing 
the giants’ game, losing their own individual choice and potential to find their 
passion in life. Given the vast educational possibilities and the lucrative system 
of getting through school with no or low student loans – with a promise to have 
chosen a future-proofed career, the resistance weakens and leaves room for this 
development to flourish.
5.4.8 Real-time evaluation of student performance
Digital players will base all education on their core capability – digitalization of 
all processes with a strong data-driven, student-centric approach. Students are 
evaluated in real time while they are passing on to new levels in the educational 
platform. The ability to answer questions and solve problems is registered, as well 
as their facial expressions to adjust to the student’s level of competence. Gamifi-
cation is widely used to keep students’ interest, to encourage them to move on to 
higher levels and more knowledge.
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5.4.9 Big brother is always watching
“Big brother is watching you” is definitely present in this scenario. Everyone has 
the ability to know where you are at any given time. You may choose to “switch 
off” at certain times – but your everyday mode is fully connected and surveyed. 
Your personal security clearance automatically grants or denies access to different 
functions in society. The clearance is based on your personal data that you provide 
to large corporations in order to benefit from some of these functions even if you 
are rejected at other important institutions. Due to the continuous surveillance 
of our society, real-time updates are available for the big platforms, and we will 
know as soon as something happens as to which areas are unsafe. This enables 
you to navigate as a lone pedestrian almost as safely as in a car during the night. 
The widely implemented security systems in our cities may also alert or prevent 
us from entering certain areas in case of danger, or if you, based on behavior and 
historical data, are predicted to cause a danger to others within that area. Risky 
behavior is surveyed and “punished” by demoting you to lower access to services, 
support, and protection, as well as higher costs for you as an individual in society.
6 Analytical summary
We can already today see clear patterns emerging in our society that support the 
development in all four scenarios described in this chapter, although they are not 
yet developed all the way. The interviewees and workshop attendees all had dif-
ferent opinions on where we are today and where we should be heading. This is 
the strength of the scenario methodology since it encompasses different perspec-
tives and still forces the participant to consider other aspects than their own point 
of view. It is our hope that these scenarios can be used for a further discussion to 
clarify what the choices our society makes – or does not make – will lead to in the 
long run. It is by analyzing the consequences and considering the vastly different 
outcomes that we can distinguish which decisions we make today will carry the 
most impact on tomorrow.
6.1 Discussion
Looking at Figure 15.1 presented in Section 5, the left side of the scenario cross 
requires stronger driving forces, such as a severely detrimental climate change 
and its subsequent consequences, in addition to significant data misuse and data 
intrusions. Politicians, scientists, and businesspeople strongly disagree on the 
impact and the possible outcomes of these events. Data are used either to prove 
or rebut climate change, but most of all the global discussion is characterized by 
opinions and prioritization of other objectives such as maximizing profits and 
sticking to current business models, ways of working, and value chains. Having 
said that, consumers are beginning to speak out and use their consumer power to 
promote companies that take substantial responsibility in society. The challenge is 
multifaceted; we have created strong habits in our consumption patterns, and even 
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if certain citizens are willing to change in theory, the supply is in many cases not 
there, or not enough. Every day we are using environmentally unfriendly means of 
transportation; frivolously using antibiotics that, in the long run, may cause anti-
biotic resistance; or buying clothing produced in a questionable work environment – 
and we may not even realize which choice could be better than the other. It is 
challenging to know what characterizes a “good choice” – when taking into 
account a much more complex view of the whole ecosystem of a society. Transpar-
ency, data collection, and measurements will be crucial to gain confidence among 
citizens and consumers, but also to make the right investments and drive change 
toward a more sustainable society and economy. There is a huge opportunity in 
closing this awareness and competence gap, where politicians, businesspeople, 
and consumers all can contribute better if there is trust and a common perspective.
Digitalization is a major contributor to enabling and empowering a sustainable 
change. Today we can collect data and distribute them on a massive scale. His-
torically, both politicians and companies have been able to filter data and adjust 
them to fit their own agenda – showing the good parts and holding back the more 
uncomfortable parts. Media and journalists have had a mission to uncover miscon-
ceptions or inaccuracies, but the lack of transparency has certainly hidden many 
faults. The digital transformation that we have seen in the private sector is lagging 
in the public sector, most certainly due to lower pressure to change. However, 
citizens are consumers and have gotten used to much more user friendly, auto-
mated, data driven, and innovative ways to meet their needs. This, in combination 
with an increased demand for services that are sustainable, with care for efficient 
utilization of resources, will force the public sector into a more dramatic digital 
transformation than we have seen until now. It will not be justifiable not to con-
sider the opportunities and improvements that digitalization brings about when 
strategically implemented. Digitalization should be viewed as the most important 
area to improve and to build capabilities and knowledge among all employees in 
the public sector – to build a more sustainable society.
We have looked specifically into the three areas: health care, education, and 
security. We have analyzed the consequences on these areas if larger platforms 
such as Apple, Amazon, Alibaba, Google, Facebook, or Tencent (and similar new-
comers with an ecosystem approach) increase their control and power. Then, we 
analyzed how these areas would develop if instead more niched players, focusing 
on solving specific needs, would gain market share. These niched players could 
either be serving a global market or a local market (solutions like Swish, a digital 
solution for instant money transfer via the mobile phone). In this category, we 
could count the whole public sector, which today is mainly focused on serving the 
national or local society, with the exceptions of some larger hospitals, universities, 
and colleges collaborating on a global basis.
All the mentioned types of players will most certainly have changed their posi-
tions significantly by 2030, and new players will have entered the market. The old 
generation of digital players will face transformation needs due to new legisla-
tion, new opportunities, new business models introduced by new entrants, and 
changing customer demands. In the scenarios, we have discussed the blurring 
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borders between the private and public sector, and the lower part of the scenario 
cross in Figure 15.1 brings about further globalization and specialization of both 
schooling and health care whether it is due to stiff competition, citizen demands 
for efficiency, citizens feeling pressured for time – or simply due to a significantly 
increased overall pressure to become more sustainable. In both these scenarios, 
the public sector of today has become more specialized in handling specific citi-
zen needs, such as unusual diseases, children and youth with special needs, or 
just citizens in general who crave more specialized attention. Needs that are fre-
quently occurring and where large volumes of people need to be addressed, such 
as the flu, common types of cancer, or basic education, will be handled on a mass 
scale by large global actors. They will be able to efficiently meet a global demand, 
making only some local adjustments. This, in turn, will be possible through digi-
talization and AI.
In the two upper scenarios, the public sector can choose to take a niched role 
focusing on storing and distributing citizen data in a trustworthy way and being 
the best solution to preserving individual integrity and taking responsibility for 
ethical handling of data. The other option is that the public sector becomes a part 
of an increasingly commercialized society, where profitability governs, while the 
public sector is there to preserve regional or provincial services and ensure that 
schools, health care, and security systems are available even in locations where 
they are not profitable for a commercial actor.
6.2 Conclusion
We believe that to build a robust future-proof welfare system, we need to inves-
tigate the future and understand future citizen demands as well as the technology 
development enabling new ways to meet those needs. The scenarios describe very 
different outcomes for welfare services and roles for the Swedish state to take. 
While the scenarios will most likely co-exist, it becomes apparent that certain 
strategic choices must be made to ensure modernization of the current welfare 
system in Sweden. Citizen demands are changing, and the private sector is con-
tinuously increasing our expectations. Global digital players as well as niched 
startups will meet customer demands, ignoring the border between the private and 
public sector whenever and wherever that is possible. This is not a threat, it is a 
great opportunity to redefine the public sector and redistribute resources to areas 
where they have the best impact.
We are at a crossroads in terms of formulating and deciding on a vision and 
a strategy for the next level of citizen-centric, data-driven, digitalized welfare 
system based on future demands rather than on historic legacy. It is a great step 
forward for Sweden that the country now has an appointed Chief Digitalization 
Officer tasked to drive this transformation. Just as the private sector has experi-
enced significant disruption, this will happen in the public sector, too. The chal-
lenge is to be part of the disruption, by anticipating and contributing to it. This 
takes an understanding of what new technology can do and a way to connect 
that knowledge to an overall strategic agenda of a modern welfare state, while 
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maintaining a strong focus on the citizens’ needs and experience. To this end, the 
use of digitalization has an immense potential to improve our future society by 
building a sustainable society.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto published on the Internet the paper “Bitcoin: A peer-
to-peer electronic cash system” that introduced one of the most secure protocols 
in the open web (Nakamoto, 2008). The protocol, termed blockchain, distributes 
the point of failure across a network of different nodes, which are devices con-
nected to the network, and provides the nodes with incentives to keep the system 
secure. As of 2019, Bitcoin has reached a market capitalization of USD62 bil-
lion with over 200,000 transactions per day without a single hacking incident of 
the underlying technology (Blockchain.com, 2019; CoinMarketCap, 2019). The 
blockchain protocol has also been used by a large number of entrepreneurs and 
traditional incumbents, such as governments and global financial institutions, to 
provide secure processes in the digital world. As a result, the blockchain industry 
has grown at an outstanding pace in the past two years. As we can see in Fig-
ure 16.1, both traditional investors, such as venture capitalists and angel inves-
tors, and crypto-enthusiasts have invested large amounts of money through equity 
funding rounds and initial coin offerings (ICOs), which are a new type of fund-
raising system enabled by blockchain (CB Insights, 2018; Coinschedule, 2018).
Figure 16.1 illustrates the recent growth of blockchain technology through 
recent investments. Equity funding investments were obtained from CBInsights 
(2018), and ICO amounts were obtained from Coinschedule (2018).
The recent growth motivates us to investigate the potential impact of blockchain 
on institutions. Keeping this goal in mind, we first provide a brief explanation of 
blockchain, followed by how it relates to the emergence of trust in institutions. 
We then discuss three case scenarios in which blockchain can be applied to reduce 
certain institutional inefficiencies. Finally, we venture into a discussion of the 
conceivable benefits of a nation implementing blockchain technology.
1.1 A brief explanation of blockchain
Blockchain is, above all, a security protocol that provides an irreversible proof of 
a transaction conducted on a digital network. The network is governed by nodes 
that decide to approve a state transition based on predefined rules. In the case of 
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digital currencies, the network decides to approve a transaction by looking at the 
sender’s transaction history. For instance, if Bob1 wants to send 5 BTC to another 
party, the network reviews the amount of BTC sent and received over Bob’s life-
cycle. If Bob received 10 BTC and only spent 5 BTC, the network approves it. If 
Bob received 8 BTC and spent 5 BTC, the network rejects it.
Another application of blockchain technology is smart contracts. With a smart 
contract, two or more parties agree on a series of predefined rules, which can be 
anything explicitly written in code, and the network approves the state transition 
depending on whether those predefined rules have been fulfilled. For instance, 
if Bob wants to buy a USD500 computer from Alice for delivery by UPS, they 
would both agree on defining a smart contract that has the following steps:2
1 A contract account is created.
2 Bob sends USD500 to the contract account.
3 Alice sends the UPS tracking number to the contract account.
4 If:
a UPS uploads in its tracking system that Bob has received the goods,
i The contract account releases the money to Alice.
b UPS does not upload in their tracking system that Bob has received the 
goods,
i  The contract account releases the money back to Bob or, if Alice disputes 
it, a predefined court of preference decides where the money goes.3
Each step of the contract is completed after the majority of nodes approve that the 
condition is fulfilled. For instance, if Alice does not send a UPS tracking number 
or Bob does not receive the computer, the money will never be released to Alice. 

















Figure 16.1 Blockchain investments
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instead of being performed through a trusted central party (e.g., a financial firm) 
in exchange for a small fee.
Blockchains can be divided into two types: private and public blockchains:
• Private blockchains have a finite set of trusted private nodes. Security is 
based on the private nodes not colluding to change the system as well as the 
difficulty of hacking the majority of them simultaneously.
• Public blockchains have a potentially infinite set of nontrusted public nodes 
that are motivated through a set of incentives. For example, public nodes 
have the option to “mine” blocks in exchange for cryptocurrencies. The cryp-
tocurrencies that the miners receive can be either created by increasing the 
money supply or provided by the sender as transaction fees.
With the blockchain, and particularly smart contracts, code is “law” and anything 
that can be written in explicit code is possible (Moreno Puertas and Teigland, 
2018). The resulting security that arises from distributing the decision-making 
process, which approves or rejects a state transition, is thus the most important 
feature of blockchain.
Although blockchain seems new, the protocol is based on the same principle 
that generated credible governments in the late 17th century – that of the distribu-
tion of power, which we discuss below.
1.2 The emergence of trust in political institutions
In the early 17th century, the world was heavily reliant on centralized powers. 
Spain and France, the main superpowers, were governed by absolute monarchs, 
and both countries aimed to impose a strict Catholic regime around the world. 
Nevertheless, Britain was becoming increasingly aligned with the Protestant 
reform, which resulted in the Anglo-Spanish war (1585–1604).
Soon after the Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588, Britain decided to further 
sponsor its mercantile operations across the world in order to ensure survival. The 
expansion was eventually successful and resulted in the bourgeoisie class gaining 
economic power (Motley, 1892; Simon, 2017; Ulm, 2004).
In the 17th century, Britain was involved in numerous wars, and its expendi-
tures far exceeded its revenues. In order to keep financing its government, the 
Crown had to negotiate new sources of revenues, such as custom taxes and “forced 
loans,” with the bourgeoisie class represented in the Parliament. In exchange for 
money, the Parliament requested the king to respect private property rights and 
cease monopolistic practices. However, the king had a tendency not to honor his 
promises and dissolve the Parliament if needed. Consequently, the emergent bour-
geoisie class united to defeat the king. Over the century, through a series of civil 
wars culminating in the Glorious Revolution (1688), the bourgeoisie was able to 
establish politically aligned institutions (North and Weingast, 1989).
The new political institutions, as represented in the Parliament and independent 
courts, consisted of a diverse group of people. The distribution of power ensured 
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that no group had too much power, thereby generating stability, as Douglass C. 
North, a 1993 co-recipient of the Nobel prize in economics, and Barry R. Wein-
stein (1989, p. 818) stated in the following:
The new constitutional settlement endowed several actors with veto power, 
and thus created the beginnings of a division or separation of powers. Sup-
plying private benefits at public expense now required the cooperation of the 
Crown, Parliament, and the court. . . . The institutional and political changes 
significantly raised the predictability of the government . . . [and] the govern-
ment’s ability to tap the resources of society increased.
As a result, the British government established credible property rights, became 
financially solvent, and increased borrowing to unprecedented levels. For 
instance, from 1630 to 1688, the British government ran on average a total 
debt (obtained mostly through forced loans) of GBP1 million and had multiple 
defaults. In 1697, nine years after the Glorious Revolution, the British govern-
ment raised its debt to GBP16.7 million (40 percent of GNP) without a signifi-
cant increase in inflation. The ability to raise government debt allowed Britain to 
obtain enough resources to fight France in the Nine Years’ War (1689–1697) and 
emerge as a superpower. Furthermore, with an independent judicial system and 
a strong parliament, the bourgeoisie class not only started to trust the govern-
ment but also perpetuated the development of private debt markets (North and 
Weingast, 1989). Credit started to take a greater role in the economy as borrow-
ers were able to put their guaranteed assets as collateral and lenders trusted their 
ability to claim them without government intermediation. Consequently, Britain 
experienced a financial revolution and a booming economy, acquiring global 
hegemony.
The distribution of power, which shifted the necessary trust from the king (cen-
tral party) to the system (distributed parties) played a key role in this transition, 
as it enabled the British government to make credible promises, raise substantial 
amounts of debt, and develop its capital markets (North and Weingast, 1989). 
Today, almost every developed nation has implemented a similar system in order 
to foster economic growth and financial markets.
Blockchain is the enlargement of the already developed system present in mod-
ern economies to the open web. Blockchain brings different stakeholders into the 
equation and shifts trust from the centralized party to the distributed system. The 
protocol emerged as a solution to a series of failed attempts to create a new digital 
currency. Bitcoin, the first successful cryptocurrency, manages to stay resilient 
by providing incentives to users to participate in the decision-making process 
(Georgios, 2017). Today, the blockchain industry has evolved with many different 
types of governance, and the common denominator among them is, similarly to 
developed institutions, a distribution of power.
In the next sections, we are interested in how blockchain can diminish insti-
tutional inefficiencies that arise from centralized political elites. Nonetheless, in 
order to understand its potential impact, we must first understand why certain 
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political elites are reluctant to distribute their power given its economic advan-
tages and the consequences of a centralized government.
2 Centralization of power
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) argue that conflict of interest among 
various interest groups is the main cause that prevents central governments from 
implementing institutions that promote economic growth. Although a plausible 
solution to this is to negotiate the distribution of benefits among different groups 
(see Acemoglu’s (2003) discussion on the political Coase theorem), the centrali-
zation of power incentivizes the political elites to choose institutions that satisfy 
their self-interests and do not constrain their future actions. Consequently, the 
decisions made by the government are not binding. This lack of commitment pre-
vents groups from engaging in effective bargaining, thereby inhibiting improve-
ments to the overall well-being of the country’s citizens. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2005) discuss two main commitment problems: 1) political losers and 
2) hold-ups.
2.1 Political losers
In many countries with centralized governments, the political elite obtains rents, 
incomes, and privileges through their power. For that reason, they evaluate every 
potential change based on its political consequences. This prevents them from 
promoting institutions that provide power to other groups, regardless of potential 
economic benefits. As we saw above in the financial revolution, Britain’s support 
for mercantile expansion ended eventually with a ruling bourgeois class (North 
and Weingast, 1989).
This was also seen during the industrial revolution. As workers started to organ-
ize and demand rights in Britain, political elites in nearby countries, such as Russia 
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, opposed building railways to prevent similar 
potential tumults. It was only after certain military defeats that they decided to 
engage in full-scale industrialization (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005).
2.2 Hold-ups
In hold-ups, there are two groups: the political elite and the investor who has no 
political power. The investor offers the political elite to make an investment in 
exchange for future returns.
• In ex-ante negotiations, both parties have bargaining power and are incentiv-
ized to cooperate. The political elite gains from the investment and the inves-
tor gains from the future returns.
• However, in ex-post negotiations, only the political elite has bargaining 
power. The investor has already made a sunk investment and depends on the 
political elite to enforce property rights and provide them with the returns.
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This problem has occurred many times throughout history. It is important to notice, 
as we explained in the financial revolution, that it was only after the merchant 
class obtained enough power that they were able to challenge the king and protect 
property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; North and Weingast, 
1989). Furthermore, on many occasions, countries experience regime changes 
and the new political elites are not incentivized to honor any previous deals.
Except in rare cases of benevolent dictators, the distribution of power has thus 
been essential to promote the right economic institutions through effective bar-
gaining. For that reason, a large part of the world, in which power tends to be 
concentrated, suffers from not having the desirable institutions, thereby depriving 
it of investment and long-term planning.
Nevertheless, with the emergence of the Internet, the world is becoming more 
digitalized and interconnected. Consequently, new opportunities are emerging to 
provide people from distant places with the right instruments to blossom in an 
ever-increasing digital world. Blockchain, with its security, is able to fill some of 
the gaps that arise from centralized governments by taking advantage of a global 
network to provide value-related services.
3 The trust revolution
In this section, we will focus on blockchain’s potential to preserve private prop-
erty and diminish the inefficiencies that arise from centralized political elites. We 
have divided this section into three parts: 1) digital currencies, 2) contracts and 
digital courts, and 3) tangible property rights.
3.1 Digital currencies
One of the main functions of a government is to establish a credible monetary 
system that enables its citizens to exchange goods and services. In most developed 
countries, the government sets up an independent central bank that is in charge of 
the money supply, thereby ensuring relatively stable exchange rates and price lev-
els (e.g., EUR, USD) and, sometimes, other objectives such as high employment 
(e.g., USA). The central bank’s independence is necessary in order to prevent 
governments from using their power to satisfy their short-term self-interests at the 
expense of their citizens’ well-being.
However, in many less-developed countries with centralized power, the gov-
ernment has significant influence on the central bank, which results in a hold-up 
problem. In ex-ante negotiations, centralized governments promise to have the 
right monetary policies to encourage investments. However, once investments are 
made, the political elite has the power to print more money than expected in order 
to fund expenses and decrease debt.
This results in large price fluctuations and uncertainty that prevents households 
and firms from accurately forecasting future outcomes, such as cash payments 
(Poole and Wheelock, 2008; Barnes, Boyd and Smith, 1999; Tommasi, 1994). 
Furthermore, on many occasions, governments peg their national currencies at 
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unrealistic fixed exchange rates, further hindering trade with other countries. As 
a result, black markets emerge for other stable currencies, which citizens buy at a 
premium (Investopedia, 2013).
Digital currencies transmitted through the blockchain have the potential to pro-
vide citizens with the opportunity to avoid the drawbacks from unreliable central 
banks. In this area “stablecoins,” which are considered the “holy grail of crypto-
currencies,” are of particular use. Stablecoins can be divided into two different 
types:
• Those that represent stable assets stored in a private location, for example, 
Tether (USD), DigiX (gold)
• Those that use a set of incentives to ensure price stability, for example, Maker 
and Havven
Stablecoins allow citizens to have easier access to parallel currency markets 
through the open web. For instance, lower-income countries receive large inflows 
of USD and EUR through remittances. These remittances tend to be expensive 
(on average a 7.13 percent transaction fee) and are converted through the official 
exchange rate, which reduces substantially the amount of money received (The 
World Bank Group, 2018; Beck and Martínez Pería, 2011). Eventually, it would 
be expected that parallel markets based on stablecoins would emerge to provide 
better mediums of exchange for local citizens. This would provide greater bar-
gaining power, as citizens would have an alternative option to inefficient mon-
etary policies.
3.2 Contracts and digital courts
An independent judicial system is essential to ensure that contracts, which are 
agreements between two or more parties, are enforced in accordance with the 
law (Merriam-Webster, 2018; Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2016). The founda-
tions for the independence of the judicial system were laid out after the Glori-
ous Revolution in 1688, which was discussed above with the financial revolution 
(Section 1.2). This system increased the level of cooperation in society, as people 
could rely on an independent judicial system to settle civil cases. This resulted in 
an economic boom, and other countries started to mimic the system. Today, most 
developed nations have a relatively independent judicial system.
However, this is not the case for many lower-income countries. Although a 
strong independent court system provides clear economic benefits (Keefer and 
Knack, 1997), many countries with centralized power structures are reluctant to 
set independent judicial bodies. This is an example of the political loser problem 
described earlier (Section 2.2). Political elites perceive an independent judicial 
system as a potential threat to their power and decide to enact suboptimal institu-
tions to prevent it.
Blockchain has the potential to mitigate the problems that arise from dependent 
judicial systems through smart contracts. Smart contracts, as explained above, 
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are programmable contracts that are self-enforced through a distributed network. 
With a smart contract, different parties agree on a set of predefined rules and the 
global node community accepts or rejects the state transition based on whether the 
predefined requirements have been fulfilled.
Currently, entrepreneurs are launching platforms that enable digital courts and 
provide clauses in case of disagreement. Digital courts are decided by the play-
ers within the networks and, usually, based on reputation.4 For instance, in Sec-
tion 3.1, we explained the process of buying a computer through a smart contract. 
The fifth step contains an “else” function that allows, in the case of dispute, a 
court of preference to decide where the money will be moved. Once the court 
makes a decision, the global node community will move the digital currency to 
the desired destination.
In the blockchain world, digital courts are being promoted as parts of larger 
ecosystems that provide a digital landscape for individuals. Examples of such 
a system are 1) the Aragon Network and 2) Pangea. A brief explanation of both 
systems is included in the Appendix.
Smart contracts provide contract enforceability, and digital courts have rights 
over digital currencies. This diminishes, but does not eliminate, the need for a 
central party to supervise many commercial activities and enables cooperation 
among untrusted parties. Once again, the benefit of smart contracts and digital 
courts is that they provide alternatives to inefficient institutions. Unreliable courts 
prevent cooperation among untrusted parties, as they fear unjust verdicts in case 
of disputes. In the blockchain world, people can be assured that a contract will 
not be enacted if certain conditions have not been fulfilled and that any dispute 
will be solved in a digital court, which incentivizes cooperation among untrusted 
parties. For example, funds will not be moved unless the contract conditions are 
fulfilled, and, in the case of disputes, the funds will be dependent on the digital 
court’s decision.
3.3 Tangible property rights
Property rights, which are a shared belief, have played a prominent role in 
the development of human civilization by promoting cooperation among 
humans. Nonetheless, for the vast majority of human history, this shared 
belief depended on a central party, which resulted in high volatility as the 
self-interests of the central party shifted over time. For instance, in medieval 
times, kings secured property rights for their people on many occasions but 
then later expropriated property if needed without a valid reason in the eyes 
of the common people (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). The result-
ing volatility harmed cooperation, as people were never fully guaranteed that 
their property belonged to them. Only after a system of checks and balances 
was implemented, in which every decision required the approval of different 
independent bodies, did the financial industry emerge (North and Weingast, 
1989). This system originated in the Netherlands and Britain and expanded 
across the current developed world.
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Yet, in countries with centralized power, the political elite still decides what can 
be expropriated. The resulting outcome is a hold-up problem. In the ex-ante situa-
tion, political institutions promise private property rights to encourage investment 
and stability. However, in the ex-post position, they have the ultimate power to 
expropriate assets when needed. This potential lack of commitment is accounted 
by investors and reduces their incentive to invest.
The blockchain may help to mitigate these problems by ensuring an adequate 
recording of every movement in a common distributed ledger. In the ex-ante situ-
ation, when both parties have bargaining power, the investor can require the use of 
blockchain technology in order to make an irreversible proof of every state move-
ment, from any communication to payments. In the ex-post state, the centralized 
power will still have the power to expropriate, but the victim has an irreversible 
proof of every step conducted beforehand. This increases the likelihood of the 
victim recuperating their assets, as they have enough evidence to claim them in 
international courts or in future stable regimes.
However, the potential effect of blockchain technology on tangible property 
rights is not as high as in digital currencies and smart contracts. The reason is that 
tangible products, such as houses, cannot be physically moved through the open 
web, and their protection still relies on the government. Nonetheless, in the long 
term, the blockchain may help to reduce the incentives from central governments 
to expropriate, as they will always be accountable for their behavior.
4  The hypothetical blockchain nation: going back to  
first principles
In the previous sections, we have discussed the potential benefits of blockchain 
technology for currencies, contracts, and property rights. Each of these concepts 
is actually imaginary, or rather, an abstract idea provided by institutions to pro-
mote cooperation among ourselves (Soto, 2000).
• Currencies were created as an abstract medium of exchange that, compared 
to bartering, enhanced trade. Over time, currencies evolved from mint coins 
to bank notes to further increase the exchange of goods and services.
• Contracts originated as a set of promises and responsibilities attested by a 
group of witnesses. The enforcement of the contract tended to depend on 
centralized figures of power until the late 17th century, when courts started to 
become increasingly independent.
• Property rights were created as a framework to allocate resources. For most 
parts of human history, their allocation depended on the entities that had 
political power. In the late 17th century, property rights evolved into fully 
guaranteed rights. The ability of citizens to exercise those rights enabled the 
development of the financial industry and long periods of economic growth.
Each of those abstract ideas requires trust in order to function properly. To main-
tain trust, governments have distributed power among a diverse group, ensuring 
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that no person or entity has enough power to modify the pre-established concept 
(e.g., currencies, contracts, property rights). The resulting trust has allowed citi-
zens to convert fixed assets into abstract forms and transact them at a low cost. 
For example, we can observe this abstraction when a company raises equity in 
exchange for US dollars:
• US dollars are an abstract concept that depends on an independent central 
bank, whose chairman is chosen by the president (executive power) and con-
firmed by the Senate (legislative power).
• The process of raising equity is done through a contract that is based on cur-
rent laws (legislative power), which are enforced by the president (executive 
power) and in cases of dispute, judged by the courts (judicial power).
• The outcome, a stock, is a type of property right, which is protected by the 
executive, legislative power, and judicial power.
As we can see, each abstract concept depends on an agreement by a diverse group 
of people. Today, the total value of all stocks in all companies globally amounts 
to around USD80 trillion. These assets in their abstract form are constantly trans-
acted in an imaginary financial world, which offers low transaction costs and 
results in an efficient allocation of capital.
This distribution of power, which guarantees trust, is also the basis of blockchain 
technology. Nonetheless, the abstract concept does not need to fully depend on the 
trust provided by an institution, which may or may not decide to distribute power, 
but on the trust provided by a global distributed network through the open web.
Having the aforementioned government services, relying on the open web can 
substantially diminish transaction and information costs, potentially resulting in 
another financial revolution. This would have an even greater impact in the devel-
oping world, as institutions have not yet managed to provide the trust needed to 
fully benefit from abstracting assets.
We can already see this disruption through the rise of initial coin offerings. 
Although studies have shown that more than 80 percent of ICOs are scams (Kelso, 
2018), they have provided a clear medium of exchange between an abstract idea, 
usually represented in the form of a whitepaper, and an abstract digital currency. 
Since 2017, ICOs overtook venture capital funding, which is the traditional 
method for exchanging currencies for ideas, to blockchain startups by over 3.5 
times, from USD1.3 billion to USD4.5 billion, respectively (Rowley, 2018). One 
of the main reasons behind this disruption is that digital currencies allow any per-
son from anywhere to invest in an idea presented in the open web.
We can imagine a similar disruption occurring in the developing world if a 
government, or an independent society, decides to fully implement blockchain 
technology. For instance, imagine a hypothetical nation called SatoshiLand. 
SatoshiLand has implemented blockchain from the ground up:
• Every property is registered in the public ledger.
• Every property and currency movement needs to be accepted by the global 
set of nodes and is published in the public ledger.
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• Smart contracts regulate most contractual relations between different parties 
and have clauses that, in case of disagreements, allow a digital court chosen 
by the network to resolve the disputes based on available data.
SatoshiLand would provide international investors an irreversible proof of every 
transaction conducted. This would substantially reduce scams, given the recent suc-
cess of behavioral analysis in fraud prevention. A firm may be able to bribe an 
auditor, but it is unlikely that it can mimic the behavior of a business, in terms of 
transactions and properties, over many years. Investors would also be able to trans-
fer funds almost instantly from anywhere and monitor how the firm uses their funds.
For example, suppose that an imaginary firm in SatoshiLand wants to raise 
money from an international lender to increase its shoe production. In the current 
world, the lender would charge a high premium, as it experiences information 
asymmetries and mistrusts the local legal system. In SatoshiLand, the international 
lender would have access to the inflows and outflows of the company over the past 
years. This information could not be forged and would be extremely expensive to 
mimic. Furthermore, the investor could arrange a contractual agreement through 
the blockchain that specifies how the money is spent and adds clauses in case of 
dispute, which would allow a digital court to redistribute the remaining digital 
currency if the borrower is at fault. The result would be 1) a lower risk rate and 
2) a larger supply of funds through the international sphere. Overall, international 
lenders would be able to accurately forecast risk and improve substantially the 
efficient allocation of capital, which would result in higher economic growth.
Furthermore, citizens would be able to engage in global savings schemes due to 
the free flow of capital. Economic literature emphasizes how people can maximize 
their utility by smoothing their consumption over their life cycle using financial 
instruments. Yet, a large portion of the world does not have access to these finan-
cial instruments. If they experience unexpected events, they have to reduce their 
consumption or rely on informal high interest rate networks (Kast and Pomeranz, 
2014). Kast and Pomeranz (2014) showed that access to formal savings reduces 
substantially reliance on informal credit networks, thereby improving the welfare 
of the poor. With stable digital currencies, lower-income people would be able 
to access international saving schemes through the open web and increase their 
consumption smoothing. This enables them to be self-insured regardless of local 
government policies.
Finally, diminishing information asymmetries could also reduce government 
fraud and increase government efficiency. Several studies have shown that people 
are reluctant to pay higher taxes when their governments cannot be held account-
able (Glaser and Hildreth, 1999; Ortega, Ronconi and Sanguinetti, 2016). This 
means that people who may want more government services are voting for budget 
reductions due to a lack of trust. In SatoshiLand, since every government expendi-
ture post has a digital trace accessible in the open web, citizens would be able to 
audit their governments and vote accordingly. In the long term, we would expect 
a more effective government that matches citizens’ preferences. Given that the 
willingness to pay taxes increases with government efficiency and accountability, 
we expect a greater role of the government under this potential scenario.
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Although the implementation of this type of digital nation seems far off, coun-
tries are already starting to use the blockchain for 1) registering properties and 
mortgage deeds, 2) increasing transparency, and 3) transacting digital currencies.
In our theoretical framework, the institutional spillovers arose from those 
nations that were able to adapt best to the emerging conditions. Blockchain tech-
nology enables a new type of irreversible digital trace that provides an unprec-
edented level of accurate information to both international investors and citizens. 
This would provide firms and citizens with access to international financial mar-
kets and governments with a greater source of revenues, potentially resulting in 
another financial revolution.
5 Conclusion
The distribution of power among a diverse group of people has formed the basis 
of credible governments and enables the emergence of financial markets. Block-
chain brings this distribution of power to the digital landscape and creates trust 
in the open web. The benefits from this newly developed trust are still unclear. 
However, we see a tremendous potential in the developing world, as it enables 
their citizens to 1) access international financial resources and 2) provide an irre-
versible digital trace of their actions, which substantially mitigates information 
asymmetries. Nonetheless, our model is still in its nascent stage and has not dis-
cussed potential drawbacks (e.g., privacy concern) or the possible solutions to 
those concerns (e.g., zero knowledge proof or the decentralizing privacy model). 
We encourage future work in those areas and an empirical approach to measure 
the outcome of blockchain projects in developing countries. Our objective is not 
to justify our theory but to bring it as a starting point to discuss the potential ben-
efit of blockchain technology in the institutional landscape.
Appendix
Aragon Network
The Aragon Network is a decentralized autonomous organization and a blockchain- 
based ecosystem where companies, investors, and entrepreneurs can securely 
transact and enforce smart contracts. The Aragon Network aims to provide a 
hybrid between smart contracts and real-world business applications using a 
decentralized court system called the Aragon Network Jurisdiction (ANJ). Any 
person with an Aragon token (ANT) can create a bond, which is a call for arbitra-
tion. The judges are drawn from a sample of people/entities who also posted a 
bond. If the person/entity selected decides to not participate, it will be penalized.
The selected judges will then look at ANJ and at organization-specific rules to 
state a verdict. If all the judges have a unanimous vote, they all receive back the 
bond, which was created in order to request an arbitration. If the vote is not unani-
mous, the verdict that had the most votes will be chosen. The judges that voted for 
the verdict that had the minority of votes will be penalized. This aims to create a 
dynamic judicial court that is based on incentives.
The agent, if not satisfied, can request an upgrade to a marketplace in which all 
judges can participate. Finally, if the user is still not satisfied, they can take the 
case to the “Supreme Court,” which is composed of nine judges chosen by the 
whole Aragon network.
If the judges feel that the user has not posted enough information to make a 
case, the judges have the right to dismiss it. However, if the user requests an 
upgrade and the case is then approved by a higher hierarchy, the low-tier judges 
will be penalized. This provides the incentive that 1) people spend time on giving 
a detailed and understandable case and 2) if judges decide to slack off, they will 
be penalized (Cuende and Izquierdo, 2017).
BitNation
BitNation is a global free market for governance services based on the Pangea 
Jurisdiction. The Pangea Jurisdiction is decentralized software that allows citizens 
to conduct peer-to-peer (P2P) arbitration and create nations. The whole system is 
based on irreversible reputation, which is gained through feedback similar to the 
Uber and Airbnb rating systems.
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Citizens are encouraged to develop smart contracts, reach agreements, and 
solve disputes through the Pangea Arbitration Token (PAT). The PAT contains 
both nontradable and tradable tokens.
Nontradable tokens serve to build reputation and are rewarded based on perfor-
mance metrics (rated by AI) and user satisfaction (rated by other humans). There 
are three types of nontradable tokens:
• POA (Proof of Agreement): Given to users and arbitrators based on perfor-
mance criteria with smart contract creation and execution.
• POC (Proof of Collective): Given to nations, user groups, and governance 
services based on users’ satisfaction with collective contract creation and 
execution.
• PON (Proof of Nomic): Given to contracts, laws, and legal codes based on 
user satisfaction.
Tradable tokens (PATs) serve to pay for 1) arbitrators, judges, and juries and to 2) 
timestamping and executing smart contracts. PATs are rewarded to founders and 
contributors (32 percent), external stakeholders through a token sale (34 percent), 
and those who maintain high reputation scores (34 percent). A total of 42 billion 
tokens will be released through different stages (Tempelhof et al., 2017).
Notes
 1 In reality, “Bob” is a public key.
 2 This process is simplified to provide a clear explanation of the protocol.
 3 Courts are a relatively new concept in the blockchain landscape. They are explained in 
detail in Section 3.2.
 4 In the appendix, we have included two blockchain platforms that exemplify how courts 
are composed.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly recognized that the Internet and digital technologies are bringing 
about a fundamental and sometimes disruptive change to businesses, society, and 
the lives of individuals (Kenney, Rouvinen and Zysman, 2015). The overall phe-
nomenon is often referred to as digitalization, whereas the process of effectively 
adapting to digitalization is called digital transformation.
This chapter aims at investigating the potential future of the nation-state in the 
context of change brought about by the Internet and digitalization. Will the nation-
state go through a process of digital transformation, altering its characteristics to 
be more in line with the conditions of a digitalized world and with the changed 
expectations of its citizens, maintaining their support? Or will it be completely 
disrupted and potentially replaced by some other organizational structure, better 
adapted to meet the future demands of people and organizations living together on 
our planet, in a world shaped by digital technologies?
2 Methods
The underlying theory that will be used in this chapter is a framework called the 
innovation loop, developed by the author, loosely inspired by evolutionary theo-
ries, mainly the concept of natural selection and the survival of the best adapted1 
by Charles Darwin, and the theory of how innovations diffuse, presented by Ever-
ett Rogers in his seminal work Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers, 1962).
The basic principle of the innovation loop (see Figure 17.1) is that evolution-
ary steps in the biological system can be compared to human inventions and that, 
in a generalized sense, the evolution not only of species but also of technology, 
businesses, and society can be seen as a result of natural selection and survival of 
the best adapted – be it organic beings, individuals, products, services, processes, 
organizations, or societal structures.
A natural phase of the loop to start looking at is the point of an invention. 
Although human inventions are mostly made through human thinking, while 
biological evolutionary steps occur through random variations such as muta-
tions, both are based on previous steps, and both, if favorable, diffuse gradually. 
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Biological evolutionary steps diffuse through inheritance and natural selection 
and human inventions through individuals’ varying tendency to adopt them, as 
described by Rogers with concepts such as early adopters, early majority, late 
majority, and laggards.
When a favorable evolutionary step or an invention reaches a certain level of 
diffusion, it starts changing the conditions for everything in the surrounding sys-
tem. This is most notable for larger evolutionary steps and larger inventions, with 
examples ranging from sexual reproduction and sight to the wheel, the printing 
press, the steam engine, and the Internet.
As a consequence, organic beings, individuals, and organizations will have to 
adapt to the new conditions, and those who are best adapted will be the most suc-
cessful. This is arguably also valid for products, services, and structures, which 
are being adapted by humans according to changed conditions. The adaptation 
process is similar in the biological system and in the innovation system, especially 
regarding behavioral adaptation, and it is effectively described through the con-
cept of natural selection.
One recent example could be a person adapting to the availability of an Internet 
connection, starting to write emails instead of letters and searching for informa-









Figure 17.1 The innovation loop
Source: Model by the author.
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It is worth noting the importance of diversity in the process of adaptation – the 
less diversity, the less variety of ways to adapt. Moreover, the less variety of ways 
to adapt, the higher the risk of weak points being shared by various, multiple enti-
ties in the system. This would in turn make the system, as a whole, more vulner-
able. To a certain extent this is also true for the diffusion phase, and altogether this 
is arguably the fundamental reason for striving for increased diversity of all sorts 
in all systems and in all situations since change and innovation occur continuously 
everywhere.
Once the initial adaptation process has been established, an extended form of 
adaptation takes place. This phase consists of various types of experimenting, for 
example, combining the initial invention or evolutionary step with others already 
existing in the system, or exploring opportunities to build inventions on top of the 
initial one. Humans do this through innovation, while nature uses random varia-
tions such as mutations. Since this phase leads to new inventions, it completes the 
cycle: innovation, changed conditions, and success of the best adapted.
An example of the last phase would be the combination of the Internet and of 
commerce, paving the way for E-commerce.
A few more observations can be made regarding the innovation loop:
• It’s not a serial process. Many loops are running in parallel, interacting with 
each other.
• The result of each cycle can be described as increased self-organization and 
increased efficiency. This can be better observed looking at a large time span, 
billions of years back. Early life started with single-celled prokaryotes that 
evolved into multicellular eukaryotes, then into plants and animals – animals 
through reptiles and mammals, into apes, eventually walking on two legs, 
gaining intelligence, and evolving into homo sapiens, inventing the spoken 
language, agriculture, the wheel, the written language, the printing press ena-
bling the scientific revolution, the steam engine enabling the industrial revo-
lution, electricity, telephone, radio, the Internet, the World Wide Web, the 
smartphone, and further inventions now being developed. Unless there is a 
divine power influencing this evolution, what we are looking at is one single 
self-organizing system. Although the smartphone should hardly be consid-
ered the “crown of creation,” efficiency is steadily increasing in the meaning 
that what can be achieved with a certain amount of energy, resources, and 
number of organic beings has never been more than today.
• The pace of change is constantly increasing, which can be concluded not-
ing the time span between early evolutionary steps, for example, about two 
billion years from eukaryotes to prokaryotes, and comparing it to the time 
span between recent major inventions, for example, about 17 years from the 
World Wide Web to the smartphone. Ray Kurzweil has proposed an explana-
tion for this increase in pace of change in his essay “The Law of Accelerat-
ing Returns,” where he argues that “Evolution applies positive feedback in 
that the more capable methods resulting from one stage of evolutionary pro-
gress are used to create the next stage. As a result, the rate of progress of an 
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evolutionary process increases exponentially over time. . . . Biological evo-
lution is one such evolutionary process. Technological evolution is another 
such evolutionary process” (Kurzweil, 2001, paras.11, 15, 16).
• The evolution described by the innovation loop will arguably continue, 
resulting in increased self-organization and increased efficiency at an ever-
increased pace of change until it potentially fails because of lost stability, for 
example, due to failure to balance available resources with consumption and 
recycling of resources.
The framework of the innovation loop will be used in this chapter to analyze the 
roots, the construction, and the development of the nation-state from the perspec-
tive of change brought about by inventions. Specifically, it analyzes the future 
evolution and the fate of the nation-state under the influence of the Internet and 
digital technologies – arguably the most important field of inventions of our time.
The invention-related analysis will be integrated with ideas and findings on the 
topic of the future of the nation-state presented in a number of articles and aca-
demic papers, and with opinions and ideas expressed in personal interviews with 
a series of people throughout April 2018 to May 2018.
3 Results and discussion
3.1  Definitions
Essential to this analysis is a definition of the nation-state. There is some common 
confusion about the use of the terms nation, state, nation-state, and nationalism. 
The definitions that will be used here are that nation is a cultural term referring to 
a body of people bound together by certain aspects that give them a sense of unity, 
making them feel that they have something in common and differ from other peo-
ple; state is a political term, referring to a body of people who live on a definite 
territory and are unified under a set of institutional forms of governance, which 
possess monopoly of coercive power and demand obedience from people; and the 
nation-state is a merger of the two terms, implying that politics and culture sup-
port each other (Lu and Liu, 2018).
It must be noted that although nation is a cultural term, what gives people a 
sense of unity does not have to be a common history and a culture derived from 
a common descent or ethnicity. The source of unity might also be democracy 
and a common political will where the members have equal rights. These two 
approaches are commonly called the ethnic approach and the civic approach 
(Hutchinson, 2003; Lu and Liu, 2018).
This is also why the nation-state is not immediately related to the concept of 
nationalism, which could be seen as a strong emphasis on the ethnic approach of 
the nation, often better explained by the term ethno-nationalism.
Also, the state can be related to the two approaches. The ethnic approach argues 
that people’s trust in the state derives from deeply rooted cultural values that are 
learned from an early age, leading to an interpersonal trust, which in its extended 
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form builds trust in the state. The civic approach, on the other hand, maintains 
that the trust in the state is built on the performance of political institutions (Lu 
and Liu, 2018).
3.2 Origins and development of the nation-state
Looking at the nation-state from the perspective of innovations, its early roots can 
be considered to go far back in human history. Spoken language – one of humans’ 
first and most important inventions, which is believed to have evolved between 
50,000 and 200,000 years ago – changed the conditions for human interaction by 
introducing the oral tradition. This is arguably an important base for human cul-
ture and thus for building culture-based communities, which in turn are a building 
block for the nation according to the ethnic approach.
The invention of agriculture from about 10,000 years ago brought people closer 
together in villages, and a reasonable adaptation might have been improved meth-
ods for defining property and for resolving disputes. Another communications 
technology, written language, which was invented about 5000 years ago, probably 
helped in that matter. This could be seen as the early roots of the state.
Going ahead in history, there are different opinions among scholars whether the 
nation was formed as a consequence of the state or the contrary.
Early forms of modern states from the 13th century and onward are by some 
considered to have been formed through war, where warfare contributed to an 
increasingly centralized administration in order to impose taxes and enforce 
order (Hutchinson, 2003). Centralized and more complex administration was also 
developed due to improvements in agriculture productivity, which made it possi-
ble to sustain larger populations. Inventions and discoveries in other areas such as 
political economy, mercantilism, and cartography further strengthened the state, 
all leading to people in nations being more united, thus indicating that the nation 
emerged as a result of the state.
On the other hand, inventions such as the printing press gave rise to increased 
literacy, strengthening of national languages, and sharing of common knowledge, 
tales and culture, while it also led to increased reliability of trade for example, 
through the spreading of knowledge of techniques like double-entry bookkeeping, 
all entailing an increased interconnection between people, potentially building a 
sense of unity, which in turn could support the state. This consequently suggests 
that the state was built on the nation (Anderson, 1991).
Regardless of whether the nation led to the state or the other way around, or 
a combination of both – which might seem reasonable – another observation 
remains: inventions in fields such as warfare, agriculture, printing, trade, and 
communications all changed the conditions for people and society. Consequently, 
people and society had to adapt to these changed conditions in ways that gradually 
strengthened both the nation and the state.
The merger of the two, that is, the nation and the state, and the subsequent 
establishment of the nation-state in its modern form, is commonly considered to 
be a result of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Schwartzwald, 2017). Until then, 
298 Mats Lewan
many different powers, religious as well as civic, had an overlapping authority 
on nations, territories, and populations. The essential outcome of the Peace of 
Westphalia was that states were guaranteed sovereignty over a nation, its territory, 
and its population, thus forming a nation-state, and that other states would refrain 
from interfering with internal affairs in neighboring territories, for example, by 
supporting foreign co-religionists in conflict with their states.
The resulting international system of independent and sovereign nation-states 
has been compared to billiard-ball interactions – an anarchical society of external 
interactions between states (Thompson and Hirst, 1995).
From an internal perspective, it did not matter in this system whether states were 
empires or based on homogenous nations or if they were autocratic or democratic. 
But again, inventions influenced the evolutions of states. It has been argued, for 
instance, that improved communications technology – roads, rail, and the steam 
engine – made it technically possible to bypass local leaders and impose direct 
rule as opposed to indirect rule, thus ending the age of empires (Hechter, 2001; 
Hutchinson, 2003). Reasonably, other communications technologies – printing, 
telegraph, telephone, and radio – over time reinforced this trend. Such technolo-
gies also supported the spreading of information and the evolution of democratic 
systems. And, in fact, democracy is often considered to have given legitimacy to 
the sovereign power of the state, replacing a sovereign autocrat or king, even-
tually including citizens and binding them together and thus strengthening the 
nation-state (Thompson and Hirst, 1995).
Representative governments could also create uniform national systems for 
administration, education, and public health, again supporting increased inclu-
siveness and homogeneity of the population. During the 20th century, states also 
acquired the means to manage national economies – through state planning in the 
Communist world and by Keynesian measures in the Western world.
This is seen by many as the final glorious days of the nation-state before its 
demise under the pressure of globalization and digitalization. One early blow to 
the logic of a world composed by independent and autonomous nation-states was 
the end of the Cold War in 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down and when US 
President George H. W. Bush and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
met at the Malta Summit, making declarations of cooperation and peace. Already 
the Cold War in itself, emerging as a result of nuclear weapons technology, had 
destabilized the idea of independent nation-states, since the devastating power of 
nuclear weapons had made it essentially impossible for nuclear powers to win a 
war. The prospect of a nuclear conflict was unthinkable destruction on both sides, 
and thus the idea of settling disputes with war in the anarchical system of inde-
pendent nation-states became impassable.
Yet, a nuclear attack remained a palpable threat and a possible scenario for 
many during the Cold War, making states necessary. With the end of the Cold War, 
however, this argument became more diffuse, while the effects of an increasingly 
global economy gained more attention.
A common view since then, summed up by the term globalization, is that in 
a global economy, market forces are stronger than any nation-state. Capital is 
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mobile, while labor is not, meaning that capital moves where the conditions are 
most favorable, forcing nation-states to compete by providing such conditions. 
The nation-state thus has had to give up some of its autonomy and sovereignty – 
the exclusive power to independently manage instruments such as national labor 
rights and monetary and fiscal policies. From this perspective, nation-states are 
becoming to the world what local authorities used to be to the state – providers of 
desired conditions for attracting businesses without the power to shape economy 
or employment within its territory.
This view, at least in its most far-reaching form, has been contested, for exam-
ple, in the article “Globalization and the Future of the Nation-State” (Thompson 
and Hirst, 1995). The authors admit that there is some truth in the globalization 
view – states are less autonomous, they have less exclusive control over the eco-
nomic and social processes within their territories, and they are less able to main-
tain national distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity.
Thompson and Hirst (1995) argue, however, that the changes are not as pro-
found as they may seem for a series of reasons, among them that the number of 
genuine transnational companies (TNCs) is small, foreign trade flows and patterns 
of foreign direct investment are highly concentrated to advanced industrial states 
and a small number of newly industrialized countries, the thesis that capital is 
moving inexorably from high-wage advanced countries to low-wage developing 
countries is inaccurate in aggregate, and the evidence that world financial markets 
are beyond regulation is by no means certain.
An example of the last point is a series of international investigations, black-
lists, and measures against tax havens in recent years, in order to reduce tax avoid-
ance, estimated at £506 billion each year (Boffey, 2017).
Thompson and Hirst (1995) also argue that the reduced autonomy of the 
nation-state doesn’t deprive it of an important role in a global system of gov-
ernance. Instead, because of its relationship to territory and population, the 
role of a nation-state is pivotal as a source of legitimacy for transferring power 
both “above” it and “below” it – above through agreements with other states 
in various international organizations and bodies, and below it through a con-
stitutional balance within its own territory among central, regional, and local 
governments, and also with publicly recognized private governments in civil 
society.
According to Thompson and Hirst (1995), nation-states can do this in a way 
no other agency can, because they provide legitimacy as the exclusive voice of a 
territorially bounded population. They admit that such representation is very indi-
rect, but that it is the closest to democracy and accountability that international 
governance is likely to get.
3.3 The impact of digitalization
In the last decades, global mobility of technology has been added to that of capi-
tal. With the broad diffusion of the Internet, technology and information are vastly 
more mobile than they ever were before.
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From the perspective of the innovation loop, a few of the major changed condi-
tions brought about by the Internet and by the first wave of digital technologies 
are that:
• Computer software can be used to effectively manage, process, and analyze 
most kinds of information and contents, making an increased level of auto-
mation possible.
• The cost of a digital copy is essentially zero – thus, once information, pro-
cesses, contents, services, products, or even weapons have been digitalized, 
they can be copied at large scale at a minimal cost.
• The whole world can be reached with one click, not just with a phone call 
as through the telephone network, but with basically anything that can be 
digitalized.
• Once products and services have been digitalized, they can be mixed with 
other products and services much more easily than ever before.
• The Internet connects people peer-to-peer across the world, which means that 
horizontal structures for human activity, as opposed to hierarchical or vertical 
structures, which have been the norm for thousands of years, are becoming 
functional at a large scale.
Among the consequences or adaptations to these new conditions are:
• A major change in business models with a general shift from owning to 
accessing and from products to services, since what is digital can be copied 
almost infinitely and what is not digital can be shared efficiently on digital 
platforms (often referred to as the sharing economy), with a subsequent con-
centration of users to a few large digital platforms through the network effect2
• An increased reliance on horizontal structures such as social networks and 
informal networks for knowledge and news distribution, with partially unex-
pected effects such as trolling and fake news
• An increased focus on purpose in human activities – for example, in busi-
nesses where purpose may become as important as the basic requirement of 
long-term profitability – reasonably as a consequence of the opportunities 
the Internet offers for horizontal collaborative work with significant global 
impact at a scale that was only attainable by states and global corporations a 
few decades ago, for example, Wikipedia and open-source software
• An increased focus on customer experience since it is easier than ever to 
launch a product or a service offering with limited resources, targeting the 
whole world, and since this entails intensified competition for people’s atten-
tion and steadily higher expectations among users and customers for ease, 
convenience, and transparency
• The emergence of a fourth military branch beyond Army, Air Force, and 
Navy – a cyber-warfare branch, along with a generally increased focus on 
cybersecurity in businesses and in society, as a consequence of the growing 
possibilities to perform highly effective cyberattacks, ranging from criminal 
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activities aiming at economic gain, to state-supported activities with the pur-
pose to inflict damage on enemy countries
The collective term for these phenomena is digitalization, whereas the ways in 
which businesses or public entities or agencies adapt in order to remain competi-
tive and relevant in a digitalized world is often called digital transformation.
Although digitalization is regularly perceived as an established and stable 
ongoing process, it can be argued that it is only at its beginning, noting that most 
organizations, private or public, only just started their digital transformation.
Furthermore, before the first wave of digitalization has even reached its full 
power, a second wave is emerging with technologies such as AI and machine 
learning; natural language processing and cognitive computing, with effective 
voice interaction and human-like dialogue; the Internet of Things with networks 
of sensors and actuators – being to AI what our senses and limbs are to the brain; 
advanced automation also mastering mental work; and blockchain-based applica-
tions distributing a range of services and structures, potentially eliminating the 
need for controlling bodies and institutions such as banks, governmental agencies, 
and even courts.
Combining these technologies, the second wave will bring changed conditions 
that are difficult to anticipate, to say nothing of people’s ways to adapt to such 
changes. As mentioned before, the pace of change is also increasing, which gives 
a hint about further inventions adding up to a third wave, and a fourth, and so 
forth.
The main question that this chapter aims at addressing is whether it will be 
possible for nation-states to remain relevant through digital transformation, and 
in that case how, or if they might be disrupted or become obsolete and replaced by 
some other structure for governing the world’s populations and territories.
To understand how the nation-state can adapt to digitalization, it may first be 
useful to establish what the nation-state offers that is adaptable. From the initial 
definition, we find that the nation-state provides unity, a territory, and a form of 
governance. Through its institutions, it also supplies a number of services.
Out of these four aspects, both services and governance can be effectively 
adapted from a digital transformation perspective. Unity, in contrast, could be 
considered to depend on second-order effects of digital transformation, while ter-
ritory is a physical aspect that turns out to remain important in a digitalized world. 
This will be discussed later.
Adaptation of services in a digitalized world involves not only services offered 
by the nation-state itself. Also, services offered by alternative providers must be 
taken into account, since digital technologies and the Internet, as noted before, 
make it possible for service providers to target the entire world, even with fairly 
limited resources.
The ways in which governance may be adapted to digitalization, on the other 
hand, depends largely on the form of governance. Noting that democracy is con-
sidered to have strengthened the nation-state through increased legitimacy, the 
question of governance will here be focused on adaptation of the democratic 
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process, although effects of digitalization on authoritarian states will also be dis-
cussed further down.
Hence, from a digitalization perspective, there are three important aspects of 
digital transformation of the nation-state – efficiency of services offered by the 
state to citizens, alternative providers of those services, and the structure of the 
democratic process.
1 Among the main services offered to citizens are health care, child/elder/social 
care, education, infrastructure, law and order, and defense, all paid for by tax 
revenue.
Like any other service, all these can be made more efficient through digitaliza-
tion. This is necessary since the expectations of individuals and organizations are 
increasing, while tax revenues will not grow substantially. The increased expecta-
tions derive partly from people’s experience of the large range of various services 
offered online, with a significant increase in convenience and ease of use com-
pared to only a decade ago, all at a low cost or for free (in exchange for access to 
people’s personal data).
In this way, people have an indirect understanding of the quality improvements 
and efficiency gains that are possible through digitalization, using, analyzing, and 
combining data flows; providing well-designed user interfaces; and so on, and 
they naturally expect the same improvements in public services. In short – the 
conditions have changed and public services have to adapt in order to remain rel-
evant, which also goes hand in hand with the increased focus on customer experi-
ence brought about by digitalization.
In many nation-states, the digital transformation of public services is ongo-
ing, but since these services are normally not exposed to market competition, 
there is not any immediate risk of being outcompeted, and the driving force for 
change must, therefore, derive largely from an insight among leaders and those 
responsible.
An example of a country that is considered to have reached far in its efforts to 
digitally transform its services is Estonia (Heller, 2017). Apart from many ser-
vices being accessible online, three technology-related aspects creating condi-
tions for the Estonian digital welfare state are:
• A government-issued electronic ID for all citizens
• The “once only” principle, which means that no single piece of data should 
be entered or collected twice
• The governmental data platform X-Road, which links servers and systems to 
each other through encrypted connections
From a privacy and integrity point of view, it can be noted that any access to an 
individual’s personal data by a public officer or a professional is recorded and 
reported.
Besides improving services and making them more efficient, there are also dis-
cussions about the possibility for the public sector to partner with alternative pro-
viders from the private sector and with civil society. An example is the Swedish 
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Association of Local Authorities and Regions (commonly known internation-
ally as “SALAR,” or “SKL” in Swedish).3 Klas Danerlöv, Innovation Manager 
at SALAR, refers to the demographic challenge, to steadily increased expecta-
tions among citizens, and to the need for working in smarter ways due to lack of 
resources already visible in budgets, and he discusses a change in definition of the 
role of the public sector, from producer to facilitator, collaborating with private 
service providers and with civil society in areas such as digitalized health care 
and emerging mobility solutions. He explains that such a change depends partly 
on legislation since today’s rules for procurement are rigid and prevent the public 
sector from cooperating with industry in a development-oriented manner. He also 
envisions that the fundamental responsibility of the public sector might become 
narrower, caring for exposed groups and for those not able to use digitalized ser-
vices (K. Danerlöv, personal communication, April 16, 2018).
Regarding digitalization of national defence, it may be noted that with the 
emergence of cyber-weapons and of the military cyber-warfare branch, military 
activity is becoming increasingly digital since it is possible to inflict significant 
harm to enemy states by attacking essential infrastructure through digital net-
works and devices, with a minimal risk for human and material losses. Also, since 
it is also possible to make attacks without being directly exposed, it becomes less 
evident who the enemy really is, making warfare less effective for supporting 
national identity.
2 The aspect of alternative service providers goes further due to the Internet’s 
global reach. Such providers can essentially be located anywhere in the world 
and, depending on local legislation, provide their services to citizens of various 
countries on a global market. The same goes for nation-states that can offer ser-
vices to their own citizens worldwide, through the Internet and through collabora-
tion agreements with local or global providers.
Interestingly, nation-states can also offer their services to citizens of other 
countries, which they already do. Estonia offers an e-Residency – a kind of lim-
ited citizenship in the form of a government-issued digital ID available to anyone 
in the world, offering the possibility to easily start and run a business in Estonia, 
which is part of the EU (Republic of Estonia, 2014).
Quite obviously though, the digital ID is not valid as a physical identification 
or a travel document, it does not serve as a residency permit, and it does not grant 
its holder the right of physical residency in Estonia. This aspect, regarding physi-
cal territory, people’s physical movements, and the rule of law, will be discussed 
further below.
The concept of e-Residency is also related to private service offerings from 
alternative providers and to the question of how extended these offerings could 
eventually become. Let us say that a digital giant like Google, Apple, Amazon, 
or Microsoft puts together packages of social services such as online education, 
digitalized health care, cybersecurity, transportation as a service, and more, and 
combines these packages under the umbrella of a private digital citizenship – and 
in this way takes on the role of a private virtual state, PVS. At what extent would 
that be an alternative to a citizenship in an existing nation-state?
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Essentially, this comes down to two considerations:
1 First, the PVS offering the services will probably not have its own territory, 
and thus it will have its head office in some jurisdiction, having to obey the 
corresponding legislation. Potentially, it could acquire e-Residencies like the 
one offered by Estonia, for local branches in countries offering this opportu-
nity, thus adapting to the local legislation in each country.
2 Second, users acquiring private citizenship will live in other territories. Either 
they will have a citizenship and a residency in the corresponding nation-state 
or the PVS will have to enter mutual agreements with nation-states, defin-
ing matters for users such as residency, work permits, taxation, and also the 
validity of some kind of passport or other travel document issued by the PVS.
Both considerations highlight an opportunity for nation-states to systematically 
offer extended versions of Estonia’s e-Residency, targeted toward PVSs, paving 
the way for what could be called the State as a Platform, SaaP.
A PVS successfully concluding such agreements, attracting a large number of 
users, could be described as a popular state owning no territory, fitting into an 
often-cited pattern in digitalization: Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns 
no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s most popular media owner, creates no con-
tent. Alibaba, the most valuable retailer, has no inventory. Moreover, Airbnb, the 
world’s largest accommodation provider, owns no real estate.
It also fits one of the main adaptations to digital technology mentioned above – 
a general shift from owning to accessing.
However, a citizenship is different from a taxi ride or a night’s accommodation. 
If Uber or Airbnb goes out of business, users might suffer a short inconvenience. 
But if this happens to a PVS, users might become stateless.
This would be acceptable only if there are a number of PVSs for users to imme-
diately choose from, a situation that could possibly emerge after years of trial and 
error with pioneering PVSs offering services to early adopters who maintain their 
original citizenship as a back-up.
A number of PVSs for users to choose from would also in a way solve the issue 
with lacking democratic influence by citizens on a PVS. Since a PVS is a private 
company, it is essentially autocratic, being controlled by its owners who are not 
substituted through elections. If there are other PVSs available, users or citizens 
could simply “vote with their feet.“ If, on the other hand, one major PVS domi-
nated, for example, due to the network effect, this would not be the case and the 
lack of a democratic process would become a serious issue.
Other aspects of the PVS scenario are economic, social, and political. Would 
PVSs paying for SaaP manage to provide citizenship and social services more 
efficiently than nation-states, at a lower cost than ordinary taxation? Or would 
they profile citizenship as a premium product for which people would be willing 
to pay more? If so, would such a selection be acceptable? Could PVSs over time 
become the partners that organizations such as Swedish SALAR envision, while 
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nation-states take care of exposed groups? Or should PVSs, through international 
regulation, be obliged to receive all users, and if so, at what cost?
Adding to this is a final question – whether a PVS would need something cor-
responding to a nation, that is, a sense of unity among the users or the citizens, in 
order to survive. As will be discussed below, this is also a challenge for multicul-
tural federations of nation-states, and for this reason, it’s not obvious that a PVS 
could ever reach the stability of a nation-state, strong enough to keep it united 
in situations of crisis. Rather, also with regard to the issue of lacking democratic 
influence, PVSs are more likely to be what they are – commercial entities offering 
convenient and attractive services, entities that may come and go, with a limited 
long-term engagement from the users.
However, the PVS model also exposes an opportunity for nation-states to adapt 
and remain relevant to citizens with a growing interest in a cosmopolitan set of 
values. Building on the kind of agreements that PVSs would have to enter with 
nation-states, such agreements could also be made between nation-states in a sys-
tematic way, similar to the roaming agreements between mobile telephone opera-
tors in different countries that allow their users to continue using their mobile 
phone while traveling abroad, paying for the usage to their home operator.
In a corresponding way, citizen-roaming agreements between nation-states 
would allow citizens to move freely between the two countries, benefitting from 
social services and rights as local citizens, also paying local taxes and being 
answerable to local duties. It could be seen as an extended version of the freedoms 
in trade blocks such as the EU, with obvious challenges, not the least regarding 
interstate trust, but also with increased possibilities from an administrative point 
of view in a digitalized world, with conceivable digital entities such as clearing 
houses for citizen-roaming. As opposed to a PVS, a nation-state offering citizen-
roaming would be able to provide long-term stability and democratic influence, 
but whether one model would be better adapted than the other to future conditions 
in a digital world remains to be seen.
Related to this topic, leaving the physical world behind, are virtual worlds, 
which could be seen as a kind of private virtual reality states. Existing only in 
virtual reality, there’s no need for agreements with states in the physical world nor 
for travel documents or for physical services such as health care, transportation, 
and so on.
Not providing for people’s physical needs, virtual worlds can hardly be consid-
ered an alternative to nation-states. They may, however, have a certain influence 
on real-world economies – substantial economic transactions are already made 
for virtual goods in virtual worlds such as Second Life, and this may increase with 
improved technology for virtual reality. It is also likely that when virtual reality 
reaches a sufficiently high-quality experience, people will spend significant time 
in virtual worlds, both for work and for pleasure.
3 The third aspect mentioned above regarding the digital transformation of 
nation-states is the structure of the democratic process. Two issues emerge on this 
aspect.
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First, there seems to be a possibility to effectively manipulate individuals’ opin-
ions and worldviews through digital means, without people knowing it or noticing 
it. This would put democracy, as we know it, at risk.
Second, today’s democratic systems have not yet adapted to the way the Inter-
net and digital technologies have changed the conditions for information distri-
bution, making geographic distances essentially irrelevant from an information 
perspective.
The first issue – manipulation of individuals – came to general attention in 
the late 2010s partly due to events regarding the company Cambridge Analytica. 
The company had reportedly collected massive amounts of personal data through 
Facebook, and built individual profiles from the data, relying on research in psy-
chometrics. The profiles had then been used to expose individuals at a large scale 
through social networks to personally tailored political advertisements designed 
to activate a certain response, with the aim to move the electorate in a desired 
direction (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018).
Although not conclusively proved to be effective, the basic idea is in line with 
the capabilities of digital technology today – analysis of large amounts of data, 
personalization based on such analysis, and individual targeting through social 
networks, all at a massive scale. Exploiting the human nature with its fairly pre-
dictable responses to certain stimuli also seems to be viable, but possibly further 
progress has to be made – a few cycles in the innovation loop – until the method 
becomes effective.
Possible scenarios could include tuning the output from AI-based personal digi-
tal assistants or finely manipulating the search results of a large search engine – a 
plot that has been credibly described in the novel 11 Grams of Truth (Swe: 11 
gram sanning) (Akenine, 2014).
Any such scenario becoming reality would be a significant threat against the 
democratic process and also to any nation-state that depends on democracy for its 
legitimacy.
One proposed model that could be resilient to such manipulation attempts is 
deliberative polling, which is a version of deliberative democracy, a term coined 
by Joseph M. Bessette in 1980, meaning that democratic decisions must be pre-
ceded by authentic deliberation – long and careful consideration or discussion – 
not just voting (Bessette, 1980). The idea behind deliberative polling, which was 
proposed by James Fishkin (1988), is that rather than having a whole population 
of relatively uninformed people make decisions in a matter, it is better to have 
a random, representative sample of the population make an informed decision 
after thorough briefing and discussion. Such a deliberative process normally takes 
place at a physical meeting during a whole weekend, with the model having been 
tried out in a number of countries in the world on various occasions (Center for 
Deliberative Democracy, 2019).
The second issue – adaptation of the democratic process with regard to new 
conditions for information distribution – is connected with an often-expressed 
worry over a general decline in political activity and political interest in dem-
ocratic states, particularly in younger generations. Although it is contested that 
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Millennials are less politically active, it has also been found that a decline in 
voter turnout in established democracies during the last four decades coincides 
with decreasing levels of people’s personal interest in politics and a declining 
trust in traditional democratic institutions as vehicles for personal fulfillment and 
well-being (Dalton, 2016). This decline in interest and trust can be effectively 
explained by a shift in priorities and values of Western citizens. As people have 
begun adapting to a higher material living standard, they are increasingly pri-
oritizing autonomy and individual lifestyle choices over more basic economic 
necessities and class divisions, while traditional forms of community life and 
interaction have largely eroded, giving space to individualism and social isolation 
(Ferrini, 2012).
More specifically, from a digitalization perspective, it has been found that 
improved digital infrastructure and increased digital freedom in a country have 
opposite effects on people’s trust in the state and their sense of unity as a nation, 
counterbalancing each other.
Improved digital infrastructure increases people’s trust in the state for provid-
ing effective tools and services, while it also brings about social fragmentation 
and cultural individualization, which weakens national identity. On the other 
hand, digital freedom strengthens national identity since offering everyone an 
opportunity to speak constitutes an essential feature of democratic fairness, and 
democracy is found to serve as an ideological link to unite people into a nation. 
But digital freedom also has a negative effect on trust in the state since no insti-
tution in an open and free society can escape criticism from some segment of 
society.
According to these findings, the nation-state can reach increased strength 
through digitalization only if there is a balanced development of digital infra-
structure and digital freedom (Lu and Liu, 2018).
The same study also finds that as a country becomes more Internet-connected, 
people’s attachment to the nation-state tends to derive more from the universal 
appeal of democracy (the civic approach mentioned before) than from the particu-
lar appeal of ethnicity (the ethnic approach) (Lu and Liu, 2018).
Hence, the question we ask is how the democratic process could adapt with 
regard to:
• Internet-based information distribution, which has made geographic dis-
tances essentially irrelevant
• People tending to prioritize individual choices while yet placing great value 
on digital freedom and democracy as unifying aspects
It is probable that a democratic process offering citizens a more direct influence 
at regular occasions, from wherever they are located at the moment, would be a 
favorable adaption to such new Internet-related conditions.
One proposed model for democratic processes, which could fit this require-
ment, is liquid democracy, a system where voters can either vote directly or del-
egate their vote to other participants. Voters may select different delegates for 
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different issues, and they are free to withdraw their delegation at any time. People 
who have received the right to vote for other voters can in turn delegate these 
votes to other delegates.
Even though this kind of voting system has roots going back to the 19th cen-
tury, digital technology can help to make implementations of liquid democracy 
substantially more effective, flexible, and easy to use.
It is worth noting that digital voting through the Internet is generally met with 
significant skepticism, mainly for lack of transparency and for the risk of vot-
ers being exposed to coercion when voting at home or in other non-controlled 
environments. However, there are solutions to both these issues, which have been 
implemented, for example, in digital elections in Norway, but for such solutions 
to gain trust among voters, more time will probably be needed with successful 
experiments (Lewan, 2013).
Finally, regarding the aspect of the structure of the democratic process in a digi-
tal perspective, it can be noted that both deliberative polling and liquid democracy 
are in line with an increased reliance on horizontal structures and an increased 
focus on purpose, mentioned above as adaptations to new conditions brought by 
digitalization.
These three aspects of the digital transformation of the nation-state – efficiency 
of services, alternative providers of those services, and the structure of the demo-
cratic process – can be considered fields where the nation-state has to adapt in 
order to remain relevant to citizens or, in other words, successful.
A fourth aspect as a consequence of digitalization can be added – the issue of 
future taxation and revenue sources. Since one main part of today’s tax revenues 
comes from income taxes, the main question here regards the future of work. 
Recent progress in AI and machine learning, specifically in the field of deep learn-
ing, has shown that increasingly advanced tasks that only humans used to be able 
to perform can be automated, not only physical work but also mental work. In 
many cases machines even outperform humans, and there’s a general concern 
that machines eliminating human work will lead to high levels of unemployment.
However, efforts at predicting whether AI and automation will eliminate more 
jobs than they will create, or the contrary, provide results pointing in all directions 
and differing by tens of millions of jobs only in the US, indicating that it is dif-
ficult to know which effect will prevail (Winick, 2018). It is also true that rather 
than eliminating jobs, AI and automation are expected to eliminate tasks within 
jobs, while jobs will be transformed to focus on tasks that humans still do better 
than machines, such as creativity, convincing and motivating other people, empa-
thy, and fine dexterity.
Thus, whether tax revenues from income tax will decrease drastically due to 
unemployment is unclear, but it is certain that the future of work will be differ-
ent than work of today. In the case that unemployment would rise significantly, 
solutions such as negative income tax or unconditional basic income have been 
proposed as solutions for distributing resources to citizens. As for an alternative 
tax revenue base, different forms of increased sales taxes are often suggested, 
with generous tax deductions for consumption that can be connected with present 
The future of the nation-state 309
or future professional activity, ranging from equipment to investments in educa-
tion, as an adaption to the trend of increased self-employment in the gig economy.
3.4  Threats from supra-states, localism, and  
cosmopolitanism
Apart from changed conditions due to digitalization that force nation-states to 
adapt, the most commonly discussed threat to the nation-state is perhaps the com-
bination of supra-state and intergovernmental institutions such as the EU on one 
hand, and localism with claims of independence by populations such as the Kurds 
and the Catalans and by regions such as Scotland and Quebec on the other.
As for the EU, which could be seen as the most advanced attempt at a modern 
federation of nation-states, there are different ways to explain the main reasons 
for building the union, ranging from national interests of gaining influence by 
being members of a larger player in world politics and international economy, to 
an effort for peace and collaboration, or a step toward a European state. The main 
question, however, is if it would be possible to build a sense of national unity 
among Europeans – either through the civic or ethnic approach – strong enough 
to mobilize the population to collective action in a crisis. This is effectively con-
tested by Hutchinson (2003), who notes that the EU does not even possess a com-
mon language, let alone a bank of myths, memories, and symbols to convey a 
sense of belonging in a community of sentiment.
Referring to the United States, Australia, or Canada as successful models for 
building multicultural federations is of limited relevance for Europe since these 
are countries founded by immigrants who have found a common identity in the 
willingness to build a new culture in a new territory.
From a larger perspective, looking beyond “immigrant nations,” it is also worth 
noting that what characterizes successful constructions of multicultural federa-
tions, as opposed to federations that keep suffering from fragmentation due to 
cultural divides, can be explained by three elements – first, building political alli-
ances on already existing cross-cultural voluntary organizations, such as reading 
circles, trade unions, political clubs and so on; second, providing public goods in 
exchange for taxes across all regions of a country; and third, having a shared lan-
guage with which individuals can communicate and converse (Wimmer, 2018). 
None of these could be considered viable for the EU, except maybe the second 
under the condition that a federal tax is introduced, which is a remote option as 
of today.
Rather than becoming a European state, the future role of the EU and other 
large federations is more likely to be in line with what Thompson and Hirst (1995) 
argue – trade blocks that, together with international organizations and bodies, 
can exercise some governance over international economic activities, labor mar-
ket policies, social and environmental protection, and so on, based on legitimacy 
derived from national-states.
The threat posed to nation-states by localism is somewhat different. Although 
it might lead to a few more new small states, trying to build strong societies on a 
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local homogeneous unity as an answer to what might be perceived as an increas-
ingly hostile globalized world is essentially a dead end.
From the perspective of the innovation loop, it is undeniable that the world is 
becoming increasingly interconnected, multicultural, and diverse through steadily 
more efficient and pervasive communications technologies. Any attempt at mod-
eling a society on cultural homogeneity and exclusiveness will therefore necessar-
ily lead to a society that is less adapted to the changed conditions in the world, and 
thus less competitive. Furthermore, as already noted, the more a society becomes 
Internet-connected, the less people will feel attached to the nation-state based 
on ethnicity, in favor of the universal appeal of democracy (Lu and Liu, 2018). 
In other words, the wave of ethnic and nationalistic ideologies sweeping over 
the world during the mid-2010s – promoting harder delineations of national bor-
ders, tighter immigration controls, stronger trade barriers, stronger celebration 
of national symbols and of authoritarian regimes, more idealized depictions of 
nationalistic history, and so on, entailing increased racism and nationalist xeno-
phobia, could be seen simply as a temporary swing of the pendulum of history.
If the innovation loop is a valid model for describing the origin of change, the 
pendulum could be expected to swing back and forth around a center that moves 
along the trajectory of continuous innovation and of adaptation to changed condi-
tions. In that case, it is just a matter of time before ethno-nationalist and isolation-
ist ideologies will turn out to be unsuccessful as a way to improve the workings of 
the nation-state, which in turn will make the pendulum swing back toward more 
open, interconnected, and multicultural societies. However, the attempt at turn-
ing back the clock with nationalist and separatist values is understandable, not 
only because of increased migration, which is often the main reason for making 
nation-states more closed. Some view the world as increasingly divided into two 
categories of people – one cosmopolitan with mostly urban people, sharing an 
international set of values, interests, and culture, communicating globally and, to 
some extent, also travelling globally, and another category of more locally rooted 
people, typically rural to a larger degree, and less able to harvest the opportunities 
offered by an increasingly interconnected world.
Since the latter category could be considered less adapted to new conditions 
emerging in a digitalized world, wanting to go back in time to a situation with 
more closed nation-states – the billiard balls mentioned before – is a natural reac-
tion. Another important reason making many people wishing for time to stop is 
arguably a general fear of the future, which is vague to many, for natural reasons. 
While the pace of change is increasing, most political leaders themselves have 
vague ideas about the future, and credible, long-term, positive visions for a future 
world are clearly lacking.
This is not to say that the opinions expressed by the second category mentioned 
above are not important. On the contrary, what is important, and in everyone’s 
interest, is keeping society united, learning from diversity, and helping everyone 
to take part in the ongoing digitalization process since high tensions in society 
will be unfavorable for everyone.
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On the other hand, one may ask whether the cosmopolitan category has such 
values and motivations that people in this group would rather abandon the nation-
state in favor of some global alternative state, such as a PVS, uniting, for example, 
people living in large urban environments across the world.
Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (2004), investigating the nature of cosmopoli-
tanism, sketches a wide range of different flavors and origins. The range of 
these flavors and origins stretches from the international elite working in global 
organizations, moving across the world, to a Pakistani villager, not particularly 
well-educated, but a member of a Sufi cult and formerly a migrant laborer in the 
highly mobile, heterogeneous society of the Gulf, there picking up a series of 
foreign languages. Hannerz further notes that cosmopolitanism has two faces; 
one side aesthetic and intellectual with a happy face, and one political side with 
a worried face.
He raises the question of whether there could be a “thick” cosmopolitanism, 
corresponding to the unity required for building a national identity, and without 
coming to an answer, he observes that while cosmopolitans are often seen as root-
less, cosmopolitanism can also be seen as the “privilege of those who can take a 
secure nation-state for granted” (Hannerz, 2004, p. 78).
It is thus not obvious whether a growing cosmopolitan tendency could be seen 
as a threat to the nation-state, or even as a support. It’s also clear that the number of 
far-reaching ideological cosmopolitans in the world is dwarfed by the sheer num-
ber of involuntary cosmopolitans – international migrants – reaching 258 million 
worldwide in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 (United Nations, 2017).
The increasing international migration thus appears as a stronger threat 
to nation-states, not only since it is a main reason for the backward-aiming 
forces striving for closed and isolated countries, poorly adapted for the world’s 
changing conditions. Migration is also likely to continue growing since the 
interconnectedness of the world lets information flow more easily, making the 
differences and the injustice in the world more apparent to everyone. This is 
further enforced since cultural homogeneity will be increasingly difficult to 
use by advanced states as an argument for exclusion, and closed borders will 
thus appear as what they are, a mere refusal of entry based on the lottery of 
birth.
Such a world order will become untenable, and it will remain a major threat 
to advanced nation-states unless the differences decrease. Just like within West-
ern nation-states, where improved communications technologies over time made 
a leveling of resources and opportunities between classes inevitable in order to 
avoid unsustainable tensions in society, it is unlikely that the world’s poor will 
passively accept their poverty, and a leveling of resources in the world will 
become necessary.
Apart from limiting the migration pressure on advanced nation-states, such a 
leveling would also strengthen the opportunities for the concept of citizen-roaming  
mentioned before, through improved conditions for interstate trust, and thus sup-
port nation-states in more than one way.
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3.5 The rule of law
The final consideration to be made on the nation-state is the rule of law. A declin-
ing autonomy for nation-states to exclusively decide over internal politics does 
not diminish the importance of the state’s monopoly as a lawmaker in its territory. 
On the contrary, in a world that is more complex and interconnected on the one 
hand, and more individual and diversified on the other, the rule of law as a guaran-
tee of stability, limiting the harm that individuals, companies, and the government 
itself can do, is of increased importance. The rule of law is also necessary for a 
structure of global governance to be effective, as a way for transforming interna-
tional agreements into national laws and imposing such laws on the citizens. And 
although cities are often considered to be the main future actors of global collabo-
ration since a majority of all people in the world now live in cities, nation-states 
are important for making cities and regional governments accountable according 
to the rule of law.
Apart from this, however, the rule of law is also a tool of power in the hands 
of the nation-state, which eventually comes down to the monopoly of coercive 
power and to the fact that, even in a digitalized world, all individuals have a 
physical body and all cables and servers that make up the Internet have a physical 
location.
The combination of the monopoly of coercive power and the control of a physi-
cal territory gives the nation-state a significant power over individuals and their 
movements, and also of the organizations they make up, which together with digi-
tal tools such as surveillance cameras, facial recognition, data analysis and so on, 
is strengthened rather than weakened. The power can be used by authoritarian 
states for control and oppression. However, also in democracies, even where the 
level of corruption is low, it remains a strong foundation for the nation-state to 
build its survival on, even when challenged.
We can look at the cryptocurrency Bitcoin as an example of such a challenge. 
Although the future of Bitcoin today is unclear, not the least for the unsustainable 
level of energy consumed by the Bitcoin system and for the low transaction speed, 
future versions might offer interesting opportunities for international peer-to-peer 
transactions without the need for controlling parties such as banks or financial 
institutions. Crypto-libertarians and/or crypto-anarchists,4 however, often con-
sider Bitcoin one of the tools that could make the nation-state irrelevant, due to its 
distributed, noncentralized nature.
Also, the underlying database technology, the blockchain, may offer attractive 
distributed applications in a wide range of contexts, eliminating the influence and 
bias of controlling parties, but again, crypto-libertarians and/or crypto-anarchists 
see many of these opportunities as ways to subvert the state and its institutions.
Confronted with such a challenge, before it reaches critical levels, the nation-
state could use the rule of law to effectively defend itself by drastically limiting the 
use of such applications. It is true that software applications through virtualization 
can be made to jump seamlessly in real time between physical servers across the 
world, but eventually, the ability of the state to reduce the usage is significant.
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In the context of rule of law and digital technologies, a special note may be 
made on what could become a global competition between liberal democracy 
and digital authoritarianism (Wright, 2018). Digital technologies, in particular 
the latest evolution of artificial intelligence, have turned out to offer authoritar-
ian regimes – for the first time in decades – a possible way to sustain long-term 
economic growth while controlling their citizens. China is by many considered 
to lead this development with large-scale Internet censoring and widespread 
surveillance through technologies such as face recognition, and with machine 
learning tools in combination with a “social credit system,” which according to 
the Chinese government will be rolled out nationwide for every citizen by 2020 
(Munro, 2018).
Many AI-based machine-learning technologies depend on access to large 
amounts of data for training. Authoritarian regimes like China therefore have a 
significant advantage over liberal democracies in using such technology for ana-
lyzing and controlling citizens’ behavior, being able to access and combine peo-
ple’s personal data with few restrictions and privacy concerns.
The official scope of the “social credit system” is to increase trust and to 
decrease the level of corruption and fraud in Chinese society. This is admittedly 
needed and some citizens also welcome it, but it is also clear that citizens will 
have limited opportunities, if any, to challenge the system.
It is an open question whether citizen control realized through digital authori-
tarianism will make countries like China more competitive and better adapted 
than liberal democracies to a digitalized world, but it is undeniable that China will 
give it a try. According to a recent report by the US government-financed democ-
racy watchdog Freedom House, China is also actively spreading its methods and 
technology in this area to tens of other countries (Shahbaz, 2018).
Speaking against the success of digital authoritarianism is the aforementioned 
finding, that is, that the nation-state can reach increased strength through digitali-
zation only if there is a balanced development of digital infrastructure and digital 
freedom (Lu and Liu, 2018).
However, as described by the innovation loop, neither democracies nor authori-
tarian states, will, in the long run, be able to resist necessary adaptations to new 
technologies changing the conditions for their existence; otherwise, they will col-
lapse and be disrupted. Yet, the rule of law will give nation-states substantial capa-
bilities to delay such a development, providing extended time for implementing 
change.
On the other hand, there is already another strong technology trend, apart from 
Bitcoin and the blockchain, hinting at a more decentralized model of society: local 
energy production with renewables such as solar and wind, but also with yet unex-
plored small-scale energy sources such as low-energy nuclear reactions (LENRs). 
If such energy sources over time can make wide-area power grids unnecessary, 
they will also bring the advantage of making societies less vulnerable to cyberat-
tacks and cyberwarfare, which typically target crucial infrastructure systems.
In a distant future, distributed technologies such as blockchain and hyperlocal 
energy production may one day provide the basis for a completely decentralized 
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world order, akin to nature itself where all individuals and entities are independent 
of any state structure and free to interact globally, but where – in a difference from 
nature – an AI-based rule of law is built in to the decentralized system, limiting the 
harm individuals and organizations can do and thus avoiding the cruel aspects of 
the law of the jungle. However, it is only when humans may merge with machines 
(making it possible to transcend the physical body) that the power over physical 
territories will eventually lose its importance.
4 Conclusion
In an increasingly globalized, digitalized, and interconnected world, with mobil-
ity for capital and technology and for digital services and products, the nation-
state is challenged but may remain a fundamental building block for governance 
and international collaboration. Nation-states are losing some of their sovereignty 
regarding exclusive control over economic and social processes within their ter-
ritories, and they are less able to maintain national distinctiveness and cultural 
homogeneity. On the other hand, their role as a source of legitimacy for agree-
ments made in international institutions, organizations, and bodies is becom-
ing more important, as well as for ensuring accountability of cities and regional 
governments. From an innovation perspective, losing independence and gaining 
another role in an increasingly interconnected world can be seen as a natural evo-
lution, being a consequence of steadily improved communications technologies 
through human history.
In order to remain relevant to citizens and to the world, however, nation-states 
need to adapt to new conditions posed by digitalization. These adaptations can be 
found in three fields – efficiency of services offered by the state to citizens, alter-
native providers of those services, and the structure of the democratic process.
Efficiency of services needs to increase through digital transformation, in order 
to address a combination of increased expectations and limited resources. The 
increased expectations derive partly from people’s experience of the large range 
of various services offered online, with a significant increase in convenience and 
ease of use compared to only a decade ago.
Alternative providers of social services may partner with public agencies that 
in turn may transform their role from producer to facilitator of services. Such ser-
vice providers could also extend their offerings into a private virtual state eventu-
ally providing an alternative to traditional citizenship. However, since a PVS will 
depend on legislation in the nation-state where it is registered as a company, it will 
need to enter agreements with nation-states where its users live and work, and it 
will need to solve the issue of lacking democratic influence on the owners. Mean-
while, nation-states could offer services to PVSs through concepts such as State as 
a Platform, and nation-states could also make agreements with other nation-states 
for citizen-roaming, allowing their citizens to live and work in other countries.
The structure of the democratic process needs to adapt to decreased political 
involvement and to the risk of advanced manipulation of people’s opinions on 
one hand, and to the fact that geographic distances have become irrelevant on the 
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other. Two possible models addressing those issues are deliberative polling and 
liquid democracy.
It is also found that the nation-state can reach increased strength through digi-
talization only if there is a balanced development of digital infrastructure and 
digital freedom.
Another question related to digitalization regards a future base of tax revenue 
in the case that AI and automation would lead to massive unemployment and to 
reduced tax revenues from income taxes. Although it is unclear whether automa-
tion will eliminate more jobs than it creates, an often-suggested alternative tax 
base is increased sales taxes, while alternative ways of distributing resources to 
citizens are negative income tax or unconditional basic income.
Nation-states are also considered to be threatened by a combination of supra-
states, localism, and cosmopolitanism. However, since it will be hard for a 
supra-state to build a national identity strong enough to keep it united in crisis, 
the nation-state will likely have a role as a source of legitimacy for larger inter-
national structures, as mentioned before. Localism, on the other hand, will, in 
the long run, have limited opportunities to be successful due to the increasingly 
interconnected nature of the world. Specifically, with regard to ethnic homo-
geneity, it has been found that as a country becomes more Internet-connected, 
people’s attachment to the nation-state tends to derive more from the univer-
sal appeal of democracy than from the particular appeal of ethnicity. Regard-
ing cosmopolitanism, it is not clear whether a growing cosmopolitan tendency 
could be seen as a threat to the nation-state, or even as a support. However, 
the increased number of involuntary cosmopolitans – international migrants – 
constitutes an increasing threat to nation-states, reinforced by improved com-
munications technologies highlighting the injustice of the lottery of birth, 
and, eventually, the only way to remediate this threat is through a leveling of 
resources in the world.
Even though it is difficult to define a valid alternative that would threaten or 
disrupt the nation-state, the need for the nation-state to adapt as described above 
in order to remain relevant is urgent since digitalization is a process that arguably 
has just started and since the pace of change is accelerating. Not adapting is not an 
alternative since no entity can avoid adaptation to new conditions brought about 
by inventions without collapsing or being disrupted. However, the combination 
of the rule of law, the monopoly of coercive power, and the control of a territory 
gives significant power to the nation-state even in a digitalized world, which even-
tually comes down to the fact that all humans have a physical body and that the 
Internet is built on servers and cables that all have a physical location. This power 
gives nation-states substantial capabilities to delay any challenging development, 
providing extended time for implementing change.
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Notes
 1 The term “best adapted” is a more accurate, and less problematic, representation of the 
source material than the popularly used term “fittest.”
 2 Network effect: a phenomenon whereby a product or service gains additional value as 
more people use it.
 3 Swe: Sveriges kommuner och Landsting.
 4 Crypto-anarchists or crypto-libertarians refer to people who use cryptographic software 
striving for total or a high degree of anonymity, freedom of speech, and freedom to 
trade.
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Most of the power of authoritarianism is freely given. In times like these, indi-
viduals think ahead about what a more repressive government will want, and then 
offer themselves without being asked. A citizen who adapts in this way is teaching 
power what it can do.
– From Timothy Snyder (2017, p. 17): “On Tyranny”
1 Introduction
Democracy is obviously far more than majority rule. To a great extent, democracy 
is about the dialogue between citizens and their democratically elected represent-
atives as well as the participation in the political process. Developments in recent 
decades have brought drastic change: the political parties are just a remnant of 
what they once were and civil discourse has largely been replaced by confronta-
tion and conflict.
This dramatic change is taking place globally and is largely due to the digitali-
zation of the political process and organizations, as well as of methods for shaping 
public opinion and disseminating mass media.
Digitalization has, however, not only had negative effects. Rather, it has also 
liberated forces that work for democracy. There were the young activists with 
cell phones who rebelled against some of the Arab world’s worst dictatorships 
during the “Arab Spring.” It was with cell phones that pictures were taken of tor-
tured prisoners in the US-based Abu Ghraib camp. And cell phones were used to 
take pictures of Neda Agha-Soltan, who was shot dead during the demonstrations 
against the Iranian regime in 2009.
The research conducted in this chapter is chiefly based on the author’s profes-
sional experience and reading on the topic discussed in this study, as well as on 
the research conducted by the Swedish Government’s Democracy Commission 
(Government Offices of Sweden, 2016b) and the work of the Government’s Digi-
talization Investigation (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016a).
2 The transformation of American politics
Donald Trump (2019) – with his more than 64 million followers on Twitter (he 
himself follows 47 people as of mid-2019) – shows how digitalized public opinion 
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formation now dominates. Trump has three TV screens in his bedroom; turns 
them on for the morning shows when he wakes up and reacts to what he sees with 
tweets (Wolff, 2018). These tweets then dominate the news cycle in the US – and 
subsequently often across the globe.
The fact that Trump was elected president is largely a result of how he and his 
campaign made use of social media. Trump’s tweets dominated the political news. 
Because US network television lives off advertising revenue and advertisers pay 
in proportion to the numbers of viewers viewing these ads, TV networks want to 
have Trump on screen. He dominates the news, and news about him draws viewers. 
Because of his savvy exploitation of mass media, the Trump campaign was proba-
bly the least expensive in modern political history (Confessore and Yourish, 2016).
The Swedish US-based journalist Martin Gelin wrote in an article in the Swed-
ish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter that it is hard to fully comprehend how influ-
ential the alternative digital media have been for Trump, both in his candidacy 
and his presidency (Gelin, 2017). This is especially true regarding his ability to 
reach younger voters through these media channels. These influential alternative 
media channels would not exist without the Internet. A print magazine with the 
same content would probably only be purchased by a core group of supporters 
and, like pornography, would not be sold openly. As an example, because of its 
web presence, the far-right news organization Breitbart was during summer 2016 
able to attract 31 million unique visitors and was one of the largest news sites in 
the United States. Trump realized early on the power of alternative media and 
hired Breitbart publisher Steve Bannon to head up his campaign during the sum-
mer of 2016.
In addition, Trump supporters used social media to mobilize potential voters 
and to make Hillary Clinton’s potential voters stay home. Journalists from both 
The Guardian and Dagens Nyheter reported from Macedonia on how teenagers 
fabricated and disseminated “news” through social media on behalf of groups on 
the extreme right and were paid according to clicks and shares (Nevéus, 2016; 
Cadwalladr, 2016).
During the election campaign, many false claims circulated online and were 
shared tens of thousands of times. That the Pope supported Trump was one such 
claim. The most provocative example is the story, spread through the Infowars 
web site among others, claiming that Hillary Clinton and her campaign manager 
John Podesta from the basement of a Washington, DC pizzeria were running a 
pedophile ring with enslaved children (Farhi, 2017). The pizzeria was identified 
in the story. The story, later known as Pizzagate, led to the pizzeria employees 
being threatened, while an armed man stormed the pizzeria intending to shoot the 
employees and free the children. The story had been shared to more than ten mil-
lion people, and according to an opinion poll from Yougov, 45 percent of Trump’s 
supporters believed that it was true (Gelin, 2017).
In a survey done by the Pew Research Center, every fourth American stated 
that they had, intentionally or not, shared a fake news story (Barthel, Mitchell and 
Holcomb, 2016).
Trump, of course, was not the first to take advantage of the digital revolu-
tion. Barack Obama’s presidential campaign organized through Meet-up, a site 
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the campaign used to bring supporters together and to engage them in actively 
supporting the candidate.
What was new in the Trump campaign, however, was the extent to which it 
used “big data.” In 2018, Cambridge Analytics was in the news for its methods of 
gathering and exploiting personal data (Hern, 2018). It also sold access to groups 
of individuals with certain desirable, identifiable traits. Big data collects what 
people in social media share and what they follow, as well as their answers to 
popular polls of the type “If you were an animal, what would you want to be?” 
Often, you can capture individual consumer patterns, map voters, and then target 
them with the right message. Identifying, gathering, and grouping this type of data 
is sometimes called “psychometrics” (Reed, 2018).
On the day before the US presidential election in 2016, I met with a consult-
ant in Washington who had become especially skilled at using a specific app that 
could be used to organize, identify, and exploit personal data garnered from Face-
book. He showed me how easy it was to find, for example, gay Wisconsin men 
who were still in the closet. He accomplished this by mapping networks of indi-
viduals and monitoring their searches on Facebook.
Of course, it is easy to find homophobes and those who are not, or to find xeno-
phobes and those who are not. In addition, though, it is possible to map individu-
als’ personalities and attitudes in minute detail and ensure that they are getting 
posts to their timeline tailored to their interests and personality.
Facebook’s own review shows that 126 million Facebook users in the US may 
have been reached by posts from Russian trolls (White, 2017). It is unclear if this 
was significant enough to be a factor in Trump’s victory, but it does show how 
wide-open and vulnerable democracies are to Russian influence.
The Obama campaign was first to use data gathering through Facebook to tar-
get and mobilize potential supporters (Shapiro, 2018). But since then, so much 
more has happened. The Trump campaign was able to send tailored – often con-
tradictory – messages to tens of thousands of people in key states (Grassegger and 
Krogerus, 2017).
Donald Trump’s influence within the Republican Party is also based on his Twit-
ter usage. Because he is in direct contact with his followers, Trump can command 
Republican loyalty by implying on Twitter that he is switching support to a differ-
ent candidate should the incumbent not fall in line behind Trump. That turned out 
to be guiding for the republican candidates in the 2018 midterm election.
During December 2017, a directive from the White House to leaders in the 
various departments of the federal government banned the use of seven words 
in the departments’ budget applications. The words were: “vulnerable,” “enti-
tlement,” “diversity,” “transgender,” “fetus,” “evidence-based,” and “science-
based.” That all official documents (including budget applications) are now 
available in digital form has made it possible to track the usage of banned terms 
and thus affect censorship. Through the digital revolution, the new administra-
tion has, more than ever, before the ability to view and control all public activi-
ties (Sun and Eilperin, 2017).
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3 The Five Star Movement – a digital party
Donald Trump’s campaign is by no means unique. Following the Italian general 
elections of March 2018, the Five Star Movement gained the largest representa-
tion in the Italian parliament, even though it is not a party in the conventional 
sense, but rather a movement organized and directed through digital media.
The Five Star Movement ran its campaign mostly using social media. Using 
the app “Rousseau,” members of the movement could guide its work, voting on 
which political issues the Movement should focus on in the campaign and select-
ing which candidates would represent the Movement.
Part of the Five Star Movement’s goal was also to work toward the establish-
ment of a comprehensive, online-based direct democracy.
In the election, the Five Star Movement had its greatest success in the poorest 
southern parts of Italy. There, traditional media as well as traditional political par-
ties are weak. But with the new communication platform of the Internet, the Five 
Star Movement was able to reach voters directly.
4 China – a new, digitally founded, imperialism
In April 2018, Chinese president Xi Jinping led a national working conference on 
cybersecurity and computerization. The purpose was twofold: China wanted to 
become world leading in digital technology. At the same time, the president also 
wanted to ensure continued control of the Internet and strengthening of the party 
dictatorship.
China’s 800 million network users are behind the “Golden Shield,” the censor-
ship wall blocking Facebook, Google, and hundreds of thousands of other sites 
(among them my personal site, www.wastberg.se).
China has also become leading in the use of big data and facial recognition to 
control the population and prevent the coordination of public opinion support-
ing dissident groups. The government’s goal is to make it possible for each Chi-
nese person to be digitally identified in three seconds (Wong, 2018). The Chinese 
regime also uses the Internet for international control. As part of its global foreign 
influence campaign, the Chinese Communist Party is applying censorship abroad 
and is punishing companies and citizens in other countries that step out of line. 
Beijing’s claim is that any criticism of the Communist Party, anywhere around the 
world, is a violation of Chinese sovereignty and an offense committed against the 
Chinese people (Rogin, 2018).
5 Radically changed Swedish politics
In 1993, US political scientist Robert Putnam and two of his Italian colleagues 
wrote a well-received book about how democracy had grown in Italy. They 
showed that the reason democracy had deep roots in northern Italy, in contrast to 
southern Italy, could not be explained by the fact that people in the North were 
322 Olle Wästberg
economically stronger. Instead, the reason was that those in the North had access 
to greater social capital (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). People trusted 
each other and their public institutions. The people of the North had begun issu-
ing and amassing social capital by having a collective mind-set: joining their fel-
low human beings in non-profit associations like choirs and sports associations. 
Putnam showed how social activity through clubs and associations are important 
to the emergence of a strong democracy. A decade later, Putnam (2000) came out 
with a study: Bowling Alone. He said that Americans who had previously organ-
ized themselves in bowling clubs now chose to bowl alone. They cared less about 
the collective or community aspect. This was a symptom of a trend in US society 
where, for example, fewer are active in non-profit organizations. This trend has 
contributed to a devaluation of social capital. This contributes to the crisis of our 
present moment, since social capital is a ground on which democracy is built.
Bowling has never been an important pastime in Sweden, but few countries in 
the world have the same level of participation in collective activities as Sweden. 
Nearly three out of four Swedes are members of the Swedish Church or of unions, 
three million are members of sports clubs, and nearly 600,000 Swedes sing in 
choirs (Nordström and Skjöld, 2009). We are still a people of members, but as in the 
United States, our associations are losing members. According to Statistics Swe-
den (SCB), every second Swede was active in a club in the early 1990s, but now 
it is down to every third (Vogel et al., 2003). Several researchers point to the fact 
that organizations such as the Boy/Girl scouts, the temperance societies, the free 
churches, and the unions are all losing members. This is combined with the trend 
toward individualization and the ever-increasing dominance of the Internet; fewer 
and fewer people seem to want to congregate together in clubs and associations. 
Who wants to gather around a coffee table in the clubroom to discuss societal 
problems when you can tweet or like a post on Facebook?
At the same time, the established political parties in Sweden have chosen not 
to use the Internet as a way to engage members and enable them to influence the 
direction that the party takes. Research that looked at party members’ attitudes 
toward internal democracy shows that dissatisfaction is high. A third of the party 
members felt that they had no more influence than non-members. Nearly two-
thirds of the members of established political parties want to be able to vote on 
the Internet for their party leadership; however, none of the parties has yet adopted 
this approach (Government Offices of Sweden, 2015b).
The social scientist Tobias Harding describes how traditional associations are 
dying out, while newer movements are taking over (Harding, 2012). These new 
associations function more often as informal networks that enlist people in more 
short-term and spontaneous commitments. We join campaigns and respond to 
calls to action that are launched through social media, but we are less interested 
in extended board meetings that require voting according to protocol and writing 
minutes that have to be adjusted.
The perishing of collective associations is thus of great concern for democ-
racy, as associations are democracies in microcosm. Like the cabinet of a demo-
cratic government, an association has its board and board officers. And, like a 
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democracy, associations make decisions through voting and debate. Associations 
also act as training grounds for democratic participation and cooperation. When 
we stop meeting to try to solve problems together, the community’s capacity to 
create the social capital that democracy depends on disappears.
Few things have changed so quickly through digitalization as political parties 
and the process of shaping public opinion. As voters have lost confidence in politi-
cal parties, their members have left. In Sweden during the early 1980s, political 
parties had about one and a half million members. Today approximately 260,000 
Swedes are members of one of the eight parties represented in parliament (Kölln, 
2015). This means that while some 40 years ago, 20 percent of eligible voters 
were members of a political party, only 2.5 percent of the voters are members 
today.
The political youth federations are now just remnants of what they once were. 
Fifty years ago, the Center Party Youth League was Sweden’s largest, with nearly 
200,000 members. Today they have about 2000 (SVT, 2018).
There are many examples of how traditional association-based work in shaping 
public opinion continues to be replaced by the use of social media. The Swedish 
Government’s Democracy Commission, which I led, showed that the overwhelm-
ing majority of first-time voters in the 2014 election had Facebook as their main 
source of information (Government Offices of Sweden, 2015b).
Even with regard to the culture of politics in Sweden, digitalization has brought 
about tremendous change. The Swedish journalist Olle Svenning worked at Swe-
den’s Prime Minister Tage Erlander’s office in the mid-1960s. In his biography, he 
describes the Prime Minister’s Office in the 1960s as being a continuous seminar, 
where staff exchanged articles and papers and discussed and commented on their 
reading (Svenning, 2018). Today, almost all such communication takes place via 
email, or in an equivalent online manner. Previously, members of parliament sat 
and paged through documents relevant to the proceedings and made notes in the 
margins. Now, most of the documents are read online, and the parliament is lit by 
computer screens while voting is ongoing.
Thus, it seems as though not many ponder how digitalization has changed poli-
tics, in spite of the fact that it has clearly contributed to the erosion of political 
parties and to widen the gap between the voters and their elected representatives.
6  From face to face to Facebook: the relocation  
of political dialogue
In the past, a young person seeking to be politically active might have joined 
a party’s youth league, begun attending meetings, have distributed flyers, have 
attended training sessions, and so on.
This path to political activism has drastically changed.
In fact, young people are more interested in politics now than ever before, but 
they have chosen a different forum for engagement: the Internet. The path to activ-
ism described above meant that the budding activist met and debated with others 
who shared the same basic ideas and interests. Now, though political engagement 
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has relocated online, a person who engages through social media will still end up 
matched with a cohort that shares his or her interests and values. In other words, 
groups and algorithms in social media build community the way that social inter-
action once did.
It is worth noting that the far-right dominates in social media. According to a 
recent survey by Retriever, a media analysis firm, the far-right party, the Sweden 
Democrats, has the most dominating presence on social media of all Sweden’s 
political parties (Rosenbaum, 2018).
Retriever’s head of social media commented that it is not so much that the Swe-
den Democrats are overrepresented, but that other parties are underrepresented. 
He also notes that the Sweden Democrats have an understanding of how social 
media work and a sophisticated social media strategy in contrast to the other polit-
ical parties.
There are political opinions far more extreme than the Sweden Democrats that 
possess a large and frequent presence on social media. A strategy among right-
wing activists is to insert themselves into online dialogue and influence the tone 
on various Internet forums. A highly visible case was in December 2016 when the 
Swedish department store Åhléns used an image in its holiday advertisements of 
a young black boy as Lucia. In the ensuing reactions were comments consisting 
largely of hate speech that were posted in a closed Facebook group facilitated by 
right-wing extremists and Neo-Nazis. Within a few hours, the comments from the 
closed group spread to several other groups on the Internet as well as to Åhlén’s 
Facebook page, where about 500 such disparaging comments ended up.
There are several closed Facebook groups like the one described above. With 
content and posts being shared among these groups and their members, the mem-
bers get the impression that there are many who think like them and that they 
represent the true will of the people.
Online activists affect what is shared and to what extent. Much material that is 
posted online reaches many more readers through the sharing of content than it 
ever would have through its original published channel. As an example, Jimmie 
Åkesson and Mattias Karlsson (respective party leader and group leader of the 
Sweden Democrats) wrote an article posted in the Wall Street Journal on Febru-
ary 22, 2017, where they expressed support for a recent statement by President 
Donald Trump that seemingly implied that the recent influx of immigrants to Swe-
den had been the cause of the recent increase in violent crimes. This article was 
shared online several million times. However, the corrective issued by Swedish 
Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson (also in the Wall Street Journal) was shared 
only a few thousand times. It is telling who dominates the online narrative.
An explanation for this asymmetrical sharing of opinions and opinion pieces 
on social media is that the lack of confidence in the traditional media channels is 
most present on the right end of the political spectrum. Thus, those on the political 
right tend to first turn to online information and are consequently more active in 
sharing what they find.
Perhaps the most important difference between an activist on the right and 
mainstream politicians is that they do not only post to “friends” or profiles that 
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they follow, rather they actively seek out discussion forums that cater to their 
perspectives and insert themselves in other online conversations to agitate and 
provoke a response.
7 The political dialogue
Digitalization has changed the political dialogue – in both positive and negative 
ways. Groups that previously stayed out of the political conversation have now 
found their way via the Internet. This applies both to people who have previously 
been more passive, and, for example, to people with disabilities. Information pro-
vided by municipal governments and local forums for information exchange is 
continually being shifted from traditional to digital media.
According to a study carried out on behalf of the government’s Digitalization 
Investigation, those that have traditionally been less politically active are now 
more politically active online (Government Offices of Sweden, 2015a). These 
include young men, those lacking post-secondary education, and those who are 
foreign born. These groups can express their political views online through social 
media more easily than they can organize themselves in political parties and opin-
ion groups. The outcome is that the Internet actually leads to more equal par-
ticipation in the formation of public opinion. Even those who are already active 
in the community engage online. Thus, the Internet can revitalize democracy by 
increasing the representation of demographic diversity and introducing a wealth 
of opinions into the political conversation.
In the governmental Democratic Commission – which I was appointed to 
head – one of the principal recommendations was “The Citizens’ Initiative” (Swe: 
Folkmotion), an idea imported from Finland (Wästberg and Lindvall, 2016; Pop-
ulation Register Centre, 2006; Eduskunta, 2017). If 1 percent of the voters in 
a municipality, county council, or the country as a whole sign a proposal, it is 
introduced as a proposition to the city council, county council, or parliament. This 
would be a way to use the Internet to expand and strengthen democracy.
Previously, when a government investigation logged hundreds of written 
responses, these would be difficult to access for interested citizens. As a young 
journalist in the 1960s, one of my jobs was to sit for days in government offices 
reading reports on current governmental investigations. Now anyone can easily 
search them on the government’s website.
The fact that the Internet has succeeded in engaging people who are not active 
in political organizations and community groups can also have a negative effect. 
There is a risk that while we have a formal party or association-based activism 
that is visible and where representatives are held accountable for their views and 
actions, we will also have anonymous Internet activity where there is no public 
responsibility taken. The Internet enables the emergence of a new social move-
ment where the exchange of opinions takes place in closed forums and where all 
manner of claims can stand unchallenged. It is not uncommon that things commu-
nicated on the Internet may take on extreme expressions, simply because they are 
communicated reflexively to a computer screen rather than to a human face that 
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reacts. This type of activism is governed by social pressure and promotes a herd 
mentality. It may draw strength from its outsider status and tend to express itself 
through hate speech and aggression. Finally, this type of activism risks becoming 
a force that erodes rather than builds up social capital.
Social media have become increasingly important for political dialogue. For 
the young, social media have become the main forum for political participation. 
For political parties, social media platforms have become increasingly important 
as forums for communication with voters. According to the Democratic Commis-
sion (which I headed) survey, more than half of all party organizations now use 
the Internet to communicate with voters. Social media are also considered the 
most important channel for recruiting new party members. Through their online 
presence, parties gain access to those who have not participated in or been respon-
sive to party politics. On social media, the debate on local issues can be more 
dynamic, which may help in forging contacts with new electoral groups.
8 The transformation of the media
Through digitalization, media have been transformed dramatically. The Newspa-
per Publishers’ Association reported in 2018 that revenue growth for traditional 
newspapers is now primarily through digital publishing (TU, 2018). Since 2014, 
digital subscriptions to morning papers have increased by over 260 percent.
Advertising in digital media also accounted for more than half – 51 per-
cent – of the total media investments in 2017. According to surveys from the 
Institute for Advertising and Media Statistics (IRM), advertising investment in 
Sweden amounted to a total of SEK 37.7 billion, a new record. Advertising in 
digital media increased 21 percent from the previous year, accruing sales of SEK 
19.2 billion. The areas that grew the fastest were social networking and online 
video (in addition, advertising on television increased by about 2 percent in 
2017). Finally, just 14 percent of total advertising investments is allotted to print 
news media (IRM, 2017).
Swedish public service media (SR, UR, SvT) is increasingly moving toward 
digital platforms. Several commercial TV channels are planning to abandon 
traditional terrestrial broadcasts in favor of completely switching to digital 
broadcasting.
Not since the days of Gutenberg and the invention of the printing press have 
we seen a revolution on this scale of methods for dissemination and cheap com-
munication. This is a revolution that not only transforms radio and television, but, 
in equal measures, also the printed press. That is to say, most local newspapers can 
now also be found online and many of them store their content behind a paywall.
We are being drowned in information in a way that was not possible before 
the breakthrough of digitalization. Over 90 percent of all data produced in 
human history have come into existence since 2012 (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 
2014, p. 16).
We face a development that has prompted many analysts to talk about the 
imminent death of print newspapers. And yes, the next step is that newspapers 
Digitalization and the foundation of democracy 327
will entirely skip their printed editions. What we are seeing is that the supply of 
information and news no longer is managed by the media, but by the individual’s 
selection. Even when people are consuming the same media, there is an increased 
fragmentation of the group of readers when their reading is done digitally instead 
of on paper. When people read print newspapers, everyone is exposed to the same 
content; when reading is done digitally, it is guided by topics that are of special 
interest for the reader. It is also guided by the popularity of certain stories, as 
determined by the number of times it has been shared via social media. If you read 
a print newspaper, you are exposed to the content in its entirety. If instead, you 
read a newspaper digitally, you will be exposed to separate articles.
9 There’s no turning back
Political opinion formation and public information have in this way as much as 
been taken over by the digital media. It is not the first time that a society has been 
transformed through the media’s technological revolution
The development of the printing press in the late 1400s gave Martin Luther the 
basis for a revolution that would not otherwise have been possible.
The complaint that people are no longer able to handle the flow of information 
and no longer justify what they read is hardly new: During the first half of the 19th 
century, a shift from intensive to extensive reading took place. “Multi-reading” 
was seen as destructive and non-intensive (Jarlbrink, 2010, p. 52).
The Nazis’ success was partly a result of how well the National Socialists 
understood the new medium: the radio. And the crucial debate between Rich-
ard Nixon and John Kennedy in the presidential election campaign of 1960 was 
sometimes described as a new form of drama that manipulated the public opinion. 
The face of the politicians took over from the political positions (Sorensen, 2010).
“The core of post-truth politics,” wrote the Dutch-British author Joris Luy-
endijk, is that “the individual’s freedom to express their own opinion has become 
the freedom to choose their own facts” (Luyendijk, 2016, para.1). Today, we 
choose, to a greater extent than before, how we want to get the news or if we 
want to be informed at all. The Internet allows us to consume only the news that 
confirms our own worldview and deselect information that questions it. Many end 
up in echo chambers, media bubbles. We do not even need to actively avoid news 
that does not fit our worldview; the search engines we choose offer preferences 
and give us headlines based on what an algorithm thinks we want.
Digitalization of media and debate has great advantages in terms of accessibil-
ity and search opportunities. At the same time, the drawbacks are obvious: it has 
never been easier to spread “fake news.” Political polarization increases sharply 
when people can stay in their Internet bubbles. Politics is increasingly becoming 
a matter of digging trenches.
To like or not like online is binary, either/or; thus, dialogue and compromise 
disappear.
The numbers of threats and hatred that thrive on the outskirts of the public 
debate has grown sharply in a time when politicians and journalists are digitally 
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accessible. At the same time, it is easier to hide one’s online activity. The Dark 
Net is used not only for criminal transactions but also the activity conducted by 
extremist groups.
10 The way forward
However, the future cannot be separated from digital information; everyone 
has to adapt to the new reality. While serving as director of the Swedish Insti-
tute (a government agency that provides information about and strengthens 
the image of Sweden) I discovered that the digital “world” Second Life had 
grown to include many millions of members (as avatars) and that tens of thou-
sands were in Second Life at any time of the day. Since the Swedish Institute 
invested in maintaining a presence in places with fewer residents, I decided 
to open a Swedish Embassy in Second Life. At this “digital embassy,” you 
could obtain forms for visas and passport renewals. You could sit in digital 
sofa groups from Swedish furniture manufacturers such as IKEA and Lam-
mhult and look at paintings found at Nationalmuseum (the Swedish National 
Museum of Fine Arts) hanging on the walls. In addition, you could order 
Swedish food and participate in the Midsummer celebration. In this way, we 
showed that a public authority could renew its activities through digital oppor-
tunities. The Swedish Embassy in Second Life got extensive publicity all over 
the world. However, since then, the active user-base of Second Life has dwin-
dled considerably.
In her book Desktop Warriors (2013), Swedish journalist Lisa Bjurwald notes 
that the Alt-Right were pioneers on the net. She suggests that since the first hate 
sites appeared in the 1990s, the Alt-Right has created a veritable online university 
for prospective extremists. Many have learned how to “throw torches” to enflame 
public opinion, and how to formulate the kind of extreme claims that attract 
shares. As this is disseminated on the web, it has a completely different effect than 
when politicians write debate articles in the traditional media (Ahlström, 2016).
Elected politicians have only minimally familiarized themselves with these 
new forms of communication. In Sweden, there is hardly a member of parliament 
who would not take a long-distance train to a rural town to speak to 20 party mem-
bers. However, it is very unlikely that the same person would spend 2–3 hours a 
day engaging in discussions on social media.
There are many reasons as to why extremist views thrive, but it is a fact that an 
ever-increasing group of voters feel neglected and forgotten in the political decision- 
making process and are therefore attracted by new nationalist movements. Cer-
tainly, one factor is the gap between urban and rural areas. The disenchanted 
always have social media as a natural forum. And yet, traditional politicians have 
almost no familiarity with the digital space.
The digitalization of politics and democratic dialogue also provides a forum for 
destructive forces. Russia has in many ways been at the center of this. The jour-
nalist Peter Pomerantsev discusses in his book Nothing Is True and Everything 
Is Possible (2016) how Russia, in recent years, has had the strategy of creating a 
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kind of information chaos in the West. The purpose has been to reduce confidence 
in democratic institutions and their elected leaders.
An example of how a Russian channel can play a role is the Russian counterpart 
to Facebook, VKontakte (VK). Here, the Swedish Nordic Resistance Movement 
(SMR) has posted entries – which are not regulated as they often are on, for exam-
ple, Facebook. During the electoral campaign of 2018, images of Prime Minister 
Stefan Löfven behind bars and the agrarian Centre Party leader Annie Lööf wear-
ing a hijab were created and posted on VK. These “memes” were then shared 
many times over across the Internet (SvD, 2018).
The Swedish survey the “Youth Barometer” (Swe: Ungdomsbarometern) shows 
that today, around 20 percent of individuals under the age of 25 believe in popular 
conspiracy theories like “The world is ruled by a secret society/organization” or 
“an American or Jewish conspiracy plotted the September 11 attacks.” The survey 
also shows that those who believe in conspiracy theories are mostly young men 
who sympathize with the far-right or have their roots in the Middle East. Of those 
who believe in conspiracy theories, a significant number use alternative media 
sites (Poohl and Simonsson, 2015).
As the number of citizens avoiding traditional news media grows, the need for 
expertise in source criticism and critical scrutiny is becoming increasingly impor-
tant. The National Agency for Education has stressed the importance of learning 
how to review and critically assess information. Having these skills equips the 
individual to safely use the Internet for knowledge retrieval, including gaining 
the knowledge necessary for participating in democracy. However, a survey from 
the Swedish National Agency for Education (Swe: Skolverket) indicates that a 
third of all high school students never get training in source criticism.
According to the Swedish Media Council (Swe: Statens Mediaråd), teacher 
training on Internet use and source criticism is very uneven. Bo Jansson, former 
chairman of the Teachers’ National Union, wrote that today’s students are an easy 
target for malicious actors who want to destabilize our society. He contends that 
training in source criticism and critical thinking are too important a part of how 
students are trained to be members of a democratic society to be made optional 
due to “a lack of resources” (Jansson, 2015). Today’s students do not use print 
newspapers to access information. Instead, they use the Internet.
11 The Swedish general election of 2018
The 2018 Swedish general elections became the first to be characterized by the 
use of digital media to shape public opinion. Political debates were still broadcast 
on public service channels. Many were also or instead made available on the 
network websites. In addition, the tabloids organized political debates that were 
shared on their own digital television channels.
Certainly there were election posters in towns and along the roads, but politi-
cal parties invested more than ever in social media, and the media controlled on 
specific sites what was said in politics. In the Swedish general elections of 2018, 
the far-right party the Sweden Democrats (Swe: Sverigedemokraterna) dominated 
330 Olle Wästberg
on social media (Mounk, 2018). The party’s official Facebook account received 
more likes and was shared more times than all the other Swedish political parties 
together. It totaled approximately several hundred thousand interactions during 
the election campaign.
In the Swedish election of 2018, digitalization was an underlying factor. In 
Sweden – just as in the United States – the dwindling faith in the future plays a 
significant political role. And the fear of future development is likely to be due 
to the fear that digitalization and AI will lead to greater unemployment. One of 
the political parties has pitted globalization (driven by digitalization) against the 
Swedish welfare society. Traditionally, the Swedish election campaign has always 
begun with Politikerveckan (Eng: “Politician’s Week”), in an otherwise annual 
event taking place during the 27th week of the year, in and around Almedalen, 
a park in the city of Visby on the Swedish island Gotland. The event typically 
attracts more than 40,000 visitors attending 4300 events. In 2018, nearly a thou-
sand of these touched upon the digital development. During this event, a special 
series consisting of 26 seminars was characterized as “Digidalen.”
The question of whether the Swedish election process can become digitalized 
by means of e-voting has been subject to much debate throughout the years. In 
Estonia, citizens have the ability to vote online, a right exercised by a large num-
ber of voters (Alpman, 2018). Following the US election of 2016, this issue has 
been all but rejected in Sweden. The risk of hacking the e-voting system, as well 
as the mere suspicion of its occurrence, is enough to diminish the legitimacy of 
any electoral results.
What was unique for the 2018 election was how the Swedish Civil Contin-
gencies Agency devoted considerable resources to controlling and mapping the 
attempts by foreign powers to influence the Swedish election by hacking sites, 
anonymously participating in online debate, and disseminating “fake news.”
As recently as during the 2014 elections, hardly anyone could have predicted 
this. All we know about the future is that it will be different.
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1 Introduction
The digital transformation of public services is by and large depicted as a “dis-
ruptive” development inasmuch that it fundamentally alters the way individuals 
in society receive welfare services and how welfare providers supply them. More 
than that, it has also opened up a venue for private/non-governmental actors 
to claim market shares in an area in which the state has in the past century or 
so, for all intents and purposes, exercised exclusive control and been the sole 
“incumbent.” That is to say that the public-sector bodies have traditionally been 
monopolies by their very nature, but it is a monopoly that is steadily losing its 
grip. To this end, the digital transformation and digitalization process has also 
had a disruptive effect on the state as an incumbent, inasmuch that it has pro-
vided a possibility for the state to automatize its services to a greater extent, and 
encourage “self-help” among the citizens (Kucuk, 2016). For instance, patients 
may now (in certain places) conduct doctor’s appointments online by their own 
devices, which saves time and resources from the caregiver from having to do 
so at the patient’s behest. Still, as digital transformation is rarely a simple task, 
it is especially daunting for public-sector organizations for a number of different 
reasons.
For starters, the complexities surrounding the public sector are invariably far 
more advanced than the corresponding complexities found in private “disruptive” 
companies (Farrell and Goodman, 2013; Bryson and Edwards, 2017). Public-
sector organizations are often tasked with wide and far-reaching goals that are 
dependent on a range of external technical, political, and socio-economic factors, 
such as schools seeking to “educate people.”
A second problem is that the public sector covers many different areas. This 
book has outlined three major welfare areas: health and social care, education, and 
citizen protection. Even so, all of these areas are, in and of themselves, vast areas 
that often carry relevance mainly to various country-specific needs. Thus, it is a 
daunting, if not to say a near-impossible, task to get a full understanding of all the 
technology used throughout all of these welfare areas. Moreover, the diversity of 
technology used in each area makes it extremely difficult to identify all the digital 
opportunities that could potentially carry a wider societal impact.
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A third problem is that it is sometimes difficult to identify the actual customer 
of the public-sector welfare (Alford, 2002). Is it the taxpayers whose funds are 
used to deliver the welfare? Is it the institutions receiving the funds from the state 
to deliver the welfare? Is it the people who are the beneficiaries of welfare? Is it 
the policy-makers who are to adopt digital transformation strategies? Or is it soci-
ety at large? Invariably, various labels such as “customer,” “consumer,” “user,” 
“client,” “stakeholder,” “taxpayer,” “citizen,” or even “the public” often circulate 
in regard to the public sector (Thomas, 2013; Alford, 2002). While digital trans-
formation often places emphasis on the customer experience, there is rarely the 
same kind of clarity in the public-sector environment as to who the customer is, as 
opposed to other business environments. To that end, there may also be difficulties 
in gauging the value of public goods provided to the customers of public-sector 
organizations, as opposed to the commercial sectors, where revenue from con-
sumers is a clear and direct measure of success.
A fourth problem is that the public sector has a tradition of suffering from 
resistance to change (Fronda and Moriceau, 2008; Barton Cunningham and Kem-
pling, 2009). The public sector is not profit driven and procures most of its fund-
ing through the tax system (Asquer, 2018). For that reason, there is not the same 
inherent incentive always to be a trailblazer of innovative, cutting-edge tech-
nology and methods, but rather tested and cost-effective solutions are favored. 
This in turn may lead to the organization becoming insular and, if not resistant 
to change, then at least inert. The processes are by and large bureaucratic and 
ingrained, which invariably favors the status quo. Thus, introducing innovation to 
a public-sector organization often becomes a big undertaking, especially so for an 
organization that is accustomed to moving at a measured pace.
However, the disruption caused by the new actors; a new technological aware-
ness among citizens, along with greater political interest in the digital technology; 
and a growing need to serve larger volumes of people is now reshaping entire 
welfare industries. Concepts considered “a bonus” (at most) just a decade or so 
ago (such as mobile apps or websites) has now become such a basic service that 
is has come to be more or less expected from almost any service provider. While 
this shift may have accelerated in the private sector, its impact has come to seep 
over to the public sector as well, as citizens now expect the same level of service 
in this area. Naturally, this means the public sector will need to reconsider the way 
they interact with consumers, patients, citizens, business, and society at large. To 
that effect, the public sector needs to possess the ability to innovate, adapt, and 
respond in a swift manner and foster an environment that seeks to take on intel-
ligent risks that will bring innovative and efficient solutions to the forefront that 
benefit the public sectors as well as the citizens.
The difficulty with disruption and innovation overall is that projects and pro-
grams can take months or years to budget for and build (Fuchs, Nowicke and 
Strube, 2017). The risk is therefore that they may become irrelevant before they 
even launch due to sudden shifts in conditions. Examples of this could be a change 
in the ruling party in government, large-scale terror attacks, a serious breach of 
cybersecurity, a sudden financial crisis, or any other factor that carries serious 
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ramifications on a larger scale. Notwithstanding, business transformation gener-
ally tends to be a complex and unwieldy beast to implement in full. Technology 
evolves at breakneck speed, which in turn pressures organizations to keep an even 
pace or risk falling by the wayside. To that end, organizations today generally face 
two main challenges in connection to digital transformation. First, they must put 
digital transformation/digitalization on their roadmap. Second, they must ensure 
that they possess the agility to deploy new technologies before they become obso-
lete. As digital and technological disruptors are fundamentally altering the neces-
sitated mode of operation for the public sector, the need to keep an even pace with 
digital developments will be more important than ever.
Throughout this volume, a team of researchers have investigated various areas 
of the welfare sector, how they are affected by digital transformation/digitaliza-
tion, and what the overall ramifications may be for society at large. This chapter 
will thus seek to elaborate on the conclusions drawn by the authors through their 
respective chapters, while endeavoring to build up an overall conclusion based on 
the findings and predictions made.
2 Chapter summaries
The following section will seek to elaborate upon the conclusions drawn by the 
different chapters in regard to the different welfare areas of the public sector as 
outlined by this book’s structure.
Health and social care
Welfare in health care will likely see a rise in the use of telemedicine (most nota-
bly so in Sweden, but possibly also soon in other digitalized nations). As such, 
telemedicine has the potential to alleviate the lack of accessibility of primary 
care, and digitalization of the healthcare sector by and large enables the pos-
sibility of more care to be provided at home or remotely, which in turn serves 
to reduce the costs of hospital care (Blix and Jeansson, Chapter 2, this volume; 
Larsson, Elf, Gross, and Elf, Chapter 3, this volume). Still, even though telemedi-
cine is a major disruption to the conventional type of health care, the findings 
suggest that the public sector exudes a more reactive than proactive stance toward 
market shaping. That is to say that although the public sector generally expressed 
positive attitudes toward the emergence of telemedicine, given its perceived 
potential to enhance productivity and ability to propel the innovation abilities of 
the public sector, there is decidedly some apprehension from the public sector. 
Specifically, the public sector appears wary that development toward telemedi-
cine will ignore quality assurances. This, in turn, prompts the need to introduce 
more standardized quality measurements of telemedicine. Interestingly, the pub-
lic sector appears interested in collaborating more with the “disruptors,” but, at 
the same time, collaboration seems unlikely for the foreseeable future due to, 
among other things, their vastly contrasting value bases (Larsson, Elf, Gross, and 
Elf, Chapter 3, this volume).
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We may also see a future development toward electronic health records/data 
for use in the health care sector and for research purposes on a larger scale, but 
also for individual use. As discussed by Essén and Ekholm (Chapter 4, this vol-
ume), there is a need to share health data for learning purposes on a wider scale 
in a much more accessible manner. The governance arrangement of today’s state-
based health information exchanges may be enhanced with the use of more decen-
tralized, possibly blockchain-based, HIEs.
Interestingly, the overall inert digital technological uptake by the public sector 
has led to some clinicians (and even patients) independently developing services 
and applications (Øvretveit, Chapter 5, this volume). This has been a develop-
ment that has been recurrent not only in Scandinavia, but in many welfare nations 
around the world. In this way, we see that the inherent inertia by the public sector 
does little to stymie the digital/technological advancement and that people active 
in the public sector may in fact partake in this development even if it is done 
outside of the public sector’s purview. Some of these developments are being 
developed in public-private partnerships, such as subsidized primary care remote 
physician consultations. To this end, we may expect to see an increase of patient 
advocacy and patient organizations championing this cause in the future (Øvret-
veit, Chapter 5, this volume).
Given the fact that public health care organizations by and large tend to be 
change resistant, it is actually likely that if any fundamental change to the health 
care sector is to happen, it will be impelled through changed consumer behavior 
(Edwards and Saltman, 2017). To this end, Wänn (Chapter 6, this volume) argues 
that the growing need for better data management, especially from a patient 
perspective, has prompted a consumer-powered, automated system relying on 
AI to deliver predictive, preventative, and actionable advice directly to the end 
user. Along with a growing user base, more data sources covering aspects such 
as genomics, wearables, and behavioral data will successively help optimize the 
system’s reliability and usefulness while empowering patients to take better pre-
emptive care of their health. Hence, there will be a need for publicly funded health 
care to transform their business models as the growing AI platforms will run a risk 
of outcompeting some of the extant health care services, such as acute primary 
care, while at the same time complementing others, such as treatment of patients 
with chronic conditions. Wänn (Chapter 6, this volume) suggests that a solution 
to this issue would be for the providers of the electronic health platforms to team 
up with the national agencies responsible for providing health care. This could in 
no uncertain terms cause a disruption of the current health care model, but, on the 
other hand, this could also allow for a personalized, predictive, and preventative 
platform that has the ability to benefit patients, health care service, and politicians 
(by enabling more cost-effective and pre-emptive medical care).
This need to provide cost-effective, high-quality care in addition to reducing 
waste has also been a lingering issue within dental health care for some time. 
The issue is becoming more pressing, as the number of dentists in the workforce 
is diminishing rapidly. Larsson and Sabolová (Chapter 7, this volume) argue that 
digital dentistry in the form of a combination of different technologies such as 3D 
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printing, as well as virtual reality and augmented reality, could be instrumental 
in combating the problem. However, at the same time, the authors caution that 
awareness must be raised among policy-makers in order to ensure the right pre-
conditions in facilitating this digital technology so that it is used as intended and 
reaches its full potential.
In the social care sector, new forms of collaboration may be in the making. 
Drawing upon the Swedish example, Laya and Markendahl (Chapter 8, this vol-
ume) argue that the current structure of the social care sector stymies social care 
innovation based on digital solutions. The authors contend that while it is not 
likely for non-governmental actors to overrun the public sector in terms of social 
care services, there will be an increased need for collaboration between private 
companies and disruptors who can supply innovative solutions. The reason is in 
part due to regulation, but also as a mean of combining expertise. This may in turn 
create external pressure on the public sector to adopt and accept innovation more 
swiftly and to a greater extent.
Education
Education is an area that is likely to see much disruption due to digital inno-
vation (McGrath and Åkerfeldt, Chapter 9, this volume; Mahaley, Chapter 10, 
this volume). As emphasized by Mahaley (Chapter 10, this volume), there is an 
ongoing debate regarding the legislation of the privatization of education and the 
future policies of digital transformation of the educational sector in order to meet 
the needs of the millions of learners globally. In order to reach out and meet the 
growing need in an efficient manner, educational technology will most certainly 
continue to play a pervasive role in the educational system in the years to come. 
Even more so, the use of EdTech will likely find its way to a younger target 
group in preschools and compulsory and secondary schools, as well as in higher 
education. It is no doubt that EdTech has had a disruptive and transformative 
impact on the extant educational environment and will continue to have so even 
in the future. However, as pointed out by McGrath and Åkerfeldt (Chapter 9, this 
volume), universities appear to lack a dedicated digital learning strategy. The 
authors have also found that laws regulating public procurement of services, in 
addition to data regulation laws, constitute major obstacles to EdTech ventures. 
To that effect, new strategies are needed, both from the universities and from the 
policy-makers. The concept of EdTech undoubtedly raises the question of the 
future role of educators. A take-away from McGrath and Åkerfeldt (Chapter 9, 
this volume) is that that future opportunities for educators should not be less 
favorable, even if EdTech becomes more widespread. Rather, educators should 
be viewed as creators of knowledge who possess the ability to dissect knowledge 
into comprehensible components that can be disseminated, questioned, and built 
upon further. Thus, the way forward for educators is for them to be cocreators 
of intellectual output and on-demand solutions. In that way, they may not only 
enhance their own teaching efforts, but also the learning efforts of the students 
with whom they interact.
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Mahaley (Chapter 10, this volume) contends that digital transformation will 
bring about much future change in a multitude of areas. From the side of learning 
administration and credentialing, the application of AI can be expected to gain a 
greater foothold, arguing that this change may occur either by design or by default, 
but that it is, notwithstanding, inevitable. As more resources become available and 
accessible via the Internet, the tracking of completion of various coursework and 
qualifications will likely no longer reside in formal institutions, but rather in indi-
vidually held, publicly recognized repositories. The author argues that blockchain 
technology has great potential in this space, as it provides the possibility of having 
services that can provide individuals with the continuity of verified learning. In 
this regard, the public sector would have to keep itself and its policies attuned to 
new technologies that promote learning sciences in new, unconventional ways.
Citizen protection
Citizen protection is essentially divided into two different aspects. There is the 
more “physical”-type protection on the one hand that keeps the individual and 
the nation safe from direct, physical threats, and then there is the “digital” type 
of security that safeguards the individual and societies from various forms of 
cyberthreats. Drawing upon the US example, Conley and Nakkawita (Chapter 11, 
this volume) argue that although citizen protection efforts have traditionally fallen 
under the purview of the state/public sector, governments have been collaborating 
with private entities since the early 20th century in their efforts to promote citizen 
security for various reasons, ranging from financial efficiency to technological 
superiority. As new technology is constantly evolving at a rapid pace and finan-
cial incentives have changed, the consumer market for innovation has surpassed 
the public sector, which has resulted in governments no longer being the primary 
drivers of the innovation agenda. For that reason, Conley and Nakkawita (Chap-
ter 11, this volume) have argued that research supports the notion of citizen sup-
port for an increased private role along with a decreasing public role in delivering 
safety and security. To this end, a future development in this space would be the 
public-private partnership, which is a growing hybrid model where private organ-
izations master digital innovations and apply them toward public citizen protec-
tion missions. The authors contend that this model shows a lot of potential to gain 
traction in public opinion, as citizens trust government capabilities and intentions.
Given the notion that innovations in “physical” security are primarily propelled 
by other actors than the public sector, it is important to determine how digitaliza-
tion itself can work toward making societal security more agile and resilient while 
also increasing the learning abilities of society at large in terms of security issues. 
Norlander (Chapter 12, this volume) contends that digitalization and digital trans-
formation can both add new and reinforce existing capabilities for the protection 
of both society and its citizens. Digitalization/digital transformation can accom-
plish this by 1) expanding the number and variety of societal security approaches 
an entity can choose among (a larger, more diverse organizational and technologi-
cal “toolkit”); 2) enabling entities to select and adopt the most appropriate societal 
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security approach given the situation-specific circumstances; and 3) making indi-
vidual approaches and the systems that support them more responsive, versatile, 
flexible, and resilient and making individuals and organizations more adaptive 
and innovative.
Threats, however, can also come in digital forms, thus prompting the needs of 
cybersecurity.
In exploring the different models that have emerged in terms of data man-
agement systems and identity management, Ingram Bogusz (Chapter 13, this 
volume) has assessed their strengths and weaknesses, in addition to comparing 
them to existing identity and data use systems. The chapter concludes that there 
is an ongoing struggle between control and transparency on the one hand and 
convenience on the other. The key determinant is implementation, which in turn 
decides which business model should be used and if it is advantageous to set 
up a common ground for the different identity verification and data management 
services. If users were to prioritize control and transparency over convenience, 
it is possible that there would be a market for data management systems that are 
far more interoperable and nuanced than those presently available. It is important 
to remember that the market is already to a large extent saturated with several 
established contenders competing for the larger market shares; thus, the window 
of opportunity for new entrants would appear slim at best. The costs of bringing a 
new large-scale product to fruition that aspires to take on extant giants like Face-
book, Google, Spotify, Apple, Amazon, Alibaba, and so on would in most cases 
be insurmountable, and the attempts that have been made thus far have more often 
than not had limited to no success.
Thus, the public sector and policy-makers will need to consider in which direc-
tion they wish to steer the identity management issue, as there are many possible 
ways to go. To this end, it is also important to garner an awareness of the fact 
that while “effective policy” may be devised in numerous areas, such policy also 
has the potential to affect the very future of identity management solutions. As 
explained by Ingram Bogusz (Chapter 13, this volume), many countries have had 
a long history of making adjustments to account for externalities and supporting 
markets for services that are considered to serve the public interest, such as iden-
tity management services. In that way, it is possible that digital transformation/
digitalization will affect policy issues far beyond the remits for a particular wel-
fare area, quite possibly affecting the very essence of the state itself.
Future of the welfare state
Eriksson and Sandhill (Chapter 14, this volume) argue that there is a growing 
policy development in various welfare states, and especially so in the case of 
Sweden, to reduce the amount of cash in society in favor of “cash-free” payment 
alternatives. This includes alternatives such as credit/debit cards, money trans-
fer, and, more popularly in recent years, mobile payments. The contention is that 
this development alters the balance of power from both the individuals and from 
the welfare services provided by the state to global, private actors. In this way, 
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unchecked digitalization may in fact in the future pose a threat to the state as we 
know it inasmuch that private organizations may utilize it to consolidate their 
power and control (whether it is direct or indirect) over the state itself. Thus, the 
authors posit that it is incumbent on national governments to take decisive action 
in order to ensure the survival of the analog payment system alongside the digital 
alternatives, should they wish to retain full control even in the future.
Conversely, Mattfolk and Emfeldt (Chapter 15, this volume) discuss the future 
possibilities for the welfare sector in a digitalized society. The point of departure 
is that digitalization will likely prompt the consumption of welfare services to 
take on similar traits to those of the consumption of any other kind of service. 
That is to say that future citizen demand, in addition to technological develop-
ment, will likely dictate the development of new welfare solutions that are quite 
distinct from the way in which they are presently offered. The authors map out 
four different scenarios using Swedish welfare as an example. Each of these sce-
narios describes markedly different outcomes for welfare services and what role 
(if any) the national state could take in each scenario, given the corresponding 
type of citizen and their individual consumer preferences. While the authors argue 
that it is not a case of “either-or,” as the different scenarios will most likely co-
exist with one another, they also contend that there will be a need for different 
strategic choices in order to modernize the welfare system in a way that is in line 
with consumers’ behavior and demands. To this end, the private sector is invari-
ably always one step ahead of the public sector, with global digital players and 
niched startups possessing the ability to meet customer demands by blurring the 
lines between the private and public sector whenever and wherever possible. The 
authors emphasize that the development in itself is not a threat, but an opportunity 
to redefine the future public sector so that resources may be redistributed to areas 
where they may carry the greatest impact.
Digital transformation also affects the welfare state in the developing parts 
of the world. Approaching the impact on political institutions, Moreno Puertas 
and Teigland (Chapter 16, this volume) conclude that the distribution of power 
between diverse groups of people has traditionally been formed as a basis of 
credible governments, and that it is this form of distribution that has enabled the 
emergence of financial markets. The authors contend that blockchain technology 
brings this distribution of power to the digital landscape and creates trust in the 
open web. They argue that there is much potential to be had in the political insti-
tutions of the developing world inasmuch as blockchain technology could enable 
their citizens to access international financial resources while also providing an 
irreversible digital trace of the actions carried out by said political institutions.
Lewan (Chapter 17, this volume) takes the debate concerning digital transfor-
mation and its impact on society to a deeper, philosophical level by developing 
a theoretical model called the innovation loop, wherein the author argues that 
evolutionary steps in the biological system can be compared to human inventions, 
and that evolution in this sense also concerns technology, businesses and society, 
and so on. The author argues that the development of the modern nation-state 
should be viewed from the perspective of major human inventions and that in 
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order to remain relevant to citizens and to the world, nation-states need to adapt 
to the new conditions set forth by digitalization. The same also applies to welfare 
and public services, which will also need to adapt in order to remain relevant to 
citizens, much in line with the increased focus on customer experience brought 
about by digitalization (Lewan Chapter 17, this volume). The chapter concludes 
by deducing that the nation-state will continue to be an important concept even 
in a future international governance system, but this is contingent on its ability to 
make the necessary changes to accommodate for a change in consumer behavior.
On this note, Wästberg (Chapter 18, this volume) contends that the future 
democratic welfare state, as we know it, may actually be in jeopardy. The author 
brings up topical examples from the United States and Sweden, as well as other 
European nations, of how the digital revolution has provided citizens with an 
abundance of data as well as the power to act and react online. While empowering 
citizens, this development has also led to a polarization of the political climate, 
while also altering the habits of how people consume their information. Print 
media is being increasingly replaced by digital media, and the news is spread 
worldwide instantaneously, usually in a matter of seconds, and often by word of 
mouth. This development makes news reports more susceptible to disinformation 
or misrepresentation of facts, which can in turn be exploited for more nefarious 
political purposes. The new means of spreading information is an inevitable fact 
that all citizens must reconcile themselves to sooner or later, as the future cannot 
be separated from digital information. To that end, the author concludes that the 
future safety of welfare is incumbent on society’s ability to educate its population 
at an early age in source criticism and critical thinking.
3 Concluding comments
As mentioned in the introductory chapter (Larsson and Teigland, Chapter 1, this 
volume), this book endeavored to explore the ramifications of the development 
of the digital transformation and digitalization processes and its effect on welfare 
and the future role of the public sector. The overall results of the studies have 
concluded that the digital transformation of the welfare/public sector is a fact and 
that it has only just begun. Its societal impact will be profound and extensive, but 
it will come with benefits as well as costs. As information becomes more detailed 
and freely accessible, citizens’ awareness will increase, as will their demands and 
expectations of what services to expect. The public sector as we have known it 
will not have the resources and the policy framework to be able to accommodate 
all of the future demands placed on it by citizens, such as around-the-clock avail-
ability, swift and simple access to welfare, and personalized welfare that accounts 
for individual needs. This has left an opening for new actors to step in and provide 
new services in ways that the public sector cannot. Technology and automation 
may be used to lessen bureaucracy and shorten lead times in the health care sec-
tor. It is even technically possible to provide some health care (and to some extent 
even social care) remotely. The same also applies for education to a large extent. 
Increasingly, education is accessible via remote applications, lessening the need 
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of being physically confined to any particular place in order to partake in knowl-
edge sharing. Via advanced technology, private initiatives can proffer security 
services to individuals in ways that the public sector is unable to accommodate, 
giving people an increased sense of security.
Needless to say, the overwhelming risk that this development carries is that the 
concept of “welfare” becoming commoditized. This is to say that different welfare 
services may be ascribed an economic (or other) value that contains distinguish-
able attributes within their own set of welfare type. That is to say that it would 
become far more commonplace with different types of welfare services according 
to what one as a consumer is willing to pay. Thus, this commodification of welfare 
would entail a shift from welfare given on a basis of “need” to one that is given 
on a basis of purchase power. This would also allow for a greater customization 
of welfare services. Perhaps it may be possible to purchase various “subscription 
plans” of welfare services much in the same manner that one purchases different 
types of insurance plans? In such a scenario, it may also be possible for welfare 
services to transcend national borders so that a customer preferring the welfare 
solutions offered by provider organizations in one particular country could pur-
chase a plan that would allow for them to opt for that type of welfare at a particu-
lar station or hub set up in a different country. In this instance, only those who 
have a subscription with the organization offering that type of welfare would be 
served at that station/hub.
What would then remain of the future role of the public sector? As outlined in 
some of the chapters, digital transformation may in and of itself fundamentally 
alter the entire structure of the public sector. However, this does not mean to say 
that the state should resign itself to merely providing for essential functions such 
as security and infrastructures and/or road maintenance, and so on. Rather, as 
illustrated in some of the chapters (e.g., Conley and Nakkawita, Chapter 11, this 
volume), the state and the public sector enjoy a level of credibility and trustwor-
thiness that is rivaled by few, if by anyone at all. As such, the public sector will 
continue to play an essential function even in a future, digitalized world. How-
ever, it would seem likely that the public sector would come to shift its priorities 
and provide welfare to a much lower extent in certain areas than what it is cur-
rently doing (especially so in the field of health care and social care), exercising 
increasingly “elective” procedures from its selection, and rather opting to focus 
on the bare essential, life-saving procedures. It is also possible for the public sec-
tor to eventually enter some type of collaboration with the “disruptors,” estab-
lishing clear standards and guidelines and so on and taking on a more regulatory 
function that would oversee the quality of welfare being distributed in these areas. 
The public sector could, of course, decide to act in a completely contrary man-
ner and decide that it seeks to contend with all the “disruptors” and operate in a 
manner that is as agile and accommodating as citizens demand their welfare to be, 
although that would most certainly require extensive legal reform and vastly more 
funding, which in itself would be a topic for political contention.
Hence, as digitalization progresses, it is difficult to see the hands of time being 
turned back and welfare returning to the way “it once was.” Through a series of 
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analytical accounts provided by several experts in their respective fields, this book 
has provided an anthology of potential future scenarios and developments for wel-
fare areas. Thus, a discussion of the future role of the public sector as the undis-
puted welfare provider and its function in digitalized society must be broached 
by politicians and policy-makers. The time has come for a proper debate on the 
future of the public sector and what direction it should take.
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One of the surest things we can say about technological development is that bar-
riers to technology due to cost will always drop to acceptable levels for adop-
tion. There is essentially no technology that was expensive when created that 
has not eventually reached the majority of people, either through market pres-
sure to undersell or through efficiencies of production. So it has been with cars, 
phones, housework technology, computers, and mobile devices. Welfare services 
in health care/social care, education, and protection services follow this trend, and 
so it is inevitable that all the technological advances we see today as prohibitive 
and cutting edge will eventually be cheap and mundane. It is simply a matter of 
time before it is possible that data-driven tracking systems, dynamically adjust-
ing assignments, virtual reality, augmented systems, artificial intelligence–driven 
evaluations, and multimedia creation tools can be ubiquitous in welfare institu-
tions across the public sector.
What does not automatically advance is design. As has been clear from the 
introduction of video technology, data-driven approaches, and personal comput-
ers, the fact that the technology can arrive in schools does not mean that it will be 
integrated into schools effectively, nor that it will live up to its potential. Some 
of this has to do with the technical savvy of the institution itself – often, schools 
rely on the limited resources of IT or computer science instructors to handle all 
of the technical implementation decisions. The need for schools to be critically 
evaluating processes and learning about technologies and their potential peda-
gogic effects means that more staff members have to develop technical produc-
ing skills as part of their work to make sure not only that smart decisions are 
made about how acquired technologies are made part of the school experience, 
but which technologies are even appropriate for schools to have and how they can 
be modified or designed to maximize educational impact. This is a need that goes 
far beyond education, as there is no aspect of work that is not benefited by staff 
that have this critical approach to process and an eye on what technology can do 
and offer.
But what is even more critical is how technology does not override basic ineq-
uity. Too many attempts have been made to introduce computers into struggling 
schools, only to recognize that their mere presence does not fundamentally change 
the basic dynamics of the school. A gamified system of tracking student progress 
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to create meaningful challenge could be a wonderful system to encourage learn-
ing and help students succeed, but only if there are the resources for teachers and 
students to make use of it. If students continue to lack basic needs such as food or 
safety, or if teachers are not given time to interface with systems or support with 
integration, we will see the exact same half-uses of technology we see today – 
individual teachers creating ad hoc processes that squeeze the new things into the 
hard limits of classroom time, teachers spending their own money to introduce 
new elements to class, and pointless exercises of bureaucracy to track data that no 
one looks at and are never processed. As much as there is an inevitability in the 
introduction of technology, there is an inevitability that limited-resource institu-
tions will underuse and in fact waste the technology by not having the support to 
integrate it to its full potential.
So now, as always, we find ourselves at a crossroads in welfare services in 
general and in education in particular. Coming technologies and designs based 
around those technologies are giving us access to the truest manifestation of indi-
vidualized learning we have ever had. Gamified systems of uniquely tailored chal-
lenges; holistic data capture of student performance that informs intervention and/
or acceleration; synchronized communication of student progress between the 
student, teacher, and parent; extensive multimedia objects that allow new access 
to information in virtual, augmented, and hands-on ways – all of these are pos-
sible right now, and all of them provide means to help low-performing students 
improve, mid-performing students accelerate, and high-performing students soar. 
This can be done for all income levels, in all communities, and the technology 
can be an equalizer between disparities. We have more potential than ever to have 
schools be a place where privilege is leveled and opportunities are built around 
individual achievement, preference, and ability.
But if we assume that technology will do this automatically, and ignore the sys-
temic issues of inequality and privilege that allow for disparate experiences in wel-
fare institutions, then we will simply continue to replicate the wide gulf between 
the well and poorly supported. We will see high-resource, high-performing 
schools as wonderlands of individually guided learning, hands-on exercises, and 
transparent information display. That will truly be a miracle of educational pos-
sibility. But, at the same time, we will see the very same technologies applied 
in a slapdash and improvised way in low-resource, lower-performing schools, 
where technology is siloed, student creativity is stifled, and data are under- or 
completely unused due to the basic demands the schools have to meet. It would 
be tragic to see those things that work magic in other schools neglected in these 
institutions, but the realities of the needs of these schools will surely do so if they 
are not addressed first. This bifurcation of education will simply replicate itself 
on any technological advance until a design is introduced to specifically combat 
the bifurcation.
Technology alone never solves problems; well-intentioned design that uses 
technology can. We must be vigilant that as we think about how new kinds of 
media, data, processing, and communication can be used to enhance experience 
that their application take into consideration the systemic biases and inequities 
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that currently exist, and that the design of how these technologies are integrated 
into institutions works specifically to counteract those systemic issues. We have 
decades of experience with technology in education and other welfare institutions 
to show us that unless a holistic approach is taken, thinking about the new techni-
cal approaches as part of a larger reform project, the core injustice of inequality 
will not change. It is incumbent upon us to see the technologies as what they are – 
tools – capable of enabling us to make great change, but only if we wield them 
with wisdom in the right places and the right ways.
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